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Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs by Way of Financial Incentives

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posted on 2019-10-29, 08:27 authored by William Potts
This article begins by exploring the shortage of organs available for transplant and its possible causes, and submits that the ever-expanding gap between supply and demand could be alleviated by offering financial inducements. The numerous arguments against paid organ donation are deconstructed in an effort to show that such arguments are not strong enough to justify the failure to seriously consider a market system. Particular attention is given to the concept of 'no property' in the human body and the extent to which unquestioning adherence to this principle does more harm than good. The question of whether society is prepared to accept paid organ donation is considered before moving on to examine the practical considerations involved with the commerce of organs and the question of regulation. The article concludes that a market in body parts, which is limited to transactions in cadaveric donations, and which is closely regulated by the state, represents the best solution to the organ shortage.

History

Publication Date

2005

Volume

31

Issue

2

Type

Article

Pages

212–236

AGLC Citation

William Potts, 'Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs by Way of Financial Incentives' (2005) 31(2) Monash University Law Review 211

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