



MONASH University

**CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
THROUGH THE LENS OF THE FIVE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL CO-
EXISTENCE**

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ABSTRACT

CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA THROUGH THE LENS OF THE FIVE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL CO- EXISTENCE

This research pays attention to the gradual development and changing statecraft of China's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era (1990-2017) through the lens of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence. Making use of the foreign policy cliché "walk the talk," the research explores these five Chinese foreign policy guiding principles, which are enshrined in China's 1982 constitution. In terms of the "talk," the research uses official Chinese White Papers and Policy Papers relative only to the Five Principles. In Chapter 4, China's "walk" in the various countries in which it does its business is examined. Through observations and interpretations of practical foreign policy practices and decision-making patterns, the inquiry reveals inconsistency between China's "talk" and its "walk." The research findings show that the Five Principles, though claimed to guide China's foreign policy, fall secondary to China's national self-interests (such as energy demands, national security and economic development). Moreover, although the spirit of the Five Principles is prevalent in China's foreign policy "talk," the researcher argues that the Five Principles seem to in fact be used more as "survival strategies" than mechanisms for common, shared aspirations in international affairs. The country's behavioural transformation, coupled with its foreign policy "walks" post the 2007 global economic crisis, can be seen to have changed from being passive to becoming more assertive and confrontational. Notably, China's overall foreign policy "walks" in several country cases discussed in this paper seem to suggest that the US is a common denominator in China's foreign policy concerns, which is congruent with the hypothetical views of other writers. In this regard, the "Beijing Consensus" seems to challenge – if not seek to replace – the "Washington Consensus."

DECLARATION

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at any university or equivalent institution and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

Signature:



Name: Tafadzwa Mandinyenya

Date: 13 September 2017

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFECC	Anhui Foreign and Economic Construction Company
ARATS	Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits
ASDF	Air Self-Defense Force
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BRICS	Britain, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CFLI	Canada Fund for Local Initiatives
CNBS	Chinese National Bureau of Statistics
CNN	Cable News Network
CNPC	China National Petroleum Corporation
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
EU	European Union
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GDP	Gross domestic product
GOSS	Government of Southern Sudan
GPF	Global Policy Forum
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IMF	International Monetary Funds
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
KMT	Kuomintang
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGOs	Non-governmental organisations
NIOC	National Iranian Oil Company

NPT	Non Proliferation Treaty
NYC	Nigerian Youth Congress
OBOR	One Belt One Road
OFF	Oil-For-Food
OPEC	Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PRC	People’s Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China
SEF	Straits Exchange Foundation
SPLA	Sudan People’s Liberation Army
SPLM/A-IO	Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law Of the Sea
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
WB	World Bank
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organisation
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Unity – Patriotic Front

CHAPTER 1

Introduction, Theoretical Framework and Methodology

1.1 Introduction

The cliché “walk-the-talk” is a popular catch phrase used in policy studies. For instance, it was used in 2015 by the Institute for Policy Studies to examine the World Bank’s (WB) energy-related policies and financing (2000-2014),¹ and then again in 2017 by Jeff Wheeldon in the *Huffington Post* in his discussion of Canada’s foreign policy.² It is this cliché that is subject to scrutiny in this research on China’s post-Cold War foreign policy, through the lens of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence as enshrined in the Constitution adopted on 4 December 1982.³ The practical relevance of the phrase “walk the talk” to this exposition on China’s foreign policy rests upon China’s newly found international stature as a profound global economic powerhouse (the 2nd largest economy) in the 21st century, with relative political, social and cultural influence in global affairs. Given the magnitude of China’s stature, the lack, to date, of an in-depth investigation into whether or not it “walks its talk” on its acclaimed foreign policy principles, goals, aims and objectives is regarded by this researcher as an oversight, greatly reducing one’s ability to understand the contemporary state’s behaviours, choices and priorities in international affairs.

In general, foreign policy studies cover dozens of topics or fields, such as politics, economic, environmental and international relations. Based on a careful examination of literature, it appears that the Chinese government makes use of its foreign policy as a tool to modify and moderate its economic development, using the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence as exponents of its new quotient of power in international affairs. These Five Principles are used to manage various states’ interactions, allegedly simplifying complex problems or tensions arising from states’ pursuit of their individual interests in a globalised world. The motivations for this research rest on the fact that governments and prominent leaders pronounce intended policies and objectives, which they often tend not to live up to or fulfil. For instance, in 1986,

¹ Janet Redman, “Walking the Talk?” World Bank Energy-Related Policies and Financing, 2000-2004 to 2010-2014,” *Institute for Policy Studies*, 8 Oct. 2015, <https://www.ips-dc.org/walking-the-talk/>.

² Jeff Wheeldon, “Canada talks the foreign policy talk, lets start walking the walk,” *The Huffington Post*, updated 14 Jun. 2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/jeff-wheeldon/canada-foreign-policy_b_17072500.html.

³ Constitution of the PRC, adopted 4 Dec. 1982 (*People’s Daily Online*, 1982), <http://en.people.cn/constitution/constitution.html>.

the then-President of the United States (US), Ronald Reagan, in the middle of the Iran-Contra Affair, stated: “We did not – repeat, did not – trade weapons or anything else for hostages, nor will we.”⁴ However, in 1987, Reagan had to recant his promise following the Tower Board’s⁵ findings, which contained irrefutable facts and evidence that showed that the US did in fact trade arms for hostages.⁶ In the context of China, the much-heralded post-1978 reforms of information revolution and openness have failed to live up to their promise of a more politically liberalised society, as the communist one-party-state has since successfully subdued any such attempts of this nature.⁷

Through the lens of China’s constitutionally enshrined Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, the primary objective of the proceeding research is to provide an exposition of China’s post-Cold War (1990) foreign policy.⁸ Guided by the cliché “walking the talk,” the research explores a wide range of Chinese Policy Papers and White Papers in a bid to establish the “talk” on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, often referred to in this paper as the Five Principles. These Five Principles are: Mutual Respect (for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity); Mutual Non-Aggression; Non-Interference (in the domestic affairs of other nations); Equality and Mutual Benefit; and Peaceful Co-Existence. According to China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Five Principles are supposed to transcend the hostilities and tensions that have characterised state-to-state relations among socialist states.⁹ The ideals of the Five Principles are diametrically opposite to the “power politics” that fashioned international relations before 1953, when the Principles were introduced. These Principles were later communicated to the world by China following the Polish and Hungarian uprisings of 1956.¹⁰

In the post-Cold War era, several foreign policy scholars and institutions seem to portray foreign policy as a mechanism used by governments to promote and administer national

⁴ John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on the Iran Arms and Contra Aid Controversy*, Public Papers of the President (The American Presidency Project, 1986), <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=36728>.

⁵ A specially appointed review board that reviewed the Iran Arms and Contra Aid controversy.

⁶ American Experience, *The Iran-Contra Affair*, Public Broadcasting Service (March 4, 1987), <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/reagan-iran/>.

⁷ Cheng Li, *China’s Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 169.

⁸ Constitution of the PRC, adopted Dec. 4, 1982.

⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (here after: MFA-PRC), *China’s Initiation of the Five Principles of Co-existence 1998-2014* (Government of China, 1998), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18053.shtml.

The Soviet Unions’ imposed foreign policy on its satellite states resulted in tensions when the people from both Hungary and Poland revolted against their governments in October 1956. China then proposed the Five Principles as an alternative to manage foreign affairs so as to avoid conflicts and tensions.

interests.¹¹ In the context of China, however, the subtle difference between China's foreign policy before and after 1990 is marked by a transition from a pre-1976 conservative communist China, which started changing after the death of Mao Zedong, to a more open and reformed China under the leadership of Mao's successor, Deng Xiaoping. Later, the end of Cold War marked an end to the hegemonic ideological competition between the United States' capitalism and the Soviet Union's communism, giving way to the intensification of global connections under capitalism, enhancing what Marshall McLuhan in 1964 termed "a global village."¹² More content on China's foreign policy in this enhanced globalised world post-1990 will be provided in the course of this paper.

Figure 1.1: Map of China



Source: "Map of the People's Republic of China," Professional Regulation Commission, World Bank, 2017, <https://www.google.co.za/search?q=Map+of+The+PRC&oq=Map+of+The+PRC&aqs=chrome..69i57j0l5.7239j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8>.

¹¹ Lynne Dratler Finney, "Development Assistance 'a tool of foreign policy'. Case Western Reserve," *Journal of International Law* 15, no. 2 (1983): 213-218; The World Bank, *Tools for Institutional, Political, and Social Analysis of Policy Reform. A Sourcebook for Development Practitioners* (Washington DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2007); Richard N. Haass, "Economic sanctions: too much of a bad thing," Brookings Policy Brief Series 34 (summer 1998), <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/1998/06/sanctions-haass>.

¹² Marshal McLuhan, *Understanding Media Today: McLuhan in the Era of Convergence Culture* (Barcelona: Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, 2011).

1.2 Historic Overview of the People's Republic of China

China's current population is estimated to be more than 1.3 billion people as of January 1, 2017, according to Live World Population Clock.¹³ Written history of ancient Chinese society shows that its population is composed of unified multi-ethnic social groups emanating from a succession of dynasties that goes back as far as 221 BC. According to Hiromi Kinoshita, Ying Zheng of the Qin dynasty (known as Gansu province today) was the first emperor of China in 221BC.¹⁴ Owing to varying complexities at this time, several other dynasties emerged after frequent incursions of nomadic cavalry and wars between states and kingdoms in ancient China. Examples of these dynasties include the Han dynasty (206 BC-AD 220),¹⁵ Sino-barbarian dynasties such as the Liao dynasty of the Khitan Mongols between 907 and 1125 (along the Great Wall), the Jin dynasty of the Jurchen, whose rule extended from 1125 to 1222 (in Northern China), the Yuan dynasty of the Manchus, which ruled between 1279 and 1368, and the Ch'ing dynasty of the Manchus, whose rule spanned from 1644 to 1911.¹⁶ A common factor here is the interactions that took place between these Chinese dynasties and foreign countries and traders. It can be argued that these interactions represent early Chinese foreign policy traditions and customs, which over time were better managed and developed when China learnt proper central state customs after its independence from Japan in 1945.

In the aftermath of the 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombings, Japan relinquished its grip on China, leading to the formation of the Republic of China. It was not long, however, before the two dominant national parties in China – the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under Mao Zedong and the Kuomintang (KMT) under Chiang Kai-Shek – engaged in civil war. The war came to an end in 1949 with the defeat of Chiang Kai-Shek, who then retreated and settled on an island, where he formed the independent Republic of China (ROC), known today as Taiwan. The event of the civil war officially marked the formation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 as a single party state on mainland China.¹⁷

¹³ Population of China, China Population Clock, Country Meters, <http://www.livepopulation.com/country/china.html>.

¹⁴ Hiromi Kinoshita, "The First Emperor: 'China's Terracotta Army'", Exhibition at the British Museum," *Journal of Asian Affairs* 38, no. 3 (2007): 371.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ John K. Fairbank, *China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 452.

¹⁷ Mac R. Farquhar, *The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

After the PRC was formed, Mao transformed the CCP from merely a political party and revolutionary movement into the ruling party. Its foreign policy became more organised and assumed more responsibilities aimed at transforming or overseeing the wellbeing or livelihood of the people, promoting nation building, ensuring national security, and promoting economic development and modernisation, among other concerns. On a national scale, the CCP was tasked with the burden of dealing with difficult domestic nation-building tasks, agricultural inefficiencies, food shortages, and economic and infrastructural ruins owing to wars that had for centuries plagued Chinese lands. Mao therefore adopted a number of initiatives in the post-1949 era in his attempt to deal with such problems in China. Such initiatives included the redistribution of land to the peasants, nationalisation of most businesses, devising a five-year plan (1953-1957) aimed at building heavy industry in China, the Great Leap Forward of 1958 (aimed at boosting industrial production), and the Cultural Revolution of 1966 to 1969, which was aimed at improving the living conditions of the Chinese working class through reforming education and promoting hands-on experience in the factories and fields, leading to the closure of universities and schools.¹⁸ In its first foreign policy, the CCP attempted to unify patriotism and internationalisation. In Mao Zedong's words: "The Chinese Communists must combine patriotism with internationalism. We are both internationalist and patriotic. Our slogan is to fight for our motherland and against the invaders."¹⁹ Such doctrines were made top priority in China's national attributes as well as international aspirations, as Mao urged revolutionary forces of the world to unite and fight against imperialist aggression.²⁰

Mao's post-1949 China therefore adopted a number of initiatives, such as the redistribution of land to the peasants, nationalisation of most businesses, and a five-year plan (1953-1957), which, as mentioned above, was meant to build heavy industry in China. The feasibility of the five-year plan rested upon the support of their communist ally the Soviet Union, whom they were trying to imitate in implementing a concentration of authority in the CCP central government. Mao was sceptical about such centralisation, however, arguing that: "Our territory is so vast, our population is so large and the conditions are so complex that it is far better to have the initiatives come from both the central and the local authorities than from one source alone. We must not follow the example of the Soviet Union in concentrating everything in the

¹⁸ Li Xing, "The Chinese Cultural Revolution revisited," *The China Review* 1, no. 1 (2001): 146.

¹⁹ Mao Tse-Tung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, From Marx to Mao* (Peking, Foreign Language Press, 2006-2007), 24.

²⁰ Lin Piao, *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1966), 2.

hands of the central authorities, shackling the local authorities and denying them the right to independent action.”²¹

Other historic events that characterised China post-1949 include the Great Leap Forward of 1958, the Cultural Revolution, which took place from 1966 to 1969, and the Tiananmen Square Massacre of 1989.²² The Great Leap Forward was targeted at increasing agricultural and industrial output through communes and small factories in the countryside, such as backyard furnaces (intended to redistribute labour from large industrial areas into small factories in the communes). This initiative, however, did not attain its intended outcomes, and had undesirable effects, such as economic ruin, hunger and bad harvests, to the extent that some critics have named it the “great leap backward.” The 600 000 backyard furnaces, for instance, were too weak and thus failed to transform China.²³ The Cultural Revolution that followed was meant to favour the Chinese working class and penalise capitalist groups. It involved reforming the education system and promoting hands-on experience in both the factory and the field. Consequentially, several universities and schools were closed. Junsen Zhang, Pak-Wai Liu and Linda Yung thus concluded the years 1966 to 1976 in China were characterised by social turmoil, which immensely affected the Chinese society.²⁴

The state of affairs in China changed after the death of Mao in 1976. His successor, Deng Xiaoping, reversed the effects of Mao’s policies, because he was more of a liberal communist. He allowed more freedom of expression and created democratically elected communes, and introduced some elements of capitalism, with markets opening up in 1976.²⁵ Since then, China has seen remarkable transformation and modernisation, making it one of the dominant global powers in the post-Cold War era. Similarly, many scholars believe that China’s primacy in international politics has significantly increased, resulting in China having become one of the

²¹ Yingyi Qian and Barry R. Weingast, “China’s transition to markets: Market-preserving federalism, Chinese Style,” *Journal of Policy Reform* 1 (Summer 1996): 12.

²² On 15 April 1989, university students in China led a demonstration as a form of democratic movement (calling for government accountability, freedom of press and speech, etc.), over the deep separations within the country’s leadership following the death of Hu Yaobang (CCP General Secretary). The Chinese government condemned it as a counter revolutionary movement and, in response, it forcibly suppressed them using the military through marshal law which resulted in the death of many people and several others severely injured. See, Kevin McSpadden, “4 Jun. 1989 is not just a date of the Tiananmen Massacre but of many other bloody crackdowns across China,” *The Times*, 3 Jun. 2015.

²³ Chris N. Trueman, “The Great Leap Forward – History learning site,” *Modern World History*, 26 Aug. 2016, <http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/modern-world-history-1918-to-1980/china-1900-to-1976/the-great-leap-forward/>.

²⁴ Junsen Zhang, Pak-Wai Liu and Linda Yung, “The Cultural Revolution and returns to schooling in China: Estimates based on twins,” *Journal of Development Economics* 84, no. 2 (2007): 631.

²⁵ Farquhar, *The Politics of China*.

most formidable forces with which to be reckoned in the 21st century.²⁶ For instance, China holds a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and is entrusted with the mandate to play a role in maintaining peace and security in international affairs. China has also to date established trade ties with 168 countries and is said to have signed ten free trade-zone agreements, as well as further bilateral agreements with 129 countries. In addition, it is also a member of major emerging national economic associations such as BRICS²⁷ and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), into which it entered in 2001.²⁸ These developments and achievements affirm the significance and role of China in contemporary affairs and, as such, its foreign policy and decisions in any given scenario will greatly impact other countries whose interconnectedness and dependability has increased after the end of the Cold War.

Given China's increased prominence and rise in the global ranks, it is expected to assume further responsibility in confronting problems on national, regional and global levels as an example to the rest of the world. Such problems include, for instance, governance, terrorism, genocide and human rights violations in other nations. However, the premises of the Five Principles seem averse to directly tackling such problems head on. As such, China's foreign policy is heavily criticised by Western media outlets and other policy makers and political analysts. For instance, in *The New York Times*, China's foreign policy is described as "highly deficient, embodying the government's nervousness and insecurities making the government uncertain in managing foreign relations abroad."²⁹ In her analysis of China's aims and ambitions in its growing assertiveness at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Dr Merriden Varrall came to the conclusion that China's foreign policy is guided by three main elements: its history of humiliation by foreign invaders; its inherent cultural aspects; and its history as destiny to China and its neighbours.³⁰ Henry Kissinger, as cited by Rana Mitter in *The Guardian*, in turn asserts that China's foreign activities are characterised as being both "conceptual" (in the East-Asian context) and "pragmatic" (mainly towards the US). He explains that China's foreign policy exhibits these "conceptual" forms based on its history of

²⁶ Joanne Gowa, *Allies, Adversaries and International Trade* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Allan R. Millet and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense* (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 471-541.

²⁷ Named after the member countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).

²⁸ Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on China's Peaceful Development* (Government of China, 2011), 1. http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-09/06/content_1941354_2.htm.

²⁹ Zheng Wang, "Does China have a foreign policy?" *The New York Times*, 18 Mar. 2013.

³⁰ Merriden Varrall, "Chinese worldviews and China's foreign policy," *Lowy Institute for International Policy*, 26 Nov. 2015, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/chinese-worldviews-and-china-s-foreign-policy>.

external attacks on its borders, and its “pragmatism” based on the need to establish and maintain prominent global influence as a great power.³¹

1.3 Statement of the Problem

At the beginning of the 21st century, China affirmed its commitment to promoting common development as well as maintaining a peaceful international environment in an attempt to build a harmonious world of durable peace.³² It also affirmed its active and constructive role in addressing both international and regional problems as a responsible international player. These commitments are subject to its Five Principles, which it claims guides its foreign policies, as enshrined in its Constitution. Yet, as Ashley Telis argues, in practice, China pursues the goal of accumulating and maximising comprehensive national power in a bid to enhance its capabilities relative to its foreign competitors in the fields of economic development, military supremacy and technological advancement.³³

Challenges within China’s foreign policy in the 21st century are even more daunting, most likely owing to the fact that since 1977, China has gone from being self-sufficient (producing what it consumes)³⁴ to one of the biggest importers in the world, with an insatiable appetite for natural resources such as crude oil, gas, timber, cotton and minerals.³⁵ Such high demands may be a result of its modernisation and ever-growing population of over a billion people, among other factors. Statistical data shows that there is a 10% annual increase in gas and oil demands in China, with a projected increase from 33% to 66% by 2020.³⁶ Further statistics from Platts’ monthly reports in October 2015 show that China’s oil demands rose from 10.2% to 11.19 million barrels per day.³⁷ Furthermore, according to data from the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (cited in the Platts Report), demand for liquefied petroleum gas increased by

³¹ Rana Mitter, “*World Order by Henry Kissinger – review*,” *The Guardian*, 1 Oct. 2014.

³² Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on China's Peaceful Development*.

³³ Ashley J. Telis, *China's Grand Strategy: The Quest for Comprehensive National Power and Its Consequences*, (New York: Encounter Books, 2009).

³⁴ Friedrich W.Y. Wu, “From Self-Reliance to Interdependence, Developmental Strategy and Foreign Economic Policy in Post-Mao China,” *Modern China* 7, no. 4 (1981), 463.

³⁵ Brad Plumer, “How China’s appetite for raw materials is transforming the world,” *The Washington Post*, 13 Feb. 2014.

³⁶ Peter Brookes and Ji Hye Shin, *China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States* (Washington: The Heritage Foundation: 2006), 26.

³⁷ “Platts Report Newswire: China oil demand grows 10% year over year in August,” *PRNewswire* (1 Oct. 2015), accessed 8 Jun. 2017. <http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/platts-report-china-oil-demand-grows-10-year-over-year-in-august-300153031.html>.

6.5% from the statistics given by NBS in 2014, amounting to an average demand in September 2015 of 10.49 million b/d.³⁸

These figures pose the questions *where* and *how* China will get resources to meet its increased demand, and whether or not China's "walk" is in line with its "talk" with regards to its foreign policy, which is codified in its official government White Papers and Policy Papers. This research therefore seeks to undertake an explorative analysis of Chinese foreign policy through the lens of the Five Principles. The crux of the matter lies that in order to sustain its need for resources, China seems to be using its foreign policy as a means to an end, increasingly reaching out to countries that are volatile, dysfunctional and conflict-ridden. Nowhere is this more evident than in countries where it does its business in Africa and the Middle East, including Iran, Iraq, Sudan and Zimbabwe, among others. Indeed, the WB claims that 60% of China's oil comes from key suppliers in volatile countries.³⁹ These countries are characterised by violence, terrorism, dysfunctional governments, corruption and human rights violations. Although China claims to be a responsible international player actively addressing international and regional hotspot problems, it is seen doing business with volatile countries despite China's awareness of "hotspot" problems in these countries, such as gross human rights violations, violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and disregard of United Nations (UN) resolutions and sanctions. China's foreign policy thus seems to be self-contradicting and unsettled. As such, it is worthwhile assessing whether or not China's foreign policy "walk" in the post-Cold War era conforms to its foreign policy "talk."

1.4 Research Purpose and Questions

The main purpose of this study is to explore and analyse China's post-Cold War foreign policy (1990-2015) through the lens of its Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence.

The following sub-questions will guide the discussion:

- What are China's post-Cold War foreign policy goals and objectives within the framework of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence?
- What are the key themes informing China's post-Cold War foreign policy decisions?
- Are there any fundamental differences in how China practices its foreign policy in relation to its stated goals (i.e. its foreign policy "walk" vs. its foreign policy "talk")?

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2012), 85, 107.

1.5 Research Aim and Objectives

China insists on its moral position as a peaceful power as guided by its Five Principles. The aim of this study is to investigate if this claim is true. China's diplomatic, economic, political and other national interests and endeavours will be assessed in order to establish whether or not China, having the second largest economy in the world in terms of gross domestic products (GDP), practically fulfils its stipulated commitments.

1.6 Research Rationale

The researcher's rationale to use the Five Principles as the basis for this study, and not the emerging new concepts such as 'the New Security Concept', 'Peaceful Development', 'Harmonious World' and 'Community of Common Destiny', is built on the fact that the Five Principles are enshrined in the Chinese Constitution and stated to be the guide of China's foreign policy in the future, even though they were established during the Cold War. As such, they are still highly regarded and celebrated in the post-Cold-War era (see 3.2). It is therefore the contention of the researcher that the mentioned new concepts are derived from the original Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence. In Chapter 3, the relevance of the Five Principles in the post-Cold War era will be established at the hand of an analysis of official Chinese government White Papers and Policy Papers released between 1990 and 2017.

1.7 Significance of the Study

This research hopes to make a modest contribution towards understanding China's post-Cold War foreign policy. The significance of this study rests on the analysis of China's post-Cold War foreign policy within the "walking the talk" aphorism, which the researcher believes will illustrate how China conducts its foreign policy. This inquiry is guided by official Chinese government White Papers and Policy Papers and other public statements by prominent government officials between 1990 (the end of Cold War) and mid-2017. The research has the potential to increase understanding of contemporary Chinese foreign policy, traditions and activities across various continents.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

A significant part of the aims, objectives and purpose of this study will be explained by using relevant theories of international relations. An exposition of these theories helps to describe the

Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence that guide Chinese foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. This study will attempt to position the Five Principles within the theories of realism and liberalism.

1.8.1 Realism and Neorealism: Anarchy, Power and Self-Interest

The theory of neorealism assumes that the international system is characterised by a constant state of anarchy, which emanates from the lack of an overall system of law that governs how states should behave, as well as an overarching government to enforce those rules. Conflict therefore becomes inevitable, as states' interests, beliefs, values and the methods they implement may differ, thus limiting the degree to which states can freely execute their interests in foreign policy. Such a situation may be aptly described by the aphorism "God for us all, each man for himself," as each state or political actor must look out for its self-interests.⁴⁰ The absence of a global legal system also allows states to act as rational actors in pursuit of their self-interests, maximising gain and acquiring more power, which then allows them to attain or maintain economic development, among other targets. The realist theory therefore argues that power in the international arena is a relative concept and, as such, if one state gains more power (perhaps by means of developing nuclear weapons), it becomes a threat to its neighbour and is more likely to earn it the right to be recognised by other powerhouses.⁴¹

The result of a constant state of anarchy perpetuated by different national interests is mistrust, conflict and competition, which eventually lead to a cycle of wars. When interpreting the nature of global interactions, it is evident that states as unitary actors see the need to acquire and to safeguard their own securities, sovereignty and integrity. One important means to ensure these outcomes is through economic wealth, which allows a country to purchase military strength for its own survival. Those with such power, such as China, Russia and the US, focus on preserving their high profiles, which leads to several expectations from other, less powerful states when tackling the problems humanity faces. Furthermore, owing to the lack of an international legal system, states may often compel less powerful states to pick a side or ally that has the capability to protect it in case their sovereignty is threatened – "the alliance system" phenomenon that characterised both the First and Second World Wars as well as the Cold War, and will possibly

⁴⁰ Henning Tewes, *Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe* (Houndsmills, UK: Palgrave, 1998); Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns W. Maull, *Germany as a Civilian Power. The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2001).

⁴¹ Gunther Hellmann, *Germany's EU Policy on Asylum and Defense. De-Europeanization by Default?* (Houndsmills, UK: Palgrave, 2006); Beverley Crawford, *Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

continue to do so: “According to realism, these states cannot or have less opportunities to forge an independent foreign policy and as such, must play according to the will, interests or satisfaction of the major power they have allied themselves with (for example, Zimbabwe and China in the 2000s; South Korea and US in the 1950s; East Timor and Australia in the 2000s).”⁴²

It therefore seems safe to conclude that since there is extensive competition among states seeking to expand their self-interests, as realism projects, these major powers become even more dominant, and their influence or interests can be easily promulgated or imposed upon weaker or less developed countries. These interests may include competition for resources, strategic interests or alliances, or other issues that will allow them to maintain their high profiles as global powers. However, a new phenomenon of regionalism seems to be gaining autonomy and relevance in contemporary foreign policy and international relations in general. Regionalism can be defined as a form of collective identity characterised by common foreign policies, integrated economies and unified markets, leading to regional security cooperation and mutual defense policies.⁴³ Within these regions, various organisations are formed to safeguard common goals and interests of less developed or small countries against the dominant competing major powers, such as the US, China, Russia and Britain. Some of these organisations include the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the African Union (AU), among others. Because of the presence of such organisations, the major powers’ foreign policy and commitments to various regions may differ. Thus regionalism or regional interests appear to be another crucial aspect that shapes a country’s foreign policy; indeed, analysing China’s foreign policy commitments region-wise will allow for a better understanding of China’s foreign policy behaviour post-Cold War.

1.8.2 Liberalism: Interdependence of International Institutions

In relation to foreign policy, the premise of liberalism is based on the distribution of economic wealth – a major aspect that affects the formulation, management and practices of foreign policies of states. According to liberalism arguments, the world has transformed over time. Factors that have necessitated this change include technological advancement, increase of

⁴² Juliet Kaarbo et al., *Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior* (Washington DC.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2012), 12.

⁴³ Aleksis Ylonen, “Security regionalism and flaws of externally forged peace in Sudan: The ISAD peace process and its aftermath,” *African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)* (7 Jul. 2014), accessed 9 Jun. 2017, <http://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/%EF%BF%BCsecurity-regionalism-and-flaws-of-externally-forged-peace-in-sudan/>

global trade and financial relations, which has resulted in a world that is characterised by the interdependence of nations.⁴⁴ The ideals of liberalism in foreign policy also propose that various countries prefer cooperation to conflict as a means to achieve their interests. Moreover, cooperation can be facilitated through trade agreements as well as cultural exchanges that will be beneficial to both sides, emphasising the idea of interdependence among states, as the fortune of one state is connected to another. The theory sees this interdependence as one of the characteristics of the international system. However, in this system, the poor states cannot resist pressures from major or dominant powers to open markets, which can impact them either positively or negatively. Therefore, the analysis of foreign policy helps to analyse the impact of both internal and external factors on policies and politics, as well as state relations.⁴⁵

Liberalism postulates that both domestic and foreign policies have the same goal, which is centred on peaceful cooperation. Liberalism values human and mutual cooperation between states – a factor that characterises the Chinese foreign policy goal in the 21st century, as it advocates for non-interference in the domestic affairs of other sovereign nations as a means to prevent the waging of war. The liberal perspective in foreign policy is founded upon the premise that in contemporary society, it is impossible for a state to satisfy its needs as a self-sufficient community directly from its domestic products and, as such, phenomena such as war or conflict that disrupt the exchange of goods and products do immense damage to the civilisation, undermining the well-being of millions of people. Thus the liberal approach in relation to foreign policy emphasises the need for states to adhere to mutual and peaceful cooperation.⁴⁶

1.9 Research Methodology

This section details the research design (methods, data collection methods, sampling methods, analysis and interpretation techniques) that are used in this study and briefly explains the reasons why specific methodologies were chosen – namely, to ensure the feasibility of this inquiry.

⁴⁴ Philipp Gordon, *Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

⁴⁵ Harld Wolpe, “Capitalism and cheap labour-power in South Africa: From segregation to apartheid,” *Economy and Society* 1, no. 4 (1972): 425-456.

⁴⁶ Michael C. Williams, “The discipline of the democratic peace: Kant, Liberalism and the social construction of security communities,” *European Journal of International Relations* 7, no. 4 (2001), 525-553.

1.9.1 Exploratory Research

The foreign policy cliché “walking the talk” has never before been applied to assess China’s foreign policy before or after the Cold War. In addition, there are no clearly demarcated parameters within which the guiding Five Principles operate. They are merely stated in official government documents, with limited substance or explanatory content. As such, in order to gain insight into China’s Five Principles and to allow a clear investigation of China’s post-Cold War foreign policy “walk” and “talk,” the research is exploratory. This approach will allow the researcher to conceptualise definitions and define “the post-Cold War World Order.” Exploratory research also allows for a nuanced investigation of the proposed questions, and a detailed study outcome.⁴⁷ For instance, Lawrence Neuman in *Social Research Methods* wrote that exploratory studies help to address the generated “what” questions.⁴⁸ In this research, exploratory techniques will be applied to the following research questions: What are China’s post-Cold War foreign policy goals and objectives within the framework of the Five Principles? What are the identified key themes informing China’s post-Cold War foreign policy decisions?

1.9.2 Qualitative Method

In principle, qualitative research is also primarily exploratory research and, as such, this research study uses qualitative data to gain an understanding of the motivations of China’s Five Principles vis-à-vis its foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. The reason why quantitative means are not used for this kind of study is that the proposed Five Principles to be investigated, together with other foreign policy terms such as security interests, modernisation and nationalism, cannot be quantified.⁴⁹ Indeed, Maxwell states that qualitative research methods do not convert observations and opinions into numbers, which is common in quantitative methods.⁵⁰ Also, when investigating the aphorism “walking the talk,” qualitative data will be used to uncover trends or patterns within the scope of the phrase. Such data allows the researcher to use a wide range of sources or evidence that will allow him or her to unveil the re-defined rules of engagement, if any, and then fill in the lacunae in existing literature.

Using the apparatus of qualitative data collection, this research makes use of social artefacts such as primary and secondary sources, including official publications, reports from

⁴⁷ Lawrence W. Neuman, *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches* (England: Pearson Education Limited, 2014), 39.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 38.

⁴⁹ Harold Lasswell, *Politics: Who gets What, When, and How* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2012), 78.

⁵⁰ Joseph A. Maxwell, *Designing a Qualitative Study: The SAGE Handbook of Applied Social Research Methods* (US: SAGE Publication, 2009), 71.

government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), newspapers, White Papers, journal articles, news reports, visual media, books, and other government documents.⁵¹ All the White Papers and Policy Papers that pertain to the Five Principles and will be used to establish the “talk” in Chapter 3 and later the “walk” in Chapter 4 – the latter between 1990 and 2017. The selection of these social artefacts is highly dependent on the proposed research questions and in line with the aims and objectives of this study.

This research uses China as a **single case study** to examine features of its Five Principles as applied in a few selected countries that have bilateral foreign relations with China in the post-Cold War era. The strength of using this case study approach in data collection is that it allows the researcher to link abstracts or content from different artefacts to the execution of China’s Five Principles in various countries across different regions and continents. So doing will necessitate the application of theory to China’s foreign policy behaviour. This approach corresponds with the writing of Charles Ragin on how to construct social research; he postulates that “almost all qualitative research seeks to construct representations based on in-depth, detailed knowledge of cases.”⁵²

1.9.3 Purposive or Judgemental Sampling Method

To qualitatively explore the “walking the talk” cliché, the researcher will use a qualitative sampling method known as **purposive sampling**, also referred to as **judgemental sampling**, to select the countries whose foreign relations with China will be investigated. Given the proliferation of social artefacts on China’s foreign policy “walk” in general, the researcher selected a total of two countries through which to explore each of the Five Principles, to regulate the amount of contextual data on China’s foreign policy. It is impossible to list all countries in the world and try to sample them randomly to give a detailed, in-depth exposition of China’s Five Principles. The countries under investigation have thus been selected based on the following criteria:

- *Conceptual validity*: the ability to identify China’s post-Cold War foreign policy goals and objectives, as well as the key themes that inform China’s post-Cold War foreign policy within the framework of the Five Principles of Co-existence.

⁵¹ Karin Maree, *First Steps in Research* (Pretoria: Van Schaik, 2007).

⁵² Charles C. Ragin, *Constructing Social Research* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 1994a), 92.

- *Causal mechanisms identification*: the ability to provide clear details of China’s foreign policy “walk,” by demonstrating the mechanism by which one principle may affect the others.
- *Ability to capture complexity and trace processes*: the ability to demonstrate the Five Principles over time and space.
- *Holistic elaboration*: the ability to elaborate on the application of the Five Principles holistically, thus allowing the researcher to incorporate several viewpoints or perspectives on the data collected in a detailed and focused approach.

Some of the countries were selected based on their historic relations with China and China’s conscious decision to engage with them in the post-Cold War era. The countries to be focused on in this study are: Taiwan, Japan, North Korea, Russia, Iran, Iraq, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Canada and the US. These countries have increased prominence in China’s foreign policy.

Because the aim of exploring China’s foreign policy through the lens of the Five Principles has quite a broad application, a decision was taken to employ “purposive sampling” to provide data on the Five Principles’ “walk,” with the goal of providing for an understanding of the larger picture of China’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.⁵³ Sampling different cases from various regions will help reveal distinctive aspects of China’s acclaimed foreign policy’s “walk” in different settings or contexts.

1.9.4 Data Analysis and Interpretation

The data collected from these social artefacts will be analysed qualitatively. De Vos, Strydom, Fouche and Delpont argue that qualitative data analysis is a process that brings order and structure and ascribes meaning to the diverse content gathered from social artefacts.⁵⁴ Qualitative content analysis is applied for the subjective interpretation of the data gathered, allowing the researcher to identify significant patterns. It is important to note that regarding the application of qualitative content analysis in this research, a mixture of both deductive approaches and inductive approaches will be utilised. According to Berg, deductive approaches are very useful at the beginning of data analysis.⁵⁵ Therefore, the Five Principles will be linked with their practical application (“walk”) and examined in a deductive way, allowing the

⁵³ Neuman, *Social Research Methods*, 274.

⁵⁴ De Vos, H. Strydom C.B. Fouche and C.S.L. Delpont, *Research at Grass Roots* (Pretoria: Van Schaik, 2011), 397.

⁵⁵ B.L. Berg, *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Science* (Boston: Allen & Bacon, 2001).

researcher to interpret the meaning derived from social artefacts. In a sense, the data will be structured into codes and themes, which will be applied to the various social artefacts in an orderly fashion. This coding procedure makes the process of data analysis manageable.⁵⁶

By virtue of employing qualitative content analysis in scrutinising the data collected, the interpretivist paradigm is used. The interpretivist approach allows for subjective interpretation and a thick description of China's foreign policy realities deduced from data collected.⁵⁷ The process of making the most likely interpretations of the relevant collected data is referred to by McKee as an educated guess, which is an inductive method, and is relevant to the analysis of Chinese foreign policy behaviour regionally.⁵⁸ Moreover, on applying theory to make sense of the data collected, the research uses two variations of illustrative methods to analyse and interpret the data: case clarification and pattern matching. Case clarification involve the use of theory to clarify specific principles and make the collected data more understandable by applying pre-existing theories (realism and liberalism), while pattern matching is the matching of patterns through the researcher's observations derived from pre-existing theory and the collected data.⁵⁹ This approach is best explained in the words of Victoria Bonnell, who postulates that "Pre-existing theory can provide conceptual empty boxes that you fill with the empirical evidence."⁶⁰ The evidence or data in each section of Chapter 4 will therefore fill these lacunae and help to answer the research question, Does the theory of Realism and Neo-Realism help to explain China's post-Cold War foreign policy walk?

1.9.5 Research Ethics

Conducting this qualitative study through an exposition of social artefacts means that the use of interviews or direct contact with people is unnecessary. Hence no application for ethical approval is required, as the data is collected from government White Papers and Policy Papers, journals, newspapers, reports, think-tanks, books and other relevant articles, as outlined in the methodology section.

⁵⁶ Rose-Marie Bezuidenhout, Corne Davis and Franzel du Plooy-Cilliers, *Research Matters* (Claremont: Juta, 2014), 235.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 191.

⁵⁸ Alan McKee, *Textual Analysis: A Beginner's Guide* (London: Sage, 2003), 1.

⁵⁹ Neuman, *Social Research Methods*, 490.

⁶⁰ Victoria E. Bonnell, "The uses of theory, concepts and comparison in historical sociology," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 22 (1980): 156-173.

1.9.6 Overview of Chapters

This thesis comprises five chapters. The first chapter presents the background to the problem, the research methodology to be followed, as well as the theories realism and liberalism. Chapter 2 offers a conceptualisation of foreign policy in general, followed by a discussion of the development of Chinese foreign policy both before and after 1990. Chapter 3 provides an exposition of China's foreign policy "talk" as extracted from official Chinese government White Papers and Policy Papers, relative to the Five Principles. The chapter systematically explores China's post-Cold War foreign policy. Then in Chapter 4, the phrase "walking the talk" will be used. This chapter offers an investigation and analysis of China's "walk," looking at patterns and traits of China's foreign activities from the data provided in Chapter 3 (the "talk"), as well as other related social artefacts that demonstrate the country's actions on the ground. In this chapter, the data is analysed and interpreted using the realist or liberalist theoretical perspectives. Finally, Chapter 5 is dedicated to final interpretation and summation. In essence, the last chapter presents the findings, conclusions and recommendations for future studies.

CHAPTER 2

Conceptualisation of Foreign Policy

2.1 Introduction

A significant amount of existing literature on foreign policy pays attention to exploring the process of foreign policy making, decision making and exploring the gradual transformations that the field of foreign policy studies has undergone. In *Foreign Policy: Handbook of Political Science* by Cohen and Scott, the emphasis on such approaches is identified as one of the major deficiencies in the field of foreign policy studies.⁶¹ Indeed, a random selection of some of the works of esteemed writers in the field of foreign policy studies attests to such an unbalanced exposition of the subject matter. For instance, central to the work *Pathology of Public Policy* by Hogwood and Peters⁶² is a discussion on the development of foreign policy and its changes. Later, in their book *Policy Dynamics*, they pay much attention to strategies, programmes, policy consolidation, ideal types, social security, policy innovations and instruments of foreign policy change.⁶³ The work of Sabatier during and after the Cold War, in 1987⁶⁴ and in 1998,⁶⁵ provides an analysis of the transformation that foreign policy underwent between these years, which led him to develop a learning-based theory centred on belief systems and competing coalitions. In a slightly different approach, Hersmann in 2000 in *Friends and Foes* investigates how foreign policy is influenced by individual power and issue leaders.⁶⁶ Then, Phillips in *The Development of the Nigerian Foreign Policy* examines foreign policy in the federal government and the new Nigerian state through an analysis of action groups such as the AU, the Nigerian Youth Congress (NYC) and Nigerian foreign policy during colonialism.⁶⁷

A common denominator that underlines these literatures is the extent to which domestic factors influence foreign policies. As such, both domestic and foreign policy can arguably be intrinsically linked, as changes in domestic agenda can change foreign policy priorities. Fearon

⁶¹ B.C. Cohen and H.A. Scott, "Foreign policy: Handbook of political science" in *Success and Failure in Foreign Policy*, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Institute of War Peace Studies Columbia University, 2000), 167.

⁶² Brian Hogwood and Guy B. Peters, *The Pathology of Public Policy* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985).

⁶³ Brian W. Hogwood and Guy B. Peters, *Policy Dynamics* (Michigan: Wheatshaf books, 1983).

⁶⁴ P.A. Sabatier, "Knowledge, policy oriented learning and policy change," *Knowledge, Creation, Diffusion, Utilisation* 8, no. 4 (1987): 649-92.

⁶⁵ P.A. Sabatier, "The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Revisions and Relevance for Europe," *Journal of European Public Policy* 51, no. 1 (1998): 98-130.

⁶⁶ Rebecca K.C. Hersmann, *Friends and Foes, How Congress and the President Really Make Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution Press: 2000).

⁶⁷ Claude S. Phillips, *The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy*, 13th edition (Michigan, North-western University Press, 1964).

describes the casual mechanic linkage between the two as the “domestic-political explanations” of a state’s choice in the global arena.⁶⁸ The domestic agendas or policies possess persuasive powers that can redefine or shape foreign policy. In light of this context, the primary aim of this chapter is to offer a detailed exposition and conceptualisation of the notion of foreign policy in the form of a literature review, allowing for a close analysis the dynamic development of China’s foreign policy. First, however, the term “foreign policy” is defined and operationalised.

2.2 Defining “Foreign Policy”

In the development of foreign policy as a concept, it is evident that its scope changed over time, mainly because of changing environments, changes in domestic political situations and changes in perceived national interests. From earlier times – in the development of dynasties and emperors, the advent of the concept of “a nation state,” and the development of national self-interests – to Cold War politics and post-Cold War engagements, the idea of foreign policy has been defined differently by different scholars, depending on the context or country they were looking at. For example, Stein defines foreign policy as a process of decision making that is further characterised by a steering process in which one country is supposed to adjust to the outside world.⁶⁹ Welch in turn defines this concept in terms of government bargaining processes, explaining that since governments have interests in the outcome, they negotiate.⁷⁰

Given the above arguments, foreign policy in this research is defined as the strategic goals and objectives of one state, which it systematically chooses and employs in its relations with the outside world with the intention of safeguarding its interests in international affairs. According to the researcher’s rationale, this definition takes into account ideas of an increased level of globalisation and transnational activities post-Cold War, which see new players such as NGOs and other non-state actors being involved in the process.⁷¹ This definition is applicable to China’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, where nations have become increasingly interconnected and dependent upon each other. Owing to such causal linkages, the

⁶⁸ James D. Fearon, “Domestic politics, foreign policy and theories of international relations,” *Annual Review Political Science* 1, no. 1 (1998): 289.

⁶⁹ Janice Stein Gross, *Psychological Explanations of International Conflict: Handbook of International Relations* (London: Sage Publication Ltd, 2002), 292-308.

⁷⁰ David A. Welch, “The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and prospect,” *International Security* 17, no. 2 (1992): 112-46.

⁷¹ David S.A. Guttormsen and Carina van de Wetering, “Non-state actors in world politics and international relations research – An introduction,” *Political Perspectives* 7, no. 1 (2013): 1-5; Thomas G. Weiss, Conor D. Seyle and Kelsey Coolidge, *The Rise of Non-State Actors in Global Governance, Opportunities and Limitations* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).

consequences on one state will in turn affect the others. The sections below first traces general ancient foreign policy traditions and interactions, and then moves on to discuss the origins and development of China's foreign policy since those times up to the new post-Cold War order.

2.3 The Actiology and Development of Chinese Foreign Policy

The development of Chinese foreign policy is intertwined with the history of how China as a state was formed. Foreign policy practices in the Chinese society can be traced to traditional practices in the Han dynasty. Central to the Han dynasty was the Confucian doctrine of rule-by-virtue, which was vibrant and commonly practiced by various emperors and rulers between 202 BC and 220 AD.⁷² These rulers' traditional ideas and practices were guided by the principle that "if distant people are not obedient to Chinese emperors, the emperors should win them over by cultivating their own refinement and virtue."⁷³ The doctrine of winning and the cultivation of Chinese refinement and virtue among its subordinates point to the ideas behind foreign tribute and interactions, which increased the power and influence of the emperors as they commanded respect, allegiance and tribute from subordinate kings. Such correspondence between Chinese rulers and subordinate foreign rulers, representatives and merchants attest to early foreign policy practices, and highlight the multi-tiered political relations between people from different places.⁷⁴ These ancient traditional practices later developed and became more organised, resulting in the establishment of the Silk Road during the Achaemenid Empire as a system of commercial or interconnected networks of trade routes linking China with the rest of Asia.⁷⁵ The Silk Road became instrumental in the development and expansion of China's trade with Rome, Egypt and other nations, which resulted in an accumulation of wealth and thus necessitated the growth of China's foreign policy.

Chinese maritime activities in the 1400s further demonstrate the importance of trade and foreign relations within China's history. The Court Eunuch, Cheng Ho, under the directive of the Yung-lo emperor, led an estimated 48 missions into India, Aden and the Hormuz Strait, and reached the coast of Africa, creating more than 50 new tributaries to the Chinese emperor.⁷⁶ China's naval power capabilities in Southeast Asia, among other reasons, made China superior in size and wealth until the 1430s, when its maritime expansion ceased. Fairbank notes that

⁷² Fairbank, *China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective*, 457.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Yang Juping, *The Relations between China and India and the Opening of the Southern Silk Road during the Han Dynasty* (Tianjin China: Nankai University, 2013), 82-92.

⁷⁵ Joshua J. Mark, "The Silk Road," *Ancient History Encyclopedia*, 28 Mar. 2014 (Accessed 18 Jun. 2017) http://www.ancient.eu/Silk_Road/.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 455.

China was now self-sufficient and stable. However, around 1644, the new Manchu rulers attempted to rebuild China's continental empire, but the attempt came to an end when the French destroyed the Foochow fleet in 1884. Between 1894 and 1895, Japan destroyed the northern fleet, which further crippled China's potential sea power.⁷⁷ Nevertheless, the governance and management of Chinese foreign policy practices made significant turns in the 18th century, when maritime trade gained importance in the management of human affairs, with increased interaction between the local Chinese people and outsiders. Later, various groups of people such as Arabs, Koreans, Indians and eventually the Japanese joined this commercial revolution, profiting the inhabitants of China and its rulers.⁷⁸

Since 1911, China has undergone many transformations and developments, which have created a climate for its foreign policy practice to be ingrained in Chinese social, traditional and cultural philosophies.⁷⁹ The formation of the Republic of China in 1912 was also central to the development of the Chinese foreign policy,⁸⁰ as it gave rise to prominent nationalists and communist leaders (for example, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung), who borrowed foreign concepts from the Han dynasty. For instance, they both agreed on ideas such as incorporating Outer Mongolia into the Chinese national realm. Similar approaches were taken during the Ch'ing Empire, where the rulers were keen on reducing the empire's dependency on maritime trade, and moving towards a more land-based foreign trade approach.⁸¹ Nonetheless, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Tse-tung and later Deng Xiaoping, China's foreign relations transformed and become defined by a united history of its diverse social groups, embedding it with the need to sustain its large population. As such, China has reached out increasingly to other nations for resources, especially after opening up and reforming its policies in 1978, which were aimed at promoting self-improvement and growth of the socialist system.

2.4 The Cold War and Chinese Foreign Policy (1945-1990)

The Cold War era was characterised by deep complexities and tensions between the communist Soviet Union and the capitalist US. This ideological conflict significantly changed the nature of foreign relations, which became more characterised by the pursuit of national self-interests

⁷⁷ Fairbank, *China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective*, 457.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, "New foreign policy actors in China," *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Policy Paper* 26 (September 2010): 1, <http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP26.pdf>.

⁸⁰ The US Department of State, *The Chinese Revolution of 1911* (Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1899-1913), <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/chinese-rev>.

⁸¹ Fairbank, *China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective*, 457.

and the need to expand and influence other nations. Within this era, benchmarks such as the Containment Principle (1947), Truman doctrine (1947), Domino Theory (1947-1961), Kennedy doctrine (1961-1963) and Nixon doctrine (1970-1977) established or contributed significantly to the tension with the Soviet Union.⁸² In the Soviet Union, the foreign policy was centred on creating a strong system for countries aspiring to become communist. Its foreign policy became a one of cooperation in socio-economic and political structures of like-minded communist states under the terms of the 1955 Warsaw Pact, a treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.⁸³ Within this dynamic, China was a vital member of the communist bloc, with great activism and commitment of resources to other countries to either contain or oust capitalism and imperialism.⁸⁴

When the Cold War started in 1945, the US had idealised a democratic “free China” as an ally under the ROC government. However, in 1949, the CCP under the leadership of Mao changed the dynamics and confounded expectations when it replaced the ROC. According to Yafeng Xia, China’s foreign policy in the Cold War era can be categorised into three distinct stages and timeframes: “Lean to One Side” (1949-1959), Revolutionary Self-Reliance (1960-1969) and Triangular Diplomacy (1970-1989). In June 1949, Mao publicly aligned the PRC with the “Lean to One Side” stage, which supported the Soviet Union and other communist countries to resist capitalism. From October 1950 to July 1953, China was engaged in the Korean War, assisting North Korea against South Korea and its ally the US, which had been supporting the defeated Nationalist Party in China. Even after retreating to Taiwan, the US continued to recognise the ROC as the official government of China, not the CCP. The CCP thus needed the support of the Soviet Union to offset the threat of the US.⁸⁵

The Revolutionary Self-Reliance Stage was characterised by the 1960 Sino-Soviet split, which took place after Mao heavily criticised the Soviet’s alignment policy of peaceful co-existence with the US, referring to such a movement as “revisionism.” In the 1970s, China adopted hard policies against the Soviet Union. This split revealed China’s “Self-Reliance,” as the country broke ties with the mother of communism: the Soviet Union. This stage was also “revolutionary,” described as such in the speeches of prominent Chinese leaders on different

⁸² Vince Wall, “US Cold War foreign policy containment,” *Talking Points: A blog of ideas in humanities, education, religion and life*, posted 14 Jul. 2013, <https://studyingthehumanities.wordpress.com/2013/07/14/u-s-cold-war-foreign-policy-containment/>.

⁸³ Glenn E. Curtis, *The Warsaw Pact – Czechoslovakia: A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 1992), http://www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/WarPact.html.

⁸⁴ Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter, *The Origin of the Cold War: An International History* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 1.

⁸⁵ Yafeng Xia, “The Cold War and Chinese Foreign Policy” *E-International Relations*, 16 Jul. 2008, <http://www.e-ir.info/2008/07/16/the-cold-war-and-china/>.

occasions: Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in March 1956 and CCP Vice President Liu Shaoqi in October 1956. Enlai stated: “our foreign affairs personnel must be confident and carry on revolutionary patriotism. This is very important to our foreign affairs work.”⁸⁶ Later, Shaoqi stated that China made concessions on several issues for the purpose of cooperating on anti-imperialist efforts with its communist allies.⁸⁷

The Triangular Diplomacy Stage (1970-1989) came about owing to China’s fear that it would be invaded by Soviet Union during the height of the Sino-Soviet split. China consequently started to normalise its foreign relations with countries such as the US and Japan, which were capitalist states. In the post-Mao era, China’s foreign policy approach also moved away from a political ideological basis, as the new Chinese government under Deng Xiaoping launched new reforms such as opening up markets and adopting pragmatic approaches in its foreign policy. Since 1978, China’s material base is argued to have become solid; steady progress has been made, which in turn has transformed the country from one that was centrally planned to one that is now an industrialised and modernised market-based economy with an average GDP of 10% per year.⁸⁸

2.5 The Post-Cold War and Chinese Foreign Policy (1990-2017)

To understand the directions of China’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, one can look at the three basic trends, modernisation, nationalism and regionalism, which brought a new orientation to China’s foreign policy.⁸⁹ Modernisation can be defined as progressive transformation of the economic, social, cultural and political dimensions of a society, from a “traditional” to a “modern” society. This transformation involves thorough processes of change within institutions and structures as well as their norms and values, thereby enabling social progress and development.⁹⁰ In China, the ideals of “nationalism” have seen continuity before and after the Cold War, with much emphasis on self-governance, state sovereignty, self-determination, and territorial significance based on history that collectively constructs shared

⁸⁶ Zhou Enlai, “Selected Works on Foreign Affairs,” in *Analysis of China’s National Interests*, ed. Yan Xue-Tong (California: James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 2002), 21.

⁸⁷ Han Nianlong, *Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy* (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Academy Press, 1987), 30-31.

⁸⁸ The World Bank, “China Overview,” last modified 28 Mar. 2017. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview>.

⁸⁹ Quansheng Zhao, *Chinese Foreign Policy Today* (Washington D.C.: International University of Japan Research Institute Working Paper, 1998).

⁹⁰ Asha Chaudhary, “Modernisation: impact, theory, advantages and disadvantages,” *International Journal for Research in Education* 2, no. 2 (2013): 34.

identities (culture, language, religion and a common history).⁹¹ According to Zhao, with regards to “Regionalism,” China in the post-Cold War era was to concentrate its political, economic and military activities within the Asia-Pacific in a bid to remain a regional power.⁹² As Zhao postulates, guided by these three directions, China was to “oppose hegemony,” “preserve world peace” and ensure “China’s reunification with Taiwan.”⁹³ These directions (modernisation, nationalism and regionalism) were therefore intrinsic to phase one (pacified policy approach) and phase two (increased assertiveness) of China’s post-Cold War foreign policy, thus aiding the Five Principles. These two phases are discussed in sections 2.6.1.1 and 2.6.1.2 of this chapter.

2.5.1 The New World Order – “Post-Cold War”

The consolidation of states under global capitalism in the post-Cold War era invites scholars and experts in the field of foreign policy to examine and explore the implications of this consolidation on inter-state relations. The post-Cold War order saw a renewal of states’ interests, objectives and pursuits, rejuvenising the study of foreign policy owing to the deepening levels of global integration and dependence as well as increased transnational activities, now including non-state actors and NGOs in these dynamics. Foreign policy studies were then therefore conducted with the intent to identify and understand associated challenges, patterns and trends of human interactions in the post-Cold War order. In a critical, descriptive view of the post-Cold War order, Berger argues that this order is characterised by a lack of systematic political challengers to the globalisation of capitalism under the Western influence.⁹⁴ His characterisation of the post-Cold War order parallels the work of Ken Jowitt⁹⁵ and Johann P. Arnason,⁹⁶ who argue that the idea of state-socialism (which stood firm against capitalism), advocated for by the Soviet Union and China prior to 1990, passed into history when the Cold War came to an end. As such, the aftermaths of the Cold War were fashioned by the US ideology of capitalism. The global political system, which favours capitalistic ideas, is argued to be mainly inspired by liberal democratic principles such as free speech, free trade, human rights protection, free and fair elections.

⁹¹ “African Nationalism,” *South African History Online (SAHO)*, last updated 27 July 2016, <http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/african-nationalism>.

⁹² Zhao, *Chinese Foreign Policy Today*.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Mark T. Berger, “The rise and demise of national development and the origin of post-Cold War capitalism, millennium,” *Journal of International Studies* 30, no. 2 (2001): 211.

⁹⁵ Ken Jowitt, *New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993).

⁹⁶ Johann P. Arnason, *The Future that Failed: Origins and Destinies of the Soviet Model* (London: Routledge, 1993).

The Western ideologies, standing as they do without any systematic political challenger, defines the rules of conduct for states. As such, in post-Cold War times, global entities such as the United Nations, WB and International Monetary Fund (IMF), among others, are dominated by ideas and procedures that are inherently Western oriented. Moreover, the rules of engagement in the post-Cold War are defined, governed, maintained and enforced by the West – as demonstrated, for example, in 1990 during Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2nd. The international community’s unified forces under the UN (34 nations led by the US) responded to the invasion of Kuwait and subdued Iraq in the name of maintaining international peace and order.⁹⁷ The same situation occurred in Libya in 2011. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) coordinated air strikes against Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi, who was accused of crimes against humanity.⁹⁸ Evidently, in this ideal post-Cold War world order, Western countries, in particular the US, have assumed the responsibility of being the watchdogs, or leaders, of humanity, unilaterally intervening in the affairs of other countries.

However, many countries and critics have been vocal in voicing their concerns against such hegemonic tendencies perpetrated by the West. It is in such a context that China as a new powerhouse appears to be looking out for its own interests in its own independently defined terms – not those prescribed by the West. Indeed, China appears to be following the “grand strategy” as described by Edward Meade Earle in *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*, who argues that states control and utilise their resources in a way that effectively promotes and secures their interests against their enemies.⁹⁹ Indeed, China is transforming its economy and geopolitical power into becoming one of the most formidable forces to be reckoned with in the 21st century. Furthermore, and in line with Earl, in so doing China does not resort to war as a means to an end, but rather uses policies to achieve its ends. In the event that war is considered as a last resort, it has to be undertaken with the maximum chance of victory¹⁰⁰ – a strategy heavily ingrained in the Five Principles explored in Chapter 3. In this new world order, according to the researcher’s observations, China’s foreign policy can be subdivided into two sections based on the behavioural approach.

⁹⁷ Ole Gunnar Austvik, “The War Over the Price of Oil,” *International Journal of Global Energy Issues* 5, no. 2/3/4 (1993): 143.

⁹⁸ Hedley Bull, *Introduction in Intervention in World Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 1.

⁹⁹ Edward Mead Earle, *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1943), 2.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*, 3.

2.5.1.1 China's Pacified Foreign Policy Phase (1990-2007)

Some of the aspects that characterise the identified key elements (nationalism, regionalism and modernisation) that help to define China's post-Cold War foreign policy are also inherently enshrined in the "Twenty-Eight-Character Strategy" proposed by Deng following the Tiananmen incident of 1989. These character strategies were contained in the following seven phrases:

Leng jing guan cha - watch and analyse (the developments) calmly;
Wenzhu zhen jiao - secure (our own) positions;
Chenzhe ying fu – deal with (the changes) with confidence;
Tao guang yang hui – conceal (our) capacities;
Shan yu shou zhou – be good at keeping a low profile;
Jue bu dang tou – never become the leader;
You suo zuo wei – make some contribution.¹⁰¹

The principles of this strategy helped to form China's foreign policy from 1990 to 2007, which was pacified, and interpreted by the "Tao Guang Yang Hui" approach, which urged the country to "keep a low profile," hiding its capabilities in the 1990s and late 2000s.¹⁰² Other interpretations to this strategy cited by Zhao from a summarised article published in Beijing by Qu Xing describe or interpret the strategy or approach to mean that China was not to try and emulate the role once played by the Soviet Union (defeated leader of the socialist camp) as the bearer of the socialist flag. In essence, China was not to present itself as a leader for the third world countries who, prior to 1990, had supported movements such as de-colonisation and revolutions. China was to move from revolution tendencies to modernisation. The state was also not supposed to engage in confrontations with the Western powers, and thus was to be detached from concrete events.¹⁰³ China, according to Deng, was supposed to:

Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.¹⁰⁴

China's foreign policy during this phase was aimed at self-preservation through peaceful national and economic developments, thereby preventing direct confrontations with the US and its Asian neighbours.¹⁰⁵ Zhao further sees this policy as China's deliberate response to its vulnerability following the Western-imposed sanctions against China after the Tiananmen

¹⁰¹ Quansheng Zhao, "Chinese Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era," *World Affairs* 159 no. 3 (1997) 114.

¹⁰² Dingding Chen and Jianwei Wang, "Lying Low No More? China's new Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy," *An International Journal* 9, no. 2 (2011): 200.

¹⁰³ Qu Xing, in Zhao, *Chinese Foreign Policy Today*.

¹⁰⁴ "Deng Xiaoping's "24-Character Strategy," GlobalSecurity.org, accessed 20 Jun. 2017, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/24-character.htm>.

¹⁰⁵ Zhao, *Chinese Foreign Policy Today*.

Square protest in 1989. Arguably, China adopted this policy to allow it to hide its capabilities and focus on building up its national and economic strength – and approach that continued until the global economic downturn in 2008. Timothy Garton described China’s policy approaches after this downturn “as moving gingerly beyond the paradigm of developmental modesty.”¹⁰⁶

2.5.1.2 China’s Foreign Policy Assertiveness (2008-2017)

China’s behavioural foreign policy approaches seem to have arisen from a pacified stance since 2008, when the global financial crisis came to an end. China became more confrontational than passive, re-orienting and flexing its economic capability and military strength more frequently to achieve its national as well as foreign policy objectives. According to Katrin Bennhold cited by Zhao, China’s foreign policy after 2008 had emerged “sooner and more assertively than was expected before the wrenching global financial crisis.”¹⁰⁷ The term “assertiveness” in this context refers to a more confident and confrontational Chinese foreign policy – one that voiced its concerns while at the same time diplomatically avoiding full-scale direct conflicts with its adversaries. Perhaps such an approach is limited by the Five Principles, which China ostensibly uses as a guide to its foreign policy; however, according to Zhao, its foreign policy after 2008 has been guided “by a new quotient of wealth and power.”¹⁰⁸ For instance, China began voicing its claims and rights over maritime issues and islands within disputed territories in the South China Sea.¹⁰⁹

In the consulted literature, a number of reasons are noted for the sudden change in China’s foreign policy approach. For instance, the state’s unprecedented need to acquire natural resources to sustain its growing population, domestic economy and rapid urbanisation and modernisation can be argued to be the result of irresistible forces that compelled the change.¹¹⁰ China overtook Japan to become the second largest oil consumer in 2003, and then replaced the US as the world’s largest consumer of grain, meat, coal and steel. China’s hunger for industrial resources has meant that it has become the second largest importer in the world, with resources such as iron, copper and aluminium imports rising from 7% in 1990 to 15% in 2000,

¹⁰⁶ Timothy Garton Ash, “China arrives as a world power today - And we should welcome it,” *The Guardian*, 2 Apr. 2009.

¹⁰⁷ Katrin Bennhold, “As China rises, conflict with West rises too,” *New York Times*, 17 Jan. 2010.

¹⁰⁸ Suisheng Zhao, “Chinese foreign policy as a rising power to find its rightful place,” *Perceptions* XVIII, no. 1 (2013): 101.

¹⁰⁹ Gregory B. Poling, *The South China Sea in Focus; Clarifying the limits of maritime disputes* (New York: Center for Strategic & International studies, 2013), 1.

¹¹⁰ David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, “China’s global hunt for energy,” Council on Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005 (accessed, 20 Jun. 2017), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2005-09-01/chinas-global-hunt-energy>.

and is still growing.¹¹¹ Therefore, the need to secure foreign markets prompted China to become more assertive.

In addition analysts tend to argue that the “nationalistic” ideas and messages contained and spread in books such as *China is Not Happy*, written by Song Xiaojun, Wang Xiaodong, Huang Jisu, and Song Qiang,¹¹² and *China’s Dream*, written by Senior Colonel Liu Mingfu,¹¹³ clearly disapproved of China’s low profile approach within its foreign policy engagements 18 years after the end of the Cold War. Within the Chinese community, nationalist prominent figures such as Colonel DaiXu have also spoken against such an approach, calling upon the Chinese government to take affirmative action against the US, which he argued put a fire in the backyard of China.¹¹⁴ On the basis of these reasons, the trio influence of modernisation, nationalism and regionalism can be seen as pressuring the Chinese government to adopt more assertive stances to safeguard its interests and influences regionally and globally.

Such pressure has serious implications for China, as it seems to have developed a new sense of insecurity vis-a-vis US hegemony. China is also currently the world’s largest importer of resources.¹¹⁵ Such great demand has prompted the Chinese government to rejuvenise its approaches and start using its huge financial muscle and foreign policy as tools to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Andrew Small explains that as a significant global power, the Chinese government has become willing to prevail – even at the expense of appearing a villain in its quest to wield influence – in order to achieve its objectives and secure its interests.¹¹⁶ Using the Five Principles, China appears to be ignorant of the prevalence of problems such as human rights abuses and lack of good governance in countries where it does business.¹¹⁷ As a result, the Chinese government receives international scrutiny and criticism from scholars and governments who expect its full involvement in dealing with such problems as a formidable force, given its economic and military capacities in the 21st century.

Eminent British historian Michael Howard has, in his assessment of China’s foreign policy developments, adopted a call to make empathy the basis of international relations analysis

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Song Xiaojun et al., *Zhongguo Bugaoxing - China is not happy* (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chuban She, 2009).

¹¹³ Liu Mingfu, *The China Dream: Great Power Thinking & Strategic Posture in the Post-America Era* (Beijing: CN Times Books, 2005).

¹¹⁴ Suisheng Zhao, *Construction of Chinese Nationalism in the Early 21st Century: Domestic Sources and International Implications*, (New York: Routledge-Taylor & Francis Group, 2014), 34.

¹¹⁵ Zweig and Jianhai, “China’s global hunt for energy.”

¹¹⁶ Andrew Small, “Dealing with a More Assertive China,” *GMF blog*, posted 10 Mar. 2013, <http://blog.gmfus.Org/2010/02/08/dealing-with-a-more-assertive-china/>.

¹¹⁷ Jack Donnelly, “Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?” *International Affairs* 74, no.1 (1998): 17.

rather than a form of “realpolitik.”¹¹⁸ However, writers such as Stuart Harris have tried to provide a balanced assessment of China’s foreign policy. In his attempt to refute such negative connotations, Harris lists a series of assertions that he refers to as “mischaracterising the nature and objective of China’s foreign policy” by those who deem China a threat.¹¹⁹ Harris alludes to Howard’s call, arguing that China approaches the world through the cultural lens of Confucianism and maintains an undeveloped foreign policy that is contingent on and responsive to events based on incomplete information. The US conjecture in Iraq (accusing Iraq of developing weapons of mass destruction) serves as an example, since these allegations proved to be untruthful.¹²⁰ Harris’ idea of Confucianism in China’s foreign policy can be understood as an ethical and philosophical system following the official abandonment of Legalism in China after the Qin Dynasty, with the new cultural intellectuals in the 20th century adopting novel doctrines to replace Confucian’s teachings with cultural ideologies centred on the people, the establishment of the Republic of China and Maoism.¹²¹ These (Maoism and Confucianism) are ingrained in Chinese ideologies, which help to inform its national interests.

2.6 National Interests as Major Determinants of China’s Foreign Policy

Modernisation, nationalism and regionalism also can be used to describe China’s national interests as encapsulated within its foreign policy. Indeed, the concept of national interests plays a significant role in foreign policy. As explained in Chapter 1, according to realist arguments each state pursues its own self-interests. This self-interest gained more prominence with the advent of a market economy in the 1800s and has since become one of the major guiding principles of foreign policy.¹²² However, the history of realism was not given much credit in the past, as compared to, for example, religion and morality. It was given primacy by the French government during the Thirty Years’ War from 1618 to 1648, when France, despite the fact that they were Catholic, intervened in the war, helping the Protestants against the Holy Roman Emperor.¹²³ The ostensible cause of the war was Ferdinand II of Bohemia’s attempt to restrain religious practices among his people, which ended in a series of treaties leading to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.¹²⁴ The involvement of different states in these events became

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Stuart Harris, *China’s Foreign Policy, China Today Series* (Malden, Polity Press: 2014), 3.

¹²⁰ Thomas R. Mattair, *Global Security Watch* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008), 51.

¹²¹ Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, “The China Quarterly,” *Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism, Leadership, and War* 12, no. 191 (2007): 782-980.

¹²² Patrick James Gunning, “The market economy” (Taiwan: Feng Chia University, 2003), <http://www.constitution.org/pd/gunning.050125/knownownt/mi-1.pdf>.

¹²³ “Thirty Years’ War,” *History.com*, accessed 20 Jun. 2017. <http://www.history.com/topics/thirty-years-war>.

¹²⁴ Benjamin Straumann, “The peace of Westphalia as a secular constitution,” *Constellations* 15, no. 2 (2008): 173.

dominant in the politics of Europe, as states openly started getting involved in wars solely out of their own interests.

According to Yan Xue-Tong, writers such as Thomas Hobbes and Hugo Grotius, among others, argue that the manner in which countries politically behave and administer their foreign policies is subject to concerns regarding national interests.¹²⁵ These national interests guide foreign policy decision-making. Complementing the work of Hobbes, one of the most prominent philosophers of the 18th century, Jean Jacques Rousseau attempts to explain in his book *The Social Contract* the correlation between the masses, sovereignty and national interests.¹²⁶ He views society as a collection of individual components that together become custodians of their sovereign integrity. Another esteemed scholar, Alfred T. Mahan, in agreement with the ideas postulated by Rousseau and Hobbes, further describes the ideas of national interests in the 19th century as the first legal considerations of foreign policy propounding national self-interest as the fundamental basis for national policy and foreign policy.¹²⁷ In the decades after the 19th century, the idea of national self-interest and sovereignty in international affairs were further developed.

National interests in the context of China can be understood via two aspects: China's national interest in the context of international politics, and its interest at the highest level in domestic politics.¹²⁸ In international politics, national interests are contrasted with global interests and, on the domestic level, are meant to represent the interests of the people. This factor was emphasised by both Chairman Mao and Deng Xiaoping. In 1954, Mao stated that "our policy toward farmers is not like the Soviet's, but it is one that takes care of both the interest of farmers and the interests of the State."¹²⁹ Then, in 1989, when he was addressing the Prime Minister of Thailand, Deng stated: "China wants to maintain its own national interest, sovereignty and territorial integrity. China also believes that a socialist country cannot violate other countries' interests, sovereignty or territory."¹³⁰

¹²⁵ Yan Xue-Tong, *Analysis of China's National Interests* (US: James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 2002), 16.

¹²⁶ Jean Jaques Rousseau, "Social Contract," in *Analysis of China's National Interests*, ed. Yan Xue-Tong (US: James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 2002), 18.

¹²⁷ Alfred T. Mahan, "The problem of Asia," in *Analysis of China's National Interests*, ed. Yan Xue-Tong (US: James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies, 2002), 16.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ "Selected works of Mao Zedong," in *Analysis of China's National Interests*, ed. Yan Xue-Tong (US: James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies, 2002), 7.

¹³⁰ "Selected works of Deng Xiaoping."

Given the above history of the development of Chinese foreign policy across space and time, it can be argued that the ideas behind China's national self-interests and beliefs have shaped the country's foreign policy conduct and management, altering behaviour and approaches in different times and scenarios. China's former foreign minister Qian Qichen made this clear when he stated: "On issues of sovereignty and national interests, we (China) have no alternative, we must respond strongly."¹³¹ Indeed, in actual Chinese political life, terms such as "guojia liyi" and "minzu liyi," when used in international contexts, express the same idea of national interest. One on hand, when referring to China's national interests in the international context, official documents and speeches by Chinese government officials prefer the expressions of "minzu liyi." On the other, in the academic circle of foreign policy, the term "guojia liyi" is preferred and ideally used to directly express China's national interests. As such, the term "minzu liyi" is uncommon in either original books or translated works. Therefore, in this sense, national interest combines the welfare and securities of its citizens (microcosm), which builds up to national interests (macrocosm level) when engaging or competing with other countries in the international arena.¹³² In principle, exploring China's Five Principles will thus help to understand China's national interests in the post-Cold War.

2.7 Conclusion

Looking at the literature discussed, China's historical past has arguably greatly influenced its foreign policy during and after the Cold War. The Five Principles, in particular mutual respect, non-interference, peaceful co-existence and non-aggression, encapsulate a victim mentality formed by the country's history as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. Literature on China's foreign policy therefore describes a defensive security outlook that it rooted in its post-Cold War relations with former imperialist countries, including Japan, its former colonial master. Its colonial history has locked the country's post-Cold War foreign policy in tensions on sovereignty and territorial claims against Taiwan, Japan and other neighbouring countries. Such history also informs its geopolitical relations with Russia and other neighbouring countries such as North Korea, whose security seems equally important to China's survival or security in the event of external invasions.

China's changing behaviour post-Cold War, i.e. abandoning its strategy of laying low in return for becoming more assertive in its foreign policy approaches, seems to demonstrate that

¹³¹ Qian Qichen: "Reviewing and prospecting," *People's Daily*, 30 Dec. 1992.

¹³² David Shambaugh, "Growing strong: China's challenge to Asian security," *Survival* 36, no. 2 (1994): 45.

incrementally, China seems to be becoming more confident in defending its values and national interests, as shown in a more confrontational approach. As identified in the above argument, the main driving forces behind China's foreign policy behavioural changes in the post-Cold War era are arguably its doctrines or ideologies of nationalism, national sovereignty, patriotism, communism, security concerns, modernisations and regionalism, which are applied constantly as the research proceeds.

CHAPTER 3

The Talk: China's Stated Post-Cold War Foreign Policy

3.1 Introduction

Although many writers and policy experts have undertaken research on the origin and subsequent development of China's foreign policy, this chapter takes a different approach. The objectives of this chapter are to unpack China's Five Principles, which guide its foreign policy. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Five Principles are Mutual Respect, Mutual Non-Aggression, Non-Interference, Equality and Mutual Benefit, and Peaceful Co-Existence. According to China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), apart from guiding China's foreign policy, these Five Principles also "giv[e] concrete expression to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and facilitate their implementation" based on two key elements: "mutual" and "coexistence."¹³³ During the 60th anniversary of these Five Principles, on 28 June 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping in his speech stated that these elements "giv[e] countries rights, obligations and responsibilities" in international relations. These Principles, according to Xi, "demonstrate the new expectation" of Asian countries in international relations."¹³⁴ Notably, Xi's speech, together with the other official documents, does not fully detail the "talk" on these Five Principles, but merely states what the Principles are, with limited description. Thus in a bid to establish China's foreign policy "talk" and acclaimed commitments, this chapter scrutinises a total of 15 official Chinese government White Papers and Policy Papers. As such, this chapter serves as a gateway to Chapter 4, in which China's foreign policy "walk" is explored, analysed and interpreted.

3.1.1 Critical Literature Review on China's Foreign Policy

Quansheng Zhao's writing focuses on three central concepts that characterise China's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era: modernisation, nationalism and regionalism. His views suggest these concepts to be at the core of China's foreign policy. As such, he writes about China's relations with Japan as its Asian partner; finding a balance in the Korean Peninsula (North and South); the high prioritisation of the Taiwan issues; and Sino – EU relations. In the proceeding research in this chapter, the researcher indeed regards these three concepts as part

¹³³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, "Carry forward the 5 Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence to build a better world through win-win cooperation" (Government of China, 2014), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1170143.shtml.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

of Chinese foreign policy objectives, but within the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence as enshrined in the Chinese Constitution. In the view of the researcher, the Five Principles guide and direct the objectives mentioned by Zhao, and they will be discussed as such. For instance, looking at China's relations with Japan, Zhao mainly focusses on 'changing perceptions' from both sides with regards to trade relations and normalisation of relations, rather than being too concerned with their history of antagonism and rivalry. In his high priority placed on Taiwan, Zhao's written work does not explore official White Papers and Policy Papers by the Chinese government, let alone whether or not the Chinese government follows up on its stated 'talk' in its actualisation of Chinese foreign policy.¹³⁵

Chen Zhimin in his work on China's foreign policy engagements writes about international responsibility and China's foreign policy in the post-1990 era. He makes reference and acknowledge China's tendencies of keeping a low profile, while at the same time doing something. In furthering his arguments, Chen explores the implications of the concept 'International Responsibility.' He explains the concept to imply a degree of accountability and answerable meaning or referring to 'the obligations that one should fulfil' as their responsibility in the global arena. According to Chen, China's status in the international arena is characterised by its status as a great power, a large developing country, as well as a permanent member of the UNSC.¹³⁶ In respect to the realist theory discussed in Chapter 1, Chen points to national self-interests, which he argues affect every countries' international responsibilities. His review of Chinese foreign policy furthermore points to some newly developed foreign policy concepts such as the 'the harmonious world view' and the 'accumulation of China's capacity.'¹³⁷ These concepts in the proceeding research are considered to be an extension of the original Five Principles, which are set to be investigated in this study.

In the context of Africa, literature on China's foreign policy seems to focus more on foreign trade and foreign aid, and the positive and negative outcomes there-of. For instance, Ian Tylor focuses on China's relations and aid in Africa, and how several African governments viewed the West's reaction against China after the Tiananmen Square incident as a pretext to

¹³⁵ Quansheng Zhao, 'Chinese Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era,' *World Affairs* 159, no. 3 (Winter 1997): pp. 114 – 129.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Chen Zhimin, *International Responsibility, Multilateralism, and China's Foreign Policy* (United Nations University Series on Regionalism, Dordrecht: 2012).

undermine China's development and modernisation. His writing also focuses more on China's reactions to condemnation and criticism from the West.¹³⁸

Unlike Tylor, who wrote on China's reactions, the proceeding research will explore the official talk in this chapter by the Chinese government, and evaluate their walk in Chapter 4.

3.2 The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence

The Five Principles are enshrined in the Chinese Constitution, which is the fundamental law of the land and has supreme legal authority. It is a by-product of China's post-colonial solidarity as it symbolises the "values of sovereignty, democracy, the rule of law and justice," according to Xi.¹³⁹ The Constitution clearly states that China's future is linked to that of the world, and that China's foreign policy is guided by these Five Principles.¹⁴⁰ It is argued that the primary objective of these Principles is to transcend hostilities and tensions that characterised state-to-state relations during the Cold War as a result of different ideologies and social systems. (Such as historical context reflects the theoretical arguments put forward by the realist school of thought (as discussed in Chapter 1) of a world characterised by a constant state of anarchy.)

Chairman Mao made the first official reference to the Five Principles on 1 October 1949, when he proclaimed the central government of the newly found PRC. He stated: "This government is willing to establish diplomatic relations with any foreign government that is willing to observe the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty."¹⁴¹

The first implementation of the Five Principles was in 1954, when the Panchsheel Treaty for Peaceful Co-Existence was signed between India, China and Myanmar. These states entered into an agreement on how to resolve recurring border tensions.¹⁴² By virtue of transcending national borders, the Five Principles to some extent provided a legal foundation of wider significance, as they become inscribed in the UN Charter by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1970 during the 25th declaration on Principles of International Law

¹³⁸ Ian Taylor, 'China's foreign policy towards Africa in the 1990s,' *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 36, no. 3 (1998): 443 – 460.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Constitution of the PRC, Adopted 4 Dec. 1982.

¹⁴¹ "Selected works of Mao Tse-tung." Proclamation of the Central People's Government of the PRC. *People's Daily*. 1 October 1949. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-7/mswv7_003.htm.

¹⁴² Liu Youfa, "The Panchsheel Treaty: For peaceful coexistence between India and China," *Daily News Analysis*, 10 Jun. 2014, <http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/column-the-panchsheel-treaty-for-peaceful-coexistence-between-india-and-china-1994447>.

Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation, and later in 1974, in the Declaration on Establishing a New International Economic Order.¹⁴³

On 1 July 2014, in his speech celebrating the 60th anniversary of the Five Principles, Xi stated that these Principles today constitute the cornerstone of China's foreign policy.¹⁴⁴ It should be noted that during his speech, Xi alluded to a sixth element, which one can view as a possible evolution of the original five constitutionally stated Principles. He claimed that the PRC in its foreign policy would advocate and preserve the six principles of sovereign equality, common security, common development, win-win cooperation, inclusiveness and mutual learning, and fairness and justice.¹⁴⁵ In his view, these principles have formed a new principled system, with the five original Principles – which he described as “integrated, interconnected and indivisible concepts that have captured the essence of today's international relations” – acting as basic norms of international law.¹⁴⁶ The terms “mutual” and “co-existence” lie at the heart of the Five Principles. Such terms place much emphasis on the mutual inclusiveness of the Five Principles, which work together, evolve together and adapt to the changing international environment, each depending or benefitting from the other. This mutualism can be analogous to the dependent relation between bees and various flowers/plants in the process of gathering nectar to make honey/food, thereby benefiting both the bees and plants.

3.3 Featured White Papers and Policy Papers

More than 30 Chinese government's official White Papers and Policy Papers were consulted to establish the basis of China's foreign policy “talk.” A total of 15 were selected based on their relevance and specific references to the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence. Given the mutual inclusiveness of the Five Principles and the lack of a clear outline of their contents or substance from the Chinese government, it is important to note that the contents of these selected Policy Papers and White Papers overlap each other, as does the ethical basis of each of the Five Principles.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ MFA, “Carry forward the 5 Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence to build a better world through win-win cooperation.”

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

3.3.1 The Principle of Mutual Respect

Below in Table 3.1 is a list of five official White Papers and Policy Papers that were explored to establish China’s foreign policy “talk” on the Principle of Mutual Respect. This table is followed by a discussion of the documents.

Table 3.1: China’s White Papers and Policy Papers on Mutual Respect

PRINCIPLE	CHINA’S WHITE PAPERS AND POLICY PAPERS	YEAR OF PUBLICATION
Mutual respect (Territorial Integrity & Sovereignty)	White Paper on the “One China” Principle and the Taiwan Issue	2000
	White Paper on National Defense	2004
	White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development	2011
	White Paper on Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China	2012
	Policy Paper on the South China Sea Issue	2016

Source: Compiled by the author.

The ultimate goal of by the Principle of Mutual Respect is to avoid state-to-state aggression, observe free political aspirations and respect the independence of other countries. The spirit of this Principle is also captured in the UN Charter, Article 2(1), which advocates for state sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Charter states: “The Organisation [UN] is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members.”¹⁴⁷

The Taiwan issue presents one of the issues regarding China’s talk on the Principle of Mutual Respect. In February 2000, a White Paper on the One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue was released.¹⁴⁸ In this White Paper, China describes Taiwan as an inalienable part of China, with the territory of Taiwan being “both de facto and de jure” (legally recognised by law) part of China. As such, the One-China Principle has evolved as a just course to safeguard China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.¹⁴⁹ In light of the Principle of Mutual Respect, the White

¹⁴⁷ Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, *Article, 2 (1)* (San Francisco, 1945), <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf>.

¹⁴⁸ Embassy of the PRC in the US, “White Paper – The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue” (Government of China, 2000) <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/twwt/White%20Papers/t36705.htm>.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

Paper describes the Taiwanese government as a local authority in Chinese territory, which “has long since completely forfeited its right to exercise state sovereignty on behalf of China.” On this basis, the White Paper claims that China will do its best to achieve peaceful reunification, through peaceful negotiations on equal footing, though it will not commit itself to ruling out the use of force.¹⁵⁰ Deeming the Taiwan issue as an internal issue, the White Paper also states:

No country maintaining diplomatic relations with China should provide arms to Taiwan or enter into military alliance of any form with Taiwan. All countries maintaining diplomatic relations with China should abide by the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and refrain from providing arms to Taiwan or helping Taiwan produce arms in any form or under any pretext.¹⁵¹

In addition, the Government of China released a White Paper on National Defense in 2004, which states that China “holds high the banner of peace, development and cooperation, adhering to an independent foreign policy of peace” and that “China will never go for expansion, nor will it ever seek hegemony.”¹⁵² On sovereignty, Xi in his aforementioned speech on the Five Principles stated: “Sovereignty is the most important feature of any independent state and the embodiment and safeguard of its national interests.”¹⁵³ Xi went on to say that through the Principle of Peaceful Co-Existence, the Chinese government “reject the law of the jungle by which the strong bullies the weak” in its “positive role of building a more equitable and rational international political and economic order.”¹⁵⁴ He further stated that the infringement of this Principle is not acceptable at any time because the Principle “strengthens the movement against imperialism and colonialism.”¹⁵⁵ Xi explained that the policies and principles of Great Powers during the Cold War, which were aimed at seeking “sphere of influence,” only heightened antagonism, creating one war after the other – mainly because state sovereignty and territorial integrity were not given due respect. Thus, in handling state-to-state relations based on the premise of peaceful co-existence, China advocates for the Principle of Mutual Respect of each other’s sovereignty as well as territorial integrity.¹⁵⁶ Similarly, in its 2011 White Paper on Peaceful Development, China claims to “unswervingly pursue an independent foreign policy of peace,” with the following caveat:

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Embassy of the PRC in the US, “White Paper – The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue.”

¹⁵² Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on National Defense* (Government of China, 2004) <http://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/natdef2004.html>.

¹⁵³ MFA, “Carry forward the 5 Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence to build a better world through win-win cooperation.”

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

China is firm in uphold[ing] its core interests, which include the following: state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification [as well as] China's political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development.¹⁵⁷

This White Paper on Foreign Policies for Peaceful Development further claims that “China respects other countries’ legitimate rights to protect their own interests and concerns.”¹⁵⁸

The 2012 Chinese White Paper on Diaoyu Dao as an inherent territory of China is another example of China’s “talk” on the Principle of Mutual Respect. The Paper lists the islands Diaoyu Dao, Huangwei Yu, Chiwei Yu, Nanxiao Dao, Beixiao Dao, Nan Yu, Bei Yu, Fei Yu and other reefs in the northeast affiliated to Taiwan as part of its territorial claim. This White Paper describes the disputed Diaoyu islands “as inherent territories of China and as such ... under the jurisdiction of the Chinese government.”¹⁵⁹ In this White Paper, China claims that Japan seized these islands in 1879, and describes Japan’s claims and agreement with the US on trusteeship of these islands as “backroom deals” that are both illegal and invalid. As such, all Japanese claims to the islands are dismissed as illegal claims. The Paper states that the placement of sovereignty markers on these islands was unacceptable. Quoting Minister Inoure Kaoru, the Paper states: “It is advisable not to go beyond field surveys and detailed reports on the shapes of the bays, land and other resources for future development. In the meantime, we will wait for a better time to engage in such activities as putting up sovereignty markers and embarking on development on the islands.”¹⁶⁰ The Paper further states that China has taken “forceful measures” in a bid to earnestly protect its interests, its people and its territorial sovereignty, especially given Japan’s move to nationalise these islands.¹⁶¹

In the 2016 Policy Paper on the South China Sea Issue, China establishes its commitments and adherence to international laws and the UN Charter when dealing with international issues. As such, China accuse Japan of violating international law, claiming that Japan’s occupation of the Diaoyu Dao islands “constitutes a challenge to the post-war international order established by legal documents such as the UN Charter, Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation and as such, Japan’s actions seriously violates international obligations and the commitments

¹⁵⁷ Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on China's Peaceful Development*.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ MFA. “Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China” (Government of China, 2012), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/diaodao_665718/t973774.shtml.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

of the Japanese government according to international law.”¹⁶² The Chinese government accuse the Japanese government of violating the international law and advise Japan to abide by international statutes. The Policy Paper further states that: “China champions a new security vision featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, and pursues a foreign policy of building friendship and partnership with its neighbours and of fostering an amicable, secure and prosperous neighbourhood based on the principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness.”¹⁶³ Claiming to be a champion of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and so forth in a bid to build friendship with its neighbours means that China is claiming to be leading by example.

3.3.2 The Principle of Mutual Non-Aggression

Below in Table 3.2 is a list of the three Chinese government’s official White Papers and Policy Papers that were explored to establish China’s foreign policy “talk” on the Principle of Mutual Non-Aggression. This table is followed by a discussion on the content of the Principle.

Table 3.2: China’s White Papers and Policy Papers on Mutual Non-Aggression

PRINCIPLE	CHINA’S WHITE PAPERS AND POLICY PAPERS	YEAR OF PUBLICATION
Mutual Non-Aggression	White Paper on China’s National Defense	1998
	White Paper on Arms Control and Disarmament	2002
	China’s Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures	2003

Source: Compiled by the author.

Taking into account China’s growing assertiveness and the need to safeguard its national interests (as discussed in Chapter 2), the Principle of Mutual Non-Aggression is perhaps one of the most difficult to uphold without compromising national core interests. For instance, considering the above discussion on the Principle of Mutual Respect, China’s foreign policy concerns in Asia’s maritime space and territorial claims against Japan and Taiwan can arguably be aggressive in its bid to protect its claimed sovereignty and territorial integrity. Yet “non-aggression” implies the elimination of all forms of aggression and threats of using force against

¹⁶² Information Office of the State Council, *China’s Policy on the South China Sea Issue* (Government of China, 2016), http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2016-07/13/content_38869813.htm.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

others. As pointed out in Chapter 3, at the heart of the Five Principles are the terms “mutual” and “co-existence,” which this section helps to establish the “mutual non-aggression” “talk.” This Principle overlaps with the Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and Mutual Benefit and Cooperation.

In his speech on the 60th anniversary of the Five Principles, Xi helped to establish China’s stance on the Principle of Non-Aggression. Making reference to the Cold War East-West confrontation, he asserted that imperialism, colonialism and policies such as “the big family,” “bloc politics” or “sphere of influence” only increased tensions as well as antagonism, mainly because such approaches were aggressive in nature.¹⁶⁴ As such, China’s post-Cold War foreign policy moves away from this Cold War mentality, embracing “non-aggression” as one of its major foreign policy guiding Principles.

In support of this Principle, China claims in its 1998 White Paper on National Defense that it “does not seek hegemonism, nor does it seek military blocs or military expansion.”¹⁶⁵ In this White Paper, the ethical basis of the Principle of Mutual Non-Aggression is inclusive of the Principle of Peaceful Co-existence, as they are both concerned with the need to safeguard world peace through the use of non-aggressive means to settle disputes or to achieve any intended goals or objectives. The White Paper states: “Security is mutual, and security dialogues and cooperation should be aimed at promoting trust, not at creating confrontations, or threatening the security of any other nation.”¹⁶⁶ This White Paper also calls for regional security, cooperation and “participation on an equal footing, reaching unanimity through consultation, seeking common ground while reserving differences, and proceeding in an orderly way step by step.”¹⁶⁷ These serve as the core values to which China adheres to vis-à-vis “non-aggression” and in building a harmonious, peaceful world.

Yet scholars have often criticised and questioned China’s military modernisation and weapons advancement in recent decades, given its increased assertiveness since 2008. For instance, Bill Gertz in a 2016 report on China’s military capabilities warns that China’s power projection,

¹⁶⁴ MFA, “Carry forward the 5 Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence to build a better world through win-win cooperation.”

¹⁶⁵ Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on China’s National Defense* (Government of China, 1998), http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/6a_5.pdf?_id=1317155142.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

given its military development, could become a contributing factor to regional conflict.¹⁶⁸ Jayshree Bajoria in turn wrote that China's growing military capabilities present a major concern to the US' security interests in international affairs.¹⁶⁹ However, in light of the Principle of Non-aggression, China's 1998 National Defense White Paper claims "China is committed to pursuing a defense policy which is defensive in nature ... will not engage in an arms race ... [and] does not pose a military threat to any country ... [as it] follows the principle of not attacking others unless it is attacked first."¹⁷⁰ In this White Paper, the maxim "associating with benevolent gentlemen and befriending good neighbours"¹⁷¹ is used to establish a "mutually non-aggressive" stance based on non-violent methods to settle disputes. The maxim is interpreted in the same White Paper to mean "solving disputes by non-military means, being wary of war and strategically gaining mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck."¹⁷²

Indeed, according to China's 2003 Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures Policy Paper, the increased connectivity in the post-Cold War era under economic globalisation has provided a good opportunity for cooperation as well as development.¹⁷³ As such, traditional as well as non-traditional security factors are inter-woven, as countries are increasingly linked and interdependent, thus calling for strengthened cooperation and common security to avoid "inevitable"¹⁷⁴ aggression. The Paper also states that for the purposes of non-aggression and peaceful co-existence, non-proliferation mechanisms are mutually complementary, compulsory and inseparably linked, given the new international security situation created by increased global connections in the post-1990 era. This Policy Paper therefore states that the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) "do[es] not benefit neither world peace and stability nor China's own security."¹⁷⁵ The Paper furthermore expounds on China's non-proliferation policy. China is:

... not advocating, not encouraging and not engaging in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, not helping other countries develop nuclear weapons, not providing any assistance to any nuclear facility not placed under IAEA safeguards, not providing nuclear

¹⁶⁸ Bill Gertz, Report: China's military capabilities are growing at a shocking speed," *The National Interest*, 7 Nov. 2016.

¹⁶⁹ Jayshree Bajoria, "China military power," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 3 Feb. 2009, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-military-power>.

¹⁷⁰ Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on China's National Defense*.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Information Office of the State Council, *China's Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures* (Government of China, 2003), <https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/wpnp1203.html>.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Information Office of the State Council, *China's Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures*.

exports to it, and not conducting personnel and technological exchange or cooperation with it.¹⁷⁶

The policy also provides for a rigorous examination system of nuclear export, severe punishment for violations, and a comprehensive and detailed export control list.

Regarding the non-proliferation of WMDs, China claims to adhere to international organisations that monitor such non-proliferation. For instance, China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984 and the NPT in 1992, and in 1996 it signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), among several other measures, for the purposes of peace building, common security and non-aggression. In the 2003 Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures Policy Paper, China claims that it “has a strong sense of responsibility, having step by step formulated a whole set of non-proliferation policies that reduce non-aggression.”¹⁷⁷ It is clearly stated in this Policy Paper that: “China resolutely opposes the proliferation of WMDs (nuclear, biological and chemical weapons), [and] does not support, encourage or assist any country to develop WMDs and their means of delivery.”¹⁷⁸ Correspondingly, in its 1995 White Paper on Arms Control and Disarmament, China claims to have a strict control policy when it comes to the transfer of sensitive materials as well as military equipment in support of the NPT principles and goals that seek to “prevent[ing] the spread of nuclear weapons, accelera[ting] nuclear disarmament, and promot[ing] international cooperation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.”¹⁷⁹ It is further claimed in this White Paper that China will fulfil the obligations laid out by the IAEA that refer to the safeguards and non-transfer of nuclear materials to a third country, stating that the country has “never” exported sensitive technologies.¹⁸⁰

China’s claimed commitments and obligations on non-proliferation are given further attention in the White Paper on Peaceful Development, which was published in September 2011. It clearly opposes the option of aggression by calling for all countries to promote mutual trust, common security and cooperative security. The White Paper states: “War and confrontation will only lead to a vicious cycle of violence begetting violence.”¹⁸¹ Therefore, to avoid this “vicious cycle,” the White Paper states that China should “resort to dialogue and negotiation

¹⁷⁶

Ibid.

¹⁷⁷

Ibid.

¹⁷⁸

Ibid.

¹⁷⁹

MFA, “White Paper on Arms Control and Disarmament,” (Government of China, 2002), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/3711_665954/t18975.shtml.

¹⁸⁰

Ibid.

¹⁸¹

MFA, “White Paper on Peaceful Development,” (Government of China, 2011), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/whitepaper_665742/t856325.shtml.

as the ONLY effective and reliable way to settle disputes.”¹⁸² The Paper further reads: “The central goal of China's diplomacy is to create a peaceful and stable international environment for its development. In the meantime, China strives to make its due contribution to world peace and development. It never engages in aggression or expansion, never seeks hegemony, and remains a staunch force for upholding regional and world peace and stability.”¹⁸³

The above White Papers and Policy Papers establish that ethical stance that aggression is inherently illegitimate, unless if it is a retaliatory secondary attack. Adherence to this Principle, according to these documents, leads to a better outcome to or solution of the tensions that characterise international relations. As such, the 2002 White Paper on Arms Control and Disarmament states: “While arms control and disarmaments are being worked on, violence must be curbed; regional conflicts must be fairly and rationally resolved and force or threat of force must not be used in international relations.”¹⁸⁴ This White Paper suggests that these conditions are favourable for disarmament and international peace and security through non-aggressive means.

3.3.3 The Principle of Non-Interference

Below in Table 3.3 is a list of three Chinese government’s official White Papers and Policy Papers that were explored to establish China’s foreign policy “talk” on the Principles of Mutual non-Interference. This table is followed by a discussion on the content of the Principle.

Table 3.3: China’s White Papers and Policy Papers on Mutual Non-Interference

PRINCIPLE	CHINA’S WHITE PAPERS AND POLICY PAPERS	YEAR OF PUBLICATION
Non-Interference (in the domestic affairs of other)	Policy and Measure Paper on Non-Proliferation	2003
	China’s Energy Policy	2012
	China-Arab Policy Paper	2016

Source: Compiled by the author.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ MFA, “White Paper on Arms Control and Disarmament.”

When exploring the Principle of Mutual Non-Interference, it is imperative to note that China's lack of direct involvement in dealing with problems in countries with which it does business – for which it receives much criticism (mainly by Western countries) – emanates from this Principle. Moreover, the Chinese government has continually made reference to the Non-Interference Principle as justification of voting record in the UNSC, used it as a tool to condemn Western powers' interventionist tendencies, or used it to counter all criticism that other countries and critics have levelled against China.¹⁸⁵ For instance, former US President Barack Obama in an interview with the *New York Times* in 2014 openly criticised China's role in the Middle East as a “free rider,” and then ironically posed the following rhetorical question: “can't we [the US] be a little bit more like China? Nobody ever seems to expect them to do anything when this stuff comes up.”¹⁸⁶ China seems to enjoy the benefits of trade and globalisation, but refrains from assuming responsibilities that come with ensuring peace and order so as to benefit from an improved security environment and restored stability for oil and gas extraction.

Indeed, the first ever Chinese-Arab White Paper was released in 2016 to address this issue, and is heavily influenced by the Five Principles. For instance, the Paper postulates that:

China firmly supports Arab national liberation movements, firmly supports Arab countries' struggle to uphold sovereignty and territorial integrity, pursue and safeguard national interests, and combat external interference and aggression, and firmly supports Arab countries' cause of developing the national economy and building up the countries.¹⁸⁷

The nature of the Principle of Non-Interference prohibits the threat or use of force against a state that is sovereign and independent. The Principle therefore acknowledges the domestic jurisdiction of sovereign states to oversee internal state affairs on the basis of self-determination, political independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Within Sino-Arabic relations, the Chinese government expounds on the ideals of non-interference in the 2016 Arab White Paper, stating that: “Both sides have broad consensus on safeguarding state sovereignty and territorial integrity, defending national dignity, seeking political resolution to hotspot issues, and promoting peace and stability in the Middle East.”¹⁸⁸ Moreover, the White Paper claims that China and Arab nations have had long-held diplomatic relations that consolidate and deepen their traditional friendship. As such, China “will adhere to the right approach to justice and

¹⁸⁵ Ankit Panda, “Reflecting on China's 5 Principles, 60 years later,” *The Diplomat*, 26 Jun. 2014.

¹⁸⁶ “Obama on the world: An interview with President Obama about Iraq, Putin and Israel,” *New York Times*, 8 Aug. 2014.

¹⁸⁷ Information Office of the State Council, *China Arab Policy Paper* (Government of China, 2016).

http://www.china.org.cn/world/2016-01/14/content_37573547.htm.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

interests and promote peace, stability and development of Arab states to achieve win-win cooperation.”¹⁸⁹

Such foreign policy “talk” on the sacredness of state sovereignty and independence is echoed in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, which states: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”¹⁹⁰ By virtue of being a prominent member and acclaimed committed member of the UN values and reforms (as according to China’s 2005 Position Paper on the UN Reforms) among other global entities or countries, China is expected at times to rise above its national interests or responsibilities and take on global responsibilities.¹⁹¹ This expectation is addressed in China’s 2011 White Paper on Peaceful Development, in which it is stated that all countries (weak, strong, big or small, rich or poor) in global affairs should safeguard the UN’s principles and mandates in governing international relations, promoting democracy and harmony and coordination, and cultivating a win-win spirit in international relations. To ensure such an environment, the White Paper states that the native people of any independent state should decide its internal affairs. When dealing with international issues, decisions must be reached by all nations through consultation on equal footing, based on right to equal participation held by all independent states.¹⁹²

On the subject of “respect,” the White Paper states that the Chinese government fully respects and accommodates other countries’ legitimate rights as well as their concerns to protect their interests. Furthermore, the Chinese government would never make gains at others’ expense, or shift its own troubles onto other nations.¹⁹³ Emphasising on the Principle of Non-Interference, this White Paper states that China:

Respects the right of the people of other countries to independently choose their own social system and path of development, and does not interfere in other countries' internal affairs. It is opposed to the practices of the big bullying the small and the strong oppressing the weak, and to hegemonism and power politics. China calls for settling disputes and conflicts through talks and consultation and by seeking common ground while putting aside differences. It does not

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ United Nations, Charter of the UN, Chapter 1: Purposes and Principles, accessed 5 Mar. 2017, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/>.

¹⁹¹ Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN, “Position Paper of the PRC on the UN Reforms” (Government of China, June 2005) <http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/zzhgg/t199101.htm>.

¹⁹² MFA, “White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development.”

¹⁹³ Ibid.

impose its own will upon others and acts in the fundamental interests of the Chinese people and the common interests of all peoples throughout the world.¹⁹⁴

China is expected to “walk” in accordance with the stipulations and measures put forward in the various international instruments and in keeping with its Five Principles. Because the Middle East is plagued by heightened levels of conflict, China’s 2016 Arab Paper claims: “We (China) adhere to political solutions to regional hot spot issues, and support the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free and WMD-free zone in the Middle East.”¹⁹⁵ China’s corresponding official documents cement the “talk” to this effect. The 2004 White Paper on National Defense echoes this stance on exporting military products and related technologies, stating that exporting such materials “should only serve the purpose of helping the recipient state enhance its capability for legitimate self-defence; it must not impair peace, security and stability of the relevant region and the world as a whole; and it must not be used to interfere in the recipient state’s internal affairs.”¹⁹⁶ This ideal is also echoed in China’s 2003 Non-Proliferation Policy and Measure Policy Paper, in which it claims that its foreign policy is crafted to help safeguard world peace and common development. To this end, China claims to have made significant contributions to help accelerate international non-proliferation processes, having adopted rigorous measures for domestic and foreign exports of sensitive items.¹⁹⁷

In terms of sovereignty in the Principle of Non-Interference, Xi’s 2014 speech emphasised the importance of “upholding sovereign equality” as the most essential feature of any independent state – one that must not be infringed upon under any circumstance or at any given time.¹⁹⁸ He also cautioned against “bending international law, and reject any attempt to undermine (the sovereign independence of nations), in the name of “rule of law,” other countries’ legitimate rights and interests as well as peace and stability.”¹⁹⁹ Reflecting on his statement, it is of paramount importance to note that in the 2016 China Arab Paper, the Chinese government stated that it “is ready to strengthen anti-terrorism exchanges and cooperation with Arab countries to establish a long-term security cooperation mechanism, strengthen policy dialogue and intelligence information exchange, and carry out technical cooperation and personnel training to jointly address the threat of international and regional terrorism.”²⁰⁰ It thus seems

¹⁹⁴

Ibid.

¹⁹⁵

Information Office of the State Council, *China Arab Policy Paper*.

¹⁹⁶

MFA, “China’s National Defense.”

¹⁹⁷

Information Office of the State Council, *China’s Non-Proliferation Policy and Measure*.

¹⁹⁸

MFA, “Carry forward the 5 Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence to build a better world through win-win cooperation.”

¹⁹⁹

Ibid.

²⁰⁰

Information Office of the State Council, *China Arab Policy Paper*.

contradictory in the sense that the statement “ready to strengthen” in this case can be interpreted to mean directly interfering in the Middle East to deal with the issue of terrorism (which presents a direct challenge to China’s energy security in the region). In this regard, one can also make reference to China’s 2012 Energy Policy, in which it claims to be an active and responsible participant in international energy cooperation, stating that, “in international energy cooperation, China assumes a wide range of obligations and plays an active and constructive role.”²⁰¹

3.3.4 The Principle of Equality and Mutual Benefit

Below, in Table 3.4, is a list of the four Chinese government’s official White Papers and Policy Papers that were explored to establish China’s foreign policy “talk” on the Principle of Equality and Mutual Benefit. This table is followed by a discussion on the content of the Principle.

Table 3.4: China’s White Papers and Policy Papers on Equality and Mutual Benefit

PRINCIPLE	CHINA’S WHITE PAPERS AND POLICY PAPERS	YEAR OF PUBLICATION
Equality and mutual benefit	White Paper on China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation	2008
	White Paper on Peaceful Development	2011
	White Paper on Foreign Aid	2014
	China’s Second Africa Policy Paper	2015

Source: Compiled by the author.

China’s “talk” on the Principle of Equality and Mutual Benefit in this section is supported and guided by the other Principles, as shown in the official Chinese government documents that will be discussed later. These Principles entail “practical results,” “affinity,” “good faith” and “sincerity,” which help to establish the “talk” on the Principle of Equality and Mutual Benefit. This Principle is included in China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid released in 2014, which stipulates that “China adheres to equality, mutual benefit and common development,” describing its foreign aid as a form of mutual help that focuses on “practical effects and strives

²⁰¹ Information Office of the State Council, *China’s Energy Policy* (Government of China, 2012) http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2012-10/24/content_2250497.htm.

to promote friendly bilateral relations and mutual benefit through economic and technical cooperation with other developing countries.”²⁰²

China’s 2011 White Paper on Peaceful Development asserts that the Chinese government uses mutual beneficial cooperation as a means to pursue peace and promote development. The Paper further alludes to the fact that economic globalisation has brought about increased interdependence and, as such, the only way to realise sustainable development and world peace in all countries is through equally sharing the fruit of development for the purposes of achieving common development. As part of its stated commitment in this White Paper, the Chinese government will: “unswervingly follows a strategy of opening up and mutual benefit. It pursues both its own interests and the common interests of mankind and works to ensure that its own development and the development of other countries are mutually reinforcing, thus promoting the common development of all countries.”²⁰³

The Principle of Equality and Mutual Benefit is also depicted in the 2013 White Paper on China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperative, which cites Africa as China’s largest trading partner – a partnership that, through common efforts and cooperation, enjoys improved mechanisms and new, common interests.²⁰⁴ These stated common efforts include: promoting sustainable development of trade, supporting African infrastructure construction, improving African people’s livelihood and capacity building. As part of its “talk,” the White Paper states that “China firmly supports Africa’s self-enhancement through unity, and works hard to strengthen cooperation with the AU and African sub-regional organizations in a variety of fields, including infrastructure development, capacity building and mechanism construction.”²⁰⁵

Similarly, in his 2014 speech, Xi described the Principle of Equality and Mutual Benefit as “powerful tools for developing countries” that deepen mutual understanding and trust, allowing these countries to preserve their sovereignty and independence while together creating or enhancing solidarity, common development, and cooperation, as well as strengthening them. He elaborated on the Principle by pointing out how big the world is, which thus allows for

²⁰² Information office of the State Council, *White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid* (Government of China, 2011) http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/09/09/content_281474986284620.htm.

²⁰³ Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development*.

²⁰⁴ Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation* (Government of China, 2013), http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474982986536.htm

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

common development as well as prosperity for all states. Moreover, Xi cautioned against uneven distribution or global inequalities among nations, which allow some countries to get richer while others are become poorer. He thus stated that while global nations are developing themselves, they should also work actively for common development of other nations in a bid to allow the gains of development to be enjoyed by more people in the world.²⁰⁶ He stated: “We should enhance South-South cooperation and North-South dialogue, strengthen developing countries’ capacity for self-development, urge developed countries to shoulder more responsibilities, and narrow the North-South gap. This will help build a more equal and more balanced new global partnership for development and cement the foundation for achieving long-term and stable global growth.”²⁰⁷

Xi’s idea of self-development and South-South cooperation is reflected in China’s White Paper on Foreign Aid released in 2014, which states that the Chinese government, to the best of its ability, provides assistance to least developed countries in order to reduce poverty and improve livelihood.²⁰⁸ The Paper states: “When providing foreign assistance, China adheres to the principles of not imposing any political conditions, not interfering in the internal affairs of the recipient countries and fully respecting their right to independently choose their own paths and models of development. The basic principles China upholds in providing foreign assistance are mutual respect, equality, keeping promise, mutual benefits and win-win.”²⁰⁹ Similarly, the 2011 White Paper on Peaceful Development stresses that “China should seek mutual benefit and common development with other countries in keeping with the trend of economic globalization, and it should work together with other countries to build a harmonious world of durable peace and common prosperity. This is a path of scientific, independent, open, peaceful, cooperative and common development.”²¹⁰ The 2011 White Paper further claims that the Chinese government puts people first and that, when making balanced overall plans, it takes all factors into consideration, as it always respects human rights and values and works to promote prosperity for all.²¹¹ In Chapter 4, this claim will be explored using Zimbabwe and Sudan as case studies. These countries were chosen from more than 30 African countries with which China has bilateral investment treaties and joint economic commissions. Indeed, as

²⁰⁶ MFA, “Carry forward the 5 Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence to build a better world through win-win cooperation.”

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid* (Government of China, 2014) http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474982986592.htm.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Information Office of the State Council, *White paper on China’s Peaceful Development*.

²¹¹ Ibid.

China's 2013 White Paper on China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation illustrates, the intended outcome of such increased engagements is to improve the livelihood of over 700,000 Africans²¹² – a goal that forms part of the “talk” on the Principle of Equality and Mutual benefit.

Moreover, in the 2014 White Paper on Foreign Aid, China expresses its desire and commitment to promote the realisation of the Millennium Development Goals, identifying Asia and Africa as the major recipients of its foreign aid assistance. Its foreign aid is given in the form of grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans. The Paper indicates that the aid would be provided for infrastructural projects, small- or medium-sized social welfare projects, emergency humanitarian aid, dispatching medical teams to affected countries, technical cooperation, reducing – or, in some instances, exempting – recipient countries from debts, manufacturing projects and constructing public facilities – all of which are means to improve the livelihood of the people. One of the main thematic concerns underlined in the Paper is poverty reduction, which China's foreign policy tries to achieve by improving health services and facilities, promoting agricultural development, improving the level of education and providing humanitarian aid.²¹³

Similarly, in the 2015 Second Africa Policy Paper, the Chinese government claims to adhere to a foreign policy that “upholds the values of friendship, justice and shared interests and adhering to the principles of sincerity, practical results, affinity and good faith, and push for new leapfrog growth of its friendly and mutually beneficial cooperation with Africa.”²¹⁴ The Paper defines the “principle of sincerity” in terms of China's insistence on other principles such as equality, mutual support, solidarity and trust as a sincere and trustworthy partner. As part of its “talk” on the principle of sincerity, the Paper further states that regarding African countries' independence, the Chinese government “stands ready to exchange governance experience with African countries on the basis of equality and voluntarism, and promote mutual understanding and acceptance of and learning from each other's political system and development path.” The “principle of practical results” is defined as China's overall objective or aim to attain practical as well as efficient results, seeking cooperation and mutual benefits through commitments with real actions, as well as results that are guided by measures for a mutual beneficial cooperation. In explaining the mutuality or “affinity” of China and Africa, the Paper claims that the hearts

²¹² Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation*.

²¹³ Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on China's Foreign Aid*.

²¹⁴ “China's Second Africa Policy Paper,” *Xinhua News Agency*, 4 Dec. 2015.

of people from these two respective sides are connected and, as such, a living-together environment is created, which allows for the exchange of ideas, cultures and policy alignment on the basis of mutual understanding and friendship. In this spirit, the Paper states that the “Chinese government encourages its enterprises as well as African citizens to care more about the well-being of local people and repay local society....” Lastly, the “principle of good faith” is explained as meaning that “China cherishes good faith and settlement of problems in an appropriate manner.” These principles explain China’s Principle of Equality and Mutual Benefit as building upon the other principles of peaceful co-existence.²¹⁵

3.3.5 The Principle of Peaceful Co-Existence

Below in Table 3.5 is a list of the four Chinese government’s official White Papers and Policy Papers that were explored to establish its foreign policy “talk” on the Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. This table is followed by a discussion of the content of the Principle.

Table 3.5: China’s White Papers and Policy Papers on Peaceful Co-Existence

PRINCIPLE	CHINA’S WHITE PAPERS AND POLICY PAPERS	YEAR OF PUBLICATION
Peaceful Co-Existence	White Paper on China EU Policy Paper	2003
	White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development Road	2005
	China’s National Defense White Paper	2008
	White Paper on Peaceful Development	2011

Source: Compiled by the author.

In line with McLuhan’s notion of a “global village” (see Chapter 1), the post-Cold War world order (see Chapter 2) has become more homogenised and interconnected despite the presence of different doctrines, systems, models and interests of people of different cultures, nations, regions and continents. This situation implies that peace and tranquillity are subject to the test of time. Indeed, given that in such an environment, confrontations, tensions and conflicts are inevitable, the Chinese government has proposed the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence

²¹⁵ Ibid.

to be its guide in international affairs. On 20 June 2014, these Five Principles were described in *Xinhua* (China's biggest state-owned newspaper) as "Peace Principles."²¹⁶ This description acknowledges China's 2011 White Paper on Peaceful Development, in which it is claimed that the country will "cherish a world view of unity without uniformity, harmony between man and nature, and harmony as invaluable."²¹⁷ To advocate for the Principle of Peaceful Co-Existence, as noted in this White Paper, the Chinese government proposes "commonness" and "mutuality" in aspects such as security and trade cooperation.²¹⁸

Mao Tse-tung in the 1960s asserted in an open letter to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) that China is a socialist state that aligned itself with Lenin's policy of "peaceful co-existence" – with a creative twist based on its history of struggle, among other issues. Lenin believed that "socialism cannot achieve victory simultaneously in all countries."²¹⁹ As such, socialist countries would exist side by side with capitalist countries.²²⁰ In light of such a socialist type of "peaceful co-existence," the 2005 White Paper on China's Peaceful Development Road describes peace as an inevitable choice and claims that "China persists unswervingly in taking the road of peaceful development."²²¹ The Paper also states: "China did not seek hegemony in the past, nor does it now, and will not do so in the future when it gets stronger. China's development will never pose a threat to anyone; instead, it can bring more development opportunities and bigger markets for the rest of the world."²²²

The 2005 White Paper also states that while adhering to the mutual benefit and win-win cooperation principle, the Chinese government "tries to find proper settlement of trade conflicts and promote common development with other countries."²²³ The Paper acknowledges that trade conflicts in international economic exchanges are inevitable. The Chinese government claims to resolve such conflicts through dialogue based on an equal footing as well as through the World Trade Organisation's dispute settlement mechanism. Moreover, the Chinese government claims to uphold harmony and mutual trust in order to realise common security,

²¹⁶ Yi Yang, "China, India, Myanmar to celebrate 60-yr-old peace principles," *Xinhua*, 20 Jun. 2014.

²¹⁷ Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on China's Peaceful Development*.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*

²¹⁹ "Selected works of Mao Tse-tung," Peaceful Coexistence - Two Diametrically Opposed Policies, 12 Dec. 1963.
<https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/polemic/peaceful.htm>.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*

²²¹ Information Office of the State Council, *China's Peaceful Development Road* (Government of China, 2005),
<http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/152684.htm>.

²²² *Ibid.*

²²³ *Ibid.*

asserting: “all countries should join hands to respond to threats against world security.”²²⁴ The purpose of such approaches is to “build a fair and effective collective security mechanism aimed at jointly preventing conflict and war, and cooperate to eliminate or reduce as much as possible threats from such non-traditional security problems as terrorist activities, financial crises and natural disasters, so as to safeguard world peace, security and stability.”²²⁵

The 2005 White Paper further proposes collaborative commitments in dealing with international problems such as terrorism, human rights, democracy and justice. Regarding terrorism, the Paper states: “We should step up cooperation in a resolute fight against terrorism, stamp out both the symptoms and root causes of the problem of terrorism, with special emphasis on eliminating the root cause of the menace.”²²⁶ On human rights, the Paper states that China “should take an active role in the promotion as well as guaranteeing of human rights so as to ensure that everyone enjoys common equal opportunities so as to promote the harmonious development of man and nature.”²²⁷ Regarding democracy and justice, the Paper claims that China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace, asserting that: “In the spirit of democracy, harmony, justice and tolerance, China has been playing a constructive role, and making efforts to attain the lofty goal of building a harmonious world together with all other countries.”²²⁸

As such, in its 2011 White Paper on Peaceful Development, the Chinese government declared to the world that it follows a path of peaceful development, which is centred on upholding and promoting world peace as well as common development and prosperity for all nations.²²⁹ In keeping with some of its national self-interests (discussed in Chapter 3), China declared again that “peaceful development is a strategic choice made by China to realize modernization.” With peace as a strategic choice, China thus describes its commitment to a strategy of comprehensive cooperative security, arguing that “War and confrontation will only lead to a vicious cycle of violence begetting violence, while dialogue and negotiation are the only effective and reliable way to settle disputes.”²³⁰ In instances of conflicts or disputes, the Paper calls for all countries to “settle disputes and promote harmony through cooperation, and oppose the use of threat of

224

Ibid.

225

Ibid.

226

Ibid.

227

Ibid.

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Ibid.

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Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on China's Peaceful Development*.

230

Ibid.

use of military force against one another.”²³¹ Taking the peaceful co-existence initiative upon itself, the Chinese government claims to adopt a way of thinking that conforms to peaceful development, and endeavours to “promote the building of a harmonious world of durable peace,” making use of its foreign policy to “promote common development for common prosperity.”²³² To achieve such harmony, the Paper makes reference to various sections of society that needs redress. Politically, the Paper calls for countries (weak or strong, rich or poor, big or small) to respect one another as equals, urging them to “promote democracy in international relations.”²³³ Regarding economics and peaceful development, China advocates for “a balanced and win-win process under economic globalisation that benefits all countries.”²³⁴ The Paper also calls for common security “featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality as well as coordination.”²³⁵ Hence, China’s foreign policy of peaceful co-existence seeks to enhance solidarity, comprehensive partnership and peace. The Paper also claims that China “never seeks hegemony.”²³⁶ The term “hegemony” in this case means that China does not seek politico-economic-military predominance or exert undue influence over other nations. In the Cold War era, the expansion tendencies from communist and capitalist blocs could be described as hegemonic, with the proponents for each believing that war was to their benefit. However, in the post-Cold War era, China tends to use the term to refer to the US’s one-sided effort to enforce their stance on issues such as democracy, human rights and weapons proliferation, among other issues, by means of violence or direct intervention in other countries’ affairs.²³⁷

To ensure the Principle of Peaceful Co-existence, Xi stated in 2014 that security should rather be universal, based on the premise of common security, with all countries shouldering a shared responsibility for maintaining peace and security.²³⁸ In his words: “We should champion common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security, and respect and ensure every country's security.” He further states that any disputes and differences that arise between and among countries should be solved through dialogue, consultation and peaceful means. He claims that China “will increase mutual trust and settle disputes, and promote security through

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Alexander Whyte, “Interpreting the rise of China,” *E-International Relations*, 13 Feb. 2013, <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/02/13/interpreting-the-rise-of-china/>.

²³⁸ MFA, “Carry forward the 5 Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence to build a better world through win-win cooperation.”

dialogue and not through the use of force.”²³⁹ Xi further states that the concept of peace and security can only be solid and enduring if it is based on the moral high ground, hence China (and other countries) “should work for a new architecture of Asia-Pacific security cooperation that is open, transparent and equality-based, and bring all countries together in a common endeavour to maintain peace and security in both our region and the world.”²⁴⁰ Furthermore, Xi said: “All living things are nourished without injuring one another, and all roads run parallel without interfering with one another. We should respect diversity of civilizations and promote exchanges, dialogue, peaceful and harmonious coexistence among different civilizations and should not seek supremacy or denigrate other civilizations and nations. Human history tells us that any attempt to establish a dominant civilization in the world is an illusion.”²⁴¹ Xi’s speech here corresponds with China’s “talk” in the 2011 White Paper on Peaceful Development, particularly regarding the statement that the Chinese government does not seek spheres of influence; rather, it seeks to create a harmonious world of durable peace based on the Five Principles.²⁴²

Moreover, in the spirit of “peaceful co-existence,” China’s 2016 Policy Paper on the South China Sea Issue confirms its adherence to UN Charter principles in its endeavours to maintain peace and stability, while at the same time being committed to upholding as well as promoting the international rule of law. This Paper highlights that the Chinese government settles disputes through negotiating and consulting its adversaries, trying to settle differences in the wake of safeguarding its claimed territorial sovereignty rights as well as its maritime interests.²⁴³

3.4 Conclusion

The above exposition of China’s foreign policy “talk” deduced from a range of White Papers and Policy Papers, which steer China’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, affirms and adds to the national interests and general trends as discussed in Chapter 2. In the words of China’s President Xi, the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, namely mutual respect, mutual non-aggression, non-interference, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence, imbue China’s foreign policy with “amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness in deepening mutually beneficial cooperation with its neighbours,” as the

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ MFA, “Carry forward the 5 Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence to build a better world through win-win cooperation.”

²⁴² Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development*.

²⁴³ Information Office of the State Council, *China’s Policy on the South China Sea Issue*.

Chinese government strives to deliver greater gains to its neighbours through its own development.²⁴⁴

This chapter was vital to the study as a whole, as it establishes China's claimed commitments in relation to the Five Principles. The above discussion on China's foreign policy "talk" is also used as a point of referral when reviewing China's foreign policy "walk" in the following chapter, ultimately allowing the researcher to draw conclusions on how China balances these commitments – one on hand attain its foreign policy goals, and on the other secure its national interests.

²⁴⁴ MFA, "Carry forward the 5 Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence to build a better world through win-win cooperation."

CHAPTER 4

The Walk: Chinese Foreign Engagements in the Post-Cold War Era

4.1 Introduction

In Chapter 3, an orientation to this chapter was provided by discussing China's foreign policy "talk." The "talk" was extracted from 15 official White Papers and Policy Papers that referred to the Five Principles of Co-existence. In this chapter, the main focus is to explore China's foreign policy "walk" by examining its post-Cold War foreign policy activities across various regions and countries in order to investigate whether or not China is "walking the talk." As discussed in Chapter 1, these countries were selected based on their prominence in China's foreign policy. Using purposive or judgemental sampling, the researcher selected two different countries within the same region as case studies for each of the Five Principles, where China's "walk" will be assessed in relation to its "talk" portrayed in the White Papers or Policy Papers as discussed in Chapter 3. Since it is impossible to list all countries in the world and try to sample them randomly in an attempt to analyse China's foreign policy behaviour, this approach has been taken to regulate the amount of contextual data and to give an in-depth discussion of each Principle. The selection of each of these countries is also based on conceptual validity, holistic elaboration, casual mechanisms identification and the ability to capture complexity and trace processes. Following the discussions and analysis of each Principle as it is "walked," the data will be analysed using the chosen theories of realism and liberalism. The fact that the Five Principles are mutually inclusiveness will be taken into account, causing the data to overlap as the inquiry proceeds.

4.2 Principle 1: Mutual Respect for Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity

In Chapters 1 and 2 it was shown that China has heightened sovereignty and territorial concerns regarding its immediate neighbours Taiwan and Japan. As such, Taiwan and Japan were selected to test China's "walk" on the Principle of Mutual Respect for Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity within the framework of the high-level priority and territorial and sovereign claims made by China in the White Papers reviewed in Chapter 3.

4.2.1 China and Taiwan

Taiwan is located close to the southern coast of China and has been governed independently from mainland China since 1949. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Taiwan Strait remains a controversial and sensitive issue. China claims that Taiwan is a province of China, yet Taiwan sees itself as a sovereign state and, as such, it seeks international recognition and pursues a separationist policy from China. Citing Plato, Aristotle and others, the Global Policy Forum (GPF) describes a “state” as an ancient institution, which qualifies China’s historic territorial claims. However, if one looks at the further definition of a state provided by the GPF as “a means of rule over a defined or sovereign territory with unique sovereign features,”²⁴⁵ Taiwan’s claim of independence is justified. It has a constitution²⁴⁶ and a democratically elected government (whose view on its status and relations sharply differ from the Chinese claims), which therefore assumes self-governance, executive bureaucracy over a territory with extensive rule of law, citizenship rights, and courts with the power to regulate internal affairs without any foreign interference, among other sovereign features.²⁴⁷

China and Taiwan began engagement with the One-China policy in 1992, under the mediation of the Chinese Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) and the Taiwanese Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF). However, they failed to reach consensus.²⁴⁸ According to *The People’s Daily*, one of the contributing factors to this failure was that the talks excluded discussion on the political meaning of a “One China.”²⁴⁹ In response, in March and June 1995, the Chinese government took deliberate action purported to intimidate and purposefully subdue Taiwan’s progressive pursuit of a separationist government and recognition as a completely independent country. The Chinese government conducted several missile tests in waters adjacent to Taiwan and under Taiwan’s control, such as on Pengchia Yu Island, 50 km from Taiwan, where they boldly carried out joint air, naval and ground exercises. It also tested its nuclear-capable M9 missiles on Pingtan Island.²⁵⁰ Later in the same year, the Chinese government conducted another two rounds of military exercises.²⁵¹ However,

²⁴⁵ “What is a ‘State?’” Global Policy Forum, accessed 27 Jun. 2017. <https://www.globalpolicy.org/nations-a-states/what-is-a-state.html>.

²⁴⁶ The Constitution of the Republic of China, Taiwan Documents Project, Adopted 25 Dec. 1946, <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/constitution01.htm>.

²⁴⁷ “What is a ‘State?’” Global Policy Forum.

²⁴⁸ “Backgrounder: ‘1992 Consensus’ on ‘One-China’ principle,” *China Daily*, 13 Oct. 2004.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Yuheng Deng, *The Taiwan Strait Missile Test Crisis (1995-1996) and Its Implications on Law of Force* (PhD thesis, University of Bristol, 2014).

²⁵¹ Deng, *The Taiwan Strait Missile Test Crisis (1995-1996)*.

Taiwan's resolve in the face of China's threats and intimidating actions remained unshaken, and it continued lobbying for its independence in the UN.

In 2000, as China feared, Chen Shui-bian was elected President of Taiwan. His victory could have been interpreted to mean Taiwan was going to prioritise the separation agenda since he was an independent pro-democratic leader.²⁵² To add to China's fears, Taiwan engaged in arms sales with the US. Shirley A. Kan, a specialist in Asian security affairs, in a 2014 Congressional Research Service Paper on major US arms sales to Taiwan post-1990, wrote that Taiwan has been ranked one of the top recipients of US arms (articles, services, agreements and deliveries) in the 21st century. The arms sales to Taiwan between 2004 and 2007 totalled \$4.3 billion.²⁵³ In 2008, under the George W. Bush administration, the US-Taiwan arms deal package totalled \$6.5 billion.²⁵⁴ Then, in January 2010, the Obama administration authorised an arms deal worth \$6.4 billion with Taiwan, which included 113 PAC-3 missile defense systems as well as 60 Black Hawk helicopters. This deal was followed by a \$5.9 billion upgrade package in September 2011 and another \$1.83 billion arms sales package in 2015.²⁵⁵

China's reaction was to remain steadfast in its resolve that Taiwan and its surrounding islands belonged to China, shown clearly in the selected White Papers and Policy Papers as discussed in Chapter 3. In its 2000 White Paper on the One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue, China consistently indicates its awareness of Taiwan's claims of sovereignty. As such, the Paper asserts that under China's peaceful re-unification, Taiwan will enjoy a high degree of autonomy. However, when analysing the Paper closely, the researcher observed that it used "pre-dictated" terms on Taiwan, under the pretext of calling them "peaceful negotiations" for "peaceful re-unification."²⁵⁶ For instance, the Paper used the term "ONLY" to condition the reunification agenda, stating: "ONLY by adhering to the One-China Principle can peaceful reunification be achieved."²⁵⁷ The researcher interprets this to mean "conditional peace" to which Taiwan had no right to object. This approach can arguably be understood to be a common characteristic of passive bullying (appearing to be non-aggressive but actually forcing the weak to bend to one's will and do their bidding) and displaying a sense of superiority. The Paper also stated that China "does not rule out the use of force" in the name of safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial

²⁵² Erik Eckholm, "China Army Renews Threat Against Taiwan Separatism" *The New York Times*, 7 Mar. 2000.

²⁵³ Shirley A. Kan, "Taiwan: Major US arms sales since 1990," Congressional Research Service, 29 Aug. 2014, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf>.

²⁵⁴ Li Xiaokun and Wu Jiao, "Warning issued over arms sales to Taiwan," *China Daily*, 8 Jan. 2010.

²⁵⁵ Shannon Tiezzi, "On Taiwan arms sales, China's bark may be worse than its bite," *The Diplomat*, 18 Dec. 2015.

²⁵⁶ Embassy of the PRC in the US, "White Paper – The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue."

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

integrity.²⁵⁸ This clause contradicts the White Paper’s “talk” of “peaceful negotiations on an equal footing.”

The Taiwan issue also seems to have influenced China’s “talk and walk” in other policy papers, and has even led to increased military spending, possibly in reaction to the US-Taiwan arms deals. These deals directly contravened China’s “talk” in its 2000 White Paper on the One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue, in which it stated that: “No country maintaining diplomatic relations with China should provide arms to Taiwan or enter into military alliance of any form with Taiwan. All countries maintaining diplomatic relations with China should abide by the **principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference** (emphasis added) in each other's internal affairs, and refrain from providing arms to Taiwan or helping Taiwan produce arms in any form or under any pretext.”²⁵⁹

The US-Taiwan arms deals were also a direct violation of China’s 2004 White Paper on National Defense. In the Paper, China accused Chen of recklessly challenging China’s status quo by using referendums as well as Taiwan’s newly enacted Constitution to incite and escalate separationist activities aimed at promoting Taiwan’s independence.²⁶⁰ The Paper further reiterated that any country with diplomatic relations with China is prohibited from selling arms to Taiwan. China views such arms sales as a violation of its own sovereignty and as threatening China’s security.²⁶¹ Indeed, the Paper voiced a very direct threat in this regard: “Should the Taiwan authorities go so far as to make a reckless attempt that constitutes a major incident of ‘Taiwan independence,’ the Chinese people and armed forces will resolutely and thoroughly crush it at any cost.”²⁶²

Notably, and as mentioned above, possibly in partial reaction to the Taiwan-US arms deals, the Chinese government increased their military budget by 17.7% from 1999 to 2000. From 2000 to 2001, the budget went up to \$17 billion, and again increased by 17.6% to amount to \$20 billion in 2002.²⁶³ In 2015, its military budget drastically increased to \$250 billion.²⁶⁴ In the meantime, in 2010, it telegraphed its disapproval of US Patriot interceptor missiles sales to

²⁵⁸

Ibid.

²⁵⁹

Embassy of the PRC in the US, *White Paper – The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue*.

²⁶⁰

Ibid.

²⁶¹

Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on National Defense*.

²⁶²

Ibid.

²⁶³

“China’s Defense Budget,” GlobalSecurity.org, accessed 21 Mar. 2017, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/budget.htm>.

²⁶⁴

Ibid.

Taiwan. This event was followed by the Chinese government successfully testing a missile defense system.²⁶⁵ China's Ministry of National Defense also urged the US government to stop arms sales to Taiwan and the Chinese government to sanction the US firms involved.²⁶⁶ Yet It should be noted that China's substantial military spending did nothing to uphold its "talk" in its 2016 Policy on the South China Sea Issue; indeed, it is quite contradictory: "China champions a new security vision featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, and pursues a foreign policy of building friendship and partnership with its neighbours and of fostering an amicable, secure and prosperous neighbourhood based on the principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness."²⁶⁷

Owing to the mutual inclusiveness of the Five Principles, it should be noted that China's "walk" vis-à-vis its increased military spending and rhetoric on Taiwan also betrays the words of President Xi in his 2014 speech, when he stated that through the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence, the Chinese government "reject(s) the law of the jungle by which the strong bullies the weak" in its "positive role of building a more equitable and rational international political and economic order."²⁶⁸ Notably, China's "walk" regarding Taiwan also contradicts the 2011 White Paper on China's Foreign Policies for Pursuing Peaceful Development, which claims: "China is opposed to the practices of the big bullying the small and the strong oppressing the weak, and to hegemonism and power politics."²⁶⁹ In addition, its 2011 White Paper on Peaceful Development (featured mainly under the Principle on Non-aggression) states: "... China does not pose a military threat to any other country. China follows the principle of not attacking others unless it is attacked, and it is committed to solving international disputes and hotspot issues with peaceful means..."²⁷⁰ Referring to the case of Taiwan as discussed above, this claim is challenged by China's threat to, "at any cost ... resolutely and thoroughly crush" any act of Taiwanese independence.²⁷¹

In summary, given the sensitivity of China's relationship with Taiwan, the US' continued arms sales to Taiwan can possibly be interpreted as a direct violation of China's national sovereignty,

²⁶⁵ Mark Thompson, "China's missile test: A symbolic warning to the US," *The Washington Times*, 13 Jan. 2010.

²⁶⁶ Ministry of National Defense "Chinese defense ministry opposes US arms sale to Taiwan" (Chinese Government, 2015), http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2015-12/17/content_4633056.htm.

²⁶⁷ Information Office of the State Council, *China's Policy on the South China Sea Issue*.

²⁶⁸ MFA, "Carry forward the 5 Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence to build a better world through win-win cooperation."

²⁶⁹ Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, *China's Peaceful Development*.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on National Defense*.

given the foreign policy priority it gives to Taiwan. To contain or deal with a threatening Taiwan, China has so far used military threats to intimidate Taiwan, but has not actually used force to take what it believes belongs to it. That being said, fundamental changes in the political landscape in Taiwan in early 2016 have increased uncertainties in the China-Taiwan territorial disputes. In January 2016, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate, Tsai Ing-Wen, won the presidential elections with a 56.1% victory. This party had been advocating for a separate and independent Taiwan for some time, and in the event that the DPP crosses the proverbial “red line,” Scott Kastner warns of renewed instability, or occasion for armed conflict between China and Taiwan.²⁷²

Moreover, in early December 2016, *CNN* and *The Guardian*, among several other sources, reported on the Chinese government’s formal complaint about US President Donald Trump’s direct call to President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan.²⁷³ According to the *BBC*, Trump’s team also noted that the US and Taiwan have “close economic, political and security ties.”²⁷⁴ In response, *Xinhua*, China’s official news agency, reported that US-China diplomatic relations has reached “a level of stability and maturity” despite some twists and turns, and, as such, the Chinese government cautioned Trump not to veer off this course.²⁷⁵ In early January 2017, the *New York Times* reported renewed tensions between China and Taiwan following Trump’s actions.²⁷⁶ China had sent an aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, into the Taiwan Strait, to which Taiwan responded by scrambling F-16 fighter jets. These rising tensions on matters of sovereignty show that China is ready to prevail as a “villain” in its cause to protect its claims. Indeed, such a war between the two nations might occur sooner rather than later. However, when one contrasts the discussed unique features of a modern state to China’s regional claims in the 2012 White Paper on Diaoyu Dao, it would also seem fair and justified for Taiwan to defend its territory and interests as a modern state whose functions and operations are separate from China.

²⁷² Scott L. Kastner, “Is the Taiwan Strait Still a flash point: Rethinking the prospects for armed conflict between China and Taiwan,” *International security* 40, no. 3 (Winter 2015/2016): 54-92.

²⁷³ Stephen Collinson et al. “China lodges complaint over Trump-Taiwan call,” *CNN*, 4 Dec. 2016, <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/02/politics/donald-trump-taiwan/>; Tom Phillips, “China lodges complaint with US over Trump’s Taiwan phone call,” *The Guardian*, 3 Dec. 2016.

²⁷⁴ “Trump-Taiwan call: China lodge protest,” *BBC*, 3 Dec. 2016.

²⁷⁵ Liu Chang, “Commentary: Future of China-US ties rests on mutual trust and mutual respect,” *Xinhua*, 3 Dec. 2016.

²⁷⁶ Michael Forsythe and Chris Buckley, “Taiwan responds after China sends Carrier to Taiwan Strait,” *The New York Times*, 10 Jan. 2017.

4.2.2 Sino-Japanese Relations

An examination of literature on Sino-Japanese foreign relations in the modern era depict strenuous relations that go as far back as 1932, when Japan was the colonial master of China. In 1945, Japan was defeated at the end of the Second World War. This defeat resulted in strenuous relations with China in proceeding years, in particular over territorial disputes involving the Diaoyu or Senkaku Islands (see Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1: China-Japan Disputed Islands



Source: Kim Jason, *The blog worth spreading*, "China-Japan conflict over islands in the East China Sea," (blog), posted November 19, 2012, <https://jasonkim29.wordpress.com/2012/11/19/china-japan-conflict-over-islands-in-the-east-china-sea/>.

To a large extent, sovereignty and territorial issues shape Sino-Japanese relations. On territorial dispute matters, the Chinese government has appealed to the Japanese government to abide by the terms of the 1943 Cairo Proclamation as well as the 1945 Potsdam Proclamations, under which the Japanese government agreed to return Taiwan and other islands such as Penghu to China's jurisdiction.²⁷⁷ However, Paul Smith describes Japan's foreign policy approaches towards China on territorial matters as being characterised by a "theory of uncertainty over control of Taiwan."²⁷⁸ The governments of Japan and the US seem to support Taiwan's

²⁷⁷ MFA, "The Question of Taiwan in China-Japan Relations" (Government of China, 2000). http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/yzs_663350/gjlb_663354/2721_663446/2726_663456/t16043.shtml.

²⁷⁸ Paul Smith, "The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island controversy: A crisis postponed," *Naval War College Review* 66, no. 2 (2013): 27-44.

independence and sovereignty, based on their arms sales to Taiwan and Japan's refusal to honour the terms of the Cairo and Potsdam Proclamations. Notably, these two proclamations were agreed upon under the rulership of the ROC, and when the ROC was ousted in 1949 by the CCP and fled to Taiwan, Japan and the US chose to continue their relations with the ROC and refused to honour the Cairo and Potsdam Proclamations.²⁷⁹

It is therefore evident in China's post-Cold War foreign policy "walk" vis-à-vis Japan that the Principle of Mutual Respect on Sovereignty and Territorial Issues takes much precedence. A number of high-level diplomatic summits between the Chinese and Japanese governments in the post-Cold War era attest to China's attempt to "walk" according to the Five Principles. These attempts include, but are not limited to, Chinese Premier Li Peng's diplomatic visit to Japan on 11 November 1997 and the first official head of government visit on 25 November 1998, when Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Japan to issue the Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration, which was aimed at building friendly cooperation, peace and development.²⁸⁰ On 20 May 2000, courtesy of the Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration and the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the Chinese President at the time, Jiang, visited Japan on a mission to exchange dialogue on cultural and tourism aspects. These high-level diplomatic meetings exemplify China's foreign policy "walk," which here is in line with the Five Principles.

Unfortunately, the cordial relations established by these high-levels diplomatic summits and treaty of Peace and Friendship did not last. In September 2012, a dangerous standoff between the two countries caused violent protests in China as demonstrators set fire to factories.²⁸¹ This was a reactionary response to Japanese governor Shintaro Ishihara's decision to nationalise the aforementioned chain of disputed islands, known as the Senkaku or Diaoyu islands (see figure 4.1).²⁸² China then repeatedly dispatched Chinese coast guard ships and maritime surveillance ships to these islands.²⁸³ According to the *Japan Times*, the Chinese government sent a turboprop aircraft (Harbin Y12 type), which intruded on Japan's airspace for the first time in history. The Japanese Air Self-Defense Force's (ASDF) surveillance system was unable to pick up the aircraft.²⁸⁴ Japan considered this act to be an intrusion on its sovereignty, while China

²⁷⁹ Drifte, "The Japan-China Confrontation Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands- Between 'shelving' and 'dispute escalation,'" *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 12, no. 30 (2014), 6-7. <http://apjif.org/-Reinhard-Drifte/4154/article.pdf>

²⁸⁰ MFA, "Visit to Japan by President Jiang" (Government of China, 1998), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18038.shtml.

²⁸¹ "Security tightened at Japanese embassy in Beijing as protests over islands go on," *The Guardian*, 16 Sept. 2012.

²⁸² Scott Cheney-Peters, "How Japan's nationalization move in the East China sea shaped the US rebalance," *The National Interest*, 26 Oct. 2014.

²⁸³ Drifte, "The Japan-China Confrontation Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands."

²⁸⁴ "Senkaku air intrusion prompts radar upgrade," *The Japan Times*, 15 Dec. 2012.

also claimed control over the islands, with the 2012 White Paper on Diaoyu Dao describing the islands as an “inseparable part of the Chinese territory” on geographic, legal and historical grounds.²⁸⁵ China’s actions were carefully planned and coordinated to deprive the Japanese government of the ability to claim sole effective control of the disputed islands. However, China’s foreign policy “walk” in this territorial matter is not in line with the Principle of Mutual Respect, as the Chinese government acted provocatively rather than peacefully or respectfully in Japan’s airspace, thereby showing aggressive tendencies.

Yet keeping in line with the Five Principles, and despite the prevailing tensions on territorial claims and sovereign matters, on 5 September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping urged the Japanese government to handle sensitive issues with caution and diligence, taking into account the history between the two nations and pointing out that China was attempting to improve their relations. However, following Xi’s statement, on 26 December 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe further revived negative feelings within Chinese communities that had historically suffered Japanese militarist aggression and colonial rule, when he paid tribute at the Yasukuni Shrine. In so doing, he commemorated what China regarded as Second World War criminals. China condemned this action, and a decline in trade and economic cooperation between the two countries was soon reported by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: while trade (exports and imports) stood at US\$312.6 billion in 2013, because of these concerns, it has declined by 5.1% every year since. China’s share from this US\$312.6 was US\$150.3 billion in 2013, but its exports to Japan saw a decrease of 0.9%, whereas imports decreased yearly by 8.7% from a total of US\$162.3 billion in 2013.²⁸⁶ This incident seems to demonstrate how historical sovereignty and territorial issues continue to affect the whole fabric of Sino-Japanese relations.

In 2014, a BBC report confirmed that bilateral relations between China and Japan continued to be strained by territorial claims over the disputed islands.²⁸⁷ By 2015, China again attempted to improve relations, prompting author William Sposato to question why China is “playing nice” with Japan despite tensions, contradictions and misunderstandings within their foreign policies owing to their history, the Taiwan issue and the disputed islands.²⁸⁸ According to Sposato, the major contributor to these hostilities remains the issue of territorial disputes or

²⁸⁵ Information Office of the State Council, *Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China*.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ “How uninhabited islands soured China-Japan ties,” *BBC*, 10 Nov. 2014.

²⁸⁸ William Sposato, “Why Is China playing nice with Japan?” *Foreign Policy Analytics*, 4 Aug. 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/04/why-is-china-playing-nice-with-japan-abenomics/>.

claims. Yet, despite the prevalence of such, China's foreign policy recently signalled willingness to improve relations with Japan. On 30 April 2016, in an attempt to address the deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in his exploration and evaluations of the factors hindering progression concluded that Sino-Japanese relations were improving despite the lack of mutual trust.²⁸⁹ Then, in an effort to further improve Sino-Japanese relations, Wang Yi proposed a four-point requirement.

The first requirement deals with the "political" aspect, which puts emphasis on Japan, their bilateral relations and honouring and adhering to the political documents and agreements made before. It is inclusive of the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement, and takes into account relevant history and the One-China policy. The second requirement deals with the "outlook," in which Japan's actions are to be guided by agreement that China is a cooperative partner rather than a threat. Moreover, Japan should accept and positively embrace a healthy attitude towards the growth of China as a partner, and should not attempt to spread themed information or attitudes on "China's economic recession theories."²⁹⁰ The third requirement, the "economic" aspect, embraces exchanges between the two countries that are characterised by a win-win atmosphere, doing away with the idea of one country heavily depending on the other. Thus, the nature of their cooperation was to be built on the basis of equal footing as well as pragmatic cooperation based on mutual benefit. Lastly, with regards to regional and international matters, both parties were to respect each other's legitimate interests and concerns. With that in mind, Japan was to cease its confrontational foreign activities and work with China to foster peace, prosperity and stability in the Asian region.²⁹¹ China's propositions and actions in this case embody the full nature of the Five Principles, "walking the talk" and trying to negotiate peacefully with Japan. It also corresponds with China's 2016 Policy Paper on the South China Sea issue, which claims: "China champions a new security vision featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, and pursues a foreign policy of building friendship and partnership with its neighbours and of fostering an amicable, secure and prosperous neighbourhood based on the principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness."²⁹²

²⁸⁹ MFA, Wang Yi Made a Four-point Requirement on Improving China-Japan Relations (Government of China, 2016), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zjzg_663340/yzs_663350/gjlb_663354/2721_663446/2724_663452/t1360026.shtml.

²⁹⁰ Sposato, "Why is China Playing Nice with Japan?"

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² Information Office of the State Council, *China's Policy on the South China Sea Issue*.

However, that being said, one cannot help but wonder if China is really “playing nice” with Japan. Giulio Pugliese and Aurelio Insisa argue that the two nations are locked in power politics, in military, economic as well as propaganda wars that are deeply rooted in a history characterised by territorial and sovereignty concerns.²⁹³ Based on the literature reviewed, given China’s thirst for natural resources to sustain its growing population and economy, one can perhaps argue that China’s increased assertiveness and claims over these islands are possibly owing to their potential richness in gas and oil reserves. Also, considering its national security concerns discussed in Chapter 2, China’s use of forceful means to claim jurisdiction over these islands is motivated by their close proximities to mainland China. Hence in terms of its security concerns, the Chinese government also views them as strategic in the event that the US and Japan invade the Asia-Pacific region. China then aims to use the islands for shipping and defensive military purposes.²⁹⁴

4.2.3 Analysis on the Principle of Mutual Respect

In the 2004 White Paper on National Defense, China claimed that it will never endorse expansion, nor will it ever seek hegemony.²⁹⁵ However, considering China’s territorial and sovereign claims on Taiwan and the Diaoyu Dao, Huangwei Yu, Chiwei Yu, Nanxiao Dao, Beixiao Dao, Nan Yu, Bei Yu and Fei Yu islands, one can argue that China is actually seeking expansion and eventually hegemony, contrary to its stated “talk.” These islands (except Taiwan) were administered by Japan until 2012, after gas and oil were discovered on them. It is interesting that around the same time, China published its White Paper on Diaoyu Dao, in which it describes these territories as inherently Chinese territories, despite the complexities and tensions these claims are causing.²⁹⁶

On 12 July 2016, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) established that there is no legal basis for China to claim historic rights over the vast resources from these areas and declared the ruling as legally binding.²⁹⁷ The UNSC is mandated by the UN Charter to oversee such dispute settlement procedures, which are considered compulsory. However, Hong Lei, spokesperson of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, declared the ruling to be “null

²⁹³ Giulio Pugliese and Aurelio Insisa, *Sino-Japanese Power Politics: Might, Money and Minds* (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

²⁹⁴ Smith, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Controversy: A crisis postponed,” 2.

²⁹⁵ Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on National Defense* (Government of China, 2004) <http://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/natdef2004.html>.

²⁹⁶ Information Office of the State Council, *Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China*.

²⁹⁷ Santosh Sharma Poudel, “The Diplomat: The South China Sea ruling: Reinforcing China’s negative image in Japan,” *The Diplomat*, 28 Jul. 2016.

and void.”²⁹⁸ Hong Lei declared that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over matters related to such territorial disputes.²⁹⁹ This statement is in direct contradiction with China’s “talk” in its 2016 Policy Paper on the South China Sea Issue, which establishes China’s commitments and adherence to international laws and the UN Charter when dealing with international issues.³⁰⁰

Interestingly, when Japan moved to nationalise the Sankaku (Diaoyu Dao) islands in September 2012, the Chinese government condemned Japan’s actions as illegal violations of international law and the UN Charter, urging the Japanese government to abide by these legal institutes.³⁰¹ Yet, in its White Paper on the South East China Issue, the Chinese government states that on issues concerning territory and maritime delimitation, China does not accept any means of dispute settlement imposed on it, nor does it accept any recourse to third-party settlement. On 25 August 2006, the Chinese government had informed the Secretary General of the UN that “the Government of the PRC does not accept any of the procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1 (a), (b) and (c) of Article 298 of the Convention.” These sections stipulate compulsory dispute settlement procedures for countries that are engaged in maritime or territorial disputes.³⁰² China’s declaration explicitly excludes itself from certain international laws that do not serve or support its national interests. This behaviour is interpreted below, using the theory of realism as discussed in Chapter 1.

4.2.4 Theoretical Application and Interpretation

The tensions between China and Taiwan as well as China and Japan may be explained by the theory of neo-realism, which states that the international system is characterised by a constant state of anarchy. This state mainly arises from the realist point of view that owing to lack of an overall system of law that governs states’ behaviour, states pursue national self-interests. Thus China, Japan and Taiwan each offer justified reasons to substantiate their different claims regarding the issue of mutual respect on territorial and sovereignty claims. Moreover, despite the UNCLOS attempting to give resolutions to the claims made by China, the Chinese government declared them “null and void.” It also publicly declares that China does not accept

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ MFA, “Spokesperson Hong Lei’s remarks on the arbitral tribunal’s claim that it would soon issue the so-called final award of the South China Sea arbitration unilaterally initiated by the Philippines (Government of China, 2016), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1376307.shtml.

³⁰⁰ Information Office of the State Council, *China’s Policy on the South China Sea Issue*.

³⁰¹ Ibid.

³⁰² Ibid.

certain clauses of the UNCLOS, seemingly on the basis of stipulations that are not in line with their national self-interest. China's foreign policy "walk" on the Principle of "Mutual Respect" on issues of territory and sovereign claims therefore seems to be heavily built on and concentrated in realist arguments.

4.3 Principle 2: Mutual Non-Aggression

Unlike pacifism, the ethical discourses on the Principle of Mutual Non-Aggression discussed in Chapter 3 do not preclude the use of violence or force for self-defense purposes. The White Papers and Policy Papers discussed in Chapter 3 suggest that violation of the Principle of Non-Aggression is justified only as a second strike or consequential and retaliatory self-defense mechanism after a first strike. This section explores and analyse China's "non-aggression" foreign policy "walk," paying specific attention to China's relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (hereafter, North Korea) and Russia. Given its justification for the use of force to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity, the proceeding discussion therefore mainly focuses on China's national security and geopolitical concerns, among others, which helps to illustrate the Non-Aggression Principle within the Asian region.

4.3.1 China and North Korea

North Korea is an autocratic state under communist rule, originally embedded through a rigid state controlled system under Kim Il-sung. Il-sung shaped North Korea's political affairs and introduced philosophies of self-reliance after the Korean War (1950-1953). Since then, North Korea has grown to be one of the most secretive regimes globally, especially taking into account its nuclear ambitions. North Korea is a nuclear-armed state, having successfully tested its first nuclear bomb in 2006, in violation of the NPT, which prohibits the proliferation, acquisition or transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states in Articles I, II and III. North Korea does not regard the NPT as binding on them, however, as they withdrew from the treaty in 2003.³⁰³ China's bilateral relations with North Korea have stood firm, however, built on the basis of national security and geopolitics. Their relations as allies stretch back to the Korean War, in which China and the Soviet Union aided North Korea when it invaded capitalist and US-allied South Korea in 1950.³⁰⁴ The dogma that seems to determine China's relations with North Korea is seen in the writing of Daewon and Richey, who explain that China wants to

³⁰³ Kelsey Davenport, "UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea," *Arms Control Association*, updated 9 August 2017, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea>.

³⁰⁴ Jian Chen, "China's changing aims during the Korean War," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 1, no. 1 (1992): 8.

ensure North Korea's sovereignty so as to shield itself from possible security threats or attacks originating from the US against China.³⁰⁵ Indeed, several writers and scholars have described the close foreign policy relationship between China and North Korea as that of "lips and teeth."³⁰⁶

In the Korean peninsula, the Chinese government thus seems to prioritise both regional stability and peace as its primary interests vital to its national security. However, the international confrontations caused by North Korea's nuclear program as well as its ballistic missiles programs created uncertainty in the region, emanating from North Korea's continued direct defiance of UN resolutions against its nuclear weapons program. The UN has over the years passed several resolutions, coupled with a series of sanctions against North Korea, notably Resolution 1695 (15 July 2006), Resolution 1718 (14 October 2006), Resolution 1874 (12 June 2009), Resolution 2087 (22 January 2013) and Resolution 2270 (2 March 2016)³⁰⁷ – all of which are aimed at putting pressure on the North Korean regime to stop its nuclear development program. Throughout, and despite North Korea's defiance and continued aggression, China has remained the only foreign ally supporting and protecting the regime, arguing against the US and UN members' proposition to use military orthodoxy to deal with North Korea. China's attitude towards North Korea corresponds with President Xi's "talk" discussed in Chapter 3, that "China rejects the law of the jungle by which the strong bullies the weak."³⁰⁸ However, in reference to China's 2003 Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures document, China's stance and "talk" on the North Korean issue seems self-contradictory, considering that China claims to protect the obligation placed on it by the NPT and the IAEA to promote the non-proliferation of WMDs.³⁰⁹

In as much as one can view China's responses towards North Korea as an indication of "walking the talk" on the Non-Aggression Principle, one cannot ignore the fact that China uses the Non-Aggression Principle above considerations such as non-proliferation of WMDs to

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Chen Jian, "Limits of the "lips and teeth" alliance: An historical review of Chinese-North Korean relations," *Asia Programme Special Report* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars (WWICS), 2003): 4-10; James Pearson, *Limits of the "lips and teeth" alliance: New evidence on Sino-DPRK relations, 1955-1984* (Washington, DC: WWICS, 2009).

³⁰⁷ United Nations, "Security Council strengthens Sanctions on Democratic Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2321," *Security Council*, 30 Nov. 2016, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12603.doc.htm>.

³⁰⁸ MFA, "Carry forward the 5 Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence to build a better world through win-win cooperation."

³⁰⁹ Information Office Of the State Council, *China's Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures*.

favour its geopolitical and national security considerations. Daewon and Mason³¹⁰ and Eleanor and Beina³¹¹ suggest that despite the instability of the Sino-North Korean relations, China has continually attempted to avoid the collapse of the regime in order to protect its geopolitical and national security concerns, not because of the Non-Aggression Principle. Important to note also is that North Korea serves as a buffer state shielding China from the US-allied Japan and South Korea. Hence, China continues to stand firm against aggressive international sanctions against North Korea. Yet contradictory to this is China's rhetoric, which condemns North Korea for its stubbornness in their nuclear weapons development on the grounds that it challenges China's regional status quo and unsettle the balance of power in the region. Indeed, the literature reviewed shows that China does not support North Korea's violations and deliberate defiance of the UN, NPT and other agencies; however, China is even more averse to the prospect of the collapse of North Korea, which would render China vulnerable to foreign attacks. Bruce Klinger interprets China's initial reluctance to deal fully or directly with North Korea as encouraging steps that all seemed to be short lived given North Korea's continual nuclear tests.³¹² In keeping with its non-proliferation policy, the Chinese government has supported sanctions and other punitive measures that were instituted against North Korea's nuclear weapons program. China's support in this instance is in accordance with its Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures Paper, which states that the Chinese government will not advocate, encourage, help and engage in the proliferation of nuclear weapons.³¹³

Yet despite the Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures Paper warning "severe violation punishment,"³¹⁴ the Chinese government, in keeping to its Non-Aggression Principle, has stood firmly against some UNSC members' proposed direct military intervention or the use of force to subdue North Korea's continued violations of the NPT.³¹⁵ Given how a nuclear weapon-capable North Korea upsets the balance of power and challenges China's regional status quo, North Korea's continued nuclear weapons program could have prompted direct military response from China. Instead, fearing the impact on its national security and regional stability, China has remained largely non-aggressive towards North Korea. That being said, China's tolerant attitude towards North Korea seems to have taken an about-turn in February 2013,

³¹⁰ Ohn Daewon and Mason Richey, "China's evolving policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea under Xi Jinping," *Asian Studies Review* 39, no. 3 (2015): 487.

³¹¹ Albert Aleanor and Xu Beina, "China-North Korea Relationship," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 8 Feb. 2016, <http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097>.

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ Information Office of the State Council, *China's Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures*.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ Michelle Nichols, US prepared to use force on North Korea 'if we must': UN envoy, *Reuters*, 4 Jul 2017.

when North Korea conducted its third nuclear test.³¹⁶ Though not taking aggressive action, China condemned North Korea during the Sunnylands Summit, in a rare joint declaration between China and the US. This declaration was followed by a Sino-South Korea joint statement for the future and an action plan to enrich the China-South Korean Strategic and Cooperative Partnership, which former South Korean President Park Geun-hye described as the basis for building bilateral relations for future regional security and peace, and common development.³¹⁷ Strengthening its cooperation with South Korea – North Korea’s primary enemy – can be viewed as China’s diplomatic attempt to curtail North Korea’s future aggression or threats in the region.

In 2016, following two more North Korean underground nuclear tests,³¹⁸ China abruptly responded by adopting a high-profile coercive measure against North Korea through collaboration with organs such as the UN, EU and US, among others,³¹⁹ possibly owing to fears of North Korea’s rising military power and continued defiance of previous UN resolutions. Adopting a high profile coercive measure but not direct military intervention, which would lead to the collapse of the regime, speaks of China’s lack of a definite resolve to deal with North Korea. Perhaps this ambiguity is because of a particular conundrum China is facing: the choice between a nuclear-armed North Korea, and a reunified Korea allied to the US and Japan. On 26 February 2017, following repeated North Korean missile tests, the Chinese government took another coercive step towards North Korea by banning its coal cargos. This was a significant step, as China is North Korea’s biggest ally and trade partner, with coal exports constituting 40% of North Korea’s total exports.³²⁰ Yet at the same time, China sent a total of 150,000 troops to the border with North Korea, according to *The Diplomat*³²¹ and China’s state-owned *Global Times* newspaper, as cited in the *Sunday Morning Herald*.³²²

³¹⁶ Daewon and Mason, “China’s evolving policy towards North Korea.”

³¹⁷ MFA, “China and Republic of Korea” (Government of China: Department of Asian Affairs, 2014), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zizig_663340/yzs_663350/gjlb_663354/2767_663538/.

³¹⁸ Albert Aleanor and Xu Beina, “China-North Korea Relationship.”

³¹⁹ Bruce Klingner, “Chinese Foot-Dragging on North Korea Thwarts US security interests” *The Heritage Foundation*, 11 Aug. 2016, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/08/chinese-foot-dragging-on-north-korea-thwarts-us-security-interests>.

³²⁰ John Ruwitch and Meng, Exclusive: North Korean ships head home after China orders coal returned,” *Reuters*, 11 Apr. 2017; Christopher Woody, “China appears to be making a key concession on North Korea,” *Business Insider*, 12 Apr. 2017.

³²¹ James Tunningley, “The deterioration of the People’s Republics: China’s North Korea problem,” *The Diplomat*, 25 Apr. 2017.

³²² Kirsty Needham, “North Korea tensions: Reports of Chinese troops on border,” *The Sunday Morning Herald*, 12 Apr. 2017.

Also of relevance is that since April 2017, there has been extreme tension between North Korea and the US. Because North Korea had been testing various types of short, medium and long-range missiles, the US has threatened to destroy the North Korean nuclear facilities. North Korea has in turn warned the US to end military hysteria in the region.³²³ Given the high alert for a potential North Korean show of force, the *BBC* claimed on 15 April 2017 that North Korea was getting ready for nuclear attack.³²⁴ According to *Aljazeera*, the US warned North Korea against launching a nuclear attack. US Defense Secretary James Mattis has also visited South Korea to reaffirm the US-South Korean military alliance after US President Donald Trump described North Korea as a problem that will be taken care of.³²⁵ China, in response to these heightened tensions, has demonstrated an uncertain response to the growing war-threatening event. According to *Sky News*, China as North Korea's sole major ally as well as neighbour has warned against strikes on North Korea, while at the same time urging North Korea to halt its nuclear program in exchange for Chinese protection.³²⁶ This ultimatum prompted Trump to state that the US was ready to handle the situation without China if necessary, as the US will not tolerate any provocations.³²⁷ Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that the region faced a precarious situation, owing to the belief that conflict could break out at any moment.³²⁸

Despite the heightened level of tension with North Korea, and, indeed, the threat to its own regional security, China is indecisive on which side to support: either a) to support the US to stop North Korea's growing nuclear threat, which would threaten its regional status quo, or b) to support a continued existence of the North Korean regime as all costs, and against the US threats, since North Korea serves as a satellite state in case of a US strike on China.³²⁹ Nonetheless, putting aside its indecisiveness, one can still classify China's stance as an act of non-aggression in the spirit of the Five Principles, which forbids it from directly intervening in the domestic affairs of North Korea as a sovereign state.

³²³ "North Korea warns US to end military hysteria," *SkyNews.com.au*, 16 Apr. 2017.

³²⁴ "North Korea ready for nuclear attack 'amid show of force,'" *BBC*, 15 Apr. 2017.

³²⁵ "US warns North Korea against nuclear attack," *Aljazeera*, 15 Apr. 2017.

³²⁶ "China warns against strike on North Korea," *SkyNews.com.au*, 14 Apr. 2017.

³²⁷ *Ibid.*

³²⁸ Justin McCury, Tom Phillips & Julian Borger, "China urges North Korea and US to step back from brink of war," *The Guardian*, 14 Apr. 2017.

³²⁹ Greg Price, "Why China remains North Korea's biggest ally," *News Week* 13 Apr. 2017.

4.3.2 China and Russia

The effects of geography on politics (geopolitics) between China and Russia are crucial variables to take into account when exploring China's Principle of Non-Aggression. For a significant amount of time prior to 1990, Sino-Soviet relations were characterised by the Sino-Soviet split resentments of the latter's alignment policy with the capitalist US (see Chapter 2). Since then, their geopolitical relations have arguably been built on Charles Krauthammer's neorealist approach. In 1990, Krauthammer referred to the "unipolar movement," in which world power is concentrated in the hands of one country: the US, as the outright victor of the long Cold War struggle, who remains unchallenged.³³⁰ It is through this construct of an unbalanced power structure within the international system that critics interpret the contemporary Sino-Russian geopolitical relations.

Critics often question whether or not China and Russia's post-Cold War geopolitical relations present a major shift in international relations, i.e. aligning against the US, with it unilateralism being as a perceived security threat.³³¹ Their geopolitical relations, according to Valentin Katrandjiev, grew to include military and technical cooperation between 1992 and 1997, seemingly against the US hegemony.³³² In 1992, the Chinese government purchased Russian super-maneuvre fighter aircrafts known as Sukhoi Su-27, which marked the commencement of large-scale modernisation and military exchanges between China and post-Soviet Russia. Despite the claims made by both governments that their relations were based on defensive purposes, the growth in cooperation in military terms does not inspire confidence in China's Principle of Non-Aggression, especially with regards to some weapon packages such as nuclear submarines, strategic bombers and interceptors, among others – deals that saw a rapid increase in 2003.³³³ Basing its geopolitical relations with Russia on their fear of US unilateral power contradicts its 1998 White Paper on National Defense, which states that "China does not seek hegemonism, nor does it seek military blocs or military expansion."³³⁴ Having a geopolitical militarily alliance with Russia is a form of military bloc or military expansion – one that is characterised by fears of the US. China's enormous arms purchases and geopolitical relations

³³⁰ Nathan A. Sears, "China, Russia, and the long unipolar moments," *The Diplomat*, 27 Apr. 2016.

³³¹ Tom Lairson, Rollins College and Ilan Alon, "Disparities limit the scope for a Sino-Russian strategic accord," *East Asia Forum*, 15 Jun. 2015, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/06/16/disparities-limit-the-scope-for-a-sino-russian-strategic-accord/>.

³³² Valentin Katrandjiev, "Geopolitical review of Sino-Russian Relations," *Journal of Diplomacy*, no. 9 (2016).

³³³ Ibid.

³³⁴ Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on China's National Defense*.

with Russia therefore validate Zweig's assertion (discussed in Chapter 2) that China has developed a new sense of insecurity vis-à-vis US hegemony.³³⁵

In 1996, the Chinese government also declared Russia a vital geopolitical partner in Central Asia, which resulted in the signing of a treaty on Good-Neighbourliness. This treaty was later followed by another treaty on Cooperation and Friendship in 2001. These treaties and China's move to mend its relations with its former foe can be interpreted acts of non-aggression. Taking into consideration that China and Russia have had territorial border disputes, China, when the Soviet Union fell in 1990, still remained non-aggressive and non-hostile. In 2004 and 2005, both countries put aside their differences regarding such disputes in a series of Border Agreements, which eventually led to the final border demarcation. This agreement in turn saw the reduction of military troops in the border areas, which in a sense activated the Sino-Russian commercial and economic cooperation.³³⁶ Given its history of antagonism with the Soviet Union characterised by the Sino-Soviet split, China could have taken an aggressive stance against a weak Russia in 1990; however in light of its later published White Paper on Peaceful Development of 2011, China, as part of its geopolitical and national security, promotes mutual trust, common security and cooperative security guided by the statement "war and confrontation will only lead to a vicious cycle of violence begetting violence."³³⁷

Yet these two powers do not always see eye-to-eye. For example, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a direct violation of the Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. This act escalated confrontations between Russia and the EU/US, as the annexation was a clear act of aggression by Russia over a smaller or weaker state.³³⁸ Moreover, on 30 September 2016, the Russian military began bombing ISIS targets in Syria, deploying Tu-160 and Tu-95 strategic bombers and an S-400 air-defense system.³³⁹ In these two incidences, Russia's foreign policy is in sharp contrast with everything that China's foreign policy claims to champion. Russia's approach here violates the Principles of Mutual Respect, Peaceful Co-Existence, Non-Interference and, most importantly in this case, Non-Aggression. However, as a geopolitical ally to Russia, China remained on the sidelines despite these violations and the escalating confrontations between Russia and the EU/US.

³³⁵ Zweig and Jianhai, "China's global hunt for energy."

³³⁶ Ibid.

³³⁷ MFA, "White Paper on Peaceful Development."

³³⁸ Yu Bin, "'Western civil war' déjà vu?" *Comparative Connections* 16, no. 1 (2014): 6.

³³⁹ Yu Bin, "Into the Syrian storm: Between alliance and alignment," *Comparative Connections*, 17, no. 3 (2016): 145.

Considering how China has always strongly condemned or stood firm against the US's and the UN's propositions to militarily intervene in the North Korean in the name of the Five Principles, one would have expected China to more strongly engage the Russian government regarding its acts of aggression against the Ukraine. However, China simply indicated its neutrality, stating that "China is deeply concerned with the Ukraine situation;" "China does not interfere in the internal affairs of Syria,"³⁴⁰ and "We hope all parties could strengthen communication and cooperation, as well as join forces in counter-terrorism actions."³⁴¹ It seems here that Bin may be correct in his suggestion that China's neutrality was based on the fact that China wanted to support Russia, but at the same time did not favour the routes the Russian government had taken in both scenarios. This assertion is derived from China's attempt to justify Russia's rationality, but not its eventual actions. For instance, concerning the Ukraine invasion, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated: "There have been reasons for today's situation in Ukraine" – however, it did not state what those reasons were. On the Syrian bombings,³⁴² the Foreign Ministry stated that China's view on the matter was that the Russian government's military intervention was justified, because such as intervention was requested by the government of Syria to fight against terrorism and extremist forces.³⁴³ The nature of China's foreign policy behaviour in these cases makes one wonder what kind of "a more equitable and rational international political and economic order" in which "China rejects the law of the jungle by which the strong bullies the weak" Xi referred to in his 2014 speech.³⁴⁴ One can also argue that China's behaviour or foreign policy decisions in these instances are heavily ingrained within its "bloc politics" or "military bloc," in which both the 1998 White Paper on National Defense and President Xi stated that China would not partake.

Regarding other military actions, in his speech in September 2016, Chinese Vice Admiral Wang Hai stated that over a period of five years (from 2011 to 2016), China had participated in a total of six joint sea military exercises with Russia.³⁴⁵ These exercises included joint Sino-Russian drills conducted in Guangdong Province in the southern parts of the South China Sea, which took place with navy surface ships, submarines, fixed wing aircraft, amphibious armoured equipment and helicopters. Furthermore, on 19 September 2016, both China and

³⁴⁰ Bin, "Western civil war."

³⁴¹ Bin, "Into the Syrian storm."

³⁴² Bin, "Western Civil War."

³⁴³ Bin, "Into the Syrian storm."

³⁴⁴ MFA, "Carry forward the 5 Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence to build a better world through win-win cooperation."

³⁴⁵ Ministry of Defense, Ceremony held to welcome Russian warships for "Joint Sea-2016" drill (Government of China, 2016) http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2016-09/13/content_4730131.htm.

Russia in a more confrontational capacity staged a mission to seize an island. Afterwards, the Chinese Ministry of Defense concluded that the two countries have demonstrated their geopolitical joint capacity in command management, telecommunication coordination and in demonstrating a greater degree of a combined intelligence and information sharing capacities.³⁴⁶ Chen Hu, cited by the Chinese Ministry of Defense, claimed that China and Russia's shared security concerns were to "address maritime security threats, improve their navy capacity as well as safeguarding and ensuring regional security and stability." He later regarded these drills as a "coordinated three-dimensional island seizing strategy."³⁴⁷

The military exercises display aggressive behavioural tendencies that are justified as important to national self-defense. If one is to consider how third parties can view the joint Sino-Russian drills, i.e. island-seizing activities in a confrontational capacity, and military arms purchases, while taking into account China's territorial claims, one can only remain sceptical regarding the country's true intentions. These actions also challenge or contradict China's statement its 2002 White Paper on Arms Control and Disarmament that: "while arms control and disarmaments are being worked on, violence must be curbed; regional conflicts must be fairly and rationally resolved and force or threat of force must not be used in international relations."³⁴⁸ China's foreign policy "walk" here makes its Principles of Non-Aggression incompatible with its means of pursuing national as well as foreign interests.³⁴⁹

4.3.3 Theoretical Application and Interpretation

Returning to the philosophical stipulations of the realist school of thought, one can conclude that China's Non-Aggressive Principle in relation to geopolitical and national security concerns is heavily ingrained with realism aspirations. This is, as the theory speculates, "the end game of a constant state of anarchy is perpetuated by different national interests," which result in tensions, mistrust and suspicions. China's joint island-seizing activities and large arms deals with Russia only invite suspicion given the volatile nature of its relations with its neighbours (including Taiwan and Japan) on sovereign and territorial claims. China's neutrality when Russia invaded Ukraine and later intervened militarily in Syria in direct contradiction of China's Five Principles of Mutual Co-existence supports the self-interests argument. Namely, China considered its geopolitical interests and relations with Russia, and continued "business

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

³⁴⁸ MFA, "Arms Control and Disarmament."

³⁴⁹ Panda, "Reflecting on China's 5 Principles, 60 Years Later."

as usual,” owing to fears that tainted relations with Russia would leave China’s national security vulnerable. National security concerns again are seen playing a pivotal role in defining China’s foreign policy response to North Korea’s aggression, defiance and controversies in nuclear development. However, China did not condemn Russia’s use of force with the same magnitude as it did those of its immediate neighbour North Korea, thus even further supporting the realist arguments when interpreting China’s foreign policy “walk” on non-aggression.

4.4 Principle 3: Non-Interference in the Domestic Affairs of Other Nations

As noted in the literature reviewed in Chapter 3, China was referred to as a “free rider” in the Middle East by former US President Barrack Obama. Quantitatively speaking, the Middle East has both the largest oil reserves and the cheapest oil in the world,³⁵⁰ but the region is volatile. Given its potential in natural resources, a peaceful and stable region has the ability to meet China’s demands for natural resources such as oil and gas. To understand the extent of China’s need to secure energy sources in the Middle East, in particular in Iraq and Iran, one has to look at China’s behaviour during the war between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s. During the late 1980s, the Chinese government supplied weapons to both countries in exchange for oil.³⁵¹ Stork describes this as a strange war: Chinese arms sent to Iraq, such as jet fighters, were assembled for shipment in countries such as Egypt and Jordan, while Chinese arms sent to Iran, such as tanks and other heavy artillery, were delivered via North Korea.³⁵² By so doing, China was not directly interfering in the affairs of these countries yet still capitalising on the war for its personal gains. Therefore, this section explores and analyses the foreign policy “walk” on the basis of the Non-Interference Principle in Iran and Iraq, which are amongst the most volatile Middle Eastern countries with which China does business. Figure 4.2 below shows China’s crude oil imports by 2014 and the percentages provided by Iran and Iraq respectively (case studies for this section), among other countries.

Given China’s dramatic energy demands in the 21st century, its relationship with the Middle East has become dynamic, mainly driven by China’s rapid demands for oil and gas.³⁵³ According to Ted Liu, there has been an increase in oil imports from 664 million USD to 235.75

³⁵⁰ D. Champlon, C. Girard and T. Daubignard, “Oil and gas reserves of the Middle East and North Africa,” *Natural Resource Forum, A United Nations Sustainable Development Journal* 15, no. 3 (1991): 202 -214.


³⁵¹ Rozen Zeidel, “Implications of the Iran-Iraq war,” *E-International Relations* 7 Oct. 2013, <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/10/07/implications-of-the-iran-iraq-war/>.

³⁵² Joe Stork, “Arms merchants in the Gulf,” *Middle East Research and Information Project*, accessed 11 Jul. 2017, <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer125-126/arms-merchants-gulf-war>.

³⁵³ Ted C. Liu, “China’s economic engagement in the Middle East and North Africa,” *Policy Brief* 12, no. 173 (2014): 365.

billion USD from 1980 to 2014, and is projected to reach an estimate of 500 billion USD by 2020.³⁵⁴ However, heated conflicts in the region threaten China’s energy security interests, thus providing good reasons for China to intervene in the region.

Figure 4.2: China’s Crude Oil Imports by Source, 2014



Source: “EIA: China Oil Markets Overview,” *Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections: An Institute for Global Energy Research*, May 16, 2015 (accessed Aug 11, 2016) <http://www.gasandoil.com/news/2015/05/eia-china-oil-market-overview>.

4.4.1 China and Iran

According to a Paper prepared for the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission in 2013, China’s relations with the Iranian government are described as a product of competing incentives and interests.³⁵⁵ The Paper described the nature of China’s relations with Iran as harbouring mixed feelings: on one hand, it is “walking a fine line” by supporting the Iranian government’s right to ignore non-UN sanctions, and on the other, it is “showing some

³⁵⁴

Ibid.

³⁵⁵

Marybeth Davis, et al., “China-Iran: A limited partnership,” *United States – China Economic and Security Review Commission*, updated April 2013 (accessed 1 Dec. 2016), 7, <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China-Iran--A%20Limited%20Partnership.pdf>.

restraints” for its own energy and economic interests.³⁵⁶ Consequently, through an extensive investigation of both the “talk” and the “walk” on the Principle of Non-Interference, the researcher submits that such contradictions are a by-product of China’s failure to perfectly align its national interests with its Five Principles, yet both national interests and the Five Principles determine or command a great deal of China’s foreign policy relations.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the Chinese government’s advanced industrial and defense technology programs in the field of nuclear and missile production were argued to have directly assisted Iran in its nuclear program.³⁵⁷ In the 1990s, Iran purchased uranium hexafluoride feedstock for enrichment and weapons such as the HY-2 “Silkworm” anti-ship missiles from China. Iran’s nuclear development later became a subject of much controversy in international affairs. China’s assistance was a very important factor in Iran’s nuclear dilemma in 2012, when a broad coalition of concerned states sought to intervene in Iran’s nuclear ambition and stop it from reaching its goal. Considering that China joined the IAEA in 1984 and the NPT in 1992, and also claims to abide by these international instruments on non-proliferation, China’s engagement with Iran can be seen as disregarding its commitments and contradicting its White Paper on Arms Control and Disarmament, in which it claims that “all exports of nuclear materials and equipment will be subject to IAEA safeguards. China has never exported sensitive technologies such as those for uranium enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production.”³⁵⁸

The Iranian enrichment programs resulted in a backlash from the US in terms of economic sanctions in 1995. In 1997, the Chinese government ended its support of Iran’s nuclear weapons programs and missile development.³⁵⁹ However, John Garver asserts that China did not fully abandon its military support and sales to the Iranian government. Indeed, the Iranian government, instead of purchasing missiles from China, continued to purchase the means of production for missile components as well as trained technicians and engines and missile designs.³⁶⁰ This continued support contradicts China’s 2003 Non-Proliferation Policy and Measure, in which it claims it will not encourage or assist any country to develop WMDs or

³⁵⁶ Ibid, 18.

³⁵⁷ Ibid, 34.

³⁵⁸ MFA, “China: Arms Control and Disarmament.”

³⁵⁹ Michael Schwartz, “The development of the Sino-Iranian limited partnership: China’s \$600-billion proposition” *Middle East Economy* 6, no. 9 (2016): 2.

³⁶⁰ John W. Garver, *China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), 54-55.

their means of delivery.³⁶¹ In 2006, the UN passed Resolution 1696 after the Iranian government refused to suspend its uranium enrichment program. In February and March 2006, the Chinese government also voted “yes” to measures put forward by the IAEA on the matter of the Iran nuclear issue, calling on Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. Then, on 31 July 2006, the Chinese government supported UNSC demands that Iran suspends its nuclear enrichment program by 31 August 2006.³⁶² China’s “walk” in these instances is aligned with the 2011 White Paper on Peaceful Development, in which it states that, “all countries weak, strong, big or small, rich or poor should also safeguard the UN’s core role in handling global affairs.”³⁶³ It can also be argued that through its actions in the UN, China adhered to its 2003 Non-proliferation Policy and Measure Policy Paper.

In the meantime, in 1997 China signed an agreement for cooperation in the field of oil and gas exploration in Iran, committing multi-billion dollars of investment.³⁶⁴ Since then, China has gained monopoly over the South Pars gas fields and Azadegan oilfields. In January 2001, a Chinese firm called Sinopec reached an agreement with the Iranian government to explore the Zaverh Kashan Block, which is located in the central parts of Iran.³⁶⁵ In 2006, the *China Daily* wrote that China, through Sinopec, signed a multi-million dollar (20 million to 59 million) contract with Iran, purposed on exploration and potential development of the onshore Garmsar block, which the Iranian government had put out to tender in 2003.³⁶⁶ Prior to the Sinopec 2006 multi-million dollar contract, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) developed the Masjede Suleman oilfield after taking over from Canadian oil companies that withdrew from Iran due to the imposed sanctions.³⁶⁷ In 2007, the CNPC increased its investments in these Masjede Suleman oilfields and started drilling in 2007, maintaining a 75% overall share.³⁶⁸ In 2009, the CNPC remained the sole operational partner in the South Pars oilfields with a commitment to invest a total of \$4.7 billion.³⁶⁹ In September 2009, the Chinese government through the CNPC signed a deal with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), giving it

³⁶¹ Information Office of the State Council, *China’s Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures*.

³⁶² UN, “Security Council demands Iran suspends uranium enrichment by 31 August, or face possible economic diplomatic sanctions,” *Meeting Coverage and Press Release*, 31 Jul. 2006 (Accessed: 15 Aug. 2016), <http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8792.doc.htm>.

³⁶³ MFA, “White Paper on Peaceful Development.”

³⁶⁴ Davis, et al., “China-Iran: A limited partnership.”

³⁶⁵ “Sinopec in deal to explore Iran oil block,” *China Daily*, 22 Jun. 2006.

³⁶⁶ Ibid.

³⁶⁷ Davis, et al., “China-Iran: A limited partnership.”

³⁶⁸ Mark Dubowitz and Laura Grossman, *Iran’s Chinese Energy Partner* (Washington D.C., Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2010), 15.

http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/China_Report_September_2010_for_Website_2.pdf

³⁶⁹ “China pulls out of South Pars project: Report,” *Reuters*, 29 Jul. 2012.

(China) ownership of 70% of the project to develop the South Azadegan oilfields, which resulted in the CNPC replacing France Total.³⁷⁰

Table 4.1 below presents a timeline of major Chinese investments in Iran’s oil industry. This table was presented in a 2017 Congressional Research Service Paper, which documents major investments in Iran’s Energy Sector since 1999. The researcher has only singled out major energy investments between China and Iran, although other foreign companies might have been involved one way or the other.

Table 4.1: Major Chinese Energy Investment Projects in Iran

Date	Field/Project	Company or Companies	Value
May 2002	Masjid-e-Soleyman (oil)	CNPC	\$80 million
January 2004	Azadegan (oil)	CNPC	\$1.76 billion
October 2004	Yadaravan (oil)	Sinopec, deal finalised Dec 9, 2007	\$2 billion
June 2006	Garmsar bloc (oil)	Sinopec, deal finalised in 2009	\$20 million
July 2006	Arak Refinery Expansion	Sinopec	\$959 million
December 2006	North Pars Gas Field (offshore gas includes gas purchases)	China National Offshore Oil Co.	\$16 billion
January 2009	North Azadegan	CNPC	\$1.75 billion
February 2010	South Pars: Phase II	CNPC (drilling was to have begun in March 2010, still delayed)	\$4.7 billion
November	South Pars: Phase II	CNPC	\$4.8 billion

Source: Kenneth Katzman, “Iran Sanctions,” Congressional Research Service, *Federation of American Scientists* 7 Jun. 2017: Table 4. Post-1999 Major Investments in Iran’s Energy Sector. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf>.

China’s business with Iran in the face of prevailing Iranian condemnations and sanctions owing to its nuclear development program gives testimony to its allegiance to the Non-Interference Principle and is somewhat in accord with China’s White Paper on Peaceful Development, in which it is emphasised that “China fully respects other countries’ legitimate rights to protect their interests. While developing itself, it fully accommodates other countries’ legitimate concerns and interests and never makes gains at others’ expense or shifts its own troubles onto others.”³⁷¹ Yet when one analyses China’s support of UN resolutions against Iran, its voting patterns as well as its public statements, one can argue that China’s “walk” is contradictory. The Chinese government refused to sanction direct intervention in Iran (respecting the

³⁷⁰ Dubowitz and Grossman, *Iran’s Chinese Energy Partner*, 15.

³⁷¹ MFA, “White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development.”

Principles of Non-Interference and Mutual Respect), but supported sanctions that targeted Iran's investments in oil, insurance and financial institutions, owing to Iran's violations and disregard of the NPT, IAEA and UN resolutions. At the same time, it continued doing business with Iran. China's "walk" in this instance can best be argued to be diplomatically realist, putting national self-interest (demand for natural resources) before any other obligations. This approach makes both its "talk" and "walk" rhetoric seemingly secondary to self-interests, especially after China became the world's second largest consumer and net oil importer in 1993. As international oil companies departed from Iran because of fear of the imposed sanctions, Chinese state-owned oil companies stepped in to fill in the vacuum, in direct contradiction with its 2012 Energy Policy in which it claims to be an "active and responsible participant in international energy cooperation, having established bilateral dialogue and cooperative mechanisms in the field of energy with the US, the EU, Japan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and many other countries and regions."³⁷²

Davis, Lecky, Froscher, Kerevel and Schlaikjer thus describe China's policy approach towards Iran since the early 2000s, as "delay and dilution of the imposed sanctions" instead of outright obstruction.³⁷³ Their statement makes sense in this inquiry when one takes into account China's stated "talk" on non-proliferation in its 2003 Policy and Measure Policy Paper: "It is necessary to prevent any country from engaging in proliferation under the pretext of peaceful utilization."³⁷⁴ The delays and dilution of the imposed sanctions by the Chinese government can be argued to have bought the Iranian government time to work on its enrichment program, rather than engaging in "outright obstructive." This approach is evident in the passing of Resolution 1747 by the UNSC in 2007, when China declined to restrict its government loans and guarantees for its companies doing business with Iran.³⁷⁵ Resolution 1747 had no clause that imposed strict or harsh penalties on Iran, but only on targeted individuals and entities linked to this nuclear development.³⁷⁶ A resolution of this nature would therefore not affect much of China's foreign trade or business, or normal commercial transactions with Iran.

³⁷² Information Office of the State Council, *China's Energy Policy*.

³⁷³ Davis, et al., "China-Iran: A limited partnership."

³⁷⁴ Information Office of the State Council, *China's Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures*.

³⁷⁵ John Garver, "China's Iran policies: China's current and emerging foreign policy priorities," *US-China Economic and Security Review Commission*, 13 Apr. 2011 (accessed, 10 Jul. 2017), <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/4.13.11Garver.pdf>.

³⁷⁶ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747, 21 Mar. 2007, S/RES/1747(2007), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1747%282007%29.

On a separate sitting, but of similar concern, when the US Obama Administration in December 2009 introduced the motion of adopting a fourth round of UNSC measures based on Iran's failure to comply with the drafted resolution on its nuclear development, China delayed the process until June 2010 – an action that has been described by Garver as strategically buying Iran more time. The UNSC finally adopted Resolution 1929 in June 2010, restricting and prohibiting Iran from importing conventional arms as well as having foreign-based investments in nuclear enrichment operations.³⁷⁷ China's delay tactics are portrayed as having weakened sanctions embedded in the UNSC, allowing or indirectly assisting the Iranian government to swiftly advance its nuclear efforts.³⁷⁸ Arguably, China's foreign policy "walk" in Iran strained its diplomatic relations with the US. As such, in an attempt to maintain its ties with the US and not to escalate hostile relations, the Chinese government reduced its average oil imports from Iran from an annual total of 555,000 bbl/d in 2011 to 439,000 bbl/d in 2012 and 2013.³⁷⁹ However, after the commencement of peace talks in 2013, which included the Iranian government, China, the US and four other countries, China normalised its imports from Iran. These talks eventually led to a nuclear agreement being reached in 2015 under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).³⁸⁰

During the JCPOA signing in July 2015, China is argued to have played a critical arbitrating role between the US government and the Iranian government. Schwartz states that the Chinese government persuaded the Iranian government, advising them on the associated or potential economic benefits as well as increased ties with China under normalised relations.³⁸¹ Moreover, high level diplomatic visits following the signing of the JCPOA illustrates the overlap between China's Non-Interference Principle and the Principles of Non-Aggression, Peaceful Co-Existence, Mutual Respect and Mutual Benefits. On 22 January 2016, Chinese President Xi met the President of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, as well as the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (Supreme leader), to strengthen bilateral ties. A ten-year, \$600 billion trade deal between the two countries was announced, with Xi stating: "Iranians never trusted the West... That's why Tehran seeks cooperation with more independent countries like China."³⁸²

³⁷⁷ John Garver, "China's Iran Policies: China's Current and Emerging Foreign Policy Priorities," 7.

³⁷⁸ Ibid, 6.

³⁷⁹ "EIA: China Oil Markets Overview," *Alexander's Gas and Oil Connections: An Institute for Global Energy Research*, 16 May 2015 (accessed 11 Aug. 2016). <http://www.gasandoil.com/news/2015/05/eia-china-oil-market-overview>.

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

³⁸¹ Schwartz, "The development of the Sino-Iranian limited partnership," 1.

³⁸² Ibid.

Given this peaceful outcome, one can then conclude that despite China's controversial or mixed approaches in its foreign policy "walk" with Iran, it was eventually able to "walk the talk" according to the Five Principles. It managed to avoid a total eclipse of the Iranian regime through a non-interference policy against external forces such as US, EU and UN sanctions, on the basis of mutual respect of state sovereignty. At the same time, China looked after its self-interests by importing Iran's resources. With regards to the Mutual Benefit Principle, China managed to secure resources while mediating peaceful relations between the US and the Iranian government. By 2016, China was therefore in a position to actively confirm its "talk" in the China-Arab Policy Paper, as alluded to in Chapter 3.

4.4.2 China and Iraq

Given that Iraq has the world's fifth largest oil reserves and natural gas deposits, and given China's increased footprint in Iraq's energy sectors, this section explores China's Non-Interference Principle in Iraq.³⁸³ In 1990, during the invasion of Kuwait, the government of Iraq committed over 100,000 soldiers and more than 700 tanks, and ended up killing up to 200 people.³⁸⁴ Iraq's move was a direct violation of the Chinese Principles of Non-Interference, Non-Aggression, Mutual Respect of States' Sovereignty, and Peaceful Co-Existence. As such, the Chinese government joined the West in condemning the invasion and imposing sanctions on Iraq.³⁸⁵ China's condemnation of Iraq at the time depicts the moral values underlying the Non-Interference Principle. However, by the beginning of February 1991, China stepped back from the coalition's alliance against Iraq. Though various reasons were raised by critics (arguing that it is because of the fact that China was benefiting from the Gulf Crisis), it is imperative to justify China's reluctance as an indication of its Non-Interference Principle, within the context of the overlapping Five Principles. Indeed, despite Iraq's actions having been inconsistent with the UN purposes, ganging up with allied forces and using force to compel Iraq would have jeopardised the values and ethics guiding China's "talk."

After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was resolved in 1991, the US maintained its sanctions, which prohibited the Iraqi government from exporting its oil. These sanctions were later criticised as a main contributing factor to the decline of humanitarian conditions in Iraq, such as hunger and high rates of unemployment suffered by the general populace. A program known as Oil-For-

³⁸³ Chris Zambelis, "China's Iraq oil strategy comes into sharper focus," *China Brief* 13, no. 10 (2013).

³⁸⁴ "Iraq invades Kuwait: 1990," *BBC*, accessed 11 Jul. 2017.

³⁸⁵ Nicholas D. Kristof, "War in the Gulf: China; Beijing backs away from full support of the War," *The New York Times*, 1 Feb. 1991.

Food (OFF) was then started in 1996 to intervene and ease the situation, allowing Iraq to buy food as well as medicine in return for small supplies of its oil.³⁸⁶ The Chinese government took advantage of this situation and implemented some trade exchanges with Iraq under the OFF program.³⁸⁷ This arrangement did not last long, however, as accusations later surfaced against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein of exploiting the program and earning billions of dollars from kickbacks and illegal oil smuggling totalling about \$12.6 billion.³⁸⁸

In 2003, the US invaded Iraq under the pretext that Iraq was developing WMDs. The US government unilaterally used a combination of economic sanctions, no-flight zones as well as a military containment approach in north and south Iraq. Jakobsen interprets the main intention of the US as being a revolution or military-led coup within Hussein's camp.³⁸⁹ In the spirit of Non-Interference, Non-Aggression and Mutual Respect of Iraq's sovereignty, the Chinese government called upon the US to cease its unilateral actions and use the peaceful path of a political solution within the UN framework.³⁹⁰ China condemned the US' use of force in the Iraq situation. China's position in this regard acknowledges its "talk" as presented by Xi during the 60th Anniversary of the Five Principles, i.e. that "the Chinese government reject the law of the jungle by which the strong bullies the weak," which is part of China's "positive role of building a more equitable and rational international political and economic order" that "strengthens the movement against imperialism and colonialism."³⁹¹ Therefore, its position on this matter supports to its Principle of Non-Interference.

In the post US-Iraq War, the Chinese government has become more commercially invested in Iraq's oil sectors. As such, according to a 2014 article in the *Wall Street Journal*, China's imports from Iraq rose by 50% by 2014.³⁹² Most of the oil imported to China from Iraq is produced in the al-Ahdad, Halfaya and Rumaila oilfields. As such, China now holds control over Iraq's major oil production sources, which allows China to buy nearly half of Iraq's oil,

³⁸⁶ Claudio Gatti and Mark Turner, "Oil-For-Food plan chief criticised," *Financial Times*, 31 Jan. 2005.

³⁸⁷ Embassy of the PRC in the Republic of Iraq, Bilateral relations between China and Iraq (Government of China, 2013), <http://iq.chineseembassy.org/eng/zygx/zygxgk/>.

³⁸⁸ Sharon Otterman, "Iraq: Oil for Food scandal," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 28 Oct. 2005, <https://www.cfr.org/background/iraq-oil-food-scandal>.

³⁸⁹ Tor G. Jakobsen, "Why did the United States Invade Iraq in 2003," *Popular Social Science*, 25 Oct. 2012.

³⁹⁰ Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN, "China's position on the US war in Iraq" (Government of China, 2003), <http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/mideast/y1k/t537117.htm>.

³⁹¹ MFA, "Carry forward the 5 Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence to build a better world through win-win cooperation."

³⁹² Wayne Ma and Brian Spegele, "New suppliers boost China oil imports," *The Wall Street Journal*, 21 Jan. 2014.

an estimate of about 1.5 million barrels per day.³⁹³ However, the tumultuous political and security environment of Iraq in the post-US-Iraq War has arguably impeded China's operation in Iraq, and one would expect the Chinese government to intervene and help the Iraqi government to combat terrorism. The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has proven to be a brutal and radical group that is determined to spread its radical religious views, even by means of violence.

This threat, coupled with violence, mismanagement and instabilities, has negatively impacted Iraq's energy production, which normally should have prompted China's interference in a bid to bring stability in Iraq. Yet instead of intervening and dealing with these complexities, Chinese state-owned oil companies continued doing business as usual. For example, the CNPC in 2008 secured a \$3.5 billion deal with Iraq's North Oil Company (NOC), which gave the Chinese CNPC the mandate to invest and develop the al-Ahdab oilfield in al-Wasit.³⁹⁴ The CNPC in 2009 also signed joint agreements with Iraq as well as British Petroleum in a bid to increase production of oil. In the same year, coordination and collaboration between Chinese companies Petro China and CNPC and China's largest oil producer concluded an agreement with Iraq, giving China rights to operate in the Halfaya oilfield.³⁹⁵ Sinopec then followed suit by purchasing Swiss-Canadian firm Addaz Petroleum for a total of \$8.9 billion. This firm had holdings in North East Iraq in the Kurdish area as well as in Africa.³⁹⁶ On 4 November 2009, Iraq announced its oil deal with the CNPC in the giant Rumaila oilfield, worth a total investment of \$15 billion.³⁹⁷ Such huge amounts from the CNPC were meant to help rebuild the oil industry in Iraq, and in turn increase China's grip over Iraq's energy sources. Given that China is the biggest benefactor of Iraq's oil produce, one would expect China to fully assist the Iraq government in dealing with Iraq's security issues.

Indeed, radical terrorist groups have gained much prominence in Iraq and the surrounding region, making it difficult for Iraqi troops to successfully subdue these groups and stabilise the country without adequate international assistance. In 2014, the Chinese government finally intervened by endorsing UNSC resolution 2170, which strongly condemns extremists in Iraq and Syria. This move can be interpreted as a form of intervention, in opposition to its "talk" on

³⁹³ Liu, "China's economic engagement in the Middle East and North Africa."

³⁹⁴ Zambelis, "China's Iraq Oil Strategy Comes into Sharper Focus."

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

³⁹⁶ "China Gets its First Real Grip on Arab Oil," *United Press International*, 5 Nov. 2009.

³⁹⁷ Ibid.

non-interference.³⁹⁸ However, it can also be interpreted as being in accordance with its 2011 White Paper on Peaceful Development, in which it claims “to play an important role in safeguarding world peace and meeting global challenges by taking an active part in international cooperation in anti-terrorism and non-proliferation.”³⁹⁹ In addition, its 2016 China’s Arab Policy Paper states: “China is ready to strengthen anti-terrorism exchanges and cooperation with Arab countries to establish a long-term security cooperation mechanism, strengthen policy dialogue and intelligence information exchange, and carry out technical cooperation and personnel training to jointly address the threat of international and regional terrorism.”⁴⁰⁰

Prior to the release of the China-Arab Policy Paper, in 2014, ISIS had killed three Chinese militants and, a year later, on 18 November 2015, a Chinese national, Fan Jinhui, was executed by ISIS. Still, the Chinese government did not respond to these threats by intervening in Iraq or Syria in order to deal with ISIS.⁴⁰¹ Therefore, overall, China’s adherence to the Principle of Non-Interference is strong and China is indeed “walking the talk.” However, this might change in the near future, given that China stated in its 2016 Arab Policy Paper that it is “ready to strengthen anti-terrorism exchanges and cooperation with Arab nations.”⁴⁰²

4.4.3 Theoretical Applications and Interpretations

China’s foreign policy “walk” in the Middle East is best interpreted by the realist school of thought, which suggests that states’ behaviour in international relations is essentially aimed at the pursuit for power and, as such, foreign policy decisions are pragmatic calculations of self-interests. The researcher submits that China’s foreign policy “walk” in the Middle East is mainly guided by national self-interests, in particular resource acquisition for its modernisation and consumption demands, than it being guided by the acclaimed Five Principles. China’s thus faces a difficult situation: it needs to maintain good relations with the US; it needs to adhere to the Five Principles; and it needs to acquire natural resources. China is thus seen to be supporting sanctions against Iran and Iraq, while at the same time continuing to do business with them and increasingly conveying its displeasure at military West’s interventions, particularly the US unilateral interventions. When international companies left Iran or Iraq

³⁹⁸ UN, *Security Council Adopts Resolution 2170 Condemning Gross, Widespread Abuse of Human Rights by Extremist Groups in Iraq, Syria*, 15 Aug. 2014, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11520.doc.htm>.

³⁹⁹ MFA, “China’s White Paper on Peaceful Development.”

⁴⁰⁰ Information Office of the State Council, *China Arab Policy Paper*.

⁴⁰¹ Jennine Liu, “China’s ISIS woes,” *The Diplomat*, 26 Feb. 2016.

⁴⁰² Information Office of the State Council, *China Arab Policy Paper*.

owing to fear of US-imposed sanctions, China stepped in to fill in. Its reaction shows a realist stance, putting its own interests first, but doing so in diplomatic ways irrespective of the state of affairs in the two countries. Its behaviour seems to send a message that unilateral decisions made by the US against Iran were not considered as binding on third parties. As such, Chinese energy interests in Iran or Iraq could not be overridden by US unilateral sanctions, interests or decisions.

4.5 Principle 4: Equality and Mutual Benefit

The expansive One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative authorised in 2015 by the Chinese State Council is a testament to China's pursuit of the Principle of Equality and Mutual Benefit.⁴⁰³ The OBOR is a Chinese economic and diplomatic program that calls for massive investments to create trade routes that would transform trade across Asia, Africa and Europe. The OBOR often referred to as an Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road (see figure 4.3 below) seeks to equally benefit all countries. Considering that China has become Africa's largest trading partner following the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) on 25 September 2000, this section explores and analyses China's foreign policy "walk" on the African continent, paying particular attention to its development assistance and aid in Sudan and Zimbabwe. These are two of the most unstable and volatile African countries with which China continues to do business, injecting billions of dollars while refraining from directly tackling the "hotspot" problems in these countries.

⁴⁰³ Tian Jinchun, "One Belt and One Road": Connecting China and the world," *Mckinsey & Company*, Jul. 2016, <http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-projects-and-infrastructure/our-insights/one-belt-and-one-road-connecting-china-and-the-world>.

Figure 4.3: One Belt One Road



Source: Tian Jinchun, “‘One Belt and One Road’: Connecting China and the world,” *McKinsey & Company* July 2016, <http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/capital-projects-and-infrastructure/our-insights/one-belt-and-one-road-connecting-china-and-the-world>.

4.5.1 China and Zimbabwe

China’s increased footprint in Africa has led to mixed sentiments, with some arguing that Africa is enjoying China’s development assistance and aid whilst others, especially those in the West, criticising China’s *modus operandi*. According to Elizabeth Economy, China’s foreign policy engagement with Africa is guided by the “maxi-mini-principle – maximisation of rights and minimisation of responsibility,”⁴⁰⁴ an observation that supports Robert Samuelson’s view that China’s policies in Africa reflect a “me first notion.”⁴⁰⁵ Both these views do not take into account China’s claim of adhering to the Principle of Equality and Mutual Benefit. As African countries increasingly adopt a “Look East Policy,” the proceeding discussion pays attention to Sino-Zimbabwean development assistance and foreign aid relations.⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰⁴ Elizabeth Economy, *The Impact of International Regimes on Chinese Foreign Policy Making: Broadening Perspectives and Policies... But only to a point* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 215-230.

⁴⁰⁵ Robert J. Samuelson, “The danger behind China’s ‘Me First’ Worldview,” *Washington Post*, 15 Feb. 2010.

⁴⁰⁶ David H. Shinn & Joshua Eisenman, *China and Africa: A Century of Engagement* (New York: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012).

Since 2000, following the invasion of white-owned commercial farms by President Robert Mugabe's political party, the Zimbabwe African National Unity – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), Zimbabwe experienced a crisis of governance and gross human rights violations, leading to major setbacks in its social, economic and political spheres in its transition to democracy.⁴⁰⁷ Internationally, the EU, IMF, WB, US and Britain imposed economic sanctions and an arms embargo on Zimbabwe. Over the years, human rights violations under Mugabe's regime, according to a 2017 report made to the AU by the Human Rights Watch, has progressed to the extent that the Zimbabwean government violated its 2013 Constitution, which guarantees equal rights for women and prohibits other forms of discrimination.⁴⁰⁸

Yet China continued to engage with the government of Zimbabwe,⁴⁰⁹ even though in its 2005 White Paper on Peaceful Development Road, the Chinese government states: “We should actively promote and guarantee human rights to ensure that everyone enjoys equal opportunities and rights to pursue overall development. We should make innovations in the mode of development, promote the harmonious development of man and nature, and take the road of sustainable development.”⁴¹⁰ Moreover, in its 2011 White Paper on Peaceful Development, China states that it puts people first and that when making balanced overall plans, it takes all factors into consideration, as the Chinese government always respects human rights and values and works to promote prosperity for all.⁴¹¹ Given these assurances, one would expect China to respond to the gross violation of human rights in Zimbabwe. Yet, despite the Freedom House in 2013 rating freedom and civil liberties in Zimbabwe 6 out of 7 (Freedom rating 1 = best and 7 = worst), China has continued doing business as usual with Zimbabwe.⁴¹² Thus, by paying no attention to Zimbabwe's gross human rights violations, China is not “walking the talk” and, as such, attaining equality and mutual benefit is merely rhetoric given the current economic meltdown that Zimbabwe has endured over the years.

⁴⁰⁷ John Makumbe, *The Impact of Democracy in Zimbabwe. Assessing Political, Social and Economic Developments since the Dawn of Democracy* (Harare: University of Zimbabwe, 2009), 1.

⁴⁰⁸ Niger Niamey, “Human Rights Watch submission to the 60th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights,” *Human Rights Watch*, 10 May 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/12/human-rights-watch-submission-60th-ordinary-session-african-commission-human-and>.

⁴⁰⁹ Jeremy Youde, “Why Look East? Zimbabwean foreign policy and China,” *Africa Today* 53, no. 3 (2007): 3-19.

⁴¹⁰ Information Office of the State Council, *China's Peaceful Development Road*.

⁴¹¹ Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on China's Peaceful Development*.

⁴¹² “Freedom in the world 2013: Zimbabwe,” *Freedom House in the World*, accessed 18 Jul. 2017, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/zimbabwe>.

Based on the mutual inclusiveness of the Five Principles, China's lack of resolve in the Zimbabwean human rights violations can also be interpreted as a product of its Principles of Non-Interference and Mutual Respect of Zimbabwe's sovereignty. The 2011 White Paper on Peaceful Development states: "China respects the right of the people of other countries to independently choose their own social system and path of development, and does not interfere in other countries' internal affairs."⁴¹³ However, in the event of a repressive regime, the people cannot independently choose anything, which therefore means that outside countries and organisations must attempt to address the plight of these people. Indeed, it was such a response that led to the imposition of sanctions against the Zimbabwean government. Yet, China continues to do business with the Mugabe regime, despite its volatile nature. China's "walk" in the context of Zimbabwe contradicts its claim in the 2011 White Paper on Peaceful Development of being an active and responsible member of the international community who is actively addressing international and regional hotspot problems.⁴¹⁴

Also of importance here is China's development assistance, which manifested during the 4th FOCAC Ministerial Conference that was held in 2009, where it established a special loan system for both small- and medium-sized African businesses. The amount totalled US\$1.213 billion, with a contract value of US\$1.028 billion, and was mainly aimed at investments in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, fishing and other avenues closely associated with their policy of improving the livelihood of the people of Africa.⁴¹⁵ Zimbabwe is one of the recipients of China's development assistance and aid since its adoption of the "Look East Policy" in 2003, which offers priority to Chinese investors and expanding bilateral relations despite the Western-imposed sanctions.⁴¹⁶ Owing to the Look East Policy, in 2008 Mugabe passed an indigenisation policy that practically exempted Chinese companies, thereby giving China unparalleled access to resources. Other foreign companies that seek business in Zimbabwe, however, are subjected to this policy, which states that the majority (51%) of shares or proceeds must be given to local Zimbabwean nationals.⁴¹⁷

Between 2000 and 2012, the Chinese government is argued to have financed an estimate of over 120 projects in Zimbabwe.⁴¹⁸ These projects ranged from water infrastructure and

⁴¹³ Information Office of the State Council, *White paper on China's Peaceful Development*.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

⁴¹⁵ Information Office of the State Council, *China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation*.

⁴¹⁶ Youde, "Why Look East?"

⁴¹⁷ Samuel Ramani, "Is China ready for a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe?" *The Diplomat*, 13 Aug. 2016.

⁴¹⁸ Olivia Archdeacon, "China buys its first African colony for a meagre \$40 million," *CAPX*, 15 Jan. 2016.

sewerage rehabilitation within the Harare City Council, amounting to US\$144 million. In addition, the Chinese government through the Anhui Foreign and Economic Construction Company (AFECC) constructed Zimbabwe's National Defense College, worth US\$98 million, in 2010.⁴¹⁹ Loans, which Zimbabwe are supposed to repay over a period of 20 years, were given to the Zimbabwean government by the China Export and Import Bank for this project, adding to Zimbabwe's external debt, which is estimated to be above US\$8 billion, according to former Finance Minister Tendai Biti.⁴²⁰ This project was completed far ahead of its scheduled time frame, a period of three years. The construction of this college as well as the "State-of-the-Art Villas" along the Mazoe road in Zimbabwe physically represents the value of the Zimbabwean Look East Policy. Construction of the Mahusekwa hospital, a 130-bed hospital, followed in 2012, and China also assisted in the development of the Urology Department at Parirenyatwa hospital in Harare. Moreover, on 13 August 2016, *The Diplomat* cited *The Herald* (Zimbabwe's largest state paper), in stating that China pledged to construct a new parliament for the Zimbabwean government, worth USD 46 million.⁴²¹

These activities confirms China's "talk" in the 2008 White Paper on China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation, in which it is stated: "China firmly supports Africa's self-enhancement through unity, and works hard to strengthen cooperation with the AU and African sub-regional organizations in a variety of fields, including infrastructure development, capacity building and mechanism construction."⁴²² These activities also correspond with China's 2015 Second Africa Policy Paper, which calls for the principle of "practical results," seeking cooperation and mutual benefits through commitments with real actions.⁴²³ As such, Mugabe, during the China-Africa forum in South Africa in 2015, described Chinese President Xi Jinping as a "God-sent person" to Africa, citing China's development assistance programs and unconditional aid offers among other benefits that some African countries are reaping from their foreign relations with China.⁴²⁴

As part of its development assistance and aid in Zimbabwe, the Export-Import Bank of China also gave the Zimbabwean government a total sum of US\$77 million in addition to the

⁴¹⁹

Ibid.

⁴²⁰ Ngoni Chanakira, "Zimbabwe's debt arrears to reach US\$8 billion in 2012," *The Zimbabwean* 21 Apr. 2012.

⁴²¹

Ibid.

⁴²² Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation*.

⁴²³ *Xinhua*, "China's 2015 Second Africa Policy Paper."

⁴²⁴

"ISS today: As Mugabe fights for his political future, why is China silent?" *The Daily Maverick*, 21 July 2016.

US\$99,958 in 2011, targeting health development equipment.⁴²⁵ Yet China's financial assistance in a country that is plagued with bad governance, high corruption and mismanagement of funds will not help it live up to the Principle of Equality and Mutual Benefit. In 2016, the Zimbabwean Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa told the nation that more than \$15 billion had gone missing.⁴²⁶ In light of such gross government mismanagement of funds and no accountability, China's continuation to assist Zimbabwe does not in any way help the deteriorating fiscal or economic crisis in Zimbabwe, as the Principle of Equality and Mutual Benefit implies. In fact, the situation in Zimbabwe is growing worse, which has led to increasing numbers of demonstrations and worker stay-aways, which are in turn suppressed. Citizen movements have also gained momentum, as seen in the use of social networks with the handle #ThisFlag⁴²⁷ and mass protests such as the Tajamuka/Sesjikule campaigns.⁴²⁸ Using jamming devices purchased from China in 2004, the Zimbabwean government was accused of jamming social media in a bid to discourage demonstrations and social movements; however, on 7 July 2016, the Minister of Information and Communication Technology, Super Mandiwanzira, denied that the government had anything to do with the jamming.⁴²⁹ Amid fuel, food and currency shortages, the Zimbabwean government also purchased military devices, fighter aircraft and military vehicles worth \$200 million from China in order to block broadcasts of anti-government reports in the 2005 parliamentary elections – despite sanctions and an arms embargo from the international community.⁴³⁰ Ironically, despite all evidence pointing to lack of good governance in Zimbabwe, China has praised Mugabe as “a man of great achievements, devoted to world peace and a good friend of the Chinese people.”⁴³¹

In reality, the financial crisis in Zimbabwe is growing more severe, leading to a cash crisis that saw the Zimbabwean Minister of Primary and Secondary Education, Lazarus Dokora, on 17 April 2017 urging school authorities to accept the use of livestock, i.e. goats or labour, as a form of payment of tuition fees.⁴³² In the light of this situation, the Institute for Security Studies

⁴²⁵ “Zimbabwe: Chinese Bank Avails \$77 million for health,” *All-Africa*, 26 Jul. 2016.

⁴²⁶ Bulawayo Bureau, “Missing \$15 billion lootings face probe,” *The Herald*, 28 Apr. 2016; “Mugabe and the \$15 billion question,” *The Standard*, 14 Mar. 2016.

⁴²⁷ Simon Allison, The man behind #ThisFlag, Zimbabwe's accidental movement for change, *The Guardian*, 26 May 2016.

⁴²⁸ Mugove Tafirenyika, “Tajamuka threatens fresh mass protests,” *The Daily News*, 6 Jun. 2017.

⁴²⁹ Paida Moyo Chipunza, “We had no part in yesterday's WhatsApp jam,” *The Herald*, 7 Jul. 2016.

⁴³⁰ Brookes and Shin, “China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States,” 6; “Cash-hungry Zimbabwe splashes out on fighter jets,” *Business Day* 10 Jun. 2004.

⁴³¹ Mure Dickie and John Reed, “China Hails Mugabe's ‘brilliant’ diplomacy,” *Financial Times*, 25 Sept. 2016.

⁴³² Ismail Akwei, “Cash-strapped Zimbabwe has assented to the payment of school fees by parents using livestock or labour for the schools,” *Africa News*, 17 Apr. 2017.

(ISS)⁴³³ and *The Daily Maverick*⁴³⁴ have both raised concerns over China's sudden silence on the unfolding economic and cash crises in Zimbabwe. Moreover, that fact that the Zimbabwean situation has deteriorated over the years despite China's foreign aid and development assistance bears testimony to the shortfalls of the Principle of Equality and Mutual Beneficial Cooperation. Meanwhile, while Zimbabwe's political and economic frameworks continue to deteriorate, China's seems to plunder the resources of the nation, which in a way gives credit to both Elizabeth Economy's and Robert Samuelson's views that China's foreign policy engagement with Africa is guided by the "maxi-mini-principle – maximisation of rights and minimisation of responsibility"⁴³⁵ – and the "me first notion" respectively.⁴³⁶ The primary concern of the Chinese government is therefore not mutual benefit and common development, but rather resource acquisition to fulfil its own self-interests.

4.5.2 China and Sudan

Sudan remains one of the most volatile nations in the world, with rampant killings, rapes, abductions and violence. The in South Sudan is mainly a result of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) warring against the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO).⁴³⁷ Civilians in South Sudan are living under high risk of mass atrocities that target women and children – indeed, an estimate of 200 women were raped in July 2016 alone.⁴³⁸ A peace agreement was signed in August 2015, but the agreement still endures a series of setbacks, including corruption, factionalism, gross human rights violations and a lack of strong foreign intervention in South Sudan.⁴³⁹ Given China's foreign policy relations and businesses with South Sudan, a case analysis of the Five Principles, particularly the Principle of Equality and Mutual Benefit, is essential.

China's relations with Sudan resumed in 1991 through an Iranian-funded Chinese arms deal worth \$300 million, two years after the National Islamic Front took power through a military coup⁴⁴⁰ and shortly after Sudan was named a sponsor of terrorism by the US government.

⁴³³ "Think again: As Mugabe fights for his political future, why is China so silent?" *The Institute for Security Studies* 21 Jul. 2016, <https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/think-again-as-mugabe-fights-for-his-political-future-why-is-china-so-silent>.

⁴³⁴ "ISS today," *The Daily Maverick*.

⁴³⁵ Elizabeth Economy, "*The Impact of International Regimes on Chinese Foreign Policy Making*."

⁴³⁶ Samuelson, "The Danger behind China's 'Me First' Worldview."

⁴³⁷ UN reports, "Killings, rapes in South Sudan continued 'unabated' after July 2016 violence," UN News Centre, 16 Jan. 2017, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55975#.WW6Ay4SGPct>.

⁴³⁸ Ibid.

⁴³⁹ Steven C. Roach, "South Sudan: a volatile dynamic of accountability and peace," *International Affairs* 92, no. 6, (2016).

⁴⁴⁰ Daniel Large, "China & the contradictions of the 'Non-interference' in Sudan," *Review of African Political Economy* 35, no. 115 (2008).

During the 1990s, the Chinese government supplied bombs, helicopters, military aircraft and small arms to the Sudanese government.⁴⁴¹ In return, China gained access to Sudan's oil reserves. In 1995, the attempted assassination of the president of Egypt by security forces of Sudan made it more difficult for Sudan to receive funds from the World Bank and IMF. Sudan thus looked to China, and in 1995, the China Exim Bank and the Bank of Sudan reached an agreement, giving China the mandate to finance oil development in South Sudan.⁴⁴² Thereafter, China signed a co-operative agreement with Sudanese companies Petronas, Talisman and Sudapet in three oil blocks, while at the same time agreeing to share investment risks.⁴⁴³ However, China did so in the face of sanctions from the UNSC and the US in 1996 and 1997 respectively.⁴⁴⁴ China's foreign policy "walk" in this instance, given the reduced rate of loans and shared investment risks, is an apt demonstration of the Principle of Equality and Mutual Benefit as defined by a win-win relationship. China also claimed to adhere to the Principle of Non-Interference and offering aid without any political conditions attached to it. As such, the Sudanese ambassador to the UN, Abdalmahmood Abdalhaleem Mohamad, in 2010 stated that "China has no hidden agenda and China is for the prosperity of Africa ... so we salute the Africa-China cooperation, and we think that it would be a very good asset for the development of Africa."⁴⁴⁵

Yet China's doctrine of non-interference as part of the Five Principles has received much scrutiny in Sudan, given the constant, pressing instability. Moreover, Sino-Sudanese relations have grown to include the deployment of Chinese police personnel as well as military peacekeepers. A total of 430 troops were sent in May 2006, followed by a further 435 peacekeepers in 2007.⁴⁴⁶ Here, China foreign policy "walk" totally disregarded its principled stance on non-interference in the domestic affairs of other nations. The government of China is furthermore argued to have exerted influence on the government of Sudan in 2007 to accept a UN-AU peacekeeping force in Darfur.⁴⁴⁷ This move by the Chinese government is an indication of China's involvement in the domestic affairs of Sudan, which again contradicts its Principle of Non-Interference.⁴⁴⁸

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Ibid.

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Large, "China & the contradictions of the 'Non-interference' in Sudan."

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Ibid.

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Ibid.

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"Africa proud of relations with China: Sudanese diplomat" *People's Daily Online*, 1 Feb. 2010.

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Large, "China & the contradictions of the 'Non-interference' in Sudan."

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Ibid.

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Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on China's Peaceful Development*.

Moreover, according to a 2011 assessment of China's development, the total share of Chinese foreign aid (loans and grants) between 1999 and 2007 in Sudan saw a drastic increase from 17% to 73%.⁴⁴⁹ China's foreign relations with Sudan, despite the prevalence of violence, tensions and wars, supports its statement in its 2014 White Paper on Foreign Aid, in that "when providing foreign assistance, China adheres to the principles of not imposing any political conditions..."⁴⁵⁰ China's "walk" may be interpreted in two ways: either living up to the Principle of Equality and Mutual Benefit, or simply taking advantage of the Sudan for its profits and interests. Both interpretations can be supported by Mohamed Nour's balanced assessment of China's loans and aid in Sudan. In his view, aid and development assistance in Sudan from China has been both positive and negative. On one hand, Chinese finances serve as an alternative for the Sudanese government to finance its development projects in the face of sanctions from the WTO and WB, but on the other, this means increased Sudanese indebtedness to the Chinese government, owing to the interest rates that are added to the loans. Between 1999 and 2007, Sudan's debt to China increased from \$7,738,000 million to \$1,157,697,062 billion on a percentage share increase from 0.9% to 13.45%.⁴⁵¹

China's interest in Sudan is also based on access to oil. In 2011, the Chinese government was quick to improve its relations with the new Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) so as to benefit from its heavy oil investments that had been in place since the 1990s. The GOSS faces internal problems, which have been exacerbated by a civil war that broke out in South Sudan in 2013. In the meantime, the *Sudan Tribune* reported on 22 March 2017 that "China's debt in Sudan is estimated at more than \$10 billion."⁴⁵² Awad Ahmed Al-Jaz (Deputy Chairman of the higher committee for Sudanese relations with China, India and Russia) also stated: "China's investments continue to flow despite the negative impact of South Sudan's secession and failure of the international community to fulfil its obligations towards Sudan."⁴⁵³ He also pointed out that China has allocated a total of \$60 billion for energy, oil and agriculture, while Arab countries were allocated a sum of \$40 billion. Chinese investments in Sudan, mainly in oil, are estimated to amount to a total of \$20 billion.⁴⁵⁴ Again, China's posture on development assistance and aid in South Sudan can be understood in the two possible interpretations alluded to earlier, either solely on the premise of "mutual benefit and win-win," or "self-interest" in

⁴⁴⁹ Samia Mohamed Nour, *Assessment of Effectiveness of China Aid in Financing Development in Sudan* (Netherlands: United Nations University, 2014).

⁴⁵⁰ Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on China's Foreign Aid*.

⁴⁵¹ Mohamed, *Assessment of Effectiveness of China Aid in Financing Development in Sudan*.

⁴⁵² "Sudan vows to pay off 'every single penny' of China's debt," *Sudan Tribune*, 22 Mar. 2017.

⁴⁵³ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid.

the energy sectors. Either way, both scenarios point to China's "new leapfrog growth of its friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation" established in its 2015 Second Africa Policy Paper. According to this Policy Paper, China's relations in Africa are guided by the principles of "Sincerity, Practical Results, Affinity and Good Faith," which China adheres to with an emphasis on mutual support, equality, solidarity and mutual trust, in addition to the Five Principles.⁴⁵⁵

Considering that China forgave Sudan's 40 million Yuan debt in 2010, which emanated from 1995 extended loans,⁴⁵⁶ and then agreeing to extend or postpone Sudan's debt with a further five-year delay in 2012,⁴⁵⁷ one can argue China's foreign policy "walk" in these instances are indicative of the values of the Principle of Equality and Mutual Benefit. Writers such as Hessain, Hadia and Ting provide a good overall insight into China's development assistance and aid in Sudan, arguing that China's foreign aid is appreciated in Sudan, mainly because it is unconditional and un-interruptive in nature, portraying the image of a donor interested in commercial as well as economic "mutual benefit" cooperation, not the political landscape of Sudan.⁴⁵⁸ This viewpoint reflects the remarks of former Chinese Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Zhou Wenzhong, on Sino-Sudan relations being based on mutual benefit and win-win cooperation, and not on politics or interferences. He stated: "Business is business; we (China) try to separate politics from business. Secondly, I think the internal situation in the Sudan is an internal affair, and we are not in a position to impose upon them."⁴⁵⁹ The sentiments in the statement are also evident in China's 2014 White Paper on Foreign Aid, in which it is stated: "When providing foreign assistance, China adheres to the principles of not imposing any political conditions..."⁴⁶⁰

4.5.3 Theoretical Application and Interpretations

China's Principle of Equality and Mutual Benefit seems to give preference to economic cooperation rather than political considerations, which would require interference in domestic political environments. Thus also the political landscapes of Zimbabwe and Sudan are not favourable for economic mutual development, China continues to try and develop facilities, though on small scale, and offer financial aid to these countries that seemingly, owing to

⁴⁵⁵ *Xinhua*, "China's Second Africa Policy Paper."

⁴⁵⁶ "China forgives \$6 million of Sudan's debt," *Sudan Tribute*, 15 Dec. 2010.

⁴⁵⁷ "Sudan delays China debt," *Business Report*, 19 Feb. 2012.

⁴⁵⁸ Adam Hessain Yagoob, Hadia Osman Adam, and Zuo Ting, "Evaluation of foreign aid from China on Sudan's economic development process," *Developing Country Studies* 5, no. 8 (2015), 28.

⁴⁵⁹ Brookes and Shin, *China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States*, 4.

⁴⁶⁰ Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on China's Foreign Aid*.

international sanctions, have no-where else to turn. China's financial investments reflect the liberalist view on foreign policy as discussed in Chapter 1. The theory of liberalism is premised on the distribution of economic wealth, and argues that the fortunes of one state are connected to another given the McLuhan's "global village." Moreover, as the theory of liberalism postulates that domestic and foreign policies have the same goals centred on peaceful cooperation, China's foreign policy "walk" in countries such as Zimbabwe, Sudan, Iran and Iraq serves as "answered prayers" to China's domestic need for energy and other natural resources. As such, China is seen using its foreign policy to meet the demands at home.

4.6 Principle 5: Peaceful Co-Existence

Economic globalisation has entered a new phase of opening up and cooperation, but it is not without its challenges and crises emanating from an interplay of political forces, different doctrines, different systems, beliefs, models and self-interests (demonstrated in the scramble for resources and the struggle for strategic locations and rights), which would lead one to believe that the question of peace is rhetorical. Rather more common is conflict, mistrust, suspicion or tension. In its attempt to address these problems, the Chinese government proposed the Five Principles for managing human interactions on a global scale. China's largest state-owned newspaper, *Xinhua*, referred to these Five Principles as "Peace Principles."⁴⁶¹ An exposition and analysis of some of these principles in previous sections has demonstrated China's insecurities and fear of US supremacy and daunting power, even in the Asia-Pacific region. Its relations with North Korea as a satellite state in the event of a US attack, territorial disputes with Japan, whose claims are supported by the US, US-Taiwan arms deals, and even China's geopolitical relations with Russia document China's fear of the West, in particular the US. Therefore, based on the researcher's discretion, this section examines China's Principle of Peaceful Co-Existence, with the focus on Canada and the US.

4.6.1 China and Canada

Geographically, China and Canada are separated by the Pacific Ocean, which reduces the possibility of sovereign and territorial disputes between these two nations. As such, their history is characterised by goodwill for each other, despite them representing two different civilisations: the Eastern Civilisation and the Western Civilisation respectively, with different political and cultural traditions. However, in a world with shared opportunities as well as

⁴⁶¹ Yi, "China, India, Myanmar to celebrate 60-yr-old peace principles."

common challenges, as the theory of realism would suggest, where there are differences, tensions are bound to occur – as was the case in Sino-Canadian relations. In 2006, a conservative government came into power in Canada and condemned China's human rights. Incoming Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper stated that human rights remained one of the core values of Canada and should not be jeopardised at any point for any reason.⁴⁶² He commented harshly on China's human rights record and disregard in countries where it does its business, saying that Canada's values (human rights) should not be trumped by the "almighty dollar," given China's tendency of flexing its financial muscle in other countries.⁴⁶³ Harper went on to deliberately make overtures to Taiwan, knowing how China would react, given its One-China Policy. Indeed, this was regarded in China as a deliberate act to offend it, leading to a deterioration of Sino-Canadian bilateral relations.⁴⁶⁴

In July 2008, in the spirit of "peaceful co-existence," China and Canada managed to resolve their differences when they met in Japan and reached an agreement on re-affirming relations between the two countries. Upon Harper's visit to China in December 2009, China and Japan committed to a "steady and positive forward momentum" in Sino-Canadian relations, with an agreed increase of dialogue on human rights.⁴⁶⁵ In a Canada-China Joint Statement on 3 December 2009, China also agreed to "promote and protect human rights consistent with international human rights instruments."⁴⁶⁶ China's foreign policy "walk" in this instance could be viewed as an affirmation of its 2005 White Paper on Peaceful Development Road, in which it is stated: "We should actively promote and guarantee human rights to ensure that everyone enjoys equal opportunities and the right to pursue overall development. We should make innovations in the mode of development, promote the harmonious development of man and nature, and take the road of sustainable development."⁴⁶⁷ China's attempts to attend to its differences on human rights issues with Canada through agreements also bear testimony to the Principle of Peaceful Co-Existence, which also allowed them to cooperate with the UN, WTO and G20 among other multilateral mechanisms that seek to promote global peace and development.⁴⁶⁸

⁴⁶² Xuecheng Liu, "China and Canada on the Global Arena," *China Institute of International Studies*, 11 Aug. 2011, http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2011-08/11/content_4400998.htm.

⁴⁶³ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁶ "Canada-China joint statement" *The Globe and Mail*, 3 Dec. 2012.

⁴⁶⁷ Information Office of the State Council, *China's Peaceful Development Road*.

⁴⁶⁸ Liu, "China and Canada on the Global Arena."

The Chinese government also claims in its 2011 White Paper on Peaceful Development that it strives to build a “harmonious world of durable peace and common prosperity.”⁴⁶⁹ China’s policy and pragmatic cooperation with Canada, along with high-level diplomatic visits between the two, show how China “walks” the Principle of Peaceful Co-Existence. Indeed, in examining current literature on Sino-Canadian relations, one can acknowledge the significance of diplomacy in managing their foreign policy relations within five foreign policy priority areas: governance and values, health, education, environment, and energy. The diplomatic engagements in Sino-Canadian relations are evident in cooperative linkages and the high-level military exchanges that were established in the 1970s and have gradually transformed in the post-Cold War era.⁴⁷⁰ High-level military visits harbour great importance to strengthen the possibility of “peaceful co-existence” through mutual trust building and establishing and promoting common interests in the wake of safeguarding world peace. One of their largest partnerships or trade missions in the history of Sino-Canadian relations was seen in 2001, when Prime Minister Joseph Jacques Jean Chretien was accompanied by nearly 600 business participants in a visit to China.⁴⁷¹ Later, in 2009, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper visited China, followed by a visit by Chinese President Hu Jintao to Canada in 2010, thereby reaffirming their commitments to develop their strategic partnership.⁴⁷² Moreover, in 2009, Canada’s former Chief of the Maritime Staff also visited China and, in November 2011, Chinese high-ranking official General Guo Boxiong (Vice Chairman of the CPC’s Central Military Commission as well as member of the Political Bureau of the CPC) met a number of Canada’s high ranking military officers, including General Walt Natynczyk, in Toronto.⁴⁷³ These high ranking military visits, among several others between China and Canada, can be interpreted as a necessary channel of communication pivotal to the process of consolidating peaceful co-existence stances and common international security concerns. Such “walks” help to ensure a “harmonious world of durable peace and common prosperity,” as according to the 2011 White Paper on Peaceful Development.

Thus, despite their different systems and models, China and Canada share similar interests and responsibilities, such as the need to maintain global peace and security.⁴⁷⁴ China also signed

⁴⁶⁹ Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on China's Peaceful Development*.

⁴⁷⁰ “Bilateral Relations,” Government of Canada, date modified 26 Aug. 2016, URL: http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/china-chine/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/index.aspx?lang=eng.

⁴⁷¹ Liu, “China and Canada on the Global Arena.”

⁴⁷² Ibid.

⁴⁷³ Embassy of the PRC in Canada, “Safeguarding World Peace by Strengthening China-Canada Military Relations” (Government of China, 2011), <http://ca.china-embassy.org/eng/sgxw/t877953.htm>.

⁴⁷⁴ Liu, “China and Canada on the Global Arena.”

the China-Canada Joint Statement in 2009, which allowed them to gain momentum in the new stage of development, as they actively implemented the consensus reached.⁴⁷⁵ The joint statement reiterates peaceful development of the cross-straits relations with an increase of dialogue in political, economic and other fields.⁴⁷⁶ As part of China's foreign policy "walk" in its "peaceful co-existence" endeavours with Canada, China agreed that coordination and cooperation with Canada in the UN and other multi-lateral bodies should include the goals of nuclear security and nuclear non-proliferation, among other major regional and global issues.⁴⁷⁷ Indeed, for the common good and for peace, China and Canada have a strong partnership particularly on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Both countries advocate for multilateral non-proliferation processes in a bid to achieve common interests and cooperative security. As such, in their relations, they have called for peaceful resolutions when approaching the nuclear issue in Iran as well as the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and negotiation in order to achieve regional peace and stability.⁴⁷⁸ For these purposes, China and Canada successfully signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Nuclear Cooperation in 2014.⁴⁷⁹ In so doing, and as alluded to in Chapter 3, "socialist countries (like China) should exist side-by-side with capitalist countries."⁴⁸⁰ Similarly, China's 2005 White Paper on Peaceful Development states that "in the spirit of democracy, harmony, justice and tolerance, China has been playing a constructive role, and making efforts to attain the lofty goal of building a harmonious world together with all other countries."⁴⁸¹

China and Canada also have a thriving economic relationship. Canada is a major producer of oil (3.5 million b/d), with vast reserves of 171 billion barrels, making it the third largest in world rankings. In terms of natural gas, Canada is said to be the fourth largest producer, producing an estimate of 885 to 1,566 trillion cubic feet.⁴⁸² China is portrayed as the third largest importer of Canada's oil,⁴⁸³ and, as such, Sino-Canadian relations can be argued to be built on the basis that Canada is a reputable and stable supplier of energy resources to China. In addition, China and Canada's diplomatic relations extend to include issues around governance and values (human rights and establishing the rule of law). As such, the Canadian

⁴⁷⁵ "Canada-China joint statement," *The Globe and Mail*.

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁸ Liu, "China and Canada on the global arena."

⁴⁷⁹ "Energy - Bilateral Relations," Government of Canada, date modified 26 Aug. 2016, http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/china-chine/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/Energy.aspx?lang=eng

⁴⁸⁰ "Selected works of Mao Tse-tung," "Peaceful Coexistence."

⁴⁸¹ Information Office of the State Council, *China's Peaceful Development Road*.

⁴⁸² Ibid.

⁴⁸³ Ibid.

government, through the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI)-China 2016 to 2017, supports good governance and human rights initiatives and small civil projects in China.⁴⁸⁴ On one hand, allowing such intervention is in line with China's need to build a harmonious world, as described in its 2011 White Paper on Peaceful Development.⁴⁸⁵ Moreover, allowing such small-scale interference of the Canadian government in some of China's hotspot internal problems is in accordance with Principle of Peaceful Co-Existence. It is also in line with the 2015 Second African Policy Paper on China's adherence to a foreign policy, which upholds the values of friendships, shared interests, good faith, equality and several others. On the notion of "good faith," this Policy Paper also states: "China cherishes good faith and settlement of problems in an appropriate manner."⁴⁸⁶ On the other, considering China's firmness on the Principle of Non-Interference, allowing CFLI to support local projects and NGOs working to improve local development activities (civil, human rights and governance related) can be interpreted as a form of interference, given how China is often condemned for its human rights record and governance issues post the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989.

4.6.2 China and the United States

The post-Cold War world order discussed in Chapter 2 is a unipolar system, characterised by a lack of a systematic political challengers to the US hegemonic power. The unprecedented military, economic and technological advancements of the US have made the international political arena inherently Western oriented. Thus, conventional diplomacy post-Cold War has been built on Western philosophies, upon which the basic protocols and principles of contemporary diplomacy are built. Protocol is defined as a means by which people of all cultures can relate to each other.⁴⁸⁷ In terms of diplomacy, protocol centres on the behaviour or manner of states' conduct with regards to globally accepted norms such as human rights and democracy (good governance). In short, protocol is defined as international courtesy rules.⁴⁸⁸ McCaffree and Sand therefore define protocol diplomacy as the recognition of a generally accepted system or set of rules, procedures, conventions and ceremonies that relates to relations between and among states.⁴⁸⁹ Given that China has the second largest global economy after the

⁴⁸⁴ The Government of Canada, Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI) – China – 2016-2017 (Government of Canada, 2016), <http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/china-chine/highlightsfaits/2016/CanadaFundforLocalInitiativesChina20162017.aspx?lang=eng>.

⁴⁸⁵ Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on China's Peaceful Development*.

⁴⁸⁶ *Xinhua*, "China's 2015 Second Africa Policy Paper."

⁴⁸⁷ Foreign Service Institute US Department of State, "Protocol for the modern diplomat" (US Government, 2013), <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/176174.pdf>.

⁴⁸⁸ Mary Jane McCaffree, Pauline Innis and Richard M. Sand, Esquire, *Protocol: The Complete Handbook of Diplomatic, Official and Social Usage* (London: Center for Protocol Red Book Studies, 2013).

⁴⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

US, it is of paramount importance to establish how China's and the US's interests co-exist peacefully under generally accepted Western rules and procedures, which China seems not to consider in their foreign policy.

China's prominent rise as a great power thirsty for foreign resources to sustain its growing economy has serious implications for the US, as China seems to have developed a new sense of insecurity regarding the US. This attitude influences China's geopolitical relations with Russia (i.e. to ensure a balance of power) and its continued support of the North Korean regime to avoid its collapse. It is important to note here that for the purpose of establishing peace, both China and the US share common interests of a non-nuclear North Korea; however, their differences lie in the approach, as China adheres to the Five Principles while the US currently seem to favour a policy of intervention, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Furthermore, the Taiwan issue seems to top China's strategic and national security agenda, yet the US foreign policy "walk" seems to strike at the core of China's core national interests through its arms sales to Taiwan and support for territorial claims made by Japan in the disputed islands of Diaoyu/Senkaku. The Chinese government issued warnings against the US-Taiwan military arms deal worth \$ 5.9 billion in 2011, with Chinese Rear Admiral Yang Yi stating that China must sanction US defense firms involved in the arms sale "to reshape the policy choices of the US."⁴⁹⁰ In 2015, China also complained when the Obama Administration unveiled plans to re-engage the Taiwan arms deal, selling \$1.8 billion in arms to Taiwan.⁴⁹¹ Yet in the face of all this, China has managed to remain peaceful and deal with these complexities diplomatically. China chooses to align with its "talk" in its 2011 White Paper on Peaceful Development: "Peaceful development is a strategic choice made by China to realize modernization."⁴⁹² With peace as a strategic choice, China affirms its commitments to a strategy of comprehensive cooperative security, arguing that "war and confrontation will only lead to a vicious cycle of violence begetting violence, while dialogue and negotiation are the only effective and reliable way to settle disputes."⁴⁹³

As discussed earlier in this chapter, China prohibits the establishment of any diplomatic relations or communication with Taiwan. As stated, the Chinese government made formal complaints against US President Donald Trump's direct call to President Tsai Ing-wen of

⁴⁹⁰ Xiaokun and Jiao, "Warning issued over arms sales to Taiwan."

⁴⁹¹ The Editorial Board, "China's tantrum on Taiwan arms deal," *The New York Times*, 24 Dec. 2015.

⁴⁹² Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on China's Peaceful Development*.

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

Taiwan.⁴⁹⁴ Trump risked eliciting China's fury and caused diplomatic tensions between the US and China – also because of the fact that the US remains the sole military arms supplier to the Taiwanese government. Despite these events, however, China's composure and diplomatic reactions attest to its Principle of Peaceful Co-Existence in the face of several uncertainties that have arisen in its relations with the US. China's reactions towards the US also affirm China's 2016 Policy Paper on the South China Sea Issue, which establishes that China believes in settling disputes through negotiation and consulting its adversaries, trying to settle differences while safeguarding its claimed territorial sovereignty, rights and maritime interests.⁴⁹⁵

One of the chief antagonistic factors between the two countries is their difference in policy approaches. For instance, in Chapter 3 it was discussed how China adheres to a policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other nations. In contrast, after Cold War Order (as discussed in Chapter 4), the US assumed global leadership roles and the mandate to uphold universal principles and norms such as democracy and human rights. As such, they react steadily to anything threats to such through direct interference, sometimes unilaterally, as in the case of Iraq.⁴⁹⁶ Their differences thus manifest in several cases, which results in scholars often interpreting China's "walk" as a challenge to US hegemony. For instance, in the cases of Zimbabwe, Sudan, Iran, North Korea and Iraq, the US instituted sanctions on these nations, while China continued doing business with them, using the Five Principles to justify its "walk." In the case of Iran in particular, China stood strong against US demands for new UNSC sanctions in 2012.⁴⁹⁷ In response to Iran's nuclear activities, the US had imposed unprecedented sanctions on the country since 1979.⁴⁹⁸ However, US actions in the eyes of the Chinese government could be seen as attempts to isolate China from its natural allies, who significantly contribute to the survival of Chinese economic growth. China therefore condemns US unilateralism and instead offers the Five Principle card of non-interference, mutual respect and peaceful resolution, even in the face of deliberate disregard of resolutions imposed by the UN or other relevant international bodies.

⁴⁹⁴ "Trump-Taiwan call: China lodge protest," *BBC*; "China lodges complaint over Trump-Taiwan call," *CNN*; "Donald Trump speaks directly to Taiwan's Tsai Ing-wen," *Aljazeera*, 3 Dec. 2016; "China lodges complaint with the US over Trump's Taiwan call," *The Guardian*, 3 Dec. 2016.

⁴⁹⁵ Information Office of the State Council, *China's Policy on the South China Sea Issue*.

⁴⁹⁶ UN Webcast, "Zimbabwe President HE Robert Mugabe-United Nations Speech Part 1," *YouTube*, 21 Jul. 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FeX_afUOGM8.

⁴⁹⁷ Bennhold, "As China rises, conflict with West Rises Too."

⁴⁹⁸ "Diplomacy in action: Iran sanctions," *US Department of State*, accessed 16 Nov. 2016 <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/index.htm>.

In 2015, in a report on US-China relations, Kevin Rudd wrote about the rise of China in the 21st century, with the country gaining more economic and political power than the US. He used the term “melting polar ice” to describe how China’s power and influence has risen while that of the US has declined.⁴⁹⁹ In the same manner, Robert Blackwill and Ashley Tellis, in their report titled *US Grand Strategy towards China*, allude to China’s rise as a future rival to US power and hegemony.⁵⁰⁰ That being said, however, the US hegemony and the criticism of China’s foreign policy is a major cause of concern for Chinese policymakers. As such, works such as Yong Dong’s “Hegemony on the offensive,”⁵⁰¹ Samantha Blum’s 2003 “Chinese views of US Hegemony”⁵⁰² and Jin Qingguo’s 2005 “Learning to Live with the Hegemony”⁵⁰³ have been produced. One of the major shared sentiments by these authors is the view that the US hegemonic tendencies are a major constraint to China’s core status and objectives. These concerns can be argued to have greatly influenced and impacted China’s National Defense White Paper published in 2008, which states: “At the same time, the US has increased its strategic attention to and input in the Asia-Pacific region, further consolidating its military alliances, adjusting its military deployment and enhancing its military capabilities ... [hence China faces] strategic manoeuvres and containment from the outside.”⁵⁰⁴ Yet in the face of these perceived and interpreted security threats, China still chooses to employ diplomacy so as to avoid direct confrontation with the US and co-exist peacefully, ensuring a harmonious world of durable peace as described in the 2011 White Paper on Peaceful Development.

Thus while Sino-US diplomatic relations have distinct dynamic differences, which can be interpreted as confrontational over security and competition issues, China’s still maintain the Principle of Peaceful Co-Existence. Indeed, the two governments describe their relations as having matured and being steady. However their diplomatic relations can equally be argued to be a Second Cold War for dominance, influence and competition. For instance, China’s development assistance and foreign aid in Zimbabwe, Sudan, Iran and Iraq demonstrate how China’s post-Cold War foreign policy changes or redefines the rules of engagement in

⁴⁹⁹ Kevin Rudd, *US-China 21: The Future of US.-China Relations under XI Jinping*, (Harvard, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2015), <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf>.

⁵⁰⁰ Robert D. Blackwill & Ashley J. Tellis, “Revising US Grand Strategy towards China,” *Council on Foreign Relations*, accessed 21 Jul. 2017, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Blackwill.pdf.

⁵⁰¹ Yong Dong, “Hegemon on the offensive: Chinese perspectives on US global strategy,” *Political Science Quarterly* 116, no. 3 (2001), 343-365.

⁵⁰² Samantha Blum, “Chinese views of US hegemony,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 12, no. 35 (2003), 239-264.

⁵⁰³ Jia Qingguo, “Learning to live with the Hegemon: Evolution of China’s policy toward the US since the end of the Cold War,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 14, no. 44 (2005a), 395-407.

⁵⁰⁴ Information Office of the State Council, *White Paper on China’s National Defense*.

international affairs. Interpreting the changing dynamics, John Williamson pictures the nature of Sino-US relations as signifying a declining Washington Consensus,⁵⁰⁵ which is being replaced by what Joshua Ramo referred to as the Beijing Consensus.⁵⁰⁶ The latter is built on the need for China to achieve its foreign policy objectives at the expense of ignoring the Washington Consensus, thus regulating the post-Cold War order by using peaceful soft power diplomacy and not the cohesive diplomacy that the US often employs.⁵⁰⁷

Changes have also come to the trade and diplomatic relations between the countries. Following the US-China Relations Act of 2000, trade relations between the two dominant powers were normalised. The US granted China permanent normal trade relations, with China joining the WTO in 2001.⁵⁰⁸ However, since February 2012 there have been rising trade tensions between the two, with the US trade deficit seeing an increase from \$273.1 billion to \$295.5 billion. In a sitting table by the US, Japan, WTO and EU over China's restrictions on exporting rare earth metals, China was condemned and accused of violating international trade norms. The US also wanted to force multinational firms that were using such metals to relocate to China, a demand that China, according to Don Lee and Christi Parson in the *Los Angeles Times*, regarded as unfair and rash.⁵⁰⁹ More recently, on 30 May 2015, former US Secretary of Defense warned the Chinese government during the fourteenth annual Shangri-La Dialogue on Asian security to stop its controversial land reclamation in the South China and East China Seas. He stated that the US government opposed further militarisation of these disputed territories by the Chinese government.⁵¹⁰

Yet regardless of all perceived differences and disagreements within Sino-US relations, the countries have managed to pursue peaceful bilateral relations, which is at the top of their claimed diplomatic, economic and security interests. Chinese policy makers have expressed that when engaging the US, China "seeks common ground while reserving differences."⁵¹¹ A further elaboration of China's diplomatic approaches towards the US is given by Guoli Zhengzhi, who argues that China's approaches are guided by the CCP's strategic guiding

⁵⁰⁵ John Williamson, "A short history of the Washington Consensus," *Peterson Institute for International Economics*, 24 Sep. 2004, <https://piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/short-history-washington-consensus>.

⁵⁰⁶ Joshua Cooper Ramo, *The Beijing Consensus* (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004), 1.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁸ Andrew J. Nathan, "US relations with China since 1949," *Council on Foreign Relations*, accessed 21 Jul. 2017, http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_us_china.htm.

⁵⁰⁹ Don Lee and Christi Parsons, "US opens trade case against China over rare earth export limits," *Los Angeles Times*, 14 Mar. 2012.

⁵¹⁰ Nathan, "US Relations with China since 1949."

⁵¹¹ Huang Ping, "Seeking common ground while reserving differences" *China.org.cn*, 3 Dec. 2013, http://www.china.org.cn/china/Chinese_dream_dialogue/2013-12/06/content_30816879.htm.

principle of “increasing trust, reduc[ing] problems, strengthen[ing] cooperation and avoid[ing] confrontation” as noted Deng in the 1990s.⁵¹² One can therefore assume that the feasibility of the Principle of Peaceful Co-Existence is built upon such common grounds, which increase the likelihood of negotiations and diplomacy in resolving disputes and dealing with sensitive issues. However, given China’s increased assertiveness in recent years, one can pose the question as to whether or not China will remain peaceful and un-confrontational in the face of continued US hegemonic attributes.

4.6.3 Theoretical Analysis and Interpretation

Liberalism speaks of cooperation favouring common development. For such to prevail, ideas of peaceful co-existence have to be put in place. By virtue of its advocacy for a peaceful international world order characterised by durable peace, China can thus be argued to be championing values of the theory of liberalism. Its relations with Canada testify to the need for cooperation, to the extent that the Chinese government allows the Canadian government to fund local, small-scale projects in China through NGOs or local people championing human rights, governance-related issues or civil projects through the CFLI. It is unusual for the Chinese government to allow any external force or country, let alone the West, to interfere in its domestic issues, but given that the Chinese government sees this as a necessary move to amend cooperation and trade with Canada, it is indicative of the liberalist views in its foreign policy “walk.”

In terms of its relations with the US, it is evident that in the several instances where the US disregarded China’s sovereign claim of Taiwan through its continued arms sales and diplomatic ties with Taiwan severe tensions could have arisen; however, China still seems to favour cooperation and peaceful negotiations rather than conflict with the US. Thus either China might be intimidated or sceptic about provoking the US, given its insecurities and fears of the unprecedented military, economic and technological advancements made by the US, or it can be viewed as a clear-cut demonstration of the liberalist view and need for cooperation, trade and a peaceful environment to advance its businesses and profits.

4.7 Conclusion

These discussions and analysis of China’s foreign policy “walk” in several countries where it does its business show three main aspects that influence its foreign policy decision making: its

⁵¹² Chu Shulong, “US-China Relations: Stability Overtaking All,” *Global Times*, 19 Apr. 2006.

national self-interests, its Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence and its international obligations. China's foreign policy "walk" does not have a code of conduct that distinguishes or sets priorities for these three aspects, which leaves the question: under what circumstances do the Five Principles outweigh China's national interests versus its international commitments? The lack of uniformity makes China's foreign policy "walks" seem contradictory rather than complimentary when one looks at the various cases expounded on in this chapter. Reverting to the data presented above, the research therefore identifies the following three drivers (though mutually inclusive in a sense), arranged top-to-bottom according on the degree of priority placed on each of them, based on the data collected in the above expositions of China's foreign policy "walk" in the post-Cold War era:

National interests

The data presented from the various countries show that China's foreign policy is mainly built on its domestic needs, i.e. thirst for natural resources and regional security or status quo. These drivers are mainly targeted on meeting its great consumption demands given its enormous population and its ever-growing economy and modernisation.

The Five Principles

In the true sense of its "walk," it is noticeable that the Five Principles shadow the national interests, hence are the second of the main drivers of China's foreign policy "walk." They create a favourable environment for China's self-interests as evidenced through its foreign policy "walk," despite the Chinese government's attempts to parade them as "universal principles" encompassing common interests (common development, win-win cooperation and shared security concerns) and claims to function as an equal partner with the rest of the world. In the true sense of some of these Principles, they allowed China to take advantage of weak, undeveloped and unstable countries, thereby gaining global prominence, while those it continues to do business with continue to derail (e.g. Zimbabwe, Sudan and others). These Five Principles smooth tensions arising in international affairs and pave the way for China's national self-interests to flourish.

International obligations

China uses the Five Principles to justify its voting patterns in the UN and other forums and to condemn any actions that impedes the order of actions or environments favourable for its operations. These international obligations are not given much precedence in China's foreign

policy “walk,” evidenced by its support of North Korea, Iran and Iraq, despite their disregard of UN or other resolutions, and despite China positioning itself as responsible global player.

Finally, an overall assessment of China’s foreign policy “walk” shows that the scale is heavily tilted towards national interest, or the need to acquire and secure as much energy and natural resources as it can, even at the expense of appearing a villain by doing business with countries that are volatile, characterised by gross human rights violations, wars, mass killing, poor governance and disregard for the rule of law. Given that the above research points to several instances where China disregarded US or Western sanctions and did business with countries under Western sanctions, it is important to note Ramo’s assertion of the Washington Consensus being replaced by the Beijing Consensus. China’s foreign policy “walk” indeed seems to be “changing the rules of engagement” in the post-Cold War world order, despite it being inherently Westernised.

CHAPTER 5

Discussion of Findings, Recommendations and Conclusions

5.1 Introduction

On numerous occasions throughout the thesis, the data collected demonstrates themes of common or shared responsibilities, opportunities and interests, and unified approaches to global challenges and hotspot problems in international affairs in a world that has become inherently globalised. On a global scale, references made to international statutes and principles have reiterated such rhetoric, possibly given that the fate of all nations has increasingly become intertwined, and events in one state create a chain reaction and affect others. In the case of China, the Five Principles of Mutual Co-existence demonstrate the mutual inclusiveness that should bind states together. However, the practical reality and application of these Five Principles by the Chinese government, as noted in Chapters 3 and 4, portray them more as “survival strategies” favouring Chinese interests and needs, than their envisioned purpose as pillars of global peace. In fact, the researcher believes that it was adequately demonstrated that China’s foreign policy relations with Taiwan and Japan disregard the Principle of Peaceful Co-Existence. Furthermore, its involvement in the domestic affairs of Sudan and Iran, directly or indirectly pressuring these governments to make decisions of which the outcomes favour China, is not in line with its Principle of Non-Interference. Moreover, the ever deteriorating economy in Zimbabwe, in spite of China’s acclaimed Principle of Equality and Mutual Benefit, which advocates cooperation to foster common development and a win-win outcome, implies that this Principle is overrated and attests to China’s me-first attitude; i.e. satisfying China’s needs and thirst for foreign natural resources, rather than caring for the well-being of the countries with which it does business.

It is the view of the researcher that to create the much acclaimed harmonious world with durable peace it has been advocating for, China has to employ robust and rigorous non-violent diplomatic actions to intervene in global hotspot problems. China’s tendencies of standing on the sideline of global problems and proclaiming the Principles of Mutual Respect, Mutual Non-Interference and Mutual Non-Aggression will not at any point create this harmonious world, especially considering its dealings with repressive regimes whose rulerships are unorthodox at best (e.g. North Korea, Iran, Sudan or Zimbabwe). Instead of “walking the talk” as a self-claimed responsible leader, the Chinese government seems to have adopted a tendency of

“walking away” or ignoring the prevalence of internal problems in countries in which it does its business, acting as though these problems does not exist, as long as China’s interests or needs are fulfilled.

5.2 Discussion of Findings

In light of the analysis and interpretation of the data on China’s foreign policy walk in Chapter 4, there is no doubt that the chosen international relations theories of realism and liberalism explains China’s post-Cold War behaviours to some extent. These theories were used to make sense of China’s foreign policy “walks.” Their predetermined theoretical philosophical interpretations of state behaviour in international relations are constantly visible throughout the discussion on China’s foreign “walk” in the various countries that were presented as case studies. With regard to the realist school of thought, it was shown that China’s behavioural attributes are frequently premised on concepts such as national security and self-interests, based on its need for foreign natural resources in order to fuel its modernisation and economic development. These behaviours continue, despite the environments in which it does its business being mostly volatile. In terms of liberalism, China frequently draws attention to its advocacy for peaceful co-existence and economic development cooperation, development assistance, foreign aid and mutually beneficial cooperative relations that move beyond (or ignore) political considerations such as human rights issues or bad governance.

The data presented in Chapter 4 furthermore shows that China’s post-Cold War bilateral relations with volatile countries – some under Western sanctions – often defy the rules of engagement established in the New World Order (see 2.6.1) under the Washington Consensus. The Washington Consensus gained much precedence post-1990, mainly because of what Berger describes as “the lack of systematic political challengers to the globalisation of capitalism under the Western influence”⁵¹³ (see Chapter 2). The rise of China to global ranks and its increased assertiveness in the post-Cold War era poses challenges to this so-called Washington Consensus. As seen in the data presented in Chapter 4, China tendency of giving huge financial aid to some repressive regimes undermines the Washington Consensus and can also be seen as enabling abusive regimes. Moreover, its foreign policy “walk” in Sudan, Zimbabwe, North Korea and Iraq weakens the US-attained predominance and hegemony in the post-Cold War era, as such impeding the international community’s ability to leverage hotspot

⁵¹³ Berger, “The rise and demise.”

problems such as gross human rights violations and WMD concerns. China's foreign policy "walk" therefore seems to be challenging the Washington Consensus' post-Cold War rules of engagement (see discussion in Chapter 2). Based on relevant contextual data presented in Chapter 4, "redefining" in this case therefore implies that a "Beijing Consensus is gaining strength.

5.2.1 China's Post-Cold War Foreign Policy Goals and Objectives, within the Framework of the Five Principles of Co-Existence

China's foreign policy practices and decisions between 1990 and 2017, within the framework of the Five Principles as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, present China as a peaceful country, rather than synonymous with war and conflict. It can be argued that China's post-Cold War foreign policy is still developing, given how its "walks" sometimes differ from its "talks." However, one thing to note at this point is that despite continued US arms sales to Taiwan, and Japan's territorial claims and moves to nationalise disputed islands, China has managed to maintain peace and settle disputes amicably without the actualisation of force as a means to achieve its foreign policy goals and objectives.

Like every nation, China's foreign policy is mainly built on self-interests – a theme that consistently emerges throughout the exposition of its foreign policy "walks" in Chapter 4. In the case of resource acquisition as one of the major goals in China's foreign policy endeavours, its behaviour is defined by its high consumption demands (mainly in energy resources) given its massive population size as well as modernisation and economic development ambitions. Throughout its "walks," its self-interests are not compromised. Indeed, its need for national security and for foreign energy and other resources is so important to China that it is willing to be perceived as a villain to the world through its persistent business with repressive regimes and volatile and unstable nations such as Zimbabwe, North Korea, Sudan, Iran and Iraq. In terms of the Five Principles "talk" presented in Chapter 3, this "walk" is somehow interpreted in China's conscience as upholding its Principle of Equality and Mutual Beneficial Cooperation. However, taking into account China's increased assertiveness post-2008 discussed in Chapter 2, the need to secure its nationalistic heritage and defend its national pride cannot escape one's attention as one of the major determinants of China's foreign policy "walks" in the post-Cold War era. China has seemingly moved away from the victim mentality that fashioned its foreign policy behaviours during and after the Second World War, in particular in its relations with

Japan. That being said, in some respects it is clear that China still harbours insecurities and fears of invasions from foreign allied nations. In China's post-Cold War foreign relations with Japan, it relapsed to this victim mentality on some occasions. Its reaction to the 2013 incident when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe paid tribute at the Yasukuni Shrine is a particular case in point, as is the Chinese fear of the US hegemony, as discussed in Chapter 4.⁵¹⁴ Also, in its endeavours to secure and protect its nationalistic heritage and pride, China at times displays its military capabilities close to (or in) the territory of disputed islands, signalling that it is ready to militarily defend its claims – something that possibly in the future will be actualised. This stance somewhat intimidates and threatens neighbouring countries and contradicts its foreign policy “talk” of peaceful co-existence.

5.2.2 Identified Key Themes Informing China's Post-Cold War Foreign Policy Decisions

The need to “preserve and safeguard historic coastlines” emerges as one of the recurring main themes in China's foreign policy “walk” on the Principle of Mutual Respect in Chapter 4. This theme forms part of China's overall “national security” concerns. As such, the Chinese government robustly utilises non-peaceful and aggressive measures to subdue or discourage its counterparts, Taiwan and Japan, on Territorial and Sovereignty disputes. Relating this theme with the data presented in Chapter 2 and the “walk” in Chapter 4, it becomes evident that the importance of “preserving historic coastlines and territories” also prompted China's increased “assertiveness” (see Chapter 2), with the government becoming more confrontational as it abandoned its “pacified approaches” described in the “Tao Guang Yang Hui” policy (see Chapter 2).

“Natural resource acquisition” is yet another recurring theme that emerges from China's foreign policy “walk,” featuring the Principles of Equality and Mutual Benefit and Non-Interference. The Chinese government seems willing to be perceived as a villain state as long as it obtains enough foreign resources to sustain its ever-growing economy and meet the huge consumer demands of over a billion people. The government therefore uses its foreign policy as tool or means to this end, even if it means China has to obtain these resources from repressive or unstable regimes. The theme of “natural resource acquisition” is also relevant to the Principle of Non-Interference, which it is used to justify China's tendency of “walking away” from

⁵¹⁴ Information Office of the State Council, *Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China*.

domestic problems in countries in which it does business. China continues to extract natural resources from volatile countries, despite prevailing internal problems affecting those countries. As such, the Five Principles appear to be more of a “survival strategy” for China than a genuine call towards mutual non-aggression, mutual respect, mutual benefit or mutual non-interference.

As noted in the thesis, China has risen to regional and global ranks over the past years, therefore one of the main themes that drive its foreign policy decision making is the need to maintain its new found status quo on a regional basis. This theme encapsulates China’s foreign policy relations with North Korea and Russia. China’s foreign policy approaches to these countries are embedded with the need to maintain the existing state of affairs in the Asia Pacific region. For instance, a nuclear weapon-capable North Korea threatens to upset the balance of power by challenging China’s regional dominance. Furthermore, it could prompt Japan and South Korea to also seek their own nuclear offensive arsenals to protect themselves against North Korea if need be, even though they are protected as such by the US nuclear umbrella. Hence, China has publicly condemned North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and supported some measures to curtail it, but rejected the idea of using military force to deal with it. A weakened North Korean regime will render China vulnerable to external attacks, since North Korea serves as a satellite state to China. Similarly, the need to maintain its regional status quo also informs China’s geopolitical relations with Russia. Joining arms with Russia in a sense equalise the unprecedented predominant global power of the US, hence allowing China and other Asian countries to resist the US’ influence and interference in the region.

The data collected in Chapter 4 on the Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence and Equality and Mutual Benefit speaks volumes about the theme of economic development. Its relations with Canada and the US demonstrate the necessity of a peaceful environment for economic development. Projections of the OBOR (see figure 4.3) also place much emphasis on this theme, seeking to bring trade from the continents of Europe and Africa to China.

To conclude this section, then: the key themes vis-à-vis China’s foreign policy that strongly emerged from the research are the need to safeguard historic coastlines, national security, maintaining the regional status quo, natural resources acquisition and economic development. The data presented on China’s foreign policy “walk” indicates that these themes bearing on China’s self-interests are placed or prioritised above the stated Five Principles, which are claimed to guide China’s foreign policy.

5.2.3 Are There Any Fundamental Differences in How China Practices Its Foreign Policy in Relation to Its Stated Goals?

The change in China's foreign policy doctrine from passiveness to assertiveness, as discussed in Chapter 2, demonstrate the first fundamental difference in how China practices its foreign policy in two noticeable timelines: 1990-2007 and 2008-2017. During these years, China has been on the rise from a "century of humiliation" (1839-1949) under Japan and other foreign occupations of China.⁵¹⁵ These occupations were then followed by failed policies and initiatives in the post-1949 era (Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution), which were supposed to revitalise China. In the post-Cold war era, China rose to global prominence, currently having the second largest economy and substantial military and nuclear power. Given these remarkable transformations and changes, China's Five Principles and its stated foreign policy goals have become challenged with the need to maintain its new-found status, sustain its developing economy, meet domestic demands, and maintain its status as a responsible global partner for the common good. These needs are often conflict with China's foreign policy "talk," presented in in Chapter 3, versus its "walk" in the different countries used as case studies in Chapter 4.

An overall appraisal of the "talk" versus the "walk" on the Principle of Mutual Respect shows that China does not "walk the talk" according to its White Papers and Policy Papers. Its foreign policy "walk" with Japan and Taiwan makes it clear that China expects other countries to respect its territory and sovereignty, yet it is not prepared to reciprocally respect the sovereignty of Taiwan, nor the territorial integrity of Japan. On several occasions, China deliberately tested missiles in the waters adjacent to Taiwan (Pengchia and Pingtan) and boldly carried out and displayed its military and naval superiority against Japan around disputed islands. This act led to a dangerous standoff between the two nations in 2012. China's foreign policy "walk" therefore highlights fundamental changes in China's foreign policy practices, with deviate from its stated foreign policy goals and Five Principles.

Regarding the Principle of Mutual Non-Aggression, the Chinese government violated Japan's air space on numerous instances (see Chapter 4). These activities demonstrate the lack of China's adherence to the virtue of non-aggression in its foreign policy "walks." Its actions are

⁵¹⁵ Alison A. Kaufman, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on "China's Narratives Regarding National Security Policy" (US Government, 2011) <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/3.10.11Kaufman.pdf>.

concluded to be deliberate acts of aggression and intimidation that go against its principled stance on mutual non-aggression and mutual peaceful co-existence. Though China firmly stood against the use of military force against North Korea, one cannot ignore China's hypocritical use of force when it suits its own interests. Therefore, based on the mutual inclusiveness of the Five Principles (see Chapters 3 and 4), the researcher concludes that despite China's non-aggressive stance in North Korea, it does not "walk the talk" or hold true to the Principles of Non-Aggression and Peace. Considering the evidence and analysis of data vis-à-vis its relations with North Korea as a satellite state, one can conclude that its national security concerns compelled China to stand firmly against foreign powers' propositions to use cohesive military force in North Korea, and their adherence to the Principle of Non-Aggression.

The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 is pertinent in drawing a final conclusion regarding the Principle of Non-Interference "talk" versus the "walk." The literature review shows that criticism often levelled against China's lack of interference in the handling of hotspots in countries in which it does its business. Indeed, although the "talk" discussed in Chapter 3 portrays China's self-image as a responsible global leader dealing with hotspot problems in a bid to ensure harmony and durable peace, its foreign policy "walk" in Iran, Iraq, Zimbabwe and Sudan clearly does not align with this "talk." In the case of Iran, China directly or indirectly interfered in their domestic matters by playing an arbitrating role between the government of Iran and the US, and putting pressure on the Iranian government to accept settlements on a nuclear agreement as a favourable way to improve Sino-Iranian relations. Its involvement influenced the outcome, resulting in the announcement of a \$600 billion trade deal between China and Iran by the Iranian president (see Chapter 4). Similar tendencies of pressuring foreign governments were also noted in China's foreign policy "walk" with Sudan (see Chapter 4). Credit can be given to China's posture of not interfering in the internal affairs of North Korea and Zimbabwe as being reflective of this principle; however, the argument does not hold considering its "walk" in Sudan and Iran, as discussed in Chapter 4.

The Principle of Non-Interference bridges the Principle of Equality and Mutual Benefit. It is viewed in this research as a yard stick used to spearhead China's agenda on natural resource acquisition – a major consideration in China's foreign policy endeavours. Considering the reviewed data on China's relations with Zimbabwe and Sudan, the current state of affairs in these countries does not reflect the ideals of mutual benefit, common development or win-win cooperation. This principle is thus poorly managed; instead of being a mechanism for economic

development or meaningful sustainable development, it has become an avenue to empower repressive regimes, demonstrated in China's tendency of "walking away" from internal problems of countries with which it does its business while providing huge financial aid to these governments. The overall assessment of the "talk" versus the "walk" on the Principle of Equality and Mutual Benefit is premised on the current deteriorating economies in Zimbabwe and Sudan, whose debts continue to increase due while borrowing money from China. While such is the fate of these countries, China's own economy continues to flourish and benefit from the natural resources obtained from these countries, giving credit to Samuelson's argument of China's "me first" attitude.⁵¹⁶

Finally, looking at the "talk" versus the "walk" on the Principle of Peaceful Co-Existence, China's foreign relations with Canada and US speak to the virtue of peace. Considering how the US on numerous accounts braved China's response through its arms sales to Taiwan, and despite China uttering warnings against such in its "talk," China can be applauded for its effort to avoid direct confrontation with the US. However, this does not make acceptable its deliberate non-peaceful and aggressive measures against Taiwan and Japan (see Chapter 4). As such, taking into account the mutual inclusiveness of the Five Principles, the researcher concludes that China does not always "walks the talk" on fundamental virtues that promote genuine peace and co-existence. Furthermore, regarding the findings of this research that China is re-defining the rules of engagement, with the Beijing Consensus seemingly seeking to replace the Washington Consensus, China's foreign policy "walks" of doing business with countries under US or international sanctions does not uphold the spirit of peaceful co-existence.

5.3 Suggestions for Future Studies and Shortcomings

There are many factors that influence and guide the foreign policy of a country, such as domestic politics and needs. Not accounting for all possible drivers is the first limitation of this thesis. Owing to the limit on word count, a decision was taken to only focus on the acclaimed Five Principles and how they guide China's foreign policy "walk." The researcher recommends that future studies move beyond the Five Principles to further investigate the "talk" and "walk" of China's gradually changing foreign policy.

⁵¹⁶ Samuelson, "The Danger behind China's 'Me First' Worldview."

The bulk of social artefacts (media reports, books, articles, etc.) concerned with China's foreign policy conduct are predominantly from the West, which raises a risk of bias towards China. Such bias can impair the quality of data or its credibility if not carefully examined. To avoid this bias, the researcher cross-referenced or crosschecked the data against other credible sources. To further reduce the degree of bias in this research, the researcher deliberately established the "talk" in Chapter 3, based on official Chinese government documents, White Papers and Policy Papers, and also consulted local data and sources in countries engaged in bilateral relations with China.

5.4 Conclusion

China's post-Cold War internal political and economic structures portray the idea of "new wine in old bottles," given that China still regards itself as a communist nation (an old fanatic ideology established by the Cultural Revolution and the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s), yet with some adoption of capitalistic and democratic principles and values. This dichotomy can possibly help to explain why its foreign policy "walk" somewhat contradicts its foreign policy "talk," as it seeks to have peaceful and moderate relations with pro-capitalistic states from the West. Likewise, its foreign policy "walk" is often not consistent with its "talk." However, it is imperative to note that China tries to fulfil and live up to many of its stated commitments and principles, as indicated in the preceding discussions.

Trying to live up to both capitalistic and communist values has presented symptoms of what the researcher can only describe as an "identity crisis." A series of identifiable, contradicting behavioural aspects supports this notion. For instance, as discussed, China managed to rise to global prominence, currently having the second largest economy in the world, yet, it refuses to be identified as a developed nation. China identifies itself as a communist state, yet at the same time, it subscribes to some capitalist values and attributes. With reference to the Five Principles, China speaks of a harmonious world of durable peaceful co-existence, with stable markets and mutual benefits and developments, yet it lacks the resolve to directly tackle the hotspot problems that impedes such a world in countries in which it does its business, because of its "non-interference." These aspects create a paradox of conflicts between its foreign policy "talk" and "walk" vis-à-vis its stated foreign policy goals and objectives in government White Papers and Policy Papers.

This research has explored and analysed China's foreign policy based on its acclaimed Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence. Using China's official White Papers and Policy Papers, the research deduced China's "talk," which, through analysis and interpretation of the data presented on the "walk" in Chapter 4, provide a deeper understanding of China's foreign policy behaviour post-Cold War.

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