A contribution to the phenomenology of normative and theoretical phenomena

This work's point of departure is Husserl's description of normative and theoretical 'judgments' and their interrelation. The object of Husserl's descriptions is termed 'the normative and theoretical schema'. The phenomenological critique of Husserl's account is undertaken with the end in view of articulating a more satisfactory conception. The underlying charge is that Husserl fails to clearly distinguish judgments, qua types of intentional experiences, and propositions, the complex meanings affirmed in such experiences. Accordingly, this work is divided into two major parts. The aim of the first is to classify the propositions and propositional relations that constitute the schema. The other major objective is an analogous analysis of judgments and judicative relations. Overall, the endeavour is to contribute to the phenomenology of normative and theoretical phenomena, with the meta -objective being the execution of concrete phenomenological investigations.