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REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
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ERRATA

- x: 10 *for transcends read extends*
17 *for barrier for ASEAN to achieve read barrier against ASEAN achieving*
22 *for to read on*
xiv: 8 *after helped insert me*
4: 5 *for the relation read in relation*
7 *for medications read modifications*
10: 3 *for for read from*
11: 1 *after links insert in*
26: 9 *for confrontationalism read confrontationalism*
63: 7 *after interpreted insert as meaning*
73: 1 *after due to insert the following factors*
77: 4 *for for read to*
13 *after was insert based on*
78: 20 *for Favourite read Favoured*
82: 7 *for structure document read structured procedure*
88: 7 *for 1978 read 1979*
89: 13 *delete the*
90: 8 *for play a read have*
113: 3 *delete the fact*
128: 9 and 10 *for perimeters read parameters*
141: 8 *for respective read successive*
142: 4 *for respective read successive*
153: 11 *for both read they*
13 *after it insert is*
14 *after due insert to*
155: 1 *delete Both*
21 *after Southeast insert Asia*
157: 1 *for has read have*
159: 15 *after drawn insert from*
19 *for perimeters read parameters*
160: 12 *for importance read important*
161: 12 and 22 *for Suhrike read Suhrke*
164: 7 *after have insert caused*
186: 16 *for Tokin read Tonkin*
204: 9 *for be read by*
207: 26 *for has read have*
215: 17 *for non-alignment read non-aligned*
217: 2 *for procument read procurement*
232: 17 and 33 *for Suhrike read Suhrke*
235: 7 *after we insert need*
238: 34 *for Suhrike read Suhrke*
240: 9 *for has read have*
22 *for asymmetry read asymmetrical*
30 *for This read These*
241: 13 *for response read respond*
15 *for a read an*
16 *for transcends read extends*

246: 15 *delete* the fact
16 *for a read* an
16 *for* ensue *read* ensure
23 *for* move *read* more
247: 9 *for* institutional *read* institution
248: 1 *after* has *insert* to be
303 *for* Brionowski *read* Broinowski

**Regionalism in Southeast Asia: The Evolution of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)**

by

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B.A. (Honours), Simon Fraser University, 1990

M.A., Simon Fraser University, 1993

THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the loving memory of my uncle, K.T. Singam, who was my mentor and good friend. He passed on to me not only his love for people and sports, but also taught me to live life with honour and dignity.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION	II
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES.....	VI
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS	VII
ABSTRACT	X
STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP	XI
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	XII
PREFACE	XIV
INTRODUCTION.....	XVI
CHAPTER ONE: THE FORMATION, STRUCTURE AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESS OF ASEAN.....	1
INTRODUCTION.....	1
THEORIES OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION.....	4
THE FEDERALIST APPROACH.....	4
FUNCTIONALISM AND THE INTEGRATIVE PROCESS	5
THE COMMUNICATIONS APPROACH.....	7
THE ALLIANCE APPROACH.....	8
MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONALISM.....	9
REGIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA	11
SEATO, ASA, and MAPHILINDO	14
THE FORMATION OF ASEAN.....	21
THE WORDING OF THE DECLARATION AND THE ASPECT OF THE FOREIGN BASES ..	30
THE BANGKOK DECLARATION.....	32
STRUCTURE AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESS OF ASEAN	37
MUSYAWARAH AND MUFAKAT	39
SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS.....	44
CHAPTER TWO: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF ASEAN	46
INTRODUCTION	46
INTRA-ASEAN CONFLICTS	47
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ZOPFAN AND REGIONAL ORDER	51
AGREEMENT ON ZOPFAN BY ASEAN MEMBERS.....	58

IMPACT OF ZOPFAN	59
DECLARATION OF ASEAN CONCORD	61
TREATY OF AMITY AND COOPERATION	63
NUCLEAR FREE ZONE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA	65
ASEAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT	66
ASEAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (AFTA)	73
EAST ASIA ECONOMIC CAUCUS OR GROUP (EAEC/EAEG)	75
SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS	80
CHAPTER THREE: ASEAN'S ROLE IN RESOLVING THE KAMPUCHEAN CONFLICT	83
INTRODUCTION	83
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CRISIS	85
THREAT PERCEPTIONS	88
ASEAN'S ROLE IN THE KAMPUCHEAN CRISIS	90
ASEAN'S EFFORTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS	94
INDONESIA AND THE CRISIS	101
MALAYSIA AND THE INVASION	106
SINGAPORE AND THE INVASION	109
THAILAND AND THE INVASION	112
THE PHILIPPINES AND THE INVASION	116
RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT	118
IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT ON ASEAN	121
SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS	125
CHAPTER FOUR: ASEAN RELATIONS WITH EXTRA-REGIONAL COUNTRIES	130
INTRODUCTION	130
ASEAN RELATIONS WITH JAPAN	132
ASEAN RELATIONS WITH AUSTRALIA	140
ASEAN RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.	142
ASEAN RELATIONS WITH CANADA	150
ASEAN RELATIONS WITH THE EU (EEC)	153
ASEAN RELATIONS WITH CHINA	154
SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS	158
CHAPTER FIVE: THE POST-COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT AND ASEAN	161
INTRODUCTION	161
POST-COLD WAR IMPACT ON ASEAN	163
ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF)	165
THE IMPACT OF THE ARF	171
GROWTH IN ASEAN MEMBERSHIP	172
CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT	173

THE SPRATLYS ISSUE.....	180
IMPACT OF THE SPRATLY ISLANDS CONFLICT.....	197
SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS.....	204
CHAPTER SIX: REGIONALISM AND ASEAN.....	210
INTRODUCTION.....	210
THE ISSUE OF NON-INTERFERENCE.....	211
ASEAN AS A MILITARY ALLIANCE OR SECURITY COMMUNITY?.....	214
ASEAN: SUCCESS OR FAILURE?.....	229
THE THEORETICAL DEBATE.....	235
ASYMMETRICAL MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONALISM.....	239
SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS.....	242
CONCLUSION.....	245
APPENDICES.....	252
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	296
PRIMARY MATERIAL.....	296
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.....	296
LEARNED SOCIETIES/INSTITUTES PUBLICATIONS.....	297
UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL.....	298
CONFERENCE PAPERS.....	300
INTERVIEWS.....	301
SECONDARY MATERIAL.....	302
BOOKS.....	302
ARTICLES.....	320
NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES.....	338

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

FIGURE 1. MAP OF ASEAN COUNTRIES WITHIN ASIA.....	IX
TABLE 3.1 RESOLUTIONS SPONSORED BY ASEAN WITH REGARDS TO THE KAMPUCHEAN CRISIS IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. (1979-1989).....	97
FIGURE 2. MILITARY EXPENDITURE: INDONESIA 1970-1990.....	105
FIGURE 3. MILITARY EXPENDITURE: MALAYSIA. 1965-1990.....	108
FIGURE 4. MILITARY EXPENDITURE: SINGAPORE. 1970-1990.....	111
FIGURE 5. MILITARY EXPENDITURE: THAILAND. 1965-1990.....	115
FIGURE 6. MILITARY EXPENDITURE: PHILIPPINES. 1965-1990.....	117
TABLE 4.1: U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO THE ASEAN COUNTRIES. (IN MILLION U.S.\$)	149
FIGURE 7. MAP OF SOUTHEAST ASIA SHOWING MAIN SHIPPING ROUTES.....	182
FIGURE 8. MAP OF THE SPRATLY ISLANDS.....	183
FIGURE 9. OCCUPATION OF THE SPRATLY ISLANDS.....	184
FIGURE 10. SPRATLY ISLANDS OCCUPATION.....	185
TABLE 6.1: BILATERAL MILITARY EXERCISES IN ASEAN; 1972-1995.....	223

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADPS	ASEAN Dialogue Partnership System
AFTA	ASEAN Free Trade Area
AIC	ASEAN Industrial Complementation
AIJV	ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture
AIP	ASEAN Industrial Projects
ALP	Australian Labour Party
AMM	ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASA	Association of Southeast Asia
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
CACM	Central American Common Market
CBMs	Confidence-building Measures
CEPT	Common Effective Preferential Tariff
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSCAP	Council for Security in the Asia-Pacific
CSCE	Committee for Security Cooperation of Europe
EAC	East African Community
EAEC	East Asia Economic Caucus
EAEG	East Asia Economic Grouping
EC	European Community
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EU	European Union
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FPDA	Five Power Defence Agreement
GATT	General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
JIM	Jakarta Informal Meeting
LAFTA	Latin American Free Trade Agreement
MAP	Military Assistance Pact (between the Philippines and the United States)
MCP	Malaysian Communist Party
MFN	Most Favoured Nation
MST	Mutual Security Treaty
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NWFZ	Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
PKO	Peace Keeping Operations
PLA	People's Liberation Army (of China)
PMC	Post-Ministerial Conferences
PRC	People's Republic of China
PTA	Preferential Trade Agreement
SEANWFZ	Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
SAARC	South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation
SOM	Senior Officials Meeting
SPF	South Pacific Forum
SLOCs	Sea-lines of Communication
TAC	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority of Cambodia
ZOGIPAN	Zone of Genuine Independence, Peace and Neutrality
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality




Figure 1. Map of Asian Countries Within Asia

ABSTRACT

In recent years, the Southeast Asian region has experienced relative economic and political stability. The primary reason for the presence of such an environment has been the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This late 1960s experiment in regionalism has survived the Cold War and the threat of communism to become a major international player.


The main argument advanced in this thesis is that the measured success of ASEAN is primarily due to the "loose" structural and institutional features of this Southeast Asian regional grouping. The informal institutionalisation of ASEAN has fostered stability among its members for the last thirty years. Such informality transcends from the basic decision-making process of ASEAN to relations among the leaders of the organisation.

The main conceptual tool that can be analysed and identified with the informality of ASEAN is with the decision-making process of this regional body. Two deep-rooted cultural notions, *Musjawarah* and *Mufakat*, are identified and woven into the specific arguments present in the various chapters of this thesis. To a great extent, this indigenous decision-making process has been the binding force that has unified ASEAN through the last thirty years. But, on the other hand, it has been a barrier for ASEAN to achieve greater success and will be a hindrance with the inclusion of the Indochinese countries in the regional grouping.

Therefore, it is on this premise that this thesis argues that the "loose" institutional structure of ASEAN, due to its informal decision-making process, has had a positive impact to the countries involved and also at both the regional and international levels. This thesis also suggests and argues that with the greater involvement of Western countries in the affairs of the Southeast Asian region based on the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and also the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), such informality may have to give way to the evolution of a more structured and codified ASEAN.

STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP

The thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution. To the best of my knowledge, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.



Loganathan Masilamani
March 1998

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Lastly, but not least, I extend my most sincere gratitude to Dr. John Dalton my supervisor, for his timely comments, undying commitment and encouragement that has helped me to progress in a scholarly manner.

PREFACE

This research is primarily an empirical and analytical exercise in establishing the assertion that ASEAN's measured success and flexibility in approaching policy matters is due mainly to its "loose" institutional structure.

This I have accomplished via a survey of the immense literature on ASEAN¹, collecting primary data, and also by interviewing relevant experts on the topic of ASEAN.² My research trips to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore helped to foster a broad understanding of the nuances of the ASEAN experience. Also my two stays at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore as a Visiting Associate helped to gather primary data from the Institute's prestigious library and also interview the staff and various visiting academics at the Institute. Based on such extensive field work and also interviews with diplomats I have written this thesis on ASEAN. The notion of regionalism was historically a foreign concept for the countries of Southeast Asia. It is from such a beginning that, this research weaves a picture of Southeast Asia in general and ASEAN in particular. The various chapters in the thesis argue the issues of decision-making, conflict resolution, external relations, and the future of ASEAN. The various chapters explore both the high and low points of the development of ASEAN. This thesis offers some historical exploration, but is more of a topic related analysis of ASEAN. It is only by such an exercise that we can come to grips with the complexities of this Southeast Asian regional organisation.

Many ASEAN scholars have pointed to ASEAN and maintained that it is a failure. But, these scholars have failed to understand the actualities of the pre-ASEAN environment and also the particularities of individual Southeast Asian countries' relationship with each other. This thesis identifies specific flaws in such arguments fostered by mainstream ASEAN scholars and goes beyond to assert that ASEAN has been a limited success based on the mandate of the 1967 Bangkok Declaration and also

¹Reflected in my forty page Bibliography.

²During my time as a research student at Monash University, I was fortunate to have discussions with literally dozens of students from South East Asia.

based on the particular relationships of ASEAN countries that have brought peace and stability to the region.

At the end of this study I have tried to build a theory for the ASEAN experience. This was the most difficult part of the research work. As ASEAN is ever evolving and changing, both structurally and functionally, a static theory to explain this phenomenon is quite difficult to conceptualise at the present time. The time is not proper to frame a general theory around the ASEAN experience. Instability in the wider Asia-Pacific region has now focused ASEAN countries on evolving into a more security-concerned regional grouping.

It should also be noted that the thesis deals with the ASEAN experience prior to the current 'melt-down' in many Southeast Asian economies. These current problems and their resolution constitute a new chapter in the evolving history of ASEAN, which is beyond the scope of this thesis.

INTRODUCTION

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) emerged as a regional association to establish and maintain social and cultural ties among its five members in August of 1967.¹ Before the emergence of ASEAN, the region was marked by numerous territorial conflicts. With ASEAN, a mixture of countries was brought together in a single regional endeavour. Thus, ASEAN's formation heralded a period of relative stability in Southeast Asia. Economically and politically these five founding members of ASEAN were quite different; further, cultural, religious, and racial diversities were present in these states. It is from such inauspicious beginning that ASEAN has risen to a remarkably successful regional organisation in Southeast Asia.

The measured success of ASEAN as compared to other regional organisations among developing countries is primarily due to the "loose" multilateral institutional feature of this Southeast Asian regional grouping. Thus, this thesis will argue that ASEAN has a relatively strong structure but a low level of institutionalisation. This low level of institutionalisation has helped the founding countries to bind together and preserve ASEAN and its values. Without this low level of institutionalisation it is highly doubtful whether ASEAN would have existed for the last thirty years. On the issue of internal dynamics, the mechanisms are very "loose" and extremely informal. This internal informality has been in the main cause for ASEAN achieving regional peace and stability among its members and also with countries outside of the regional framework.

This thesis will argue that the particularities of the structural framework of ASEAN have brought about measured success for Southeast Asia. The main thrust of the argument that will be presented in the following chapters is that ASEAN's decision-making process based on the notions of *Musjawarah* and *Mufakat* has brought about unity among the members and political stability for the region. This economic and

¹In 1984 Brunei joined and in 1995 Vietnam became the seventh member. Myanmar and Laos became the eighth and ninth members of ASEAN on the 23rd of July 1997. Their membership will not be explored in this thesis as the period of analysis for this study is until the year 1996.

political grouping was formed during a period of uncertainty in Southeast Asia, a period in which preservation of a regional entity seemed highly unlikely.

Measuring success of any international organisation is a very complex matter. The same holds true for ASEAN. We have to divide success for a international organisation into two components. One is structure and the other is the issue of mandate of that international organisation.

The five structural characteristics that are identifiable in all successful international organisations are as follows: the first is that it is a permanent organisation that carries out a continuing set of functions. Secondly, its membership is voluntary. Thirdly, it has some type of instrument or document stating the goals, structures, and method of operation. Another characteristic is that it is a broadly, representative consultative conference organ. The final property of all international organisations is that it has a permanent secretariat to carry on continuous administrative, research, and information functions.²

If we use these five criteria to gauge whether ASEAN has met the structural requisites of being a successful international organisation, then ASEAN is a success. ASEAN meets all of the above five requirements. Thus, ASEAN structurally can be considered a proper international organisation and through the years it has been successful in maintaining this structural facet of a regional organisation. So structurally, ASEAN can be considered a success if we base the criteria on the five aspects discussed above.

Functionally has ASEAN been a success? To answer this question, we have to look at whether ASEAN has met its mandate via the 1967 Bangkok Declaration. Here again, as Chapter Six of this thesis will argue, ASEAN can be considered as a measured success.

The limited formal institutional mechanisms of ASEAN have encouraged member-states in some instances to act independently and, in others, collectively for the benefit of the whole body. Such a regional grouping has succeeded in maintaining a relatively conflict-free environment for (in 1996) the last twenty-nine years.

² Bennett, A. *International Organisations*, New Jersey, 1988, pp. 2-5.

Some scholars argue that ASEAN was a sub-regional body, as in 1967 it only represented five countries in the Southeast Asian geographic region. But, an applicable concept of regionalism has to take into consideration both structural and functional features. Hence, when analysing ASEAN, although it may have been a sub-regional body structurally, it functioned as a regional endeavour. In terms of its security and multi-functional integrative orientation, ASEAN has to be considered as having a striking resemblance to larger regional organisations.³ Such confusion among theorists and analysts alike points to a need to revisit the theoretical and functional underpinnings of the evolution and development of ASEAN.

Hence, the lack of theoretical understanding about the formation of ASEAN necessitates a fresh look at this regional body. Much has been written on the ASEAN experience, however there is a lack of consensus among ASEAN scholars on the primary reasons for its establishment. Some have argued that ASEAN was formed to curtail the confrontative nature of Indonesia, while others have mentioned that ASEAN was formed due to the perceived threat from the People's Republic of China and the likely spread of communism. This study will argue that both these factors, as well as other elements, brought about the establishment of ASEAN. There were significant internal and external factors that pushed and pulled and eventually brought the five founding members of ASEAN together. The predominant common sentiment among these five prospective members of ASEAN was the immediate need to maintain a region of peace and stability.

As ASEAN itself is changing in response to the post-Cold War environment, the present period seems to be an especially conducive period to apply and refine the basic concepts of regionalism, so as to attempt to develop an appropriate theory to fit the ASEAN experience. To comprehend fully the complexities of ASEAN and its applicability as a specific form of regionalism, a multi-faceted study is needed of the regional organisation. Hence, this thesis will undertake an extensive analysis of the structure, decision-making process, conflict resolution mechanisms, and the future of

³For further details on the characteristics of regional organisations see Joseph S. Nye, *Peace in Part: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organisations*, Boston, 1971; L.H. Miller, "The Prospect for Order Through Regional Security," in R. A. Falk and S. H. Mendlovitz, (eds.), *Regional Politics and World Order*, San Francisco, 1973.

ASEAN. By undertaking such a study, a feasible and all encompassing theory that fits the Southeast Asian regional experience can be attempted and refined. As the theoretical literature review in Chapter One below will suggest, contemporary regional theories do not readily fit the ASEAN experience. These regional integration approaches were proposed by scholars of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s and seem to have lost most of their applicability.

The first Chapter of this thesis will deal with the historical, economic, and political factors that led to the formation of ASEAN. Also a critique of integration and regionalism theories will be undertaken to highlight the many deficiencies of such literature when related to ASEAN. The final Chapter of the thesis will revisit the most appropriate theory that can be used with some modifications, to understand the evolution and interstate behaviour of ASEAN members.

By analysing the various reasons for the formation of ASEAN, it will greatly aid in identifying the principal tenets that are present in this form of regionalism. In addition, as there is insufficient research on the decision-making process of ASEAN, the later sections of this Chapter will analyse two significant factors that have played major roles in this area.

The second Chapter will analyse the specific economic and political policies adopted by ASEAN. Via such policies ASEAN matured into a regional body with a specific agenda and responded to the changing political and security environment in Southeast Asia and beyond. At its first Summit in 1976, ASEAN adopted an array of economic policies to try to bring about prosperity for its members. Further, conflict resolution mechanisms were also adopted.

Chapter Three of the thesis will extensively explore ASEAN's role in the Cambodian crisis. 1978 was a water-shed year for ASEAN. It was then that ASEAN, as a developing regional organisation, gained international recognition for its tireless efforts to resolve the Cambodian crisis. Through the analysis undertaken in this Chapter, a clear picture will be presented to illustrate the various threat perceptions that caused divisions in the regional body. Hence, the Kampuchean conflict simultaneously unified and also divided ASEAN. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia does significantly sustain this thesis's argument, that the "loose" or limited structural interrelationship of ASEAN members was the main ingredient that fostered a multifaceted regional and

international response. Such a dynamic response to the conflict not only kept media and diplomatic attention on the crisis, it also eventually helped resolve the matter in 1991.

The next Chapter will emphasis the success of ASEAN in its economic and security relations with its major global actors, primarily Australia, China, Japan, Canada, the United States, and the European Community. ASEAN created a system of encouraging relations with the majority of these countries via the yearly ministerial meetings. Areas that will be discussed in this Chapter are in the fields of economics, security and diplomacy.

Chapter Five of this research will analyse the changes that have affected ASEAN due to the end of the Cold War which has eroded the division between ASEAN and the Indochinese states. 1995 saw the inclusion of Vietnam as the seventh member of ASEAN. This was a historic event. On the negative side, Vietnam's inclusion into ASEAN has brought the issue of overlapping claims for the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea nearer to home. The Spratly issue and the repercussions of a 'hegemonic China' will also be analysed in this Chapter. Such an analysis will help to formulate the future security options for ASEAN. At present, there is evidence to suggest that ASEAN may be evolving into a integrated security or defence alliance.

The concluding Chapter will evaluate the economic, political and security performances of ASEAN since its inception. Based on such a detailed analysis it may be possible to answer the perennial question: Is ASEAN a success or failure? Also this Chapter will question the main tenets of regionalism and their application to the ASEAN case. Through such an analysis, a modified theory of multilateral institutionalism to encompass the Southeast Asian experience will be presented. Such theory construction in relation to ASEAN will be "worthwhile as the world searches for effective arrangements, both global and regional, to provide security and stability in the post-Cold War environment."⁴

⁴Amitav Acharya, "Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 29, No. 1, 1992, p. 19.

CHAPTER ONE: THE FORMATION, STRUCTURE AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESS OF ASEAN

INTRODUCTION

The Southeast Asian region has traditionally been a battleground. Regionalism and any other form of integration were quite unfamiliar concepts in this troubled region. But as the countries in Southeast Asia finally became independent, regional integration was seen to be a feasible venture, as well as a viable option, to reduce tensions and increase economic development. Prosperity through development was perceived as the means to control the spread of communism in the region.

By exploring the foundations of Southeast Asian regionalism, this Chapter will bring to the forefront the significant and complex particularities of this conflict-oriented region. Although there were other sub-regional organisations in the 1960s, ASEAN is the only regional body from that era to survive the last twenty nine years of conflict and compromise. Therefore, by analysing the various reasons for the formation of ASEAN, it will greatly aid in identifying the principal tenets that are present in this Southeast Asian form of regionalism.

Accordingly, a survey of the relevant regional integration theories, proposed by scholars of the 1960s and 1970s, as discussed in this Chapter, will suggest that contemporary regional theories do not fit in readily with the ASEAN experience, and that there is a need for a new round of theory building.

Further, an analysis of the political and economic environment of Southeast Asia, before and after the formation of ASEAN, will create the necessary foundations for the remainder of this study. To evaluate the difficulties of regionalism in Southeast Asia, the sub-regional groupings that were present before the creation of ASEAN will be discussed in detail.

Much has been written on the ASEAN experience, however, there is a lack of consensus among ASEAN scholars on the primary reasons for its establishment. Some scholars of ASEAN have argued that ASEAN was formed to curtail the reemergence of the

confrontative nature of Indonesia, while many others have suggested that ASEAN was formed due to a perceived threat from the People's Republic of China. This study will argue that both these two factors and other elements brought about the establishment of ASEAN.

Further, the contentious issue of the presence of foreign bases on member states' territories and their accommodation within the ASEAN Declaration will be explored. This is with reference to the disagreement between the Philippines and Indonesia, with regards to the preamble of the Bangkok Declaration. This issue is significant as it secured the importance of Indonesia as a member, and also the implicit ideology of ASEAN influenced by a non-aligned Indonesia.

Lastly, this Chapter will review the structure and decision-making processes of ASEAN. Little has been written on the decision-making processes of ASEAN. This section of the Chapter will try to fill the various gaps which are present in our understanding of the decision-making processes of ASEAN.

To place the discussion in perspective, it is essential to define the central terms of the area of study. In this research, the geographical area of study, which is Southeast Asia, will be defined as,

an area bounded by Burma in the northwest corner to West Irian (Indonesia) in the southeast. Within these boundaries lie the mainland states of Burma, Thailand, Laos, Kampuchea, and Vietnam; peninsular West Malaysia, insular East Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines.¹

This geographical definition of the Southeast Asian region was an invention of the British and Americans and was primarily used during the Second World War², and subsequently the term became widely adopted. Within this region, (except for Thailand) the countries shared a history of colonial rule by the British, Dutch, French, Portuguese,

¹Robert O. Tilman, *Southeast Asia and the Enemy Beyond: ASEAN Perceptions of External Threats*, Boulder, Colorado, 1987, p. 16. See also Donald K. Emmerson, "Southeast Asia: What's in a Name," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. XV, No. 1, March 1984, p. 13.

²The term gained prominence with the establishment of a Southeast Asia military command by the Allied Forces. See D. G. E. Hall, "The Integrity of Southeast Asian History," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 4, September 1973; Hugh Tinker, "Search for the History of Southeast Asia," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 11, September 1980; K. M. Panikkar, *The Future of South-East Asia: An Indian View*, New York, 1943; Russell H. Fifield, "The Concept of Southeast Asia: Origins, Development and Evolution," *South-East Asian Spectrum*, Vol. 4, No. 1, October 1975, pp. 42-51.

Spanish, and the Americans: "Colonisation brought not only cultural influences but also new territorial boundaries which cut across ethnic groups resulting in a redistribution of peoples and the development of new areas."³ These colonial boundaries fragmented the various populations in the region.

Other terms that will be discussed in this study are "regional cooperation" and "regionalism". Among the concise definitions of the term "regional cooperation," the definition provided by Michael Leifer, is the most insightful. He states,

Regional cooperation proper is distinguished by the viable functioning of institutionalised arrangements for consultation and harmonisation of policy on the part either of virtually all the states of a conventionally recognised region or of such a proportion of those states that in concert they shape the pattern of inter-state relationships.⁴

"Regionalism" is best defined by Muthiah Alagappa as "sustained cooperation, formal or informal, among governments, non-government organisations or the private sector in three or more contiguous countries for mutual gain."⁵

Further, Michael Antolik, in his definition of both these terms, notes the main difference between regional cooperation and regionalism. He states,

Regional cooperation, the commitment of several states to reach common goals by means of joint-policy undertakings, often institutionalised in the form of agencies to fulfill programs, differs from regionalism, which is more a belief that a commonality (if not a community) exists that should be fostered.⁶

As this study of ASEAN progresses, this difference between regional cooperation and regionalism will be explored and will become more pronounced.

³Estrella D. Solidum, *Towards a Southeast Asian Community*, Quezon City, 1974, p. 13.

⁴Michael Leifer, "Problems and Prospects of Regional Cooperation in Asia: The Political Dimension," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. IV, No. 2,3,4 1976, Special Issue, p. 92.

⁵Muthiah Alagappa, "Regionalism and Security: A Conceptual Investigation," in Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill, (ed.), *Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region*. Australia, 1994, p. 158. Also see Muthiah Alagappa, "Regionalism and Conflict Management: A Framework For Analysis," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 21, 1995, p. 362.

⁶Michael Antolik, *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation*, London, 1990, p. 10.

THEORIES OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION

There are essentially five broad views of regional integration. They are the federalist, functionalist (neo-functionalist included), communications, alliance and institutionalism approaches. All of them try to explain the political phenomenon of regional cohesion across countries. But if we try to apply most of them to Southeast Asia we find them to be inadequate, in particular, the relation to the formation and maintenance of ASEAN. Out of the five approaches, the institutionalist approach with some qualifications best fits the ASEAN experience. I will argue that without modifications of such theories, the ASEAN case cannot fit any of these perspectives. I shall therefore have to address the problem that there is a need for a fresh round of theory-building with regards to Asian regionalism.

THE FEDERALIST APPROACH

There are many branches of the federalist approach to regional integration. The institutional offshoot of the federalist school of thought is the best example of this theory. This branch of the federalist approach maintains that a federal system exists when a set of political communities are united in a consensual arrangement, but retain their respective autonomy.⁷ In other words federation "is a means for achieving unity where necessary, while allowing diversity where possible."⁸ In such a system the consensual agreement is based upon a legal and binding document, the Constitution. Studies have been undertaken to isolate the common features of federal states, for example, Australia, Canada, Switzerland and the USA.

Students of integration have lost interest in the federalist approach because of its lack of practical application to other political systems and also to its dominant reliance on legal and constitutional formulations. As will be discovered later, ASEAN is not a federally integrated group and will never become one. It does not possess a Constitution or have an over-arching governmental body that oversees the daily affairs of its members in various fields.

⁷For a detailed position of the federalist position see Carl J. Friedrich, *Trends in Federalism in Theory and Practice*, New York, 1968, Chapters One and Two. Also Kenneth C. Wheare, *Federal Government*, Third Edition. London, 1953.

Due to the nature of the countries that make up ASEAN, it can never turn into a federal entity. The level of distrust between the members has lessened through the years, but due to the demographic distribution of the various ethnic groups in the countries in the region, the federal option will never evolve within the regional organisation. No member country will let its regional governing body decide on domestic and foreign issues.

FUNCTIONALISM AND THE INTEGRATIVE PROCESS

The second approach to integration is functionalism and the father of this school of thought is David Mitrany⁹. His writings have greatly influenced subsequent theorists of regional integration. Mitrany maintained that,

Peaceful change would come not through a shift of national boundaries but by means of actions taken across them. States would not surrender formal sovereignty - which they certainly remained reluctant to do in any case - but would transfer executive authority for specific ends.¹⁰

He argued that international activities would be organised around the functional needs of societies, such as transportation, health, welfare and trade. Functional and highly specialised organisational bodies would look after these areas and thus bring about integration among countries. Functional cooperation in one field would lead to similar cooperation in other fields. Mitrany also believed that such functional cooperation would contribute to world peace which would eventually absorb the political sector. Functionalism, as Paul Taylor and A.J.R. Groom suggest, "begins by questioning the assumption that the state is irreducible and that the interests of government prevails and proceeds to active consideration of schemes for cooperation it is peace-oriented and seeks to avoid a win-lose stalemate framework."¹¹

⁸J.K. De Vree, *Political Integration: The Formation of Theory and its Problems*, Netherlands, 1972, p. 29.

⁹David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organisation*, London, 1943.

¹⁰Robert J. Leiber, *Theory and World Politics*, Massachusetts, 1972, p. 42. Also see J. K. De Vree, *Political Integration: The Formation of Theory and its Problems*, pp. 37-46.

¹¹Paul Taylor and A. J. R. Groom, "Functionalism and International Relations," in Paul Taylor and A. J. R. Groom, (eds.), *Theory and Practice in International Relations: Functionalism*, New York, 1975, p. 2.

Neo-functionalism, on the other hand, stresses that economic decisions are superior to political choices. Ernst Haas¹² held that "the operation of ever more controversial policies starting from shared interest in economic welfare, would ultimately bring about the establishment of a new supranational authority regardless of the wishes of the individual actors."¹³ In Haas' own words, "... the progression from a politically inspired common market to an economic union, and finally to a political union among states is automatic."¹⁴ Neo-functionalism assumes that countries would concern themselves with economic prosperity rather than ideological commitments and the national interest, i.e. foreign policy and defence. Neo-functionalism also assumes that the intensity of integration is positively correlated with industrialisation and economic diversification.¹⁵

The weakness of this theory is highly visible when it is applied to the context of developing countries, like the members of ASEAN. Often the prerequisites necessary for rapid integration are not present in lesser developed countries. Integration proceeds fastest when it constitutes a response to socio-economic demands coming from an industrial and urban environment; the factors conducive to regional integration include a pluralist social structure, economic development, and a low level of ideological politics.¹⁶ A majority of these factors were not present in countries of the Southeast Asian region in the late 1960s. Hence, the functionalist approach does not take into account the particular aspects of developing countries and thus cannot be used to explain regional integration of such countries.

¹²Ernst Haas, defines integration as "the process whereby political actors in several discrete national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties and political activities toward a new center whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states." See Ernst B. Haas, *The Unity of Europe, Political and Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*, Stanford, 1958. Also see Ernst Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organisation*, Stanford, 1969.

¹³Robert J. Leiber, *Theory and World Politics*, pp. 42-43. Also see Andrew Hurrell, "Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 21, 1995, p. 348.

¹⁴Ernst Haas, "The 'Uniting of Europe' and the Uniting of Latin America," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 5, June 1967, p. 327.

¹⁵See Ernst Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," in Ernst Haas (ed.), *International Political Communities: An Anthology*, New York, 1966, p. 117.

¹⁶See Ernst Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," pp. 104-105.

THE COMMUNICATIONS APPROACH

The third school of thought of regional integration is the communications approach. Karl W. Deutsch is a prominent advocate of this theory which has evolved from the concepts of social communication and interaction, where governments are seen as communication systems. Karl Deutsch argued that political integration arises

when people demanded greater capabilities, greater performance, greater responsiveness, and more adequate services of some kind from the governments of the political units by which that had been governed before. Integration or amalgamation were first considered a possible means to further these ends, rather than as ends in themselves.¹⁷

Further, this approach defines integration by the concept of a security community, "that is, integration requires the attainment of relationships among countries that no longer anticipate the possibility of warfare against one another, but instead have attained a sense of community strong enough to assure dependable expectations of peaceful change."¹⁸ Such security communities can further be divided into two separate categories, amalgamated or pluralistic. Leiber states: "The communications approach applies principles from cybernetics to the relations between nations or population groups."¹⁹ Cybernetics in the form of communications and transactions may be used such as the flow of mail, tourists, and trade as indicators of integration or disintegration.²⁰

The central weakness of the communications approach in general, and in relation to the ASEAN experience, is in the uncertainty over the causal relationship of the various variables. The content of messages, responsiveness among the individual actors, and relationship between trade and the community, all of these variables are discussed quite vaguely.²¹ Further, such a theory cannot be fully used to analyse the ASEAN experience

¹⁷Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton, 1957, p. 87.

¹⁸*ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁹Robert J. Leiber, *Theory and World Politics*, p. 51.

²⁰See Karl Deutsch, "Transaction Flows as Indicators of Political Cohesion", in Philip Jacob and James Toscano, (eds.), *The Integration of Political Communities*, Philadelphia, 1964. Deutsch constructed a scale for international integration and national autonomy. See Karl Deutsch, "The Propensity to International Transactions," *Political Studies*, Vol. 8, 1960, pp. 147-155, Karl Deutsch, "Shifts in the Balance of Communication Flows - A Problem of Measurement in International Relations," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1956, pp. 143-160.

²¹See Ernst B. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing," *International Organisation*, Vol. XXIV, No. 4, Autumn 1970, pp. 626-627

because this regional organisation has not fully matured and also is highly informal in nature. To evaluate a regional organisation based on the communications approach a scholar would need open access to summits and other meetings of that organisation. In the case of ASEAN, all Head of State summits are held behind closed doors.

THE ALLIANCE APPROACH

The third school of integration theory that will be explored here is the Alliance approach. Alliances are mainly designed to attain certain goals as Robert L. Rothstein has suggested,

introducing into the situation a specific commitment to pursue them; to a certain extent, it legitimises that pursuit by inscribing it in a treaty; and it increases the probability that the goals will be pursued because the alliance creates a new status which makes it more difficult for the parties to renege on each other, not only because they would be dishonouring their commitment, and earning a reputation for perfidy, but also because their new status usually creates a response in the external world, such as a counter-vailing alliance, which would tend to strengthen the bonds in the original alliance. It may also stabilise a situation by forcing enemy decision-makers to throw another weight into the opposing scales.²²

Such alliances are transitory and usually disintegrate after the attainment of the specified goals. The decision to join an alliance is usually made after careful evaluation of the costs as weighed against the expected benefits. Alliances are usually formed when conflict, or the threat of conflict, is present. Thus, the central binding issue is usually conflict. Economic and related areas of present day regional integration would not be feasible if associated with alliance building and behaviour.²³

This theory is solely based on achieving certain organisation goals proposed by the membership. Such goals may be economic or security oriented. In the case of ASEAN, it has a multilateral agenda. ASEAN was primarily based on an economic agenda when it was founded in 1967, but, as the discussion below will argue this was a facet and the members essentially wanted to maintain peace and stability in the region. Hence, based on

²²Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliance and Small Powers*, New York, 1968, p. 55. See also Robert E. Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy*, Baltimore, 1968, p. 19.

ASEAN's multilateral agenda, the alliance theory cannot be used to comprehend the complexities of this regional organisation.

MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONALISM

This is one of the approaches that best explains and fits the ASEAN experience. Multilateralism has become increasingly important in international relations literature. The various multilateral organisations in the world today attest to the importance of multilateralism. Some scholars have argued that multilateralism and institutionalism go hand in hand. This thesis has the same view and will argue that multilateral institutionalism can explain to a certain extent the evolution of ASEAN.

Robert Keohane defines multilateralism "as the practice of co-ordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions."²⁴ He also defines institutions as having "persistent and connected sets of rules, formal and informal, that prescribe behavioural rules, constrain activity, and shape expectations."²⁵ Although Keohane defines both concepts in his works, his main contribution to the study of international relations is his stress on international institutions and he seldom addresses the multilateral aspect of such organisations.

As this section concerns multilateral institutionalism, we have to try to adhere to a proper definition of the term. John Ruggie has put forth a concise definition that best describes the theoretical concept of multilateral institutionalism. Ruggie defines such institutions as;

multilateralism is an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of 'generalised' principles of conduct - that is principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions,

²³Alliance behaviour has been analysed by George F. Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence*, Baltimore, 1962; and William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, New Haven, 1962.

²⁴Robert Keohane, "Multilateralism: An agenda for Research," *International Journal*, 45, (Autumn, 1990), p. 731.

²⁵*ibid.*, p. 732. Also see, Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory*, Boulder, 198, pp. 162-164.

without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence.²⁶

There are three principles that follow for the above definition. The first principle is the notion of indivisibility among the members of the organisation, "ranging from the physical ties of railway lines that the collectivity chooses to standardise across frontiers, all the way to the adoption by states of the premise that peace is indivisible."²⁷

The second aspect of multilateralism is the issue of "diffuse reciprocity"²⁸, or as Ruggie suggests, "that is to say, the arrangement is expected by its members to yield a rough equivalence of benefits in the aggregate and over time."²⁹

The third principle of multilateralism is the aspect of nondiscrimination: "Nondiscrimination, signifies that states perform their agree-upon behaviours or satisfy their obligations without any contingencies or particularistic qualifications based on which states are involved."³⁰

There are basically three forms of institutional domains of interstate relations. They are; (1) International Orders, (2) International Regimes, and (3) International Organisations. All three need not be multilateral in nature.

As this study considers ASEAN to be an international organisation, this thesis will concentrate on the third form of institutionalism, that of international organisations. This study has established the criteria for assessing whether an international organisation is a success or failure in the introduction above.

In the present form multilateral institutionalism, as a theory, cannot be used fully and logically to explain the growth of ASEAN. When dealing with theoretical tenets of multilateral institutionalism and how it relates to ASEAN, the main issue is that of interstate relations. ASEAN members in the past and present are at different stages when

²⁶John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution." *International Organisation*, 46, No. 3, (Summer, 1992), p. 571.

²⁷*ibid.*, p. 571.

²⁸See Robert O. Keohane, 'Reciprocity in International Relations.' *International Organisation*, 40, (Winter, 1986), p. 1-27.

²⁹Ruggie, "Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution." p. 571.

³⁰Brian L. Job, "Matters of Multilateralism: Implications for Regional Conflict Management," in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*, Pennsylvania, 1997, p. 167.

discussing economic, political and security relations. In other words, there are strong links in some areas, and weak links in others. Thus, in Chapter Six below, a modified theory based on multilateral institutionalism will be proposed.

REGIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

A complete analysis of the political and economic environment of the region before the establishment of ASEAN in August 1967, is crucial to place this study in perspective. Hence an understanding of the reasons for the lack of regionalism during the colonial period, and also the significant pre-ASEAN regional groupings, namely, SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation), ASA (Association of Southeast Asia), and MAPHILINDO will be explored below.

After the conclusion of the Second World War, most of the countries in Southeast Asia, expected the era of colonialism to come to an end promptly. Butwell states: "The Japanese gave the countries they conquered some of the trappings of independence, and thereby whetted appetites."³¹ For instance, Malaya³² (the city-state of Singapore included) regarded the return of the British colonial authority after the War as only a 'reoccupation' of Malaya.³³ In the Dutch East Indies, the authorities were faced with nationalist forces which had already declared independence on 17 August 1945.³⁴ The Philippines was promised independence from the United States of America in the near future, honouring a pre-War commitment.³⁵ Against such a backdrop, the formation of regional organisations

³¹Richard Butwell, *Southeast Asia Today - and Tomorrow*, New York, 1968, p. 20. See also Robert O. Tilman, *Southeast Asia and the Enemy Beyond: ASEAN Perceptions of External Threats*, Colorado, 1987, p. 17; Donald E. Nuechterlein, "Prospects for Regional Security in Southeast Asia," *Asian Survey*, Vol. VIII, No. 9, September 1968, p. 808.

³²The term Malaya is used prior to the establishment of the new federation in 1963. Thereafter (generally) Malaysia is used. Technically the correct designation after 1963 is Peninsular Malaysia, but this does not convey the element of continuity inherent in the change from Malaya to Malaysia.

³³See John Gullick, *Malaya*, London, 1964, p. 81. Although there were some conflicts between the various ethnic groups vying for power in Malaya, they still wanted to have complete rule of the country in due course.

³⁴In Indonesia, the Japanese had trained and partially armed indigenous nationalist forces and encouraged Sukarno to declare Indonesia's Independence in 1945.

³⁵This promise by the United States annoyed the other colonial rulers in the region. See Richard Butwell, *Southeast Asia Today - and Tomorrow*, New York, 1968, p. 20. The Tydings-McDuffe Act of 1934 promised independence to the Philippines by 1944. This materialised two years later than the promised date of 4 July 1946.

was not at the forefront of events. Instead the mood in these Southeast Asian countries was nationalistic with an emphasis on the means to attain independence.³⁶ As Bernard Gordon explains: "Those were the times when the struggle for independence and the first difficult steps that must follow the removal of colonialism's yoke had priority."³⁷ With the eventual establishment of national governments, this attitude changed in most of the Southeast Asian countries. The 1950s and 1960s saw the evolution and formation of regional groupings around the world and regionalism seemed to be the fashionable trend.³⁸

In the 1950s, some of these organisations in Asia were initiated by the United States of America, like the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). Others were organised by Asian countries themselves. It is only in the early 1960s that we see the evolution of Asian regional bodies with only Asian countries as members. The most significant of these organisations was the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which was established in 1967.

Regionalism in Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s was a foreign concept. This was predominantly due to colonialisation and the "artificial"³⁹ nature of the states in the region. The different parts of the region were influenced by the former colonial rulers. With the end of the colonial period, these newly independent states in Asia were still highly dependent on these major powers for their economic and political well-being.

The reasons for the lack of regional or sub-regional groupings are three fold. Firstly, the geographical expanse and structure of the region was a significant barrier to regional integration. The region, as mentioned before, stretches from Burma in the north-west to the Indonesian archipelago in the south, and the Philippines to the east. Further, there is a

³⁶In 1950, there was only four independent states in the region; Burma, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines.

³⁷Bernard K. Gordon, "Regionalism and Instability in Southeast Asia," in Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (ed.), *International Regionalism: Readings*, Boston, 1968, p. 118.

³⁸Countries in Africa, Europe, and Latin America began to form regional organisations: - Associations such as the European Economic Council (EEC) in 1958; Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua signed a Treaty of Central American Economic Integration on 13 December 1960; the Latin America Free Trade Association (LAFTA) was signed by nine Latin American countries on 2nd June 1961; in Africa, the Organisation of African Unity was signed by 32 countries in the region on 25 May 1963.

³⁹The state boundaries were drawn up by colonial powers. Further ethnic communities were divided. Also some states had large numbers of workers imported by the colonial powers. One of such examples would be Malaya, which had a large number of Chinese from mainland China imported to work the

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natural geographic division between mainland Southeast Asia and the insular part of the region.⁴⁰

As compared to many other regional organisations in Europe, like the Nordic Council, this area was simply too immense to form a regional organisation at that time. Moreover, during this period inter-regional communication and transport infrastructure were at the developmental stage. Also, the multilingual and multi-ethnic diversity of the region hindered easy communications and thus prevented any attempt to structure a formal regional organisation. Independence and nationalism, to a certain extent, solved this problem.

Secondly, as no one colonial power was able to dominate the region, there was no common legacy present after the de-colonisation period. Such a legacy may have provided the foundation for regionalism.⁴¹ Hence, time was needed for countries to get used to each other before bilateral and multilateral ties could be developed and maintained.

Thirdly, colonisation curtailed any form of bilateral or multilateral relationships taking root in the region: "... their traditional and colonial experiences left the Southeast Asia states a legacy of isolation and ignorance of regional politics and problems."⁴²

All these factors deterred the growth of regionalism in Southeast Asia. Although the countries in the region had common problems, regionalism was not considered as a feasible option by the leaders of these countries. As Charles Fisher maintains, the indigenous people in the region were not aware at this stage that Southeast Asia could develop into a integrated political entity.⁴³

mines. See Donald Snodgrass, *Inequality and Economic Development in Malaysia*, Kuala Lumpur, 1980, p. 24; Barbara Wilson Andaya and Leonard Andaya, *A History of Malaya*, London, 1982, p. 252.

⁴⁰The countries of Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam are located on the Indo-Pacific Peninsular, which extends directly southward from China. The archipelagic countries include Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei and Malaysia. Although the inclusion of Malaysia can be disputed because it is attached to the mainland, Malaysia's historical, cultural, ethnic, religious, economic, and political links to Sumatra and the other islands of the archipelago suggest that Malaysia fits more precisely with that group. See Donald G. McCloud, *System and Process in Southeast Asia*, Colorado, 1986, pp. 5-7. This view is commonly accepted among scholars of Southeast Asia. See also G. Coedes, *The Making of Southeast Asia*, Berkeley, 1969, p. V.

⁴¹See Donald G. McCloud, *System and Process in Southeast Asia*, p. 8.

⁴²*ibid.*, p. 248.

⁴³See Charles Fisher, "Geographic Continuity and Political Change in Southeast Asia," in M. W. Zacher and R. S. Milne (eds.), *Conflict and Stability in Southeast Asia*, New York, 1974, pp. 3-4.

In the mid-1950s and the early 1960s the formation of regional and sub-regional organisation such as the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), and MAPHILINDO changed the political climate of the region. However, ASA and MAPHILINDO had short lives due to conflicts within their respective memberships. Some Asian scholars view the formation of ASA and MAPHILINDO as quite significant,⁴⁴ as they were established by Asian leaders who focused attention on the region. The countries of Southeast Asia began to think in terms of a purely regional organisation.⁴⁵ The motto for the period may have been "Asia for Asians". On the other hand, SEATO was a Western initiative, it was an organisation to bring together non-communist, Western-leaning countries in the region and Western allies.

To better understand the background to the establishment of ASEAN, we must first and foremost consider the formation and eventual collapse of these three main pre-ASEAN groupings: SEATO, ASA, and MAPHILINDO. These groupings played a significant part in the essential establishment of ASEAN.

SEATO, ASA, and MAPHILINDO

SEATO (the South East Asia Treaty Organisation) was an alliance formed as a by-product of the American Containment Policy⁴⁶ and the famous Domino Theory⁴⁷ of Southeast Asia. In essence, it was an alliance in reaction to events in Indochina, and thus

⁴⁴This view is proposed by Bernard Gordon, Michael Leifer, Micheal Antolik, Norman D. Palmer, Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl and others.

⁴⁵See Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, *Regional Organisation and Order in South-East Asia*, London, 1982, pp. 10-12.

⁴⁶For a further explanation of this policy look at the following books by George Kennan, the main proponent of the idea of containment, *American Diplomacy 1900-1950*, Chicago, 1969; *The Cloud of Danger: Current Realities of American Foreign Policy*, Boston, 1977; *The Nuclear Delusion: Soviet-American Relations in the Atomic Age*, New York, 1982; *On Dealing with the Communist World*, New York, 1964; *Realities of American Foreign Policy*, New York, 1966. See also K. Holly Maze Carter, *The ASEAN Dilemma in U.S. Foreign Policy*, New York, 1989. The fundamental objective of the containment policy was to contain the spread of Communist ideology and Soviet influence in the global context.

⁴⁷The Domino analogy was used by U.S. President Dwight D. Esienhower at a Press Conference, on April 7, 1954 to explain the political significance of Indochina to the region. President Esienhower said: "You have a row of dominoes set up and you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly... The loss of Indochina will cause the fall of Southeast Asia like a set of dominoes." See James S. Olson and Randy Roberts, *Where the Domino Fell: America*

... footnote cont'd over ...

designed to prevent the spread of communism in the region. SEATO was launched on 8 September 1954.⁴⁸ Eight countries -- Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, France and Great Britain -- signed documents called the Manila Pact which established the SEATO. Michael Haas maintains that: "The major objectives were to maintain and develop individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack, which the United States had defined to mean communist aggression, and to develop economic measures to promote economic progress and social well-being."⁴⁹ Initially, the absence of Malaya (Singapore included) from this pact, was due to the fact that they were still under British colonial rule at the time of SEATO's inception. However, after gaining independence from the United Kingdom in 1957, Malaya still refused to be part of SEATO. Tunku Abdul Rahman, the then Prime Minister of Malaya, explained that: "As an independent country, Malaya does not consider it necessary to be a member of SEATO, as we are quite satisfied with our individual Defence Agreement with the United Kingdom and our confidence in the United Nations."⁵⁰ The Tunku's strong stand was reinforced by his belief that SEATO was ineffective, negative, outmoded and under the stigma of Western domination.⁵¹ With its history of colonial domination, Malaya did not want to succumb to a United States-dominated regional body. Indonesia also perceived SEATO to be a Western-dominated Alliance and Jakarta's strong non-aligned stance prevented it from joining SEATO. The organisation did struggle through until the late 1970s; John Stirling mentions; "it survived (with occasional military exercises) until 1977, when it dissolved and its grandiose headquarters in Bangkok [was] taken over by the Thai government."⁵²

ASA (Association of Southeast Asia), the second pre-ASEAN organisation, had three members all from the Southeast Asian region; they were Thailand, Malaya and the

and Vietnam, 1945 to 1990, New York, 1991, p. 43. For full text of the President Esienhower speech, see also *United States-Vietnam Relations: 1945-1967*, Book 7, p. B11.

⁴⁸See *Collective Defence in Southeast Asia: The Manila Treaty and its Implications*. A Report by the Chatham House Study Group, London, 1956, pp. 168-171, for the full text of the treaty.

⁴⁹Michael Haas, *Basic Documents of Asian Regional Organisations*, New York, 1974, pp. 223-224.

⁵⁰*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 28 July 1960. Also see Michael Leifer, "Some South-East Asian Attitudes," *International Affairs*, Vol. 42, No. 2, April 1966, pp. 219-229.

⁵¹See *Manila Chronicle*, 12 January 1960. See also George Modelski (ed.), *SEATO: Six Studies*, Melbourne, 1961, pp. 6-7. Robin W. Winks, "Malaysia and the Commonwealth," in Wang Gungwu (ed.), *Malaysia: A Survey*, Melbourne, 1964, p. 38.

⁵²John Stirling, "ASEAN: The Anti-Domino Factor," *Asian Affairs*, No. 5, May/June 1980, p. 274.

Philippines. Vincent Pollard states that: "The July 31, 1961, Bangkok Declaration was an executive agreement signed by [Thailand's] Thanat Khoman, Prime Minister Abdul Rahman of Malaya, and the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto M. Serrano."⁵³ ASA was the brain-child of Tunku Abdul Rahman: "In July 1960 the Tunku changed the name of the proposed group from SEAFET to ASAS⁵⁴ (Association of Southeast Asian States) since SEAFET sounded too much like SEATO."⁵⁵ Due to its limited membership, ASA has to be considered a sub-regional rather than a main-stream regional organisation. It did not attract the socialist-leaning countries in the region, as they perceived ASA to be closely affiliated to SEATO and thus the United States of America.⁵⁶ Further, the People's Republic of China and communist-leaning countries were not invited to join.⁵⁷

Indonesia refused to join ASA, as it was hostile to a proposal, sponsored by Malaya's Tunku Abdul Rahman. Indonesia viewed the ASA proposal as a declaration of total and absolute negativity: "The spirit behind the proposal is any way anti-this and anti-that (as revealed by many statements of Tunku Abdul Rahman) and Indonesia does not want any part in a negative policy in international affairs ..."⁵⁸ Further, Sukarno's personal dislike of Tunku Abdul Rahman was another contributing factor to Indonesia's refusal to join ASA. Indonesia had ambitions of attaining a position of an Asian leader and further: "... any Southeast Asian pact without Indonesian participation would not have much meaning ..."⁵⁹ Hence, by not joining ASA, Sukarno thought that ASA would be totally irrelevant in the region.

⁵³Vincent K. Pollard, "ASA and ASEAN, 1961-1967: Southeast Asian Regionalism," *Asian Survey*, Vol. X, No. 3, March 1970, p. 246.

⁵⁴But 'ASAS' was rejected because it could be pronounced in English as 'asses'. See the report in the *Bangkok Post*, 29 July 1961.

⁵⁵*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 28 July 1960.

⁵⁶See Norman D. Palmer, "SEATO, ASA, MAPHILINDO and ASPAC," in K. S. Sandhu, (et. al.), *The ASEAN Reader*, Singapore, 1992, p. 29.

⁵⁷See *Malayan Parliamentary Debates*, 26 January, 1962, Col. 3877, where Tunku Abdul Rahman said that "all countries in South East Asia were invited to join ... if they wish to join they are welcome at any time, except China and all countries with communist affiliations."

⁵⁸Interview with Sumito, Secretary-General of the Indonesia Department of Foreign Affairs, reported in the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 1961, p. 55.

⁵⁹*Bangkok Post*, 8 February 1961. Also see Donald E. Nuechterlein, "Prospects for Regional Security in Southeast Asia," *Asian Survey*, Vol. VIII, No. 9, September 1968, p. 813.

ASA was founded as "an organisation for economic and cultural cooperation among the countries of South East Asia."⁶⁰ ASA brought with it aspirations of Asian regionalism. Scholars such as Michael Leifer have argued that ASA was an important step and does warrant comment:⁶¹ "ASA was an attempt to bring into being a purely Asian organisation that would settle differences among its members and promote cooperation without the participation of non-Asian countries."⁶²

The formation of ASA entrenched the division in the region between communist and anti-communist countries. The communist camp was against regional cooperation, whereas the anti-communist camp perceived regional economic and political cooperation as a means to contain the spread of communism in the region.

The first two years of ASA were the most active; however, in 1963, the formation of the Federation of Malaysia, which included Sabah and Sarawak, created a major conflict between the Malaysian Federation and the Philippines. Manila maintained (and still does to a certain extent) that the territory of Sabah belonged to it, as it was part of the ancient Sulu Empire.⁶³ This conflict between Malaya and the Philippines resulted in the eventual

⁶⁰The Bangkok Declaration of 1961.

⁶¹See Michael Leifer, "Problems and Prospects of Regional Cooperation in Asia: The Political Dimension," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. IV, No. 2-4, 1976, Special Issue, p. 92.

⁶²Donald E. Nuechterlein, "Prospects for Regional Security in Southeast Asia," *Asian Survey*, Vol. VIII, No. 9, September 1968, p. 813.

⁶³For a historical summary and analysis of the Philippines claim of Sabah see M. O. Ariff, *The Philippines' Claim to Sabah*, Oxford, 1970; S. K. F. Chin, *The Sabah Dispute*, Unpublished B.A. Thesis, Department of Politics, University of Adelaide, 1969; Julie Klein McGuire, *Political Preconditions for Regional Economic Integration: The Association of Southeast Asia*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1966, pp. 91-93; S. Jayakumar, "The Philippine Claim to Sabah," *Malaya Law Review*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1968; Micheal Leifer, *The Philippine Claim to Sabah*, Hull Monographs on Southeast Asia, 1968; Geoffrey Marston, "International Law and the Sabah Dispute," *The Australian Yearbook of International Law*, 1967; Martin Meadows, "The Philippine Claim to North Borneo," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. LXXVII, No. 3, September 1962; Nestor M. Nisperos, *Philippine Foreign Policy on the North Borneo Question*, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, 1969; Pacifico A. Ortiz, "Legal Aspects of the North Borneo Question," *Philippine Studies*, Vol. II, No. 1, January 1963; Jovito Salonga, *A Point-by-Point Reply to the Sumulong Report on the Philippine Claim to North Borneo*, Manila Bureau of Printing, 1963; Lorenzo Sumulong, "A Report on Malaysia and on the Greater Malayan Confederation in Connection with the Philippine Claim of Sovereignty to a Portion of North Borneo," *Philippine International Law Journal*, Vol. II, Nos. 1 and 2, 1962; K. G. Tregoning, "The Claim to North Borneo by the Philippines," *Australian Outlook*, December 1962; Leigh R. Wright, "Historical Notes on the North Borneo Dispute," *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XXV, No. 3, May 1966.

cessation of all ASA activities. The Sabah issue would remerge to haunt these countries in the first few years after the formation of ASEAN.

The insistence on the claim by Manila that Sabah belonged to it was primarily due to the domestic politics in the Philippines at that time. It has been strongly suggested that the Philippines wanted to construct an independent foreign policy, which was independent of the United States of America.⁶⁴ Thus, Manila wanted to distance itself from the offending comment made by neighbouring Southeast Asian countries, that it was a "Southeast Asian subsidiary" of the United States of America.⁶⁵ The Philippines wanted to develop its own foreign policy without the constant interference of the Americans. Such an attitude was evident in the Philippines since the 1950s: "Among Filipino politicians, Senator Claro Recto in particular gave expression to resentment of a suffocating association [with the U.S.] which, ... allegedly denied the Philippines a rightful opportunity of realising an Asian identity."⁶⁶ During this period, the domestic situation in the Philippines was extremely anti-American due to trade disputes and the domestic political situation.⁶⁷ As a result of such feelings, President Macapagal wanted to enhance his own independent stance and that of his Republic and ignored America's advice on the 'Sabah' issue: "In February 1962, the Counsellor of Political Affairs of the U.S. Embassy to Manila, Max C. Knebs, informed Simeon Roxas of the Department of Foreign Affairs that his [U.S.'s] government desired the avoidance of adverse relations between Britain and the Philippines, 'mutual friends' of the United States."⁶⁸ Washington's position on this matter was that it had not "acquired title to North Borneo under the Treaty of Paris. ... or under the

⁶⁴See Robyn Abell Lim, "The Philippines and the Formation of ASEAN," *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 1, Jan-June 1973, p. 2.

⁶⁵See Vincent K. Pollard, "ASA and ASEAN, 1961-1967: Southeast Asian Regionalism," *Asian Survey*, Vol. X, No. 3, March 1970, p. 247.

⁶⁶Michael Leifer, *The Foreign Relations of the New States*, (Australia: 1974), p. 41. Also see Frank H. Golay, (ed.), *Philippine-American Relations*, Manila, 1966; and Man Mohini Kaul, *The Philippines and Southeast Asia*, New Delhi, 1978, p. 183.

⁶⁷The issues here were 1) President Macapagal, the President of the Philippines at that time, was accused by rival political factions to be a colonist 'stooge'. Thus to prove that this was not true the President took a strong stance against American influence in the country, 2) the impoundment of a shipment of US tobacco by the Philippines angered the Americans, 3) U.S. wanted to adopt a global quota system for the market price of sugar, this would hurt the essential sugar industry in the Philippines, 4) U.S. House of Representatives rejected a Philippine War Damage Bill for U.S.\$73 million.

⁶⁸Robyn J. Abell, *Policy Towards Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia: 1961-1969*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Australian National University, 1972, p. 131.

subsequent sovereignty over the Philippines from Spain, and that in 1904, the American government adopted the stance that Spain had renounced sovereignty over the Borneo territories belonging to the Sultans of Sulu in favour of Great Britain."⁶⁹ But, Manila was adamant in its claim on Sabah and thus asserted an independent foreign policy. The U.S. strongly opposed the Philippines initiative over Sabah as it wanted to create a stable security environment in the Southeast Asian region.

The last of the pre-ASEAN groupings to be discussed will be MAPHILINDO.⁷⁰ Pre-Federation Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines joined together to set up this regional organisation in 1963. A meeting among Tunku Abdul Rahman, President Sukarno and President Macapagal in Manila brought about the existence of MAPHILINDO. Other countries in the region did not join as MAPHILINDO's emphasis which was on the common Malay origins of its members had a limited appeal.⁷¹ Jorgensen Dahl comments: "Officially ushered into existence in July 1963, MAPHILINDO did not survive the ensuing conflict over the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in September of that year, and was for all practical purposes stillborn."⁷² Further Estrella Solidum argues: "It was designed to prevent the worsening of the dispute between Malaysia on the one hand, and Indonesia and the Philippines on the other, over the incorporation of the Borneo territories into Malaysia without a previous determination of the wishes of the Borneo people."⁷³ But the eventual formation of Malaysia caused problems with Indonesia. On the other hand, there is some evidence to suggest that the policy of Confrontation with Malaysia by the Indonesians was discussed and implemented before September of 1963. Johan Saravanamuttu states: "As early as January 1963, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr. Subandrio, announced a policy of 'Confrontation' against the Malaysia project, charging that it was 'neo-colonialist' and 'neo-imperialist.'"⁷⁴ Further, Franklin Weinstein

⁶⁹See Nestor M. Nisperos, *Philippine Foreign Policy on the North Borneo Question*, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, 1969, p. 20.

⁷⁰The name MAPHILINDO comes from the first letters of the countries Malaya, Philippines and Indonesia.

⁷¹See Alison Broinowski, *Understanding ASEAN*, London, 1982, p. 10.

⁷²Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, *Regional Organisation and Order in South-East Asia*, p. 10.

⁷³Estrella D. Solidum, *Towards a Southeast Asian Community*, p. 29. Also see J. P. Ongkili, *The Borneo Response to Malaysia, 1961-1963*, Singapore, 1967, for further discussion on the relevant issues of the Borneo people.

⁷⁴Johan Saravanamuttu, *The Dilemma of Independence: Two Decades of Malaysia's Foreign Policy, 1957-1977*, Malaysia, 1983, p. 62.

in his study of Indonesian foreign policy maintains that "confrontation" suited the ideological aspirations of Sukarno:

Confrontation naturally appealed to Sukarno's ideological preoccupation with the struggle against *nekolim* (neo-colonialism, colonialism, imperialism), and Britain's failure to consult Indonesia with regard to the formation of the new federation only served to reaffirm Sukarno's suspicions about the West motives as a strategic threat as well, for it seemed to guarantee the perpetuation of British influence close to Indonesia's borders.⁷⁵

Thus, what existed before the 1967 establishment of ASEAN, were SEATO, ASA and the still-born MAPHILINDO. These sub-regional organisations were weak and did not have a majority of the Southeast Asian countries as members. Added to this, the "confrontation" policy of Indonesia towards Malaysia, among other things, created a sense of distrust and thus an absence of regionalism that incorporated the majority of countries in Southeast Asia. As Jumono Sudarsono puts it;

Hostilities between Indonesia and Malaysia during confrontation, the breakup between Malaysia and Singapore, tension between Singapore and Indonesia over alleged manipulation by Singapore Chinese over Indonesia's economy, the dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia over Sabah, Thailand's border problems with Malaysia -- all these are reminders that the short-term urgencies of immediate problems can adversely affect the initial commitment toward regional cooperation, peace and security.⁷⁶

In 1967, the confrontation episode between Indonesia and Malaysia had recently ended. The dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia over Sabah had also just come to an apparent end, with the election of President Marcos in the Philippines. On the other hand, Singapore had been ousted from the Malaysian Federation,⁷⁷ and Thailand had some border disputes with Malaysia. This was the political environment within which ASEAN was formed.

⁷⁵Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesia Abandons Confrontation: An Inquiry into the Functions of Indonesian Foreign Policy*, Modern Indonesia Project, New York, 1969, p. 3.

⁷⁶Juwono Sudarsono, "ASEAN: The Uncertain Commitment," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. I, No. 2, January 1973, p. 7.

⁷⁷The main reason why Singapore was pushed out of the Malaysian Federation was due to Singapore's, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's, insistence on multi-lingualism within a framework of a Malaysian-Malaysia. See Wan Hashim, *Race Relations in Malaysia*, Kuala Lumpur, 1983, p. 76 and Lee Kuan Yew's Press

... footnote cont'd over ...

In general terms, regional endeavours before the emergence of ASEAN could be categorised within two specific groups, as maintained by Johan Saravanamuttu:

Barring Indonesia, it would appear that the cooperative efforts of the would-be ASEAN states were centred around two broad imperatives: [(1)] Implicit or explicit anti-communist alliances with or without the actual participation of Western powers (SEATO, ASA), [(2)] Non-military, socio-cultural cooperation of marginal economic significance (ASA, MAPHILINDO).⁷⁸

The emergence of ASEAN can be regarded as something different from the groupings of the past, as it was a regional rather than a sub-regional body in concept and to a certain extent in structure.

THE FORMATION OF ASEAN

ASA⁷⁹ and MAPHILINDO were the structural foundations on which ASEAN was based. Although structurally weak, both these organisations played significant roles in the formation of ASEAN.⁸⁰ ASA and MAPHILINDO provided the countries in the region with the necessary and crucial experiences in establishing regional organisations. In a region that was under colonial rule for centuries, such experiences in multi-lateral relations were much needed. ASA and MAPHILINDO could be considered as experiments in regional community and confidence building. As Donald Crone correctly states; "ASEAN then, did not spring from uncultivated soil but, rather, emerged as the dominant hybrid of numerous crossbreedings."⁸¹ The main structural fault of ASA and MAPHILINDO was that they

Conference at Qantas House, Sydney on March 23, 1965 in *Malaysia-Age of Revolution*, Ministry of Culture Publication, Singapore, 1965.

⁷⁸Johan Saravanamuttu, "Imperialism, Dependent Development and Asean Regionalism," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1986, p. 216.

⁷⁹Bernard Gordon may have been right in maintaining that ASA, rather than having supplemented, had simply been enlarged and given a new name, ASEAN. See Gordon in Tilman, (ed.) p. 567. Also See Bernard Gordon, "Regionalism and Instability in Southeast Asia," in Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (ed.), *International Regionalism: Readings*, Boston, 1968, pp. 120-125. Gordon proposed "ASANEFOS" to designate the "Association of Southeast Asian New Emerging Forces."

⁸⁰See Michael Leifer, "The ASEAN States and the Progress of Regional Cooperation in South-East Asia," in Bernhard Dahm, Werner Draguhn, (eds.), *Politics, Society and Economy in the ASEAN States*, Germany, 1975, p. 3.

⁸¹Donald K. Crone, *The ASEAN States: Coping with Dependence*, New York, 1983, p. 37.

were not regional organisations which encompassed the majority⁸² of states of the region. These were sub-regional organisations that had only three member-states each. Although ASA was still present during the formation of ASEAN, by then, it had little functional application.

Xuto states: "ASEAN could rightly claim to be a genuinely indigenous Southeast Asian regional cooperation organisation, initiated, established and participated by the majority of countries in Southeast Asia."⁸³ After the experiences with ASA and MAPHILINDO, the leaders in the region realised that consensus-building and reconciliation between states were essential to create a lasting regional organisation that could bring peace and stability to the entire region.

ASEAN was formed due to both internal and external reasons. Although each founding member of ASEAN had its own respective reasons for becoming part of the regional grouping, there were some over-arching factors that were common to all these states. The threat of communism spreading into the region was upmost in the minds of the ruling political elites of the prospective members, namely, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) was seen as a major threat in the region at that time. Such a perceived threat may have had its foundation by a statement made by Mao Zedong in 1965,

We must have Southeast Asia, including South Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia and Singapore. This region is very rich, there are a great many natural resources there, and it is well worth the effort to gain possession of it. In the future it will be of great use for the development of China.

⁸² 'Majority' in terms of population and geographic area. ASA did not encompass Indonesia which had the largest population (about 98 million in population) and geographic area. While MAPHILINDO did not have Thailand as a member. Singapore at the time of both these regional groupings was under the Malayan sovereignty. The total land area of ASEAN members is over three million square kilometres. Further the ASEAN members in the late 1960s had 180.6 million in total population. The rest of Southeast Asia (the Indochinese countries) had 55.4 million. Thus ASEAN encompassed 76.52% of the total population of Southeast Asia when it was formed. Population figures attained from table 1 of Charles Hirschman, "Population and Society in Twentieth-Century Southeast Asia," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2, September 1994, pp. 381-416.

⁸³ Somasakdi Xuto, *Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia: Problems, Possibilities and Prospects*, Thailand, 1973, p. 44.

industry. All losses can be made good in that way. After we get that region, the wind from the East will prevail over the wind from the West.⁸⁴

This coupled with alleged Chinese aggression against India in 1962, military assistance to communist forces in Indochina, detonation of an atomic bomb in 1964, and the PRC's implication in the coup attempt in Indonesia in 1965⁸⁵, caused the leading elites in these societies to believe that the PRC was a major external threat, also that the PRC's involvement with regional communist parties would bring about respective indigenous internal threats. Jorgensen-Dahl states; "In other words, the internal and the extra-regional threats blended in such a way that the former was seen as an extension of or the long arm of the latter."⁸⁶ The various communist parties in the region were all affiliated to the PRC. As James A. Gregor states:

Since its founding in 1949 the PRC has provided moral and material assistance to revolutionary movements throughout the world. In Southeast Asia the authorities in Beijing have extend support to the Pathet Lao of Laos, the Viet Cong of South Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia, the White Flag faction of Burma, the Huks and the New People's Army of the Philippines, the Communist Party of Thailand, the Communist Party of Malaya, and the Communist Party of Indonesia.⁸⁷

Tunku Abdul Rahman, in his article 1977 in *Pacific Community*, maintained that the establishment of ASA and the expansion of ASA to become ASEAN were needed to prevent the spread of Communism in Asia.⁸⁸ He further mentioned in the article that a regional organisation was needed to forestall the communist threat in the region. Bob Reece argued that:

The idea of ASEAN was mentioned by the Tunku at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London in September 1966 when he said that regional co-operation was the best means of meeting the threat to

⁸⁴Quoted in Xuan Thuy, "Chinese Expansionism in Southeast Asia," *World Marxist Review*, (Prague), Vol. 24, No. 3, March 1981, p. 13.

⁸⁵See Chintamani Mahapatra, *American Role in the Origin and Growth of ASEAN*, New Delhi, 1990, p. 20.

⁸⁶Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, "ASEAN 1967-1976: Development or Stagnation?", *Pacific Community*, Vol. 7, 1976, p. 523.

⁸⁷A. James Gregor, *In the Shadow of Giants: The Major Powers and the Security of Southeast Asia*, Stanford, 1989, p. 73.

⁸⁸See Tunku Abdul Rahman, "The Communist Threat in Malaysia and Southeast Asia," *Pacific Community*, Vol. 8, No. 4, July 1977, pp. 570-571.

Southeast Asia from the North and of stabilising and strengthening the economies of each country in the area.⁸⁹

Leaders in the region perceived that the extra-regional threats to their respective countries were real. The real enemy beyond for these countries in Southeast Asia was the PRC. A majority of leaders in the region believed that poverty and social injustice would breed communism in these societies and Tunku Abdul Rahman and the other regional leaders believed that with economic progress the threat of communism could be significantly curtailed. They argued that the poor economic status of individuals caused people to be attracted to Communism and eventual revolution: "From this point of view regional cooperation was seen as an instrument which would enable the countries involved to move effectively to strike at the roots of these conditions and therefore at the very base of the most crucial support of their common internal as well as external enemy."⁹⁰

The second reason for the formation of ASEAN was the gradual realisation that the British and American military presence in the region would be temporary in nature. Although, America provided a security guarantee with bilateral and multilateral security arrangements, like those with Thailand, (the Manila Pact and the Rusk-Thanat executive agreement) and the Philippines (the Manila Pact and the Bases agreement),⁹¹ it became apparent that their presence would most likely not be permanent.⁹²

Further, British bases in Malaysia and Singapore were also temporary given the British withdrawal from 'East of Suez.' Donald Nuechterlein stated: "By 1967, however, the British government may have concluded that the security threat to Malaysia and Singapore had been greatly reduced following the striking reversal in Indonesian foreign policy after President Sukarno's fall from power in 1966."⁹³ Thus, there was a pressing need to construct a regional community as the imminent withdrawal of British and eventual contraction of American military forces would leave the region at risk. This encouraged an

⁸⁹Bob Reece, "Walking at Last," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 4 December, 1969, p. 491.

⁹⁰*ibid.*

⁹¹Chan Heng Chee, "ASEAN Subregional Resilience," in James W. Morley (eds.), *Security Interdependence in the Asia Pacific Region*, Massachusetts, 1986, p. 114.

⁹²This American position was brought to the forefront in July 1969, when President Nixon announced the "Guam Doctrine" - Asian security would become the responsibility of Asian countries. See Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years*, New York, 1979, p. 224.

endeavour to organise a regional effort to replace the withdrawal of Western military forces. Although the ASEAN Declaration does not have a security component within it, ASEAN itself provides a basis to enact regional security policies and decisions.⁹⁴ Thus, the envisaged military vacuum brought the five founding countries of ASEAN together. Jorgensen-Dahl states: "It is the perceptions and assessments of such events [the withdrawal of Western military forces] and the questions of how to cope with them that more than anything else (but not exclusively) brought the five together and have held them together since 1967."⁹⁵

The end of Indonesia's Confrontation policy towards Malaysia provided the stable environment necessary to begin talks on promoting regionalism in Southeast Asia. The Foreign Ministers of Malaysia and Indonesia agreed on the means to end confrontation at a meeting in Bangkok on 30 May 1966⁹⁶. Dewi Fortuna Anwar argues that: "Ideas for the establishment of a new regional association emerged as direct off-shoots of the Indonesia-Malaysia normalisation talks in Bangkok in April and May 1966."⁹⁷ There, the three foreign ministers, Adam Malik of Indonesia, Tun Abdul Razak of Malaysia and host Thanat Khoman of Thailand, agreed that closer relations in the region was needed to prevent conflict, such as "Konfrontasi."⁹⁸

The end of the dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia and the subsequent talks for regional cooperation were due to a change in Indonesia's leadership via a failed coup d'état and a counter-coup. President Sukarno was forced out, while the New Order of General Suharto was established.⁹⁹ This change brought about both domestic and external policy

⁹³Donald E. Nuechterlein, "Prospects for Regional Security in Southeast Asia," *Asian Survey*, Vol. VIII, No. 9, September 1968, pp. 806-807.

⁹⁴Article Two of the Bangkok Declaration of 1967 does make reference to the promotion of regional peace and stability. See attached Declaration in Appendix A.

⁹⁵Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, "Regional Organisation and Stability in the ASEAN Region," in Kusuma Snitwongse (eds.), *Durable Stability in Southeast Asia*, Singapore, 1987, p. 63.

⁹⁶The agreement to end confrontation was rectified on 11 August 1966. The delay was partly due to opposition on the part of Sukarno, who still nominally was the President of Indonesia.

⁹⁷Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, Singapore, 1994, p. 49.

⁹⁸*The Straits Times*, 3 and 4 June 1966.

⁹⁹On the fall of Sukarno see John Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography*, Sydney, 1985, Chapter 15, pp. 385-409, esp. pp. 396-403. See also Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia: The Year of Transition," *Asian Survey*, Vol. VII, No. 2, February 1967, pp. 141-142. Also see John Hughes, *Indonesian Upheaval*, New York, 1967.

alterations. In 1967, Indonesia was experiencing a very poor economic situation. By joining ASEAN, President Suharto hoped that it would greatly aid the economic recovery of the country. Dewi Anwar states that: "The outlook of the New Order leadership had three key aspects: namely, strong anti-communism, a commitment to stability and economic development, and a pragmatic international outlook."¹⁰⁰ In essence, ASEAN encompassed all these factors. Indonesia also rejoined the United Nations and began to seek economic assistance from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Asian Development Bank and the Colombo Plan.¹⁰¹

Indonesia wanted to change its external image from one of confrontationalism to one of accommodation with its regional neighbours, but it still wanted to play a significant regional role and also improve its economic status. Buss argues: "Regional co-operation was firstly intended to exorcise the ghost of Confrontation, to provide a contrast between Sukarno's confrontative foreign policy and the New Order's more conciliatory approach."¹⁰²

However, Indonesia did not want to be part of ASA. Adam Malik made it quite clear in August, while in Kuala Lumpur to sign the agreement to end Confrontation, that Indonesia would not join ASA.¹⁰³ Indonesia had three reasons for not wanting to be part of the existing ASA. Firstly, ASA's strong pro-Western image which would have been difficult to reconcile with Indonesia's independent and non-aligned foreign policy. Secondly, Indonesia wanted both Burma and Cambodia¹⁰⁴ to be part of a regional organisation in Southeast Asia, but these two countries would not have joined ASA¹⁰⁵; and lastly, Indonesia wanted to play a leadership role in the region and it could not have done that by joining an existing regional body.¹⁰⁶ This last point is echoed by Dewi Fortuna

¹⁰⁰Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, p. 35.

¹⁰¹See Claude A. Buss, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, New York, 1970, p. 55.

¹⁰²*ibid.*, p. 45.

¹⁰³See *The Straits Times*, August 13, 1966.

¹⁰⁴*Asian Almanac*, p. 2096. See also *Djakarta Times*, 10 March 1967 and *Antara*, 15 March 1967.

¹⁰⁵Burma and Cambodia would not have joined ASA as these countries still perceived it to be an off-shoot of SEATO.

¹⁰⁶See Jorgensen-Dahl, *Regional Organisation and Order in South-East Asia*, pp. 34-35; Franklin Weinstein, "The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia: An approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries," *World Politics*, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, April, 1972, p. 367; Michael Leifer, "Continuity and Change in Indonesia's Foreign Policy," *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 60, June, 1973, p. 176.

... footnote cont'd over ...

Anwar: "Equally important, Indonesia was too proud to become a junior member of an association [ASA] in which it would be the largest and most populous state."¹⁰⁷

Further, to a certain extent,¹⁰⁸ Indonesia also did not want to be part of a refurbished MAPHILINDO for two reasons. Firstly, MAPHILINDO was defined in relation to the Malay "race". Even Tunku Abdul Rahman, opposed a revival of MAPHILINDO, "which he said was a 'racialist' concept."¹⁰⁹ This would prevent other non-Malay countries from joining it, namely, Singapore, Thailand, Burma and Cambodia. Indonesia did not want to sustain a split between Malay and non-Malay countries in the region as was the policy of the "Old Order" in Indonesia.

The other reason was that MAPHILINDO was seen as a failure as it was unable to achieve its main objective of resolving the conflicts between Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. Tunku Abdul Rahman as early as 1965 maintained that MAPHILINDO ought to be scrapped altogether because it failed to achieve peaceful relations based on equality and mutual respect.¹¹⁰ By proposing to re-initiate MAPHILINDO, the old dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines could re-surface and disrupt any new endeavours in regionalism. Indonesia intended to be the motivating force for regional co-operation to foster a new image which would complement the New Order. This predominance to change its image was also to reassure its neighbours that the days of "Konfrontasi" were in the past. This brought the formation of regional organisation to the top of Indonesia's foreign policy agenda. As Bernard Gordon maintains: "Southeast Asian regional cooperation became widely accepted by Indonesia, the world's fifth largest country, as a

Peter Polomka, "Indonesia and the Stability of Southeast Asia," *Survival*, Vol. XV, No. 3, May/June 1973, pp. 115-116, for full explanation for Indonesia's refusal to be part of ASA.

¹⁰⁷Quoted in Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, Singapore, 1994, p. 50, footnote No. 11.

¹⁰⁸The Indonesian Defence Minister in 1965 said that Indonesia still yearned for a MAPHILINDO association with Malaya, the Philippines, Singapore and the North Borneo territories. *The Straits Times*, 10 December 1965. This was a statement uttered to irritate Tunku Abdul Rahman, as it brought up the topic of Sabah.

¹⁰⁹Robyn Abell Lim, "The Philippines and the Formation of ASEAN," *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 1, Jan-June 1973, p. 5.

¹¹⁰See *The Straits Times*, 16 December 1965. Thailand also agreed with the Malaysian Prime Minister, *The Straits Times*, 4 January 1966. Malaysia associated MAPHILINDO with Confrontation and the Sabah conflict. The Tunku again declared in 1967 that MAPHILINDO was "dead and buried". See *Manila Bulletin*, 1 February 1967.

legitimate means of exercising a properly significant leadership role in this part of the world."¹¹¹

Furthermore, the other countries in the region wanted Indonesia to be part of regional consensus-building. This desire to have Indonesia within a regional community was to establish an institutionalised arena where relevant economic and security issues could be efficiently discussed. They wanted to "pull" Indonesia into a stable regional forum:

For Malaysia and Singapore which had undergone almost four years of Konfrontasi, a partly diplomatic, partly military wrangle with Indonesia, it was no doubt a matter of great relief to be able to neutralise any future adventurism on the part of their large neighbour through this novel means of regional cooperation.¹¹²

Further, as Michael Leifer contends: "In the case of ASEAN some parallel might be drawn in the attempt to include Indonesia, the largest and potentially the most powerful country of Southeast Asia, in an arrangement that might fulfil ambitions of regional leadership without prejudicing the international status of the other participants."¹¹³ By including Indonesia, 68 per cent of the total area and about 72 per cent of the population of Southeast Asia were included within the ASEAN framework.¹¹⁴ The other countries in the region perceived that regional stability would be enhanced by having Indonesia in the fold as compared to being a large, unbridled outsider. This view complemented the domestic situation in Indonesia, as the change in leadership, brought with it a new direction in foreign policy. As Harold Crouch has stated:

In contrast to Sukarno's conception of Indonesia as a great power standing in the vanguard of the world-wide struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, the Suharto government adopted a low-keyed

¹¹¹Bernard K. Gordon, "Regionalism in Southeast Asia", in Robert O. Tilman (ed.), *Man, State and Society in Contemporary Southeast Asia*. New York, 1969, p. 513.

¹¹²Chandran Jeshurun, "ASEAN as a Source of Security in the Asian-Pacific Region. Some Emerging Trends," in T.B. Millar and James Walter, (eds.), *Asian-Pacific Security After the Cold War*, Australia, 1993, p. 82.

¹¹³Michael Leifer, *Dilemmas of Statehood in Southeast Asia*, pp. 148-149.

¹¹⁴See Robert O. Tilman, *Man, State and Society*, table 13, p. 536.

approach in which emphasis was given to the strengthening of ties with immediate neighbours.¹¹⁵

Such a view was shared by the Indonesian Army, which played a major role in domestic and foreign policy: "At the Bangkok meeting in August 1967 which finally established ASEAN, the Indonesian delegation, in fact, mostly consisted of elements of the army, although they were not listed as members of the official delegation."¹¹⁶

There is a mainstream group that asserts that President Suharto's foreign policy agenda was totally different as compared to former President Sukarno's confrontational agenda. But some scholars, such as Michael Leifer, maintain that there are similarities between the Sukarno and Suharto eras especially in the foreign policy arena. Leifer contends that the terminology used in the ASEAN Declaration of 1967 is similar to the Manila Agreements of 1963 which were proposed by Sukarno: "What is notable about this terminology [the ASEAN Declaration] is that, in certain essential respects, it is identical, word for word, with that employed in the documents of the Manila Agreements of 1963 which reflected the foreign policy values of Sukarno's Indonesia."¹¹⁷ Leifer is correct in asserting that, as evidenced in 1963, Sukarno was opposed to foreign bases in the Southeast Asian region. As will be discussed in the following pages, the Indonesians wanted such bases to be temporary as mentioned in the preamble to the Bangkok Declaration of 1967.¹¹⁸ The similarities between Sukarno and Suharto's foreign policy agenda ends here. Suharto in wanting a regional organisation was more accommodating than Sukarno would have

¹¹⁵Harold Crouch, *The Indonesian Army in Politics: 1960-1971*. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Monash University, 1975, p. 694. Also see, Mohammed Ayoob and Chai-Anan Samudavanija (eds.), *Leadership Perceptions and National Security*, Singapore, 1989, pp. 126-141 for analysis of the different leadership styles of Sukarno and Suharto.

¹¹⁶Dewi-Fortuna, Khadir-Anwar. *ASEAN as an Aspect of Indonesian Foreign Policy*, Unpublished Ph.d. Thesis, Monash University, 1990, p. 245. See pp. 234-282 for a succinct discussion of the Indonesian's army's role in the formation of ASEAN. By looking at the verbatim record of the Bangkok Meeting of 1967, six of the eleven officially listed members of the Indonesian delegation were from the Indonesian army and were high ranking officers. The other countries did not have delegations comprised of military officers. See *The ASEAN Declaration and Verbatim Record of the Meeting of ASEAN*, held on Tuesday, August 8, 1967, Bangkok, Thailand, p. 1.

¹¹⁷Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, London, 1983, p. 121.

¹¹⁸In May 1966, for instance, Adam Malik reiterated Indonesia's opposition to all foreign bases, "no matter where they are ... Indonesia will endeavour to eliminate all foreign bases," *The Straits Times*, 5 May 1966. The Deputy Commander of the Indonesian Army, General Panggabean, similarly declared that "there would be no need for any outside power to station military forces in the region." *Antara*, 1 March 1967.

been. ASEAN was eventually formed in an atmosphere of mutual cooperation and accommodation, but not without initial disagreement, mainly between Indonesia and the Philippines, about the wording of the preamble of the Declaration.

THE WORDING OF THE DECLARATION AND THE ASPECT OF THE FOREIGN BASES

Indonesia was concerned about the formation of a regional grouping which included the Philippines and its support of the U.S. military bases. The presence of British military personnel, air and naval bases in Malaysia and Singapore was also an issue of contention. Although, such strong concerns were highlighted by Adam Malik to his respective Asian counterparts, this disagreement was primarily between Indonesia and the Philippines. It came to prominence when a decision was needed on the wording of the preamble to the ASEAN declaration.¹¹⁹ The Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, circulated a draft preamble which the Indonesians approved. This read;

foreign bases are temporary in nature and should not be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of Asian countries, and ... arrangements of collective defence should not be used to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers...

The Philippines opposed this statement asserting that it was inconsistent with its long-standing military ties with the United States. Such ties were institutionalised through several bilateral agreements; the Military Bases Agreement of 1947, the Military Assistance Pact of 1947, and the Mutual Defence Treaty of 1951.¹²⁰ Moreover, the Philippines feared that the removal of American military bases would leave the region open to the apparent expansionist ambitions of the People's Republic of China and other external threats.

The Indonesians, however, were adamant. The removal of foreign bases would strengthen Indonesia's own and the region's non-aligned stance, and thus attract other countries, like Burma and Cambodia, as members. Such a preamble indeed would have made the regional organisation a palatable proposition to countries such as Burma and

¹¹⁹For the text of the Filipino and the Indonesian drafts, see Robyn Abell, *Policy Towards Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia: 1961-1969*, Appendix IV and V, pp. 427-431.

¹²⁰See Russell Fifield, *The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 1945-1958*, pp. 60-63 and pp. 68-69, for details about these agreements.

Cambodia.¹²¹ Also it can be argued that the Indonesians' refusal to compromise was due to domestic pressure from relevant and significant interest groups. The Indonesian military and also Sukarno may have played direct or indirect roles in insisting on the removal of military bases from the region. Gordon argues: "President Sukarno was still fighting for his political life, and General Suharto was determined not to allow him to charge that Indonesia had been humbled by agreeing to join a tainted association."¹²² Adam Malik in 1966 appealed to the others that the paragraphs concerning security and the foreign bases needed to be included for the political survival of the 'new order' in Indonesia.¹²³ The domestic interests which still backed Sukarno in Indonesia wanted a strong regional stance against colonialism and imperialism. This had been the stated reason for "konfrontasi" between Indonesia and Malaysia.¹²⁴ Adam Malik stressed that Indonesia's foreign policy would adhere to the continued "struggle against colonialism and imperialism" and "opposition to foreign bases".¹²⁵

Malaysia was not very concerned with the preamble put forth by Indonesia because it had been notified that the British were leaving: "Tun Razak had stated that British bases in Malaysia were not permanent and British troops, in any case would soon be withdrawn."¹²⁶ The British also had declared that they would withdraw from Singapore in the early 1970s, after the city-state's military forces were adequately trained.¹²⁷

Thus, the dispute was confined to Indonesia and the Philippines. This issue was resolved with the help of the Malaysians and the Thais. A watered-down preamble was agreed upon by all parties. The declaration agreed upon states that,

foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or

¹²¹See a report to this effect in *Manila Bulletin*, 9 August 1967.

¹²²Bernard Gordon, *Towards Disengagement in Asia: A Strategy for American Foreign Policy*, New Jersey, 1969, p. 113.

¹²³See *Philippines Herald*, 17 August 1967.

¹²⁴There were a mixture of motives for confrontation. See Donald Hindley, "Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives", *Asian Survey*, Vol. IV, No. 6, June 1964.

¹²⁵*Berita Harian*, 6 May 1966.

¹²⁶*The Straits Times*, 8 August 1967.

¹²⁷The Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, actually wanted the British to stay longer. Lee Kuan Yew thought that the British would be present for another 15 years.

indirectly to subvert the national independence of freedom of states in the area...¹²⁸

The absence of any statement concerning collective defence arrangements that served the interest of the great powers seems to have been agreeable to all parties involved. Although small in nature as compared to other inter-regional disagreements that ASEAN would face in the future, the amicable settlement of the foreign bases issue set the consensual tone for future ASEAN decision-making and internal conflict resolution.

The Indonesian objection to the presence of foreign military powers in the area implied that Jakarta wanted the Southeast Asian countries to take care of their respective security needs.¹²⁹ Therefore, the leaders of the region, with the formation of ASEAN, were also concerned with security matters, and not only economic and cultural issues as stated by the Bangkok Declaration of 1967: "The discussion about security and the related paragraphs in the ASEAN Declaration are indications that the member states were motivated by more than a desire to cooperate to enhance their economic and social well-being."¹³⁰ As Chan Heng Chee asserts;

That ASEAN was conceived primarily as an organisation whose major activities lay in economic, social, and cultural cooperation but whose *raison d'être* was political coordination to cope with threats to subregional peace and security, internally or externally, is a revealing statement of the maximal attainment possible in a situation of minimal consensus.¹³¹

This issue will be dealt with extensively in later Chapters of this study.

THE BANGKOK DECLARATION

ASA was set up based on the Nordic Council of Scandinavia, and ASEAN is also based much on the same structure as ASA. As mentioned before, ASA was inspired by

¹²⁸See the Bangkok Declaration of 1967, in Appendix A.

¹²⁹See Peter Polomka, "Indonesia and the Stability of Southeast Asia", *Survival*, Vol. XV, No. 3, (May/June 1973), pp. 111-118; Micheal Leifer, "Continuity and Change in Indonesia's Foreign Policy," *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 60, (June 1973), pp. 173-180; and Frank Weinstein, "The Use of Foreign Policy in Indonesia: An Approach to the Analysis of the Less Developed Countries," *World Politics*, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, (April 1972), pp. 356-381.

¹³⁰Jorgensen-Dahl, *Regional Organisation and Order in South-East Asia*, p. 43.

¹³¹Chan Heng Chee, "ASEAN: Subregional Resilience", in James W. Morley (eds.), *Security Interdependence in the Asia Pacific Region*, Massachusetts, 1986, p. 114.

Tunku Abdul Rahman and " ... it is noteworthy that the Tunku borrowed many of his ideas and received much inspiration from attempts at regional cooperation elsewhere such as the Nordic Council."¹³² The Tunku was influenced and impressed by the Western regional organisations of the time and the Nordic Council was offered by him as a model that should be adopted by Southeast Asia.¹³³ The Nordic Council was established for the purpose of consultation and cooperation among Scandinavian countries.¹³⁴

The basis of the formation of ASEAN¹³⁵ was the notion of accommodation; there was much "give and take" by the respective leaders to form ASEAN. The Philippines Foreign Minister, Ramos, expressed the process of negotiation prior to the agreement adequately: "The Declaration we just signed was not easy to come by; it is the result of a long and tedious negotiations which truly taxed the goodwill, the imagination, the patience and the understanding of the participating ministers."¹³⁶ The turbulent years before the formation of ASEAN, i.e. the Sabah issue, Confrontation, and border disputes between Thailand and Malaysia, the expulsion of Singapore from the Malaysia Federation, necessitated much accommodation between the various leaders.

Indonesia took the lead and undertook such accommodation by being the only country that sent delegates to visit the majority of Southeast Asian countries to push for the idea of regionalism.¹³⁷ Gordon claims "the idea for a Southeast Asian group can be traced

¹³²Arffinn Jorgensen-Dahl, "ASEAN 1967-1976: Development or Stagnation?", *Pacific Community*, Vol. 7, 1976, p. 522.

¹³³See *The Straits Times*, 27 July 1960. Also see *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14th July 1960, p. 52. This reference to the Nordic Council was also made by the *Philippines Malay Mail*, 9 August 1960, and *Bangkok Post*, 11 February 1961. Also see *Background Notes on ASA*, Federation of Malaya, High Commission, London, No date and publication details, quoted in John B. Dalton *The Development of Malayan External Policy, 1957-1963*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Oxford University, Oxford, p. 177, on how the Nordic Council can be related to ASA and ASEAN. Also see Jorgensen-Dahl, "ASEAN 1967-1976: Development or Stagnation?", *Pacific Community*, Vol. 7, 1976, p. 522.

¹³⁴See Amitov Etzioni, *Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces*, Columbia, 1965, p. 184.

¹³⁵For the first sixteen years ASEAN was made up of members from the (ASA and MAPHILINDO) and Singapore. Brunei joined in 1984. See Appendix D, *Declaration of the Admission of Brunei Darussalam into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, signed on 7 January 1984.

¹³⁶*Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, (Bangkok), Vol. 7, No. 1, August-September 1967, pp. 30-31. See also *The Straits Times*, 9 August 1967.

¹³⁷Indonesia did leave Thailand to persuade Malaysia to join the new organisation, due to the past conflict. Indonesia found it prudent not send its own delegate to Kuala Lumpur but left Thailand to do the necessary.

primarily to the new Indonesian government - particularly to Foreign Minister Adam Malik."¹³⁸

Adam Malik was indeed one of the two prime movers¹³⁹ in wanting to set up a new regional organisation: "The idea of creating a new forum for regional cooperation occurred to him [Adam Malik] in 1966 while he was attempting to restore good relations with the Philippines and Malaysia."¹⁴⁰ The Minister wanted to "reshape the foreign image of Indonesia."¹⁴¹ As mentioned before, Indonesia's image was extremely tarnished due to President Sukarno's provocative and somewhat erratic confrontational policy with Malaysia. The new regional organisation was intended to become "strong and powerful in economic affairs as the basis and source for developments in other fields."¹⁴² When ASEAN was conceptualised, Indonesia wanted Burma, Laos, and Cambodia to be part of the regional body, but Adam Malik was unable to persuade the leaders of these countries to be part of the organisation. Indonesia wanted Burma to be part of ASEAN as it thought that "Burma's neutral foreign policy would off-set the Western orientation of most ASEAN members."¹⁴³ These countries had a deep-rooted suspicion that ASEAN, like ASA, was a political grouping which was Western oriented. Indonesia also had such a notion about ASA. Jorgensen-Dahl maintains that "Indonesian and, for that matter, Burmese and Cambodian leaders remained unconvinced of the non-political character of the proposed regional organisation [ASA]."¹⁴⁴ But after the aborted coup and eventual downfall of Sukarno in Indonesia, the national foreign policy perspective changed. Hence, to gather support for his plan, Adam Malik sent representatives to Cambodia and the Philippines, while he went to Burma. All the countries, except Burma and Cambodia, accepted the need for greater regional cooperation. The Burmese as well as the Cambodians politely refused

¹³⁸Bernard Gordon, *Towards Disengagement in Asia*, p. 112.

¹³⁹The other was Thanat Khoman, the Thai Foreign Minister. On the role of Thanat Khoman see Bernard Gordon, "Regionalism in Southeast Asia," in Robert Tilman, (ed.), *Man, State and Society in Contemporary Southeast Asia*. Tunku Abdul Rahman only mentioned about a new regional organisation, he did not actively encourage it. He still preferred ASA.

¹⁴⁰Estrella D. Solidum, *The Nature of Cooperation Among the ASEAN States as Perceived Through Elite Attitudes--A Factor for Regionalism*, Unpublished Ph.d. Thesis, University of Kentucky, 1970, p. 103.

¹⁴¹Bernard Gordon, "Regionalism in Southeast Asia", in Robert O. Tilman, (ed.), *Man, State and Society in Southeast Asia*, p. 514.

¹⁴²Foreign Minister Adam Malik's statement before the Indonesia Parliament on June 24, 1967.

¹⁴³Kathryn E. Rafferty, *Burma and Southeast Asian Regionalism*, Virginia, 1969, p. 7.

the invitation arguing that the membership in the proposed organisation was incompatible with their general policies.¹⁴⁵ Singapore had earlier talked to Thailand about the need for a regional organisation.¹⁴⁶ Dewi Anwar states: "It was significant that Indonesia was the only country that actively tried to promote the idea for a new regional association, thus emphasising the Suharto government's enthusiasm for such a venture."¹⁴⁷

On the basis of such discussions, Thailand drafted an agreement, but, at this point, Malaysia's Prime Minister wanted an expansion of ASA so as to include Indonesia and Singapore.¹⁴⁸ Adam Malik managed to convince Tunku Abdul Rahman to abandon ASA and join ASEAN.¹⁴⁹ As discussed before, Indonesia was against the idea of an expanded ASA; Indonesia and the Philippines also had their respective draft proposals for a new regional organisation. Thanat Khoman and Adam Malik worked tirelessly to smooth over differences in the various proposals and came up with the Bangkok Declaration which was eventually signed on 7 August 1967. On the aspect of the name ASEAN, Russell F. Fifield has implied that the family of ASEAN and its name were inspired by his 1963 paper *Southeast Asia in United States Policy*.¹⁵⁰ On the other hand, Adam Malik's aides have maintained that the name ASEAN and the notion for greater regionalism were primarily moved by the Indonesian Foreign Minister.¹⁵¹ This must remain an open debate for the present.

With regard to the points of disagreement among prospective members, these were (1) the bases issue (this was taken up above), (2) inclusion of the Sabah claim by the Philippines, although President Marcos was persuaded not to carry on with the claim, and (3) the future admission of new members to the organisation. The Philippines had proposed

¹⁴⁴Jorgensen-Dahl, *Regional Organisation and Order in South-East Asia*, p. 18.

¹⁴⁵See *Asian Almanac*, pp. 2198-2199.

¹⁴⁶The Singapore Foreign Minister had paid a visit to Thailand in May of 1967, where the issue of regionalism was discussed.

¹⁴⁷Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, p. 51.

¹⁴⁸See *The Straits Times*, 14 April 1967. Also see Peter Lyon, *War and Peace in Southeast Asia*, London, 1969, p. 517.

¹⁴⁹Tunku finally agreed on the need for a new regional body on 23 May 1967 after meeting Adam Malik at the Bangkok airport. See *Djakarta Times*, 25 May 1967. See also *Asian Almanac*, pp. 2198-99.

¹⁵⁰Russell Fifield, *National and Regional Interests in ASEAN. Competition and Cooperation in International Politics*, Occasional Paper no. 56, Singapore, 1979, pp. 2-3. Also J.F. Kennedy had also mentioned in his book *The Strategy of Peace*, New York, 1960, about the desire to have a regional organisation.

¹⁵¹See Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, p. 55.

that there should be provisions restricting the admission of new members so as to exclude Australia, Japan, and other heavily industrial states which might later apply to join ASEAN.¹⁵² The other prospective members were against this aspect of the Filipino draft proposal as they did not want to alienate themselves from the other countries in the region.

The Bangkok Declaration, which was only a couple of pages long, is actually more of a document of good-will and togetherness than a basis on which to form an integrated regional organisation.¹⁵³ Its loose wording to a great extent has benefited the continuity and relative success of ASEAN. Harvey Stockwin asserts that ASEAN is not another Treaty of Rome and that it is the product of *musjawarah*¹⁵⁴ (consensus-seeking) rather than hard bargaining.¹⁵⁵

The Bangkok Declaration did emphasise the need for regional cooperation and also the aspect of non-alignment. The Indonesians wanted to emphasise that ASEAN would be non-aligned and opened to all countries in the Southeast Asian region.

As put forth by Estrella Solidum in her doctoral thesis, the salient points of the final Bangkok agreement are;

1. National sovereignty shall be preserved.
2. Cooperation is in the spirit of equality and partnership.
3. Countries of Southeast Asia share a primary responsibility for the economic and social stability of the region.
4. The countries are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference.
5. All foreign bases are temporary and will not be used directly or indirectly to subvert national development.
6. Membership is open to all states in the Southeast Asian region subscribing to the principles of ASEAN.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵²Estrella Solidum, *The Nature of Cooperation Among the ASEAN States as Perceived Through Elite Attitudes--A Factor for Regionalism*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Kentucky, 1970, p. 110.

¹⁵³See Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, "Politics in Command," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 22 October 1992, p. 30.

¹⁵⁴This will be discussed later in this Chapter.

¹⁵⁵See Harvey Stockwin, "Tricky Negotiation", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 24 August 1967, p. 380.

¹⁵⁶Estrella Solidum, *The Nature of Cooperation Among the ASEAN States as Perceived Through Elite Attitudes--A Factor for Regionalism*, p. 146.

She continues: "The ASEAN constitution could be said to represent a more sophisticated view of international affairs which subordinates dogmatic theories to practical issues."¹⁵⁷ This supports the notion that the "looseness" of the declaration has, to a great extent, benefited ASEAN.

STRUCTURE AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESS OF ASEAN

Not much literature has been produced on the decision-making process of ASEAN, because of the predominantly closed door nature of negotiations among the members.

Firstly, the structure of ASEAN provided the background to the decision-making process of the organisation. The basic structural foundations of ASEAN were taken from ASA. ASEAN leaders did not want the regional organisation to supersede their respective authorities at the nation-state level: "Rather, ASEAN should be seen as a step in the evolution of an experiment in co-operation among nations which have similar goals regarding national development."¹⁵⁸ More importantly, it was to reinforce the commitment between the various members.

The ASEAN leaders did ensure that careful planning was engaged when the structural decision-making bodies of ASEAN were enacted. The third paragraph of the Bangkok Declaration states that the bodies needed to bring about the aims of the ASEAN Declaration are:

- (a) Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which shall be by rotation and referred to as ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers may be convened as required;
- (b) A Standing Committee, under the chairmanship of the Foreign Minister of the host country or his representative and having as its members accredited Ambassadors of the other member countries, to carry out on the work of the Association in between Meetings of Foreign Ministers;
- (c) Ad-Hoc Committees and Permanent Committees of specialists and officials on specific subjects;

¹⁵⁷*Ibid.*, p. 379.

¹⁵⁸Majorie L. Suriyamongkol, *Politics of ASEAN Economic Co-operation*, Singapore, 1988, p. 49.

(d) A National Secretariat in each member country to carry out the work of the Association on behalf of that country and service the Annual or Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers, the Standing Committee and such other Committees as may hereafter be established.¹⁵⁹

Further each country within ASEAN has its own national secretariat. These national secretariats are situated within the confines of the Foreign Ministry of each country. Thus, it is within the control of the respective countries and they are not separate regional units. This aspect indicates the basis for a de-centralised decision-making process:

While the structure is decentralised (and designed to keep the member governments actively involved in ASEAN work), authority is placed in the hands of the Foreign Ministers since the two committees described thus far (the Standing Committee and the National Secretariat) are composed of people who are subordinates of the Foreign Minister.¹⁶⁰

The second level of the structural foundation of ASEAN consists of a system of Permanent, Special and Ad Hoc Committees.¹⁶¹ As can be seen the structure of ASEAN seems to be considerably unsophisticated and minimal in nature: "The minimal structure approach was unlike the establishment of other regional organisations like the European Economic Community (EEC) with its elaborate Treaty of Rome or the Andean Grouping with its Cartagena Agreement."¹⁶²

Structurally, it was only during the 1976 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting that the regional organisation evolved further. During this meeting, one of the many important decisions¹⁶³ was the agreement to establish a central ASEAN Secretariat. Indonesia was chosen to be the country to construct and maintain such a regional unit. This decision to establish an ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta was to encourage a definite role and structure for ASEAN. An organisational structure diagram of the ASEAN Secretariat is to be found in Appendix B below.

¹⁵⁹The ASEAN Declaration, 8 August 1967.

¹⁶⁰At this level the structures are the same as ASA. Policy-making and decision-making are the same as ASA. The only difference is that the number of functional committees have increased with ASEAN.

¹⁶¹For a further discussion about this aspect of the structure, see Majorie L. Suriyamongkol, *Politics of ASEAN Economic Co-cooperation*, p. 51.

¹⁶²Puspha Thambipillai and J. Saravanamuttu, *ASEAN Negotiations: Two Insights*, Singapore, 1985, p. 7.

¹⁶³The other important issues of this meeting will be taken up in other Chapters of this study.

MUSYAWARAH AND MUFAKAT

Scholars of ASEAN argue that the two concepts or notions, *Musjawarah* and *Mufakat*, have significantly affected the formation and development of ASEAN. These two concepts originated from Indonesia and have been placed in the Southeast Asian political and diplomatic framework. These notions exist in the rest of the Malay world, namely Malaysia and the Philippines, and are employed predominantly in decision-making by ASEAN members.

Firstly, a clear definition of the two concepts would be helpful. *Musjawarah* means "that a leader should not act arbitrarily or impose his will, but rather make gentle suggestions of the path a community should follow, being careful always to consult all other participants fully and to take their views and feelings into consideration before delivering his syntheses-conclusions."¹⁶⁴ This definition can be expanded to mean that "discussion takes place not as between opposites but as between friends and brothers."¹⁶⁵ Further, "*Musjawarah* tries to establish *kebulatan kehendak* or *kebulatan fikiran* that can roughly be translated as the totality and completeness of the wishes and opinions of the participants."¹⁶⁶ In political terms it can also be defined as "a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realisation of common interest where conflicting interests are present."¹⁶⁷ This fundamental theme is embodied in ASEAN by the ASEAN leaders. Political negotiations are seen as "a process whereby positions that are originally highly divergent becomes identical."¹⁶⁸ Tun Abdul Razak, the Malaysian Foreign Minister at that time, referred to the

¹⁶⁴Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitution Democracy in Indonesia*, New York, 1962, p. 40. The political origins of the terms *Musjawarah* and *Mufakat* come from Sukarno. See Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965*, London, 1970, p. 44. See also J. D. Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Bibliography*, London, 1972. William Zartman, *The Politics of Negotiations*, Princeton, 1971, p. 202. Richard Butwell, *Southeast Asia Today - and Tomorrow: A Political Analysis*, pp. 72-73.

¹⁶⁵Michael Haas, "The 'Asian Way' to Peace", *Pacific Community*, Vol. 4, No. 4, July 1973, p. 503. See also Estrella Solidum, *The Nature of Cooperation Among the ASEAN States as Perceived Through Elite Attitudes--A Factor for Regionalism*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Kentucky, 1970.

¹⁶⁶Niels Mulder, *Mysticism and Everyday Life in Contemporary Java*, Singapore, 1978, p. 41.

¹⁶⁷Fred Charles Ikle, *How Nations Negotiate*, New York, 1964, p. 124. See also, Nathan Leites, "Political Negotiations as a Process of Modifying Utilities," in Martin Shubik (ed.), *Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behaviour*, New York, 1964, pp. 243-245., originally appearing in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. VI, No. 2, March 1962, pp. 19-28.

¹⁶⁸Paul Swingle (ed.), *The Structure of Conflict*, New York, 1970, p. 46.

ASEAN Ministerial Meeting as "a family of kinship."¹⁶⁹ Even for a country that had no kinship or ancestral ties with the rest, Singapore could still invoke a spirit of brotherhood or fraternity when Rajaratnam said that "ASEAN is a child sired by the five fathers."¹⁷⁰ Excerpts of speeches by various ASEAN ministers between 1967-1987 have referred to these concepts of *Musjawarah* and *Mufakat*, as illustrated in Appendix C below.¹⁷¹

Mufakat is a concept that emphasises the need for harmonious and unified agreement. It can be defined as a "unanimous decision ... [through] a process in which the majority and the minorities approach each other by making the necessary readjustments in their respective viewpoints or by an integration of the contrasting standpoints into a new conceptual synthesis."¹⁷² Haas contends:

Mufakat, to use an Arabic-derived Malay term for this principle of unanimity built through discussion rather than voting, is also consistent with the spirit of the Lahore Convention, which developed in reaction to the stormy sessions in the early years of ECAFE: when Western countries called for votes that compelled Asian countries to take sides on particular issues, some countries voted with Western powers in order to avoid unpleasant castigations from their principal sources of capital aid and technical assistance.¹⁷³

Both these concepts also surface in the Filipino culture: "Pulang or pakikisama can be translated to mean accommodation."¹⁷⁴ As Guthrie's study declares; "Filipinos place a high value on good feelings and sacrifice other values such as clear communications and achievement in order to avoid stressful confrontation. The result is that they agree with what another says after consulting each other and compromising on divisive views."¹⁷⁵ Therefore, the countries in the ASEAN region have employed such concepts in the

¹⁶⁹See Estrella D. Solidum, *Towards a Southeast Asian Community*, Quezon City, 1974, p. 82.

¹⁷⁰*ibid.*

¹⁷¹This extensive list was compiled by Rachel Quek Beng Cho, *ASEAN Resilience: The Mufakat Factor*, Unpublished Academic Exercise, National University of Singapore, 1989.

¹⁷²Koentjaraningrat, "The Village in Indonesia Today," in Koentjaraningrat (ed.), *Villages in Indonesia*, Ithaca, 1959, pp. 397-398.

¹⁷³Michael Haas, "The 'Asian Way' to Peace", *Pacific Community*, Vol. 4, No. 4, July 1973, p. 504. See also Frank C. Darling, *The Westernisation of Asia: A Comparative Political Analysis*, Massachusetts, 1979, p. 391, for further discussion of *mufakat* and *gotong royong*.

¹⁷⁴See George M. Guthrie, *Six Perspectives on the Philippines*, Manila, 1968, p. 63. See also Puspha Thambipillai and J. Saravanamuttu, *ASEAN Negotiations: Two Insights*, p. 13.

¹⁷⁵See George M. Guthrie, *Six Perspectives on the Philippines*, p. 63.

domestic decision-making process. Such concepts can be translated to a higher plane, that of an international regime building:

From the societal and village level analysis we could apply this particular style of decision-making to the national or international level. In the international context the consensus approach implies that negotiations and decision-making are also conducted in a manner to save face and maintain a conciliatory relationship among the participants.¹⁷⁶

These notions are common in the indigenous cultures of Southeast Asia. We have to make the point here that Singapore cannot be considered to have an indigenous culture. It is primarily comprised of three distinctly different cultures. Thailand has also practised a form of consensus-building. As argued above, *musjawarah* and *mufakat* are common in Malay culture and thus this covers Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.

The formation of ASEAN has basically operationalized *musjawarah* and *mufakat* at the inter-regional decision-making level. To a significant extent, these two concepts explain the nature of the de-centralised decision-making process of ASEAN as Palmer and Reckford note:

The Political genesis of ASEAN led to the enshrining of the *musjawarah* principle in the organisational machinery set up at the initial 1967 ASEAN meeting. Because the concept means that every voice must be heard and consensus (*mufakat*) can only be reached when all are satisfied, decision-making and policy-making powers were deliberately decentralised and vested in the five foreign ministers who meet in an annual ministerial meeting to transact ASEAN business.¹⁷⁷

Hence, these two concepts have been entrenched in the formation and decision-making process of ASEAN. Several assumptions are involved in the process of *Musjawarah* negotiations:

1. The process involves two parties.
2. Parties want an agreement, and; "each party comes off better in the agreement than in the absence of the agreement."¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶Puspha Thambipillai and J. Saravanamuttu, *ASEAN Negotiations: Two Insights*, p. 13.

¹⁷⁷Ronald D. Palmer and Thomas J. Reckford, *Building ASEAN: 20 Years of Southeast Asian Cooperation*, New York, 1987, p. 39.

¹⁷⁸William Zartman, "Negotiations as a Joint Decision-making Process," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. XXI, No. 4, December 1977, p. 628.

3. *Musjawarah* takes place "not as between opponents, but as between friends and brother."¹⁷⁹
4. *Musjawarah* diplomacy takes account that all participants are equal. The "belief that no majority has the right to shame anyone. Everyone is entitled to the dignity of his own position."¹⁸⁰
5. Accommodation should be achieved. As Ernst Haas puts it, "accommodation on the basis of the minimum common denominator, that is on the basis of what the least cooperative partner is willing to accept."¹⁸¹
6. That *musjawarah* takes place until *mufakat* (or consensus) is achieved).

However, these two concepts of *musjawarah* and *mufakat*, especially the last assumption of the *musjawarah* process, have impeded some decision-making in ASEAN: "Usually, unanimity is sought and voting on specific proposals is avoided. When a particular view or policy is not acceptable to a country no decision is made."¹⁸² In other words, the decision is based on the lowest common denominator. Bilson Kurus comments: "This particular arrangement implies that the preference of the state that stands to benefit least from any given activity will serve as the basis for the group's decision."¹⁸³ Further, there is no record of voting and the final statement at the end of the conference expresses the consensus.¹⁸⁴ Hence, at the end there are no losers or winners; when the decision is reached it is the decision of every member. Jorgensen-Dahl argues that such a form of negotiation and decision-making has led to a sense of apathy in the ASEAN present membership: "In other words, the members come to meetings with plans and proposals which are deliberately or otherwise geared to the limits set by the mode of negotiations."¹⁸⁵

Jorgensen-Dahl does not believe that even the good-will generated based on feelings of brotherhood and kinship to lessen conflict, which is present in *Musjawarah*

¹⁷⁹Estrella D. Solidum, *The Nature of Cooperation Among the ASEAN States as Perceived Through Elite Attitudes--A Factor for Regionalism*, p. 135.

¹⁸⁰Michael Haas, "The 'Asian Way' to Peace", *Pacific Community*, Vol. 4, No. 4, July 1973, pp. 504-505.

¹⁸¹Ernst B. Haas, *International Political Communities: An Anthology*, p. 95.

¹⁸²Satjipanon, C., *Economic and Political Cooperation of Southeast Asian Nations*, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Ph.D. Thesis, 1987, p. 39.

¹⁸³Bilson Kurus, "The ASEAN Triad: National Interest, Consensus-Seeking, and Economic Cooperation," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 4, March 1995, p. 406.

¹⁸⁴For a good example, see "Report of the First Meeting of the Permanent Committee on Shipping," Bangkok, Thailand, August 20-22, 1969. Also see "Results of the Fourth Meeting of the ASEAN Secretariat-General," Tjipayong, Bogor, Indonesia, May 29-31, 1969.

diplomacy, is really significant.¹⁸⁶ Conversely, history has demonstrated otherwise. This notion of brotherhood and kinship did help to bring these countries together during an era of distrust and suspicion. It can be argued that Jorgensen-Dahl fails to comprehend the significance of *musjawarah* diplomacy in relation to the actual situation in Southeast Asia in the late 1960s.

Also, as argued by many scholars, the consensus model or *mufakat* is not distinctive to the ASEAN setting. Western regional organisations have also asserted such a model. However, the interesting and significant characteristic of the ASEAN consensus model is that it reaches agreement in all its decisions. Puspha Thambipillai and Johan Saravanamuttu have stated that,

What does seem peculiar to ASEAN is the process of arriving at consensus through a rather 'ritualistic' and 'stylistic' manner, in a (to quote a respondent) 'round-about, long-winded way', and at the same time avoiding conflict prone issues that would need direct interpersonal arguments but which would create antagonism.¹⁸⁷

Jorgensen-Dahl's position, on the issue of *musjawarah* diplomacy, can be sustained only to the extent to which *musjawarah* has had a limiting role in ASEAN. *Musjawarah* diplomacy may have helped to bring these countries together, but future integration needs a new mode of negotiation. An absolute reliance on *musjawarah* diplomacy may not help ASEAN in the future. It has brought the six countries together, but with increased membership (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma) this style of diplomacy may have to be modified to exert a continued influence on ASEAN decision-making. This mode of diplomacy avoids or shelves decisions on confrontational or controversial issues.¹⁸⁸ With an emerging era of increased membership, "... the larger the number of members, the greater the likelihood of paralysis, whether due to ... a crystallisation of subregional blocs,

¹⁸⁵Arffin Jorgensen-Dahl, "ASEAN 1967-1976: Development or Stagnation?", *Pacific Community*, Vol. 7, 1976, pp. 532-533.

¹⁸⁶See Jorgensen-Dahl, *Regional Organisation and Order in South-East Asia*, p. 167.

¹⁸⁷Puspha Thambipillai and Johan Saravanamuttu, *ASEAN Negotiations: Two Insights*, p. 25.

¹⁸⁸See Bilson Kurus, "The ASEAN Triad: National Interest, Consensus-Seeking, and Economic Cooperation," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 4, March 1995, p. 406.

or the difficulty of reaching consensus."¹⁸⁹ But ASEAN cannot waive the rules of the consensual decision-making process.

New members, especially Vietnam, will find it difficult to adapt to this form of decision-making process. But the 'old' members of ASEAN have the upper hand and Vietnam will have to accept this if it wishes to secure the full benefits of membership, at least in the short or medium term.

SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS

This analysis of the formation and features of ASEAN has laid the foundation for the following Chapters. From the above discussion it can be ascertained that ASEAN has provided the forum for member states to gather and discuss regional and extra-regional issues. Such a forum was not present before ASEAN.

It can be argued that the decision-making process has maintained a sense of unity within the regional body which embodies many cultural, racial, ideological, and other forms of diversity. Bilson Kurus argues that: "In the first place, the diversity of the ASEAN states essentially dictates that ASEAN operates on a basis of consensus."¹⁹⁰ This brand of decision-making created an atmosphere of trust and harmony among the five founding members. Further, such diplomacy had a direct impact on the resolution of future territorial disputes among the members. Without such a decision-making process, it is highly likely that ASEAN members would have been part of a continuing conflict-oriented region. Thus, it cannot be denied that *musjawarah* diplomacy was important for the foundation and existence of ASEAN. It is part and parcel of and can be rationalised as the "Southeast Asian way" itself.¹⁹¹

But as argued above, there has to be change with the increased membership in the near future. There has to be movement towards a decision-making process that is not rooted in the Malay society, as new members like Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar have no historical or cultural experience of such a process. Hence, the *musjawarah* form of

¹⁸⁹Donald K. Emmerson, "ASEAN as an International Regime," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 1, Summer/Fall 1987, p. 11.

¹⁹⁰Bilson Kurus, "The ASEAN Triad: National Interest, Consensus-Seeking, and Economic Co-operation," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 4, March 1995, p. 406.

diplomacy could create problems for ASEAN in the near future. This argument will be further expanded upon in Chapter Six of this study.

As discussed in this Chapter, ASEAN was a "product of a combination of common fears and weaknesses, not of common strengths."¹⁹² Hence to foster solidarity and unity, "the ASEAN leadership has utilised three tactics: (a) adoption of an incremental approach to decision-making, (b) stressing the virtue of dependability, and (c) promotion of a community consciousness."¹⁹³ Michael Antolik further argued that; "... if cooperation is the aim, the ASEAN practice of raising only those issues which attract support is surely a prudent approach to preserve the unity of a new and developing organisation."¹⁹⁴

The next Chapter will develop the argument that ASEAN, although slow to begin increased economic development, did succeed in increasing intra-regional trade to some extent. It will also analyse the various agreements that helped to unify and increase dialogue between itself and regional and global actors. Chapter Two will also explore the various territorial and other disputes among ASEAN members. Such an exploration will enhance the argument that *musjawarah* diplomacy helped to solve some of these potential conflicts.

¹⁹¹*ibid.*

¹⁹²See Poon Kim, "A Decade of ASEAN, 1967-1977," *Asian Survey*, August 1977, p. 755.

¹⁹³Michael Antolik, "The Cautious Consolidation of ASEAN," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 4, No. 3, December 1982, p. 316.

¹⁹⁴*ibid.*, p. 317.

CHAPTER TWO: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF ASEAN

INTRODUCTION

After the formation of ASEAN in 1967, the regional organisation undertook efforts to bring about greater intra-regional relations. For the first four years, such efforts had little impact on fostering a spirit of regionalism within ASEAN, due to lingering intra-regional tensions existing from the pre-ASEAN days. The three most significant conflicts were between Malaysia and the Philippines, Singapore and Indonesia, and Malaysia and Indonesia, but, due to the existence of ASEAN, these disagreements did not develop into full-scale military confrontations between the countries.

ASEAN's economic and political development can be divided into two specific time-frames. The first era of development, or stagnation as some might say, was between 1967-1975; Frank Frost argues: "During these years a large number of meetings were held but progress was slow partly because of a need to achieve unanimous consensus of opinion."¹ Although there was no substantial movement towards greater intra-regional integration, this period helped to cultivate the habit of establishing meetings between members, which provided the basis of trust between the leaders. Jorgensen-Dahl observed that "Such a pattern of cautious, tentative decision-making was clearly necessary given that most of the members of ASEAN had so recently been highly suspicious of each other."²

The second phrase was between 1976 till the present (1996). In this era much was done and, is being done, both in the economic and political fields. This momentum

¹Frank Frost, "ASEAN Since 1967-Origins, Evolution and Recent Developments," in Alison Broinowski, (ed.), *ASEAN in the 1990s*, London, 1990, p. 5.

²Ariffin Jorgensen Dahl, "ASEAN 1967-1976: Development or Stagnation?," *Pacific Community*, Vol. 7, 1976, p. 522.

for greater integration seems to have hastened after the resolution of the Kampuchean (Cambodian)³ crisis, which was only achieved in 1991.

In essence, this Chapter deals with the conflicts that erupted after the formation of ASEAN and will discuss how they were resolved. The primary aim of this exercise is to analyse the growth of economic and political initiatives of ASEAN since its infancy to its present state. There is a significant need to examine the major economic and political agreements undertaken by ASEAN and how such declarations affected the regional as well as extra-regional countries. This will help to lay the foundation for the next Chapter that deals with the significant security threat that ASEAN faced, viz., the Cambodian conflict.

This Chapter will also explore the successes and failures of ASEAN in the area of economic development. Much has been written on this topic, but there seems to be a lack of understanding of the particularities of the ASEAN economies and the relative successes that have been achieved.

Finally, this chapter will highlight and amplify how ASEAN's unique form of decision making has served the specific mandates of its members.

INTRA-ASEAN CONFLICTS

After the establishment of ASEAN, it did experience some political and territorial conflicts between its members. The three main conflicts were, (1) the Sabah issue between Malaysia and the Philippines, (2) the hanging of two Indonesian marines brought about the suspension of bilateral relations between Indonesia and Singapore, and (3) the most recent territorial dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia over the Island of Sipadan. There were other minor disputes between the members.⁴

³In this thesis, the words Kampuchea and Cambodia are used interchangeably. Until 1970, Kampuchea was called the Kingdom of Cambodia, a name originally given by its French colonial rulers. In 1970, with the overthrow of the royal house, the country was officially referred to as the Khmer Republic. From 1975 to 1978 when it was also under the Khmer Rouge, it was called Democratic Kampuchea. Since 1979, the pro-Vietnam Heng Samrin government has been referred to as the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

⁴For a detailed analysis of this affairs and related issues concerning the "Sabah Dispute" between Malaysia and the Philippines see Paridah Abd. Samad and Darusalam Abu Bakar, "Malaysia-Philippines Relations: The Issue of Sabah," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXII, No. 6, June 1992, pp. 554-

... footnote cont'd over ...

The dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines occurred because of the so-called Corregidor Affair of March 1968. This dispute, which was due to the Sabah problem, was seen by many observers as the most dangerous bilateral dispute within ASEAN. This affair was centred around the alleged Philippines initiative to use Corregidor as a base for infiltrating Sabah.⁵ The Malaysian Government obtained information of the proposal and sent a protest note to the Philippines Government. Russell Fifield states that:

Relations between Malaysia and the Philippines reached a new low when the Philippine Congress passed a resolution in September 1968 delineating Philippine territorial boundaries to include Sabah.⁶

The Malaysian Government did the same and, at the end of 1968, both these governments broke off diplomatic relations with each other. During this conflict, Malaysia refused to send any representative to the third ASEAN Summit scheduled to take place in Manila, thus it was cancelled.⁷ The problem was defused by the intervention of Indonesia's President Suharto who arranged for a private meeting in Jakarta between the two parties. They came to an agreement to normalise relations after the AMM in December of 1969, in the Cameron Highlands in Malaysia. At that

567. Also for a list of territorial disputes between ASEAN members and other countries in the region see Bilveer Singh, "The Challenge of the Security Environment in Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 2, October 1993, p. 273-274. Some of such disputes are: The sea-bed boundary dispute between Indonesia and the Philippines in the Celebes Sea: The border disputes between Malaysia and Brunei over both the unmarked, 274 km land border between Brunei and Sarawak, and the limits of their respective 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones: The dispute between Malaysia and Singapore over ownership of the island of Pulau Batu Putih (Pedra Branca), some 55 km east of Singapore in the Straits of Johore: Border disputes between Malaysia and Thailand.

⁵The Philippines claim for Sabah was been dealt with extensively in Chapter one of this thesis. But the issue erupted again and the Philippines wanted to put the issue of Sabah on the ASEAN agenda. Malaysia rightly refused as this would legitimate the Filipinos claim for Sabah. See Michael Leifer, "The Philippines and Sabah Irredenta," *The World Today*, Vol. 24, No. 10, October 1968, pp. 421-428. and T.J.S. George, *Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics*, Kuala Lumpur, 1980, pp. 122-128.

⁶Russell H. Fifield, *National And Regional Interests in ASEAN: Competition and Cooperation in International Politics*, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Occasional Paper No. 57, p. 12.

⁷The Prime Minister of Malaysia, Abdul Rahman insisted that Malaysia would not attend any ASEAN meeting, if the Sabah issue was put on the agenda by the Philippines government. Reported in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, April 23, 1969, p. N-1. ASEAN meetings were suspended for a eight month period during the period 1968-1969.

meeting, Tunku Abdul Rahman, the then Malaysian Prime Minister, announced that "diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the Philippines would be normalised forthwith ... because of the great value Malaysia and the Philippines placed on ASEAN."⁸ Although all of this was done outside the formal framework of ASEAN, it is only because ASEAN existed that these countries wanted to save it and settle their differences via peaceful means. ASEAN was a focal point of conflict resolution.

It seems that this dispute, although not in the forefront of events for the last thirty years, was only recently officially settled with the visit by Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad to Manila in February of 1994.⁹ As reported in *The Straits Times*: "This visit signalled a further warming of ties chilled by 30 years of territorial disputes."¹⁰ After this historic visit both countries have established a bilateral defence pact. Such a pact would be "modelled along Kuala Lumpur's arrangements with other ASEAN members."¹¹

The dispute between Indonesia and Singapore can be related to the policy of the Old Order of Indonesia. The two Indonesian marines were caught undertaking sabotage activities on Singaporean soil, in response to the Confrontation policy of Indonesia. Both marines were sentenced to death. President Suharto sent an official letter to the Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, requesting clemency for these two marines, but Singapore merely responded by carrying out the executions. Hence, relations between these two countries worsened as it was a personal rebuff for Suharto.¹² Indonesia tried to lessen its reliance on Singapore for its own economic development and developed its own Batam island as a exporting base for the foreign oil companies which operated in Indonesia, instead of relying on Singapore. Indonesia's Batam island became an entrepot and an industrial region. As Dewi Anwar suggests:

⁸Joint Communique, "The Third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, 16-17 December 1969," in *ASEAN: 20 Years*, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 1978, p. 269.

⁹No Malaysian Prime Minister has visited the Philippines, until Mahathir's visit in 1994.

¹⁰"KL Studies Defence Pact with Manila," *The Straits Times*, 7 March, 1994.

¹¹*ibid.* Both countries are claimants of certain parts of the Spratly Islands.

¹²Present relations between Singapore and Philippines also has been affected due to the execution of a Filipino maid in Singapore. This affair will be taken up in Chapter five of this thesis.

All these moves were intended initially as economic retaliations for the humiliation that Indonesians, and Suharto himself, felt that Singapore had inflicted on their national pride.¹³

Relations between these two ASEAN members only improved with the then Singapore Prime Minister's (Lee Kuan Yew) visit to Indonesia when he placed flowers on the graves of the executed marines.¹⁴

The recent (1995) disagreement between Indonesia and Malaysia is about the tiny island of Sipadan, which lies off Sabah in the Sulawesi Sea. Both countries have historical claims over the island. It has been reported that there was a verbal agreement in place to maintain the status quo when it came to a dispute over this island, but Malaysia's June 1991 promotion of Sipadan as a vacation spot has angered the Indonesians. As Michael Vatikiotis points out:

Although both sides have agreed at the highest level not to allow the dispute to upset bilateral relations, the thinking in Jakarta diplomatic circles is that Indonesia is more peeved about the islands than Kuala Lumpur officials realise.¹⁵

In September 1994, the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Ali Alatas, wanted this dispute to be settled via the provisions of ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.¹⁶ On the other hand, Malaysia wanted this territorial dispute to be addressed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). After the meeting, "Alatas said resolving the issue within ASEAN would reflect Southeast Asia's ability to sort out its difficulties amicably."¹⁷ But the meeting concluded in a dead-lock.

A closer look at the various diplomatic and political initiatives of ASEAN will aid in the overall analysis of ASEAN and the specific area of conflict resolution.

¹³Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, Singapore, 1994, p. 168.

¹⁴See Lee Khoon Choi, *An Ambassador's Journey*, Singapore, 1983.

¹⁵Michael Vatikiotis, "Isle of Contention," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 17, 1994, p. 32.

¹⁶See *The Straits Times*, 13 September 1994.

¹⁷*ibid.*

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ZOPFAN AND REGIONAL ORDER

The Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) was the most important policy doctrine and one of the first ventures in foreign policy cooperation undertaken by ASEAN.¹⁸ It was established to give credence to the 1967 Bangkok Declaration that formed ASEAN. As Soedjati Djiwandono states: "... the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on ZOPFAN may be said to have been an initial attempt to give expression to that very same idea [the 1967 Bangkok Declaration]."¹⁹ Although, not a complete success, it also cannot be considered as a total failure. When it was adopted by all the ASEAN members, it was also open to all other countries in Southeast Asia. ZOPFAN was an ASEAN response to the changing regional environment.²⁰

Neutrality, neutralisation, non-alignment, and neutralism are concepts that are embedded in ZOPFAN and need to be defined, as they play an important role in understanding this doctrine. Post-World War I neutrality can be defined as non-participation and impartiality in international conflicts.²¹ Neutrality is a legal norm whereas neutralism is a political concept. Neutralisation can be defined as permanent and guaranteed neutrality established by virtue of an international agreement between the neutralised states and the guarantor powers.²² The term neutralism "meant non-alignment with neither of the two military blocs each led by a superpower."²³ This term was made popular by newly independent states, with the emergence of the Cold War. ZOPFAN conceptualised the term neutralisation.

¹⁸See Frank Frost, "ASEAN Since 1967-Origins, Evolution and Recent Developments," in Alison Broinowski, (ed.), *ASEAN into the 1990s*, London, 1990, p. 5.

¹⁹J. Soedjati Djiwandono, "ZOPFAN: Is it Still Relevant," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Second Quarter, 1991, p. 116.

²⁰See Michael Antolik, *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation*, p. 109.

²¹See Harto Hakovirta, *East-West Conflict and European Neutrality*, Oxford, 1988, p. 8. Prior to World War I, this definition was different. A neutral state then did not have to abstain from involvement in a war, but had to treat both participants of the conflict equally. This definition changed with new types on conflict, which have blurred the lines between war and peace.

²²See Cyril E. Black, Richard A. Falk, Klaus Knorr and Oran R. Young, *Neutralisation and World Politics*, Princeton, 1968, pp. xi-xv, and 19. Also see Brian Crozier, "A Conflict-free South-East Asia?", *Conflict Studies*, No. 22, April 1972, pp. 2-5, for a discussion varieties of neutralisation.

²³Heiner Hanggi, *ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept*, Singapore, 1991, p. 3. Also see Paul F. Power, *Neutralism and Disengagement*, New York, 1964, p. 2. For an analysis this concepts in theory brings to newly independent states.

ZOPFAN was first proposed by the then Malaysian Member of Parliament and former Home Affairs Minister of Malaysia, Tun Ismail Abdul Rahman.²⁴ Speaking in the Malaysian Parliament in January 1968, he put forward a proposal calling for the neutralisation of the region, which would have to be guaranteed by the United States, the Soviet Union and China, and needed the signing of such a treaty among Southeast Asian States.²⁵ This idea of neutrality was adopted by the then Malaysian Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, who converted it to the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in 1970.²⁶

Because of the ever changing regional and international environment, the Malaysian policy-makers sensed a need for ZOPFAN to become the mainstay of ASEAN and regional security. The Malaysians had basically four main external and two domestic factors for ZOPFAN to be adopted by the region.

Firstly, when the British in January of 1968 announced that they would withdraw all their forces 'East of Suez' by 1971, Malaysia and Singapore wanted a guarantee that Communism would not spread to the Southeast Asian region.²⁷

The second reason for the need to adopt ZOPFAN was the announcement, by U.S. President Nixon, which signalled a new American approach to the region: "In 1969 the 'Nixon Doctrine' or 'Guam Doctrine' replaced the 'Domino Theory' and declared a

²⁴Long before this initiative, a Malayan delegate at the 1947 Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi had proposed an idea of creating a neutrality bloc. See G. H. Jansen, *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment*, London, 1966, pp. 57-61. Also Tun Ismail Abdul Rahman later became the Deputy Prime Minister in the Abdul Razak government.

²⁵See Johan Saravanamuttu, "ASEAN Security for the 1980s: The Case of a Revitalised ZOPFAN," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 6, No. 2, September 1984, p. 186. This proposal contained two other elements; (1) non-aggression pacts among regional states; and (2) a policy of peaceful coexistence among those countries.

²⁶Abdul Rahman did not readily welcome this policy, as he was a strong pro-Western supporter. But his cabinet, especially the deputy Prime Minister Tun Razak were for the idea. After the emergency period in Malaysia, Tun Razak and Tun Ismail gained greater control over foreign relations and the neutralisation policy was adopted as one of the main tenants of Malaysia's foreign policy. See Johan Saravanamuttu, *The Dilemma of Independence: Two Decades of Malaysia's Foreign Policy, 1957-1977*, p. 136, for a schematic of the proposal and adoption of ZOPFAN by the Malaysian decision-makers.

²⁷See M. Ghazalie bin Shafie, "The Neutralisation of Southeast Asia," *Pacific Community*, Vol. 3, No. 3, October 1971, p. 112.

much lower American involvement in Southeast Asia."²⁸ That policy stated that the U.S. would no longer assume a direct and active military role in the region and that entailed a reduction of the American military presence.²⁹ Regional leaders, especially the Malaysians, wanted a security guarantee that the region would not be engaged in conflict between communist and anti-communist forces, thereby extending the Southeast Asian frontier of the Cold War.

The third reason was related to the second. America's increasing relations with the PRC and President Nixon's announcement that he would visit Beijing in 1972 created tension within the Southeast Asian region. Malaysia and Indonesia were not comfortable with the notion that the PRC and the U.S. were forming close relations. This move by the U.S. was in reaction to the Soviet Union's close alliance with Vietnam. Further, it was also due to the increasing nationalist-inspired conflict in the region, especially in Laos and Cambodia.

The last external factor for the eventual adoption of ZOPFAN was the increasing economic role that Japan played in the region in the early 1970s. Southeast Asian leaders were still very distrustful of Japanese economic influence in the region.³⁰ Although all these factors affected the region, Malaysia also had its own internal reasons for wanting to adopt a posture of neutralisation for the entire region. Domestically in May 1969, Malaysia experienced major race riots. Rajendran states that:

By way of overtures to Peking, which were an essential aspect of the neutralisation proposal, the Malaysian Government must have hoped to simultaneously alleviate the alienation of the influential Chinese minority and undermine the China-dominated Communist Party (MCP).³¹

²⁸Manu Walyapechra, *Regional Security For Southeast Asia: A Political Geographic Assessment*, Bangkok, 1975, pp. 14-15. The 'Guam Doctrine' stated that there would be no more substantial United States military involvement on the Asian mainland which President Eisenhower maintained fifteen years ago. See J. L. S. Girling, "The Guam Doctrine", *International Affairs*, Vol. 46, January 1970, p. 48. Also see M. Ghazalie bin Shafie, "The Neutralisation of Southeast Asia," *Pacific Community*, Vol. 3, No. 3, October 1971, p. 112. For a further indepth analysis of the Nixon Doctrine see, Sheldon W. Simon, *Asian Neutralism and U.S. Policy*, Washington, D.C., 1975, pp. 6-11.

²⁹See K.K. Nair, *Words and Bayonets: ASEAN and Indochina*, Kuala Lumpur, 1986, p. 14.

³⁰See M. Rajendran, *ASEAN's Foreign Relations: The Shift to Collective Action*, Kuala Lumpur, 1985, pp. 24-25.

³¹Heiner Hanggi, *ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept*, p. 13.

Michael Leifer maintains that:

In light of the delicate inter-communal balance of Malaysian society, the neutralisation proposal was geared in large part to the exclusion of extra-regional forces which might exploit communal feelings, and in particular local Chinese alienation, to challenge the legitimacy of a system of government which reflects a constitutionally entrenched Malay political dominance.³²

Such a view was emphasised or magnified by the 1969 race riots in Malaysia.

The second domestic reason for the neutralisation proposal was Malaysia's need to foster a climate of stability so as to concentrate on economic development rather than military expenditure. Being a developing country, Malaysia needed a stable and peaceful domestic and regional environment to attract foreign investment from multi-national corporations.

The amalgamation of these factors was the basis for the Malaysian proposal for a new pattern of relations to be established in the region so as to counteract the changing global environment. Thus, there was a need to surmount fluctuating regional uncertainties and turn these into an opportunity to regulate relationships among the countries of Southeast Asia and with external powers.³³ As Michael Antolik states:

ZOPFAN, the first declaration since the establishment of ASEAN, responded in general to the changing regional order at the end of the U.S.-Vietnam war, and in particular to Thailand's anxiety about a power vacuum in the region should the United States withdraw.³⁴

Further, the ASEAN countries had only three choices in the midst of the Cold War: to join the Western Bloc, the Communist Bloc, or stay non-aligned. Although a few of the ASEAN members had bilateral security arrangements with Western countries, they could not be considered proxies of these countries. As M. Ghazalie bin

³²Michael Leifer, "Regional Order in South-East Asia: An Uncertain Prospect," *The Round Table*, No. 255, 1974, p. 312.

³³Ghazali Shafie, "The Search for Stability," in M. Ghazali Shafie, *Malaysia: International Relations*, Kuala Lumpur, 1982, p. 203.

³⁴Michael Antolik, *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation*, p. 109.

Shafie maintains, "the main argument for non-alignment was that no ideology or political system should be judged in advance of its actions."³⁵

When dealing with the regional security implications, the importance of this region has to be taken into consideration: "Its strategic value is underlined by the fact that it occupies the compact maritime and aerial crossroads linking the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean."³⁶

As K.K. Nair argues:

Hence as a formula for peace in the region, the ZOPFAN concept tended to rest on two considerations. The first was that by remaining neutral in the global struggle for power and influence, Southeast Asia could avoid the risk of provoking the nuclear nations into conflict with it. Secondly, by remaining neutral it would be possible for countries in the region to neutralise the desire of the superpowers to carve out or extend already defined spheres of influence.³⁷

Between 1970 and 1971, the Malaysians undertook a major international endeavour to publicise the ZOPFAN plan. The international reaction was quite disappointing. Regionally, ASEAN members were not too enthusiastic about it. Both Thailand and the Philippines had alliance commitments with the United States. Thailand was facing a communist insurgency threat in the North. With the American withdrawal from Vietnam, and with the possible future settlement of the Vietnam War, the American military bases in Thailand would assume even greater significance and this would be incompatible with neutralisation.³⁸

Further, Bangkok thought that, with neutralisation, the Americans would have to withdraw military personnel and equipment from the country and this would not only jeopardise Thai security, but also there would be a tremendous loss of revenue and local

³⁵M. Ghazalie bin Shafie, "The Neutralisation of Southeast Asia," *Pacific Community*, Vol. 3, No. 3, October 1971, p. 111.

³⁶*ibid.*, p. 113.

³⁷K. K. Nair, *ASEAN-Indochina Relations Since 1975: The Politics of Accommodation*, The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra, p. 15.

³⁸See J. Soedjati Djiwandono, "Neutralisation: A New Hope of Southeast Asia?," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 2, January 1973, pp. 66-67.

employment.³⁹ Manila did not want to abandon its key security arrangement with the U.S.⁴⁰ It was aware that the American presence would not be permanent and a need for self-reliance was necessary, but did not want to debate security, not until the Vietnam War was over.⁴¹ Further, Manila still had not completely abandoned the Sabah issue with Malaysia.⁴²

Singapore was also sceptical about the proposal. Singapore was opposed to the idea because it wanted the security guarantee from the U.S. to be maintained, as it perceived America's presence to have a stabilising regional effect.⁴³ Ever since independence in 1965, Singapore has felt extremely vulnerable with its larger Malay neighbours to the North and South. Further Singapore was apprehensive that there might be a possibility that the power vacuum left behind by the Malaysian neutralisation proposal would be filled by a potentially hostile Indonesia. As argued by Michael Leifer:

The Government of Singapore appears to think of the Malaysian neutralisation scheme in terms of the worst possible case: the exclusion of the external powers permitting the emergence of a regional order under the domination of local powers either in the form of an Indonesian hegemony or of an Indonesian-Malaysian condominium.⁴⁴

Singapore wanted "... a balanced multiple involvement of extra-regional powers."⁴⁵ Further, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines did not take seriously the proposition that both the Soviet Union and China should be guarantors of neutralisation in the region.⁴⁶

³⁹M. Rajendran, *ASEAN's Foreign Relations: The Shift to Collective Action*, p. 28.

⁴⁰See Roger Irvine, "The Formative Years of ASEAN: 1967-1975," in Alison Broinwski, (ed.), *Understanding ASEAN*, London, 1985, p. 29.

⁴¹See Seah Chee Meow, "ASEAN and the Changing Power Balance in Southeast Asia," *Southeast Asian Spectrum*, Vol. 4, No. 1, October 1975, p. 39.

⁴²Dick Wilson, *The Neutralisation of Southeast Asia*, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1975, p. 69.

⁴³See *ibid.*, pp. 83-84.

⁴⁴Michael Leifer, "Regional Order in South-East Asia: An Uncertain Prospect," *The Round Table*, No. 255, 1974, p. 314.

⁴⁵Michael Leifer, "The ASEAN States: No Common Outlook," *International Affairs*, Vol. 49, October 1973, p. 604.

⁴⁶See *The Straits Times*, 25 November 1971, p. 1, for Singapore's reluctance to accept the Malaysian proposal. Also see Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, "Singapore: A stranger in a Malay sea," *The Straits Times*, 13 October 1989.

Indonesia also rejected the idea because the proposal contradicted its own notion of regional order which Jakarta enshrined in the spirit of the 1967 Bangkok Declaration, and which implied that Southeast Asia should look after its own security.⁴⁷ The initial Indonesian opposition to the Malaysian proposal was spelt out by Adam Malik. He argued, "neutralisation, that is the product of one way benevolence on the part of the big powers, would perhaps prove as brittle and unstable as the interrelationships between the major powers themselves."⁴⁸ The Indonesians believed that there should be regional resilience in tackling the issue of security in the region.⁴⁹ As K. K. Nair has stated,

This meant the reduction and elimination of regional conflicts, refraining from inviting the intervention of external powers in the event of conflicts, abstention from military alignments with any of the major powers, the gradual elimination of foreign military bases in the region and the development of the economy at the national and regional levels.⁵⁰

⁴⁷See Michael Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia*, London, Routledge, 1989, pp. 4-7. Also see Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, London, 1983, pp. 148-50; Donald K. Emmerson, "Continuity and Rationality in Indonesian Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal," in Karl D. Jackson, Sukhumbhand Paribatra and J. Soedjati Djiwandono, (eds.), *ASEAN in Regional and Global Context*, Berkeley, 1986, pp. 93-95; Muthiah Alagappa, "Regional Arrangements and International Security in Southeast Asia: Going Beyond ZOPFAN," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 12, No. 4, March 1991, p. 272; Justus M. van der Kroef, "ASEAN's Security Needs and Policies," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 47, 1975-76, p. 166.

⁴⁸Adam Malik, "Towards An Asian Asia," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. LXXIII, September 25, 1971, p. 32. But some like Dewi Fortuna Anwar, have argued that Indonesia was a supporter for the idea, but it did not want it create suspicion among the other members by initiating the idea and thus was willing for Malaysia to propose it. But she acknowledges that Indonesia was against the ZOPFAN principle that neutralisation should be guaranteed by China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. See Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism*, p. 177.

⁴⁹The Indonesian concept of regional resilience is an adaptation of national resilience. National resilience can be defined as, "a dynamic condition of will-power, determination and firmness with the ability to develop national strength to face and overcome all manners of threats, internal and external, direct or indirect, that may endanger the Indonesian national identity and the total way of the life of the nation ..." (Explanatory note to the Republic of Indonesia Law, No. 20, 1982, paragraph 5) For a further discussion of the term see Muthiah Alagappa, "Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries," in *Asian Security Issues: Regional and Global*, edited by Robert A. Scalapino et. al., pp. 57-62. Also see Soedibyo, *Regional Security and Military Cooperation: An Indonesian Perception*, Jakarta, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, p. 8.

⁵⁰K. K. Nair, *Words and Bayonets: ASEAN and Indochina*, Kuala Lumpur, 1986, p. 16.

Sheldon Simon also maintained that fostering economic growth was a means of achieving political legitimacy and stability.⁵¹

AGREEMENT ON ZOPFAN BY ASEAN MEMBERS

Two separate but interrelated events at the international level brought pressure on ASEAN members to take the Malaysian ZOPFAN proposal seriously. These events were the 1971 announcement by U.S. President Nixon that he would visit Beijing and the imminent admission of the PRC to the United Nations. Both these events sent shock waves through the region. It alerted ASEAN members of the immediate need to normalise relations with Beijing. Normalisation with the PRC was initiated by Malaysia and this move was followed by both the Philippines and Thailand. After much debate, a watered-down draft of the Malaysian proposal was agreed by all ASEAN members.⁵² There was tacit understanding among the ASEAN members at Kuala Lumpur in 1971 that the ZOPFAN Declaration should have no direct bearing on how each ASEAN country shaped its own foreign and defence policies, particularly with regard to existing military arrangements.⁵³ Hence, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines did not accept the exclusionary factor of ZOPFAN. Further, although the ZOPFAN agreement endorsed neutralisation as a principle, the role of external guarantors was discarded,⁵⁴ basically as a concession to Indonesia and its notion of regional resilience:

The 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration stated that ASEAN undertook: to ensure the recognition of, and respect for, Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers.⁵⁵

⁵¹See Sheldon Simon, "The ASEAN States: Obstacles to Security Cooperation," *Orbis*, Summer, 1978, p. 430.

⁵²For an extensive study of the process whereby this decision on ZOPFAN was reached see Rachel Quek Beng Cho, *ASEAN Resilience: The Mufakat Factor*, Unpublished Academic Exercise, National University of Singapore, 1989. pp. 30-53. Here the author aggressively argues that the ZOPFAN decision was reached via the implementation of the concepts of *Musjawarah* and *Mufakat*.

⁵³See S Rajaratnam, "Singapore: A Stranger in a Malay Sea," in *The Straits Times*, 13 October 1989, p. 32; See also *Malaysian Digest*, Vol. 3, No. 21, 30 November 1971, p. 5; *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, Vol. 11, No. 2, October-November 1971, p. 56 and 88; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 4 December 1971, p. 5.

⁵⁴Michael Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia*, London, 1989, p. 7.

⁵⁵See Appendix E for the entire text of *The ZOPFAN Declaration*.

The PRC supported the ZOPFAN doctrine,⁵⁶ but both the Soviet Union⁵⁷ and the U.S. were not too happy with the idea. Singapore's Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, stated that:

The ASEAN countries have asked: 'Please, can we have neutralisation? Can we have a zone of neutrality, guaranteed by the big powers? The only power that has responded is China, but it is not yet in a position to guarantee it. The other two which could guarantee it - the Soviet Union and America - have not responded. So we are whistling in the dark through the cemetery of Indochina. We have to guess what China's willingness to guarantee neutrality will be when it has a blue water fleet that can police the Straits of Southeast Asia, the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.'⁵⁸

IMPACT OF ZOPFAN

Theoretically, the ZOPFAN proposal appeared to be feasible but, in practice, most critics thought ZOPFAN to be too idealistic to be implemented. M. C. Ott warned of the ZOPFAN proposal's "mistaken assumption that the dynamics of international relations can be frozen by a document."⁵⁹ The Malaysian idea of wanting ASEAN to be completely neutral was too naive, but it can be argued that ZOPFAN, to a certain extent, has endured the test of time and also the Cambodian conflict.

To counteract the ZOPFAN proposal, Hanoi put forth its own idea for a neutralised region. In June of 1978, Vietnam proposed a Zone of Genuine Independence, Peace and Neutrality (ZOGIPAN), at a United Nations Special Session

⁵⁶See Dick Wilson, *The Neutralisation of Southeast Asia*, New York, 1975, pp. 116-130.

⁵⁷The Soviet Union proposed a plan of collective security in the region, instead on neutralisation. For a detailed analysis of the Soviet Union's concept of collective security see Sheldon W. Simon, *Asian Neutralism and U.S. Policy*, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 1975, pp. 64-74. For the reactions of Southeast Asian Countries to this proposal of collective security see Justus M. van der Kroef, "ASEAN's Security Needs and Policies," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 2, Summer 1974, pp. 154-170. Also see Sheldon W. Simon, "The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia: Interests, Goals, and Constraints," *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 25, No. 1, Spring 1981, p. 75.

⁵⁸*The Straits Times*, 6 August 1973, p. 26.

⁵⁹M. C. Ott, *The Neutralisation of Southeast Asia: An Analysis of the Malaysian/ASEAN Proposal*, Athens, Ohio, 1974, p. 43.

on Disarmament.⁶⁰ Vietnam went as far as to entice the ASEAN states by appearing willing to discuss the ASEAN proposal and to replace "Independence" (in ZOGIPAN) by "Freedom" (in ZOPFAN), if all agreed.⁶¹ ASEAN remained cautious and took the necessary steps to avoid any confusion between ZOGIPAN and ZOPFAN so as to prevent embarrassing the PRC which had supported ZOPFAN.⁶² Even Vietnam and its allies in the region tried to use ZOPFAN to promote neutrality in Southeast Asia. ASEAN was not willing to accept this, as it wanted Vietnam to pull out of Cambodia and only then would ASEAN trust Vietnam's sincerity.

The first test for ZOPFAN was the 1978 invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam.⁶³ Thailand's close relations with the PRC raised concerns within the other ASEAN members with regards to adhering to ZOPFAN. ASEAN tried to come to terms with playing a role to find a solution to the conflict and also its own maintenance of ZOPFAN. As Heiner Hanggi states:

... ASEAN official statements as well as the annual UN resolution on Kampuchea would reiterate that the Kampuchean problem was the principal or even "insurmountable" obstacle⁶⁴ towards the realisation of ZOPFAN - in other words, a comprehensive solution of the conflict would be essential to the establishment of ZOPFAN.⁶⁵

ZOPFAN did not curtail the military build-up of the external actors in the 1980s as the American and Soviet naval presences in Southeast Asian waters increased during this period.⁶⁶ However, even today ZOPFAN can be conceptualised as an ideal which regional countries should try to strive for in this new era of post-Cold war peace between Russia and the U.S. The strategic importance of the region has not changed,

⁶⁰See, "Visit of the Foreign Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to Malaysia, (January 3-6, 1978), Joint Communique issued on 6 January 1978" in *Foreign Affairs Malaysia*, Vol. 11, No. 1, March 1978, p. 75.

⁶¹See Donald E. Weatherbee, "The Diplomacy of Stalemate," in Donald E. Weatherbee, (ed.), *Southeast Asia Divided*, Boulder 1985, p. 9.

⁶²See *Foreign Affairs Bulletin*, Vol. 18, No. 3, July-September 1978, p. 12.

⁶³This invasion will be elaborated upon in the next Chapter.

⁶⁴This phrase was mentioned by Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Dr Mahatir Mohamad at the 37th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York on 29 September 1982. *Foreign Affairs Malaysia*, Vol. 15, No. 3, September 1982, p. 175.

⁶⁵Heiner Hanggi, *ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept*, p. 42.

only the tense relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union (now C.I.S.) have eased. There are basically three reasons why ZOPFAN is still relevant at the present time. Firstly, the PRC still has influence in the region. This may cause some problems in the region, especially with regards to the Spratly Islands.⁶⁷ Secondly, the region may still be influenced by Russia and the U.S., although not in a militaristic or confrontationist nature as before. The aspect of external interference still exists. And finally, domestic and regional conflicts may erupt at anytime, thus ZOPFAN still has a role to play.⁶⁸ Until the new World Order is stable and regional disputes are dissipated, ZOPFAN has a place in Southeast Asia. As stated at the ASEAN meeting in Singapore in 1992,

ASEAN will seek to realise the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and a Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ)⁶⁹ in consultation with friendly countries, taking into account changing circumstances.⁷⁰

Further, Indonesian Foreign Affairs Minister, Ali Alatas, insisted just before the 1992 ASEAN meeting that ZOPFAN would be the cornerstone of a new regional order in Southeast Asia, and that the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation would not replace ZOPFAN. Alatas said that "ZOPFAN had been 'kept under wraps' awaiting the resolution of the Cambodian conflict and had never been presented to other countries in the Asia-Pacific."⁷¹

DECLARATION OF ASEAN CONCORD

The American military withdrawal from Indochina in 1973, the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975, the violent reunification of Vietnam, the Soviet-backed take-over of Laos, and the success of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, all of these incidents

⁶⁶See Sheldon Simon, "ASEAN Security Prospects," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 1, Summer/Fall 1987, p. 19.

⁶⁷This issue of the Spratly Islands will be discussed later, in Chapter Five.

⁶⁸See J. Soedjati Djiwandono, "ZOPFAN: Is it Still Relevant," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Second Quarter, 1991, p. 127.

⁶⁹Discussed in the later section of this Chapter.

⁷⁰Communique after the ASEAN Summit in Singapore, 1992.

⁷¹"Amity Treaty 'cannot replace ZOPFAN,'" *The Straits Times*, 23 January 1992, p. 24.

made ASEAN leaders positively nervous.⁷² Hence the ASEAN leaders in 1976 signed both the ASEAN Concord⁷³ and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Such confidence-building measures were undertaken by the regional organisation to reassure the member states that regional security would not be threatened by the events in Indochina.

These documents were signed at the 1976 ASEAN Bali Summit, the first ASEAN leaders' meeting after the establishment of ASEAN in 1967. The Bali Summit was significant in relation to the decision-making process of ASEAN. Reporters at the Summit noticed the complexities of the ASEAN decision-making process:

The search for consensus before the summit rather than at the summit; the signing of the Treaty of Amity, not merely its words; the cordiality of numerous bilateral as well as multilateral contacts before and during the summit; the assertion of concord - all these added up collectively to a solidifying of the spirit of togetherness that had originally brought ASEAN together in 1967, and had sustained it over eight difficult years.⁷⁴

This Bali meeting of the ASEAN leaders was the most decisive step towards the future evolution of the regional body: "Thus, the Bali Summit has reaffirmed the trend of ASEAN's development in international affairs since 1967-that of non-alignment and neutrality."⁷⁵ Not only were specific documents signed for future cooperation in all fields, but this meeting also agreed on the establishment of a central ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta.

The Declaration of ASEAN Concord is the only document that makes reference to security arrangements between ASEAN members. It recommends

⁷²See J. Clementson, "No More Dominoes": ASEAN and Regional Security," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, December 1984, p. 33. Also see Frank Frost, "ASEAN Since 1967-Origins, Evolution and Recent Developments," in Alison Broinowski, (ed.), *ASEAN into the 1990s*, p. 7. Also see David Irvine, *Understanding ASEAN*, p. 39, Chan Heng Chee, "Southeast Asia in 1976: The Handling of Contradictions," *Southeast Asian Affairs* 1977, p. 5.

⁷³The title of the Declaration was actually, "Declaration of ASEAN Cooperation and Solidarity." But this was changed because of a Filipino request, as the Filipinos had a completely different draft which was presented at the last minute. A compromise was reached with the changing of the title of the document.

⁷⁴*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 5 March 1976, p. 11.

⁷⁵Lau Teik Soon, "ASEAN and the Bali Summit," *International Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 4, July 1976, p. 541.

Continuation of cooperation on a non ASEAN basis between the member states in security matters in accordance with their mutual needs and interests.⁷⁶

ASEAN leaders had come to realise that political and economic cooperation go hand-in-hand.⁷⁷ As stated above in the quoted text, what seems contradictory in terms are the phrases "non ASEAN basis" and "member states", in regard to an official ASEAN document. This can be interpreted that such security cooperation should be only issue-oriented, and should not appear as a military alliance.⁷⁸ As stated in Chapter One above, security has been the main issue for ASEAN, but even with this declaration the members have not institutionalised it within the framework of ASEAN. Security issues have also been bilateral in nature.

Further, in the Declaration of ASEAN concord, the ZOPFAN concept was revisited and reconfirmed by ASEAN members. Also the Concord pointed to the ideal of eliminating poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy as a primary concern of each member state.⁷⁹

TREATY OF AMITY AND COOPERATION

This Treaty was also signed at the ASEAN meeting in Bali in 1976 and is a legal framework set out by ASEAN members to resolve intra-ASEAN conflicts. As Lau Teik Soon states: "The Bali Summit demonstrated that the ASEAN governments have now the political will to embark on economic and to continue social and cultural cooperation."⁸⁰ The 1973 withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam precipitated the need for a more concrete declaration of cooperation within ASEAN. The original 1967 Bangkok Declaration was too vague and the changing regional environment had to be reflected in a commonly-agreed document. There was considerable disagreement among ASEAN members before the Declaration was adopted. Malaysia did not want the

⁷⁶Declaration of ASEAN Concord, see Appendix F for full text of this Declaration.

⁷⁷See Harvey Stockwin, "A Compromise Consensus," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 5, 1976, p. 12.

⁷⁸See Susanne M. Feske, *ASEAN and Prospects for Regional Arms Control in Southeast Asia*, Berlin, 1986, p. 40.

⁷⁹Refer to the actual text of the Declaration in Appendix F.

⁸⁰Lau Teik Soon, "ASEAN and the Bali Summit," *International Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 4, July 1976, p. 548.

Philippines to use the Treaty as a vehicle to rehash the Sabah dispute.⁸¹ Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore helped to solve the impasse, and modifications requested by Malaysia and the Philippines were blended into the final draft.

Chapter IV of the Treaty contains the provisions for the settlement of specific disputes. Under Article 14 of the Treaty, the parties to the agreement shall constitute, as a continuing body, a High Council comprising a Representative at ministerial level from each of the High Contracting Parties to take cognisance of the existence of disputes or situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony.⁸²

Johan Saravanamuttu maintains that "the institutional mechanism put in place by the treaty to resolve intra-ASEAN disputes is a high point of Southeast Asian regional collective security insofar as peaceful settlement procedures are concerned."⁸³ But, in essence, this mechanism is inherently flawed. The dispute-resolving section of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation requires that the "High Council" be comprised from representatives of non-conflicting members within ASEAN. The possibility that such representatives on the "High Council" would decide one way or the other on a dispute is very highly unlikely. An interview with Michael Leifer emphasised the same point. He argued that "the provision of the High Council is just a facet as no member of ASEAN would vote against Indonesia, if a dispute arises with that country."⁸⁴ Thus, no dispute within ASEAN has ever been brought to the "High Council" as dictated in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.

The de-nuclearisation of the region was also stated as an aim within this Declaration. This process would be fostered via ZOPFAN. Further, this Treaty is registered at the United Nations according to Article 102 of the UN Charter.

⁸¹See Harvey Stockwin, "A Compromise Consensus," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 5, 1976, p. 10.

⁸²See Appendix G for the relevant section of the Treaty.

⁸³Johan Saravanamuttu, "ASEAN Security for the 1990s: The Case of a Revitalised ZOPFAN," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 6, No. 2, September 1984, p. 188.

⁸⁴Interview with Michael Leifer, 12.30 p.m., 19 March 1996, Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, Singapore.

NUCLEAR FREE ZONE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

In 1984, the ZOPFAN concept was used as a basis by ASEAN in launching a new initiative to establish a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Southeast Asia. The 1971 ZOPFAN already included reference to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Lusaka Declaration.⁸⁵ Hence, the 1984⁸⁶ initiative was an extension based on the 1971 ZOPFAN declaration. The prime mover for this concept of a nuclear free zone was the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja.⁸⁷ The Ministers at the 1984 ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting agreed to "create a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone [NWFZ] in Southeast Asia under which the United States and the Soviet Union will eventually be asked not to bring nuclear weapons into this area."⁸⁸

This ASEAN proposal for the banning of nuclear weapons in the region could be characterised as an extension of New Zealand's ban on American nuclear capable warships to its ports.⁸⁹ Further, any stationing of nuclear weapons in the region would be a violation of ZOPFAN.⁹⁰

This notion met with tremendous opposition from the Americans. At the Sixth ASEAN internal meeting in Singapore on 25 June 1987, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, pressed for the NWFZ, and had the support of the New Zealand Deputy Foreign Minister. But this was strongly opposed by the American Secretary of State, George Shultz, who stated that, "the NWFZ idea ... would reduce the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence."⁹¹ At this meeting both Singapore⁹² and Thailand

⁸⁵Treaty of Tlatelolco is the treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, and the Lusaka Declaration proclaimed Africa as a nuclear-free zone.

⁸⁶ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, Jakarta, July 1984

⁸⁷His predecessor, Adam Malik, already in the past was quite afraid that the superpowers would station nuclear missiles in the region. See *New Straits Times*, 13 December 1983.

⁸⁸*Australian Associated Press*, 12 September 1984.

⁸⁹Malaysia's Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad paid a visit in Summer of 1984 to New Zealand where he may have caught this "Kiwi disease." See Robyn Lim *ASEAN, Australia Foreign Policy Future: A Scenario*, Paper delivered at the Australian National University Public Affairs Conference, Canberra, 1984, p. 10.

⁹⁰This was emphasised again by Adam Malik when he said that this would directly violate the sanctity of ZOPFAN. See *New Straits Times*, 13 December 1983.

⁹¹Susumu Awanohara, "Seeking a Pacific Perspective," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 2 July 1987.

⁹²Singapore has always wanted American presence in the region. For instance, when the U.S. had to close its bases on the Philippines, Singapore agreed to accommodate U.S. warships at its ports. For a look

... footnote cont'd over ...

opposed the NWFZ proposal too. Mochtar tried to gain greater support by linking the NWFZ proposal to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNWFZ)⁹³, which was declared in accordance with the Treaty of Rarotonga. But no concrete agreement came about from this meeting on this crucial matter. As Johan Saravanamuttu states:

Despite the fact the interest in this ASEAN project has waned, it may be worth noting that pursuance of the idea has allowed for a further measure of confidence building among ASEAN states, not to mention that the promotion of NWFZs itself has been very much part of the UN's overall agenda to reduce nuclear proliferation.⁹⁴

Recently, there has been a revival of the concept of a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ), and it was signed by the seven ASEAN members and also Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar in December of 1995.⁹⁵ The Americans reacted maintaining that the nuclear-free zone infringed on internationally recognised freedoms of movement by air and sea, but ASEAN insisted that the U.S., Britain, China and France accede to the pact.

ASEAN AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

There are certain preconditions that need to be present before economic integration and development can take place. These conditions include: (1) a pattern of pluralism in which a functionally specific group in one member state easily establishes and articulates common values and interests with its counterpart in another member state; (2) a pattern of regional interdependence in terms of trade, travel, and intellectual communication; and (3) a pattern of regional identity and loyalties among the politically

at the Singapore position on American presence in the region see, Hamish McDonald, "No Basis for Consensus," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 November 1987, p. 12-13.

⁹³This treaty has now been signed by France, US, Britain. These countries signed the treaty on 25 March 1996. The Treaty of Rarotonga was drawn up originally by members of the South Pacific Forum at a summit in the Cook Islands capital in 1985. See *The Straits Times*, 23 March 1996, p. 3.

⁹⁴Johan Saravanamuttu, "The United Nations and Regionalism: Lessons from Security Cooperation in the ASEAN Region." Paper Delivered at the LaTrobe University Conference, *The United Nations: Between Sovereignty and Global Governance?*, Melbourne, Australia, 2-6 July 1995. Permission to cite was granted by the author of the paper.

⁹⁵See *The Straits Times*, 17 December 1995, p. 2.

aware citizens.⁹⁶ All of these aspects were not present in ASEAN when it was founded. It was only in 1976 that ASEAN had a reappraisal of its economic policies. It seems that developing countries when they form economic regional blocs have little success. Examples of economic failures are the Latin Free Trade Agreement (LAFTA)⁹⁷, Central American Common Market (CACM)⁹⁸ and the East African Community (EAC)⁹⁹, these have all failed to succeed in reaching their respective goals of greater economic regionalism.

Before a detailed analysis of ASEAN's economic progress is undertaken here, it is essential to highlight the unique characteristics of the region's economic environment. One of the most significant characteristics of the economic environment of the region is the absence of an encompassing regional economic market that would facilitate and encourage greater intra-regional trade. As compared to the European Union (EU), the ASEAN region has a very small market base: "The desired result is that these countries' industries gain access to a larger market than they would otherwise have had, enabling them to achieve economics of scale and improve their competitiveness against industries outside the region."¹⁰⁰

The second economic characteristic of the region is that members states do not have complementary economies. Many of the countries in the region have resource-based economies which are export-oriented: "The ASEAN countries (except Singapore) are also rich in raw materials and support 80% of the world's natural rubber, 70% of its tin, 50% of its copra and 95% of its tropical wood."¹⁰¹

⁹⁶These points were raised by Philippe Schmitter and Ernst B. Haas, in *Mexico and Latin American Economic Integration*, Berkeley, 1964, p. 4.

⁹⁷LAFTA was considered a failure because it did not provide trade expansion nor accelerated development to its respective members.

⁹⁸Some have suggested that the progress the CACM achieved was in lieu of considerable social and economic costs to the region. See M.S. Wionczek, "The Rise and the Decline of Latin American Economic Integration," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, September 1970. pp. 49-66.

⁹⁹Because of problems with respective countries, the EC had to suspend free trade and the transfer tax system.

¹⁰⁰Bernardo M. Villegas, "The Challenge to ASEAN Economic Co-operation," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 9, No. 2, September 1987, p. 120. There are basically primary goods producing economies. ASEAN members are the world's leading producers and exporters of seven primary products.

¹⁰¹M. Rajendran, *ASEAN Foreign Relations: The Shift to Collective Action*, Kuala Lumpur, 1985, p. 135.

The last, but most vital, economic characteristic is the actual status of the economies of these Southeast Asian countries at the time when ASEAN was established. In the 1960s, the five founding ASEAN countries could be considered to be underdeveloped. For instance, one of the reasons for Indonesia's joining ASEAN was that its leaders thought that greater economic development could be achieved by being a member. Some economists have argued that the level of development of countries in economic regional blocs is important for the development of the bloc as a whole. R. B. Suhartono states that: "There is a basic question of whether premature economic integration among developing countries does contain within it the inherent forces of its eventual disintegration."¹⁰²

Hence, it is on such a basis that we have to evaluate the specific successes and failures of the ASEAN regional group with regards to its economic performance. ASEAN undertook policies directed for greater regional economic development as early as 1968.¹⁰³ But such endeavours were on a small scale and did not provide any regional development opportunities to the five members. ASEAN was aware that its initiatives to increase regional and domestic development seemed to have halted. Thus, they looked for external help from NGOs and other international bodies such as the UN. Singapore's Foreign Minister at that time, Mr S. Rajaratnam, supported such external aid for the regional organisation. He said: "Such an approach will ensure support and permanency to ASEAN because member states will not turn their backs on an organisation which they find useful in the task of national reconstruction."¹⁰⁴

Essentially three such studies were made in the early 1970s. The principal study was conducted by a United Nations Study Team commissioned by ESCAP and approved by ASEAN.¹⁰⁵ The second study was undertaken by the Asian Development

¹⁰²R. B. Suhartono, "Basic Framework for ASEAN Industrial Co-operation," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. XIV, No. 1, January 1986, pp. 70-71. For empirical evidence about Africa see A. Hazelwood, *Economic Integration and Disintegration*, London, 1967.

¹⁰³See documents from *The Second ASEAN Ministerial Meeting*, Jakarta, 7 and 8 August 1968.

¹⁰⁴Boni R. Siagian, ed., *Eighth Year Cycle of ASEAN*, Jakarta, ASEAN National Mass Media, Department of Information and ASEAN National Secretariat, 1976, p. 140.

¹⁰⁵"Economic Cooperation among Member Countries of the South East Asian Nations: Report of a United Nations Team," *Journal of Development Planning*, No. 7, United Nations, New York, 1974.

Bank. The last study was undertaken by the Asian Industrial Development Council.¹⁰⁶ Although all these studies recommended detailed initiatives to be undertaken, ASEAN ministers decided to take the attitude of 'let things take their course'.

Prior to 1976, ASEAN was not very motivated in undertaking economic cooperation. There was no ASEAN Central Secretariat until 1976 and respective economic ministers of ASEAN states seldom met as a collective group. Hence, "economic cooperation was treated as foreign relations and not as a question of internal affairs within an economic framework."¹⁰⁷

The ASEAN members' goal of increased intra-ASEAN trade, and thus greater regional economic development, gained momentum at the 1976 Bali meeting with the adoption of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord.¹⁰⁸ It was at this meeting that ASEAN leaders decided to have Ministerial Meetings on economic matters on a regular basis.¹⁰⁹ The first record of ASEAN economic regionalism was the issuance of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord.

The issues that were discussed at the Bali Summit with regards to economic cooperation were:

- The signing of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord:
- The establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, with an economic bureau:
- The streamlining of ASEAN economic committees to promote economic cooperation:
- The assignment of a particular country to represent ASEAN in its dialogue with third countries:¹¹⁰

Although, the establishment of ASEAN in 1967 set the stage for regional cooperation, it was only in 1976 that economic cooperation was thoroughly discussed

¹⁰⁶For a full analysis of such reports, see Majorie L. Suriyamongkol, *The Politics of Economic Cooperation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Illinois, 1982, pp. 124-146.

¹⁰⁷Arnado Castro, "ASEAN Economic Cooperation," in Alison Broinswki (ed.), *Understanding ASEAN*, London, 1990, pp. 74-75.

¹⁰⁸See Narongchai Akrasanee, "Issues in ASEAN Economic Regionalism," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. XI, No. 3, July 1983, p. 27.

¹⁰⁹See *Declaration of ASEAN Concord*, see Appendix F for the full text.

¹¹⁰Narongchai Akrasanee, "Issues in ASEAN Economic Regionalism," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. XI, No. 3, July 1983, p. 28.

by ASEAN members. The main objectives for economic cooperation were detailed in the ASEAN Concord.¹¹¹ Further, the ASEAN Concord put forth the areas in which economic cooperation should be established. These were:

- Cooperation in basic commodities, particularly food and energy;
- Industrial Cooperation;
- Cooperation in trade; and
- Joint approach to international commodity problems.¹¹²

The Bali Summit also established that the Meeting of ASEAN Economic Ministers would be the highest institution to implement economic cooperation policies or programmes. But it took another year for the ASEAN leaders to meet and discuss economic cooperation. The Heads of the Governments met again in 1977 in Kuala Lumpur to deal specifically with measures to facilitate greater economic development. Three economic projects emerged from this meeting; two failed almost immediately but the Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) could be argued as a success. In 1984, a fourth project called the ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture Agreement was also initiated.

One of the failed projects was the AIP or ASEAN Industrial Projects. The AIP was basically a programme which was recommended to the ASEAN countries by the UN study team. The UN identified 13 industrial projects that ASEAN countries could undertake.¹¹³ These projects were over-ambitious from the start: "After initial difficulties about what industries would be suitable or where there should be located, five appropriate projects were identified: urea in Indonesia and Malaysia, diesel engines

¹¹¹See Appendix F for full text of the ASEAN Concord.

¹¹²Narongchai Akrasanee, "Issues in ASEAN Economic Regionalism," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. XI, No. 3, July 1983, p. 30.

¹¹³The full report of the UN Study Team was published, "Economic Cooperation among Member Countries of the South East Asian Nations: Report of a United Nations Team," *Journal of Development Planning*, No. 7, United Nations, New York, 1974, pp. 1-249. The 13 projects identified by the UN Team were, steel, typewriters, scaled compressors, small engines, soda ash, newsprint, sheet glass, ethylene glycol, DMT, caprolactum, carbon black, phosphate fertilisers, and nitrogenous fertilisers.

in Singapore, superphosphate in the Philippines, and soda ash in Thailand."¹¹⁴ Poor financing and lengthy procedures for project approval caused the AIP to fail.

The other ASEAN development project was the ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC). The AIC was to target and promote "already established, small, private-sector industries and was designed to facilitate and promote intra-industrial linkage and trade."¹¹⁵ One of the major initiatives under the AIC was to build automobiles. Like the AIP, this failed due to bureaucratic interference of the governments of the respective member-states of ASEAN. Villegas states: "However, it practically lost its purpose when member states began going their separate ways in building their own automotive industries."¹¹⁶

The 1984 Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture (AIJV) specified "preferential treatment for goods sourced from firms that are jointly set up by at least two ASEAN member states does provide the region with a basic framework for market sharing and resource pooling."¹¹⁷ The tariff concessions were limited and the whole process was too complicated and, thus this too failed to achieve the stated goals of greater regional economic cooperation.

Hence, only the PTA was a relative success. After discussing trade liberalisation at the 1976 Bali Summit, the ASEAN countries signed an agreement on the PTA on the 24 of February 1977, at the Fourth Special Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Manila. However, the PTA cannot be considered as establishing a Free Trade Area. This was only initiated in 1992 with the establishment of AFTA, which will be discussed later in this Chapter. As stated by Gerald Tan,

The stated aim of the PTA is to encourage greater intra-regional trade through the granting of long-term quantity contracts, preferential terms for the financing of imports, preferential procurement by government

¹¹⁴Antonia Hussey, "Regional Development and Cooperation Through ASEAN," *Geographic Review*, Vol. 81, January 1991, p. 89.

¹¹⁵*ibid.*

¹¹⁶Bernardi M. Villegas, "The Challenge to ASEAN Economic Co-operation," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 9, No. 2, September 1987, p. 121.

¹¹⁷*ibid.*

agencies, preferential tariffs, and the liberalization of non-tariff barriers in intra-regional trade.¹¹⁸

The trade preferences were applied to basic commodities, of rice and crude oil; the tariff discounts would be 50 per cent on these goods. From the adoption of the PTA to 1987 many of the products and resources from member countries were put on the exclusion list, thus diluting the impact of the economic policy. In 1987 a general review of the PTA was undertaken with an increase of tariff cuts from 25% to 50% and only 10% of all items produced by each member-state was allowed to be on the exclusion list. These measures greatly helped to make the PTA a success as compared to the other economic policies of ASEAN. Hussey argues: "If interregional trade is an indicator of economic integration, ASEAN appears more integrated than other third-world regional organisations."¹¹⁹

Two distinguished observers state:

So far, the preferential trading arrangement to reduce tariffs among ASEAN states has been the most successful instrument of intra-ASEAN economic cooperation. Since 1983, automatic tariff cuts of 20 to 25 percent have been extended to all items whose import values would amount to US\$10 million or less per annum, while tariff cuts up to 50 percent have been offered for all other items.¹²⁰

But although the PTA attained some success, the main barrier preventing economic progress is the competitive rather than complementary structure of ASEAN economies.¹²¹ Except for Singapore, the other members have resource based, export-oriented markets which do not facilitate intra-regional trade. Such trade is directed to the valued-added markets of Japan, the U.S. and the European Community. This is the major factor that has affected the slow progress of economic development within ASEAN.

¹¹⁸Gerald Tan, *Trade Liberalization in ASEAN*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1982, p. 3.

¹¹⁹Antonia Hussey, "Regional Development and Cooperation Through ASEAN," *Geographic Review*, Vol. 81, January 1991, p. 91

¹²⁰Robert A. Scalapino and Masataka Kasaka, (eds.) *Peace, Politics and Economics in Asia: The Challenge to Cooperate*, Washington, 1988, p. 94.

Further, the limited success of the PTA was due to:

- (a) because of differences in tariff levels, high tariff countries were reluctant to cut tariffs because of perceived inadequate reciprocity from low-tariff countries;
- (b) there was a tendency to offer irrelevant items (such as snow ploughs and nuclear reactors) or to desegregate one item detailed variants, each one being offered as a single commodity;
- (c) the rule of origin requirement was an inhibiting factor since products had to contain at least 50 per cent ASEAN content to qualify for preferences; and
- (d) the long exclusion lists maintained by member economies.¹²²

ASEAN hopes that the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement does not face these same problems.

ASEAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (AFTA)

The ASEAN Free Trade Agreement was endorsed at the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in January 1992. A free trade area was first proposed by Singapore in 1975 at the pre-Bali Summit.¹²³ In 1979, the Philippines again proposed a free-trade area in the region.¹²⁴ But both these initiatives received lukewarm responses from the other members of ASEAN. AFTA was first discussed and preliminary decisions were made at the ASEAN Economic Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, in October 1991.¹²⁵ With the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement¹²⁶ signed and the realignment of regional

¹²¹See Gerald Tan, "Asean Preferential Trading Arrangements: An Overview," in Noordin Sopiee, Chew Lay See and Lim Siang Jin (eds.) *ASEAN at the Crossroads: Obstacles, Options & Opportunities in Economic Cooperation*, Kuala Lumpur, 1990, p. 66.

¹²²Hadi Soesastro, "ASEAN Economic Cooperation: The Long Journey to AFTA," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, First Quarter, 1995, p. 28.

¹²³See Bilson Kurus, "The ASEAN Triad: national Interest, Consensus-Seeking, and Economic Co-operation," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 4, March 1995, pp. 411-412.

¹²⁴See Bernardo M. Villegas, "The Challenge to ASEAN Economic Co-operation," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 9, No. 2, September 1987, p. 122.

¹²⁵Michael Vatikiotis, "The Moving AFTA: Asean takes tentative step towards free-trade area," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 24 1991, p. 64.

¹²⁶This will be addressed in the next Chapter.

political actors, AFTA was a new beginning for ASEAN members in an endeavour to increase intra-regional economic development. AFTA was to be implemented fully within 15 years, but this was reduced to 10 years at an agreement reached by ASEAN countries on 22 September 1994 at an ASEAN Economic Meeting at Chiangmai, Thailand. Further, at that meeting, it was decided that an AFTA unit was to be set up within the ASEAN secretariat to resolve disputes between states.¹²⁷

The main objective of AFTA is to cut tariffs to 0-5% by the projected year. In 1994, it was also decided to extend AFTA to encompass 80% of goods traded within ASEAN. The primary reason for the speeding up of the implementation of AFTA is the growing concern by ASEAN members about the establishment of the Asia Pacific Economic Caucus (APEC) and its economic impact on the region.¹²⁸ At the 1994 APEC meeting in Bogor, Indonesia, it was decided (the Bogor Declaration) that APEC members should move towards trade liberalization and encourage the developed members to attain trade barrier-free status by 2010, while the less developed countries should attain this status by 2020.¹²⁹

At the most recent ASEAN Ministers Meeting, July 1995, (28th Annual ASEAN Meeting) in Brunei, the Brunei leader caused a stir within the ASEAN ranks by wanting to push the implementation of AFTA to the year 2000, so as to keep up with the other regions in the world.¹³⁰ But, at the meeting, the ASEAN ministers expressed their full support for the reduction of the time-frame of AFTA from 15 to 10 years ending in 2003 (as agreed at the Chiangmai ASEAN meeting) and noted that member countries will begin to implement the new tariff reduction schedules by 1 January 1996.¹³¹

One of the major problems with AFTA lies with the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme. This is the cumbersome trade liberalisation schedule that effectively lets certain ASEAN members decrease tariff barriers at certain prescribed dates on certain goods. For example, Indonesia, the Philippines and Brunei

¹²⁷See Tan Kim Song, "New Afta target date: Jan 1, 2003," *The Straits Times*, 22 September 1994, p. 1.

¹²⁸See *Asiaweek*, 5 October 1994.

¹²⁹As reported in *New Straits Times*, 16 November 1994.

¹³⁰See Zulkifli Othman, "Brunei 'Stand Firm Despite Winds of Change'", *Reuter Textline: Business Times (Malaysia)*, On Line (Nexis), 31 July 1995.

¹³¹See *The Australian*, 31 July 1995, p. 7.

were not due to act on products carrying duty of 20% or more until after 1996. Thailand has a reprieve until 1999.¹³² There has been some change to this time-table of implementing AFTA, but much of it is quite confusing and undisclosed at this time. Indonesian economist Hadi Soesastro argues that: "Afta is suffering from a credibility problem which has not been corrected at this meeting (October 8, 1993, in Kuala Lumpur). There is still a lot of rhetoric."¹³³

Flatters has warned: "This is the fear of the Asia-Pacific region. 'Fortress North America will add to the woes caused by 'fortress Europe'."¹³⁴ There has been some analysis which maintains that AFTA will indeed be a success for the countries involved. "... AFTA will boost intra-ASEAN trade, accelerate the economic growth of each ASEAN member nation, and improve the welfare levels in the region."¹³⁵ AFTA has to succeed for ASEAN to be a credible regional organisation.

EAST ASIA ECONOMIC CAUCUS OR GROUP (EAEC/EAEG)

The Malaysian Prime Minister, Mohammed Mahathir, espoused the EAEC or EAEG notion in December 1990 after the breakdown of GATT talks in Brussels.¹³⁶ The EAEG proposal was discussed by ASEAN countries at the Singapore ASEAN leaders Summit held in January of 1992. To push the notion of EAEC, a luncheon was held in

¹³²See "Afta: Mark II," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 21 October 1993. In the CEPT scheme, 38,308 items were nominated by members all together for inclusion. This represents, on average, 88% of the total tariff lines of the ASEAN countries. Singapore included 98% of its existing tariffs, whereas Indonesia included 80%. See Jiro Okamoto, "ASEAN's New Role in the Asia Pacific Region: Can It Be a Driving Force of the Wider Regional Economic Cooperation?", in Michio Kimura (ed.), *Multi-Layered Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia after the Cold War*, I.D.E Symposium Proceedings No. 15, Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo, 1995, p. 79.

¹³³"Afta, Mark II," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 21 October 1993, p. 32.

¹³⁴Frank Flatters, "After NAFTA: Implications for ASEAN/AFTA," Paper presented at the MIER National Outlook Conference held at Kuala Lumpur on December 8-9, 1992, p. 5.

¹³⁵Innwon Park, *Regional Integration Among the ASEAN Nations: A Computable General Equilibrium Model Study*, Westport, Connecticut, 1995, p. 141. This study is based on economic modelling that takes the ASEAN AFTA as a case study. It suggests that AFTA would increase welfare in the ASEAN countries by an average of 1% of national income. Specially Indonesia by 0.6%, Malaysia 1.6%, Singapore 0.1% (Singapore is an exception as it has already enacted trade liberalisation), Philippines by 0.7%, Thailand by 1.3%. Brunei is not taken into consideration as the economy is too small. Vietnam's inclusion into ASEAN was too recent and was not discussed in the analysis.

Bangkok in July 1994; "The luncheon reflects an attempt by ASEAN to push forward their plan for the EAEC, which has been stuck in a quagmire due to the reluctance of Japan, a key potential member, to join."¹³⁷ The Malaysian proposal of the East Asia Economic Group ran into obstacles within ASEAN, "Singapore, Thailand and Brunei reacted positively to the proposal, but Indonesia and the Philippines were less enthusiastic."¹³⁸ Singapore maintained that it would support EAEC if three conditions were guaranteed - namely, that it should be GATT-consistent, complementary to APEC, and not diminish ASEAN.¹³⁹ One of the reasons was the American opposition to the proposal: "The U.S. opposition to this initiative divided support within ASEAN because several members sought to preserve their beneficial trade relations with the United States."¹⁴⁰

The first major factor was that Prime Minister Mahathir did not consult his ASEAN counterparts before announcing his initiative to the public. The lack of consultation violated, to a certain extent, the understanding as stated in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation which specifies that signatories "shall maintain regular contact and consultations with one another on international and regional matters with a view to coordinating their views, actions, and policies."¹⁴¹ This can also be related to *musjawarah* diplomacy. Such ASEAN discontent was also shown in Malaysia's 1971 ZOPFAN proposal which was not discussed within the confines of ASEAN, before being publicised. Charles Morrison states: "It is generally understood within the ASEAN group that a member government should consult with other members before

¹³⁶See "East Asian trade grouping at top of region's agenda," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 25 July 1991, p. 52. Also see Chin Kin Wah, "Changing Global Trends and Their Effects on the Asia-Pacific," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 13, No. 1, June 1991, p. 9.

¹³⁷*Japan Economic Newswire*, 19 July 1994, (On line), (Nexis). Also see *The Australian*, 25 July 1994. The luncheon was attended by ASEAN members and China, South Korea, and Japan.

¹³⁸See Michael Vatikiotis, "ASEAN: Initiatives Test," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 11 July 1991, p. 13.

¹³⁹See *The Straits Times*, 12 January 1991.

¹⁴⁰Michael Antolik, "ASEAN's Singapore Rendezvous: Just Another Summit?," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 14, No. 2, September 1992, pp. 145-146

¹⁴¹For full text see Appendix F.

undertaking any major foreign policy initiative that might affect their interests, and that it also has a right to ask other members to consult."¹⁴²

The second reason for ASEAN's lack of interest in the proposal is the fact that some members see EAEC as an obstacle for greater global trade that would not help their respective countries. Indonesia was the strongest opponent of Malaysia's proposal. Michael Vatikiotis maintains that: "President Suharto was said to be offended by Mahathir's failure to consult him or other ASEAN leaders before launching the proposal."¹⁴³ Jakarta may have also feared that the EAEC proposal, which included China, Taiwan and Japan as members, would dilute the importance of Indonesia. Ganesan argues: "The inclusion of major powers like Japan and China within an Asian collective framework would also have diluted the regional importance of Indonesia, which is widely regarded as *primus inter pares* in ASEAN."¹⁴⁴ Further, the Indonesian stance against the EAEC proposal was its realisation that Japan has a very closed economy and that the main export market for ASEAN countries is the U.S. and other Western countries that the EAEC is trying to exclude.¹⁴⁵

At the Kuala Lumpur ASEAN Economic Minister's Meeting, in October 1991, compromise began and the East Asia Economic Grouping initiative was watered down to an East Asian Economic Caucus. The change from 'Group' to 'Caucus' was accepted by Mahathir, because he did not want to see the initiative die a premature death. The membership question for the caucus was left unanswered at that time.¹⁴⁶ It was later decided that EAEC would encompass ASEAN members, plus Japan, China, Hong

¹⁴²Charles E. Morrison, "Progress and Prospects in Foreign Policy and Cooperation Among the ASEAN Countries," in R.P. Anand and Purificacion V. Guisumbing, (eds.), *ASEAN Identity, Development and Culture*, Philippines, 1981, p. 371.

¹⁴³Michael Vatikiotis, "No Asean Consensus on Mahathir plan: Fear of Fortress," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 25, 1991, p. 54. Also see, by the same author, "The Morning AFTA: Asean takes tentative step towards free-trade area," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 24 October 1991, p. 65.

¹⁴⁴N. Ganesan, "Taking Stock of Post-Cold War Developments in ASEAN," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1994, p. 463.

¹⁴⁵Further, there is a forceful Indonesian argument that is put forth by Dewi Anwar Fortuna; she argues that Indonesia cannot understand the Malaysian proposal which would, to a certain extent, legitimise the World War Two Japanese notion of a 'Sphere of Co-prosperity,' after the suffering some ASEAN members underwent with Japanese rule. Interview with Dewi Anwar Fortuna, 30 January, 2.30 p.m., Jakarta, Indonesia.

¹⁴⁶See Micheal Vatikiotis, "The Morning AFTA: Asean takes tentative step towards free-trade area," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 24 October 1991, p. 65.

Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan. Further at that meeting, "Malaysia modified its proposal, accepting that the grouping would not be institutionalised as a trading bloc, and that would meet as and when the need arises."¹⁴⁷

Also at the meeting, there was much ill feeling on the issue of the EAEC, "but some ASEAN officials were left with the feeling that Malaysia had come close to rupturing the ASEAN spirit of harmony in order to ensure that EAEC survived."¹⁴⁸ Indonesia and Thailand regarded Mahathir's aggressiveness with hostility. Other ASEAN members were concentrating on APEC activities and that was their highest priority.

Japan is officially unwilling to lead or be part of the EAEC, due to its fear of annoying the U.S and also the trauma associated with World War II and its impact on Southeast Asian countries. But, within Japan there has been some support for the EAEC: "Japan's most influential business organisation, Keidanren, has decided to support the ASEAN-backed East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) concept, although the Japanese government continues to refuse to endorse the idea."¹⁴⁹ The Malaysian Prime Minister wants Japan to be part of EAEC and also to lead this economic grouping and also for its consumptive capacity. "Mahathir is frustrated by Tokyo's reluctance to endorse the EAEC, which he blames on Japan's unwillingness to offend the U.S."¹⁵⁰

China was also not in total support for the EAEC because, at the time of the discussion, Beijing was trying to extend its Most Favourite Nation status with the U.S. and also negotiating to enter GATT. It thus had to take into consideration the sentiments of the Americans. Taiwan also could not endorse the EAEC proposal as it traditionally has had close ties with the U.S.

In September 1994, it was decided by the AEM that EAEC would concentrate on non-trade issues. At that meeting which was held in Bangkok, the Deputy Prime

¹⁴⁷Michael Antolik, "ASEAN's Singapore Rendezvous: Just Another Summit?", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 14, No. 2, September 1992, p. 145. Also see *Bangkok Post*, 7 October 1991.

¹⁴⁸See Micheal Vatikiotis, "The Morning AFTA: Asean takes tentative step towards free-trade area," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 24 October 1991, p. 65.

¹⁴⁹*The Straits Times*, 7 January 1995, p. 11. Also see "Set up EAEC soon Japanese tell ASEAN," *The Star*, 18 July 1995, p. 12.

¹⁵⁰Robert Delfs and Michael Vatikiotis, "Low Key Diplomacy," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 January 1993, p. 11.

Minister of Thailand, Supachai Panitchpakdi, suggested that "EAEC focus its activities on developmental issues, such as human resources, power generation, tourism and environmental protection, in which ASEAN countries already have close cooperation."¹⁵¹

In July 1995, the EAEC was formally accepted as an "Asian" caucus within the APEC framework. This solution for a compromise on the EAEC proposal was brokered by Singapore at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July of 1995. From the initial proposal of the establishment of the EAEC, Singapore wanted it to be part of APEC.¹⁵² It has been said: "The breakthrough came when ASEAN ministers agreed to situate the EAEC as a caucus within the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, but to have it driven by the ASEAN economic ministers' meeting."¹⁵³ This was a significant compromise as the Malaysians wanted EAEC to be formed independent of APEC. The EAEC proposal in 1993 did receive some support from South Korea, China, Taiwan, and Japan, after their views were heard by ASEAN. The reason for such support was due to ASEAN's decision, which was taken at the ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting in Bangkok, to restrict EAEC membership only to members of APEC so that the two would not be rival organisations.¹⁵⁴ At the 28th AMM, the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN reaffirmed their support for EAEC.¹⁵⁵

Again we see the consensual diplomacy taking effect, with a watered-down agenda for the EAEC that would not compete with APEC. In a comparative article considering APEC and the EAEC, Richard Stubbs and Richard Higgott argue that:

Rather like APEC, the EAEC proposal was a response to challenge coming from the global economy. But unlike APEC, the EAEC was geared as much to combating the political power of the U.S. and Europe as it was to advancing the cause of economic liberalism.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵¹*The Straits Times*, 23 September 1994, p. 16.

¹⁵²See "S'pore wants EAEC to be part of Apec," *The Star*, 18 January 1995, p. 2.

¹⁵³Michael Vatikiotis, "Singapore Solution," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 5 August 1993, p. 11.

¹⁵⁴See *Bangkok Post*, 18 November 1993. (On line), (Nexis). Also see "EAEC to start off with only Asian members of APEC," *The Straits Times*, 8 October 1993, p. 30.

¹⁵⁵See "ASEAN reaffirms support for EAEC," *The Star*, 31 July 1995, p. 6.

¹⁵⁶Richard Stubbs and Richard Higgott, "Competing Conceptions of Economic Regionalism: APEC versus EAEC in the Asia Pacific," *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 2, No. 3, Summer 1995, p. 523.

The EAEC was a proposal to allay Malaysian fears about the formation of NAFTA and the creation of an integrated EC market: "Malaysia had been advocating an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG), arguing that the Pacific Rim states needed to coalesce in response to the actions of the European Community and the North American states."¹⁵⁷ Malaysia feared that such regional developments would divert Japanese investments from Asia to North America and Europe.¹⁵⁸ Further, the establishment of NAFTA would shift off-shore production from Asia to Mexico, thus benefiting the U.S., as labour and transportation costs would be cheaper.

Recently, Mahathir has been taking a softer stance on trying to exclude Caucasian countries from being members of the EAEC. Mahathir may be willing to invite Australia to be part of EAEC if it can identify itself with East Asia. Some argue that Mahathir's new attitude may be driven by the need to attract Japan to become an EAEC member, Tokyo has stated that it would be more interested in the proposal if Australia and New Zealand were allowed to join.¹⁵⁹

SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS

Although much criticism has been made of ASEAN for its weak initiatives, it has to be noted that, during the 1980s, ASEAN was faced with the Cambodian conflict¹⁶⁰. ASEAN spent much of its time and energy trying to form alliances, create and maintain international pressure, and provide the necessary measures to try to expel Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. This point was emphasised by Indonesia's Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja in July 1984 in Jakarta: "We believe that in our previous deliberations too much has been spent on the Kampuchean problem. Our attention should not be diverted from the pressing economic issues of common

¹⁵⁷Michael Antolik, "ASEAN's Singapore Rendezvous: Just Another Summit?", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 14, No. 2, September 1992, p. 145.

¹⁵⁸See Toshihiko Kinoshita, "Keeping Cool on Trade," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 31 October 1991, p. 23.

¹⁵⁹See *The Australian*, 16 May 1995, p. 14. At the recent Osaka APEC conference, New Zealand alluded to the prospect of wanting to become an EAEC members. Also see "Malaysia defends ASEAN's caucus proposal," *The Straits Times*, 29 August 1995, p. 16: "ASEAN 'to pursue with EAEC,'" *The Star*, 29 April 1995, p. 4.

¹⁶⁰This is dealt with extensively in Chapter Three of this research.

interest."¹⁶¹ But inevitably economic issues did not play an important role at that time. However, with the end of the conflict in Indochina, this is changing. Other regional organisation did not have to contend with a major conflict at their doorstep. Thus the ASEAN experience has to be discussed within the context of the region and also the security and national interests factors that affect individual countries and also the regional grouping as a whole. Thus, parallels with other regional groupings should not be drawn.

Further, the regional grouping was concerned to maintain a facade of consensus.¹⁶² This has been true since the inception of ASEAN. The need for such consensus has deterred the adoption of constructive regional economic policies. Added to this are the narrow national interests of individual countries; ASEAN is a regional organisation that has economically progressed at a slow pace.

Intra-ASEAN economic development will move rapidly due to the establishment of APEC. *Asiaweek* contends: "The primary impetus behind the decision to speed up AFTA came from a growing concern among the member states that ASEAN could be overtaken by the strong parallel push to turn the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum into a free trade area."¹⁶³

The pace at which ASEAN moves towards greater economic integration is intertwined with its need to foster overall ASEAN consensus.¹⁶⁴ We will see ASEAN initiate greater economic initiatives due to the presence of APEC and the inclusion of Vietnam. Vietnam will push ASEAN to reorientate its decision-making process and also its economic agenda, to what extent remains an open question.

From the discussion in this Chapter, the uniqueness of the ASEAN decision-making structure can be highlighted. Intra-ASEAN tensions were primarily resolved on the basis on accommodation. The conflicts were resolved via informal relations between the leaders of the countries involved, and no formal mechanisms were used to come to a

¹⁶¹Quoted in *Bangkok Post*, 13 July 1984, p. 1.

¹⁶²For an analysis for the need for the need for consensus on political matters see, Michael Leifer, "ASEAN and the problem of common response," *International Journal*, Vol. 38, No. 2, 1983, pp. 316-329.

¹⁶³*Asiaweek*, 5 October 1994.

¹⁶⁴See Bilson Kurus, "The ASEAN Triad: national Interest, Consensus-Seeking, and Economic Co-operation," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 4, March 1995, p. 418.

resolution. Only recently on the issue of the tiny island of Sipadan has the matter gone to the ICJ.

Again, on the issue of ZOPFAN, the initial Malaysia proposal was watered down to reach a compromise among the ASEAN members. Again the common denominator principle was used to achieved consensus among the member states.

With economic issues, ASEAN members have adopted a very informally structure document to maintain consensus among themselves. The CEPT and the present AFTA agreements all have certain provisions to create consensus among the states.

So all of these issues can be related to the notion that ASEAN has a unique form of decision making serving the ends of its members. The specific agendas of the respective countries within the regional grouping have not been abandoned for the regional stance. This Chapter through its descriptive nature has effectively demonstrated that ASEAN's unique decision-making process is based on the specific interests of each member and how such interests are assimilated at the regional level without confrontation. The implementation of ZOPFAN, the TAC, EAEC, and AFTA points to such assimilation and accommodation.

The negative aspect of such accommodation is the fact that such agreements have structural weaknesses. These agreements can fail to resolve the problems that they set out to remedy, and most scholars¹⁶⁵ of ASEAN point to this aspect as the major failure of ASEAN.

¹⁶⁵ Michael Leifer, Amitav Acharya, and Johan Sarawanamuttu are examples of scholars who maintain such an argument.

CHAPTER THREE:

ASEAN'S ROLE IN RESOLVING THE KAMPUCHEAN CONFLICT

INTRODUCTION

ASEAN was one of the many major players trying to settle, and some may argue prolong, the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea.¹ Its efforts to settle this problem date back as early as December 1978 and as recent as October 1993, when Kampuchea established a democratically elected government. This ASEAN endeavour is recognised by other countries as a major diplomatic success. ASEAN not only helped to resolve the conflict, but also succeeded in raising its stature as an important regional and international actor.²

This crisis not only unified ASEAN, but also brought about much needed international recognition at a time when it was being criticised as an ineffective regional body. Also ASEAN became a conduit through which global actors tried to persuade Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia. The crisis helped to mesh the divergent views of Thailand and Indonesia so as to provide a consensus within the regional body. All these issues will be discussed in greater detail.

This Chapter will analysis the Kampuchean crisis solely from an ASEAN perspective. It will evaluate ASEAN's role as a mediator in this crisis and how it played

¹This argument by some that ASEAN prolonged the settlement of conflict was due to the fact that the then Australian Foreign Minister William Hayden, in October 1984 proposed a conference on the Kampuchean conflict to be held by ASEAN countries, Vietnam and Laos. ASEAN rejected this idea on the basis that agreement had not been reached on the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. "Indeed all the Australian initiatives aroused misgivings and opposition in the ASEAN states, particularly in Indonesia which had long seen itself as the power best fitted to serve as an intermediary with Vietnam." Gerard Hervouet, "The Cambodian conflict: the difficulties of intervention and compromise," *International Journal*, Vol. XLV, Spring 1990, p. 281. At this meeting, Hayden offered Canberra as a venue for a meeting between ASEAN, Vietnam and Laos. See H.S. Leng and S. Silwood, "Australia and the Kampuchean Crisis," *Australian Outlook*, Vol. 40, August 1986, p. 10.

a dominant role regionally and internationally. Each ASEAN member's perspective on the issue will be analysed. But due to the ASEAN's closed door policy of its Summits, it will be difficult to discuss interstate diplomacy regarding the negotiating positions of member states regarding the Kampuchean conflict. Such an analysis will facilitate a better comprehension of ASEAN as a regional body, as well as a better understanding of the contemporary political, economic and security environment of Southeast Asia. This Chapter will conclude with an extensive exploration of the impact of the crisis on ASEAN members.

Although there is abundant scholarly literature on the role ASEAN played in achieving the Kampuchean settlement, little has been written on the aspect of how the unique structure of this regional body helped in the process. The "loose" institutional structure of ASEAN was one of the dominant features that helped to confront this crisis from all avenues. This Chapter will explore and extend the argument that the unique structure of ASEAN helped it to maintain a flexible and multidimensional approach in solving the Kampuchean conflict. This intrinsic quality of ASEAN became visible as the conflict progressed through the 1980s. Rather than fracturing the regional body, the conflict and associated internal and external pressures helped to unify the ASEAN members. As mentioned in the previous Chapter, the Kampuchean or Cambodian crisis forced ASEAN to develop and adopt specific policies to counteract the effects of the Vietnamese invasion. Until the Third Indo-China conflict, ASEAN's role in the region was very limited; this all changed when the security of Thailand was threatened by Vietnamese forces with their invasion of Cambodia.

This Chapter will conclude by analysing the role of the decision-making process with regards to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. It has to be stated that extensive analysis of this specific issue is quite difficult as all such ASEAN discussions were behind closed doors. Further, as one of ASEAN's main concerns during this period was to maintain a facade of unity, disagreements within the organisation were seldom published. In the general observations and comments section of this Chapter, I have tried to grapple with some of the inherently difficult issues

²Ronald D. Palmer and Thomas J. Reckford, *Building ASEAN: 20 Years of Southeast Asian Cooperation*, New York, 1987, p. 5.

surrounding the decisions ASEAN members took in reaction to the invasion. I have tried via interviews and extensively reviews of published ASEAN statements during the occupation of Cambodia to provide as much detail as possible and some insights into the inner workings of ASEAN with specific regard to this issue..

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CRISIS

A historical survey of the conflict will aid in better understanding the various complexities of the Kampuchean situation.³ As Elliot observes:

Given the complexity of the conflict, finding definitive answers to the fundamental questions of causation and responsibility is not an easy task. The major events in the conflict are clear enough. Vietnam invaded Kampuchea in December 1978 and China invaded Vietnam in February 1979. The connections between the key events, and the claim of cause and effect that produced them are not as easily discerned,⁴

The dispute between Vietnam and Kampuchea was to a great extent over the question of the legitimacy of the established border between these two countries.⁵ Elliot further states: "The dispute was not on the extent of the land areas, but the precise delineation of the land border; according to the Vietnamese an area of 70 square kilometres, and according to Kampucheans, 'several dozen square kilometres.'"⁶ This border dispute was primarily due to French colonialisation of the region. As in other areas, the artificially drawn territorial border created the conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia.

Small scale clashes between Vietnamese and Kampuchean troops took place from 1971, with these clashes becoming more frequent after 1975. Stephen Heder describes what happened next:

³As this Chapter of the thesis is interested in ASEAN's response to the Kampuchean crisis, it will not look into the other related nuances of the crisis. But rather state the events that took place with respect to the regional actors.

⁴David W. P. Elliot, ed. *The Third Indochina Conflict*, Colorado, 1981, p. 2.

⁵There were other reasons. They involved politics, history, racism, ideology and Cold War strategic alignments.

⁶*ibid.*, p. 22. The Kampuchean claim was also reported by Phom Penh Radio, January 10, 1978. The Vietnamese border claim was reported in a typescript translation of an interview conducted by a

... footnote cont'd over ...

For the Vietnamese . . . the Kampuchean who had cut off negotiations were now increasing their intransigence with intensified patrolling. The Vietnamese therefore did not soften their negotiations position, and instead of withdrawing, they reinforced their military position along the frontier. . . . The Kampucheans, who previously had only wanted to suggest that they could make things costly for the Vietnamese and who had probably sent in patrols with orders to fire only in self-defence, now began to initiate military activities. During this period, Kampuchean forces in some localities resorted to artillery barrages and occasional small-scale forays into what the Kampuchean regarded as Vietnamese territory.⁷

There were other reasons for the eventual invasion and occupation of Kampuchea by Vietnamese forces.⁸ The official Vietnamese explanation for the invasion of Cambodia was to eradicate the Pol Pot regime and its reign of terror in the country.⁹ As the diplomatic initiatives by both sides failed to achieve a peaceful settlement to the issue, Vietnam decided to undertake a massive invasion of Kampuchean territory. This invasion was reported to have started on 25 December 1978.¹⁰ A *Washington Post* report maintained that "they [the Vietnamese] marshalled an estimated 30,000 to 60,000 troops with complete air, armour and artillery support to carry out this invasion."¹¹ Much of the military support was sponsored by the Soviet

member of a foreign delegation visiting Vietnam, dated May 5, 1978. See also Roger Smith, *Cambodia's Foreign Policy*, Ithaca, 1965, p. 154, for a discussion on the Cambodian border claim.

⁷Stephen P. Heder, "The Kampuchean-Vietnamese Conflict," in David W.P. Elliot, (ed.), *The Third Indochina Conflict*, Colorado, 1981, p. 32.

⁸Due to the ASEAN focus of this study, only the major border differences are dealt with here. For a more detailed analysis about the reasons for the conflict, see Serm Vongchant, *The Impact of the Kampuchean Crisis on ASEAN's Unity: The Role of Thailand's Security Interest (1978-1985)*, Ph.D. Thesis, Unpublished, Claremont, 1986, pp. 100-103. Two of the reasons that are explored in this study and in other literature are the deteriorating of ties between the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and Vietnam, and also the increasing Chinese military assistance to Cambodia.

⁹To a limited extent this Vietnam official stance can be related to the Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1971 with specific reference to the creation of Bangladesh. See Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, *War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh*, Berkeley, 1990. Sumit Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947*, Boulder, 1994. Also, this Vietnamese official stance of eradicating the genocidal regime of Pol Pot can also be related to the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda to oust Idi Amin. See Semakula Kiwanuka, *Amin and the Tragedy of Uganda*, London, 1979. Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey, *War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin*, Connecticut, 1982.

¹⁰See Robert O. Tilman, *Southeast Asia and Enemy Beyond: ASEAN Perspectives of External Threats*, Colorado, 1987, p. 64.

¹¹*Washington Post*, 5 January 1978.

Union,¹² which also provided the essential economic support via preferential loan repayments and outright gifts of vital resources. ASEAN leaders, like others outside the region, maintained that Vietnam's military and economic resources were drained by three decades of war against the French and the Americans. Hence, Soviet aid was indispensable for the Vietnamese. Douglas Pike declares that "... Moscow has provided AN-12 transport planes to ferry men and supplies to Cambodia to sustain the presence of close to 200,000 VPA forces there."¹³ Further, it was reported that the Soviet Union was spending more than US\$3 to US\$3.5 million a day to support the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea.¹⁴ Some analysts assert that of all the aid the Soviet Union extended to its client states, Vietnam received about 25 per cent of such aid.¹⁵

As noted by Robert Tilman, in return for such aid the Soviet Union was granted "the use of naval facilities at Cam Ranh Bay that are [were] crucial to the continuing expansion of fleet operations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans."¹⁶ This facility was essential to the Soviets who wanted to counter the perceived threat from the American naval and air units operating from the Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines. From Cam Ranh Bay, Soviet naval vessels could reach the Indian Ocean in about half the time it took from the Soviet port of Vladivostok. Further, the use of the Vietnamese facility enabled the Soviet Union to maintain a permanent

¹²In 1976 the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Vietnam. In 1977 Vietnam joined the Soviet led Council of Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON).

¹³Douglas Pike, "The USSR and Vietnam: Into the Swamp," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 19, No. 12, December 1979, pp. 1163-1166.

¹⁴See K. K. Nair, *ASEAN-Indochina Relations Since 1975: The Politics of Accommodation*. Canberra, The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. The Research School of Pacific Studies. The Australian National University. 1984. p. 145. Further, some Western analysis maintain that, Soviet aid to Vietnam by mid 1979 was about 60 per cent of its development budget, one third of its rice imports and spending between US\$2,000 and US\$3,000 million per year on aid in the form of loans to be repaid via Vietnamese exports. See Frank Frost, *The Conflict Over Cambodia: Implications of the Khmer Coalition Agreement*. Basic Paper No. 14, Canberra: Department of the Parliamentary Library. 1982, p. 21.

¹⁵Leo R. Rose, "The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia." Paper presented at the Third U.S.-ASEAN Conference, "ASEAN in the Regional and International Context," Chiangmai, Thailand, 7-11 January 1985.

¹⁶Robert O. Tilman, *Southeast Asia and the Enemy Beyond: ASEAN Perspectives of External Threat*, p. 65. Also see, Evelyn Colbert, "Power Balance and Security in Indochina," published by Security Conference on Asia and the Pacific, California, April 1988, p. 21.

military presence in the South China Sea.¹⁷ It would have been hardly possible for Vietnam to carry out the invasion without external cooperation and aid. Its alliance with the Soviet Union greatly worried ASEAN leaders who did not want the region to be embroiled in the repercussions of the Cold War.

Resistance from the Kampuchean forces was weak and the Vietnamese forces marched on the capital in a very expeditious manner. The Vietnamese forces reached Phnom Penh on January 7, 1978 and installed the Heng Samrin regime. So started the long period of occupation of Kampuchea by Vietnam. Initially, the Vietnamese leaders hoped by invading the eastern region in large numbers that it would be possible for them to replace local administrations and grant its people protection and support. However, this did not happen and the Kampuchean forces re-grouped and started a guerrilla war. Stephen Heder states that: "They [Kampucheans] began reorganising their forces, carrying out guerrilla counter-attacks and publicly condemned Vietnam and suspended diplomatic relations."¹⁸

THREAT PERCEPTIONS

Muthiah Alagappa maintains that "the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia violated two cardinal norms of ASEAN: non-interference and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of another country, and the non-use of force to resolve political disputes."¹⁹ The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia brought to the forefront the various threat perceptions²⁰ of the respective ASEAN members. Some of these perceptions were certainly due to the geographic position in relation to Cambodia, Vietnam and the PRC. Others are historical in nature. Thailand being partially landlocked historically, has been concerned with land-based threats and, since World

¹⁷See Evelyn Colbert, "Southeast Asia: Stand Pat," *Foreign Policy*, No. 54, Spring 1984, pp. 148-149.

¹⁸Stephan P. Heder, "The Kampuchean-Vietnamese Conflict," in David W.P. Elliot, ed. *The Third Indochina Conflict*, Colorado, 1981, p. 34.

¹⁹Muthiah Alagappa, "Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 2, October 1993, p. 196.

²⁰For a structural discussion of threat perception see Robert O. Tilman, *Southeast Asia and the Enemy Beyond: ASEAN Perceptions of External Threats*, Boulder, 1987, pp. 1-15. In these pages, Tilman succinctly analyses the various dimensions of threat perceptions of countries, especially those in Southeast Asia.

War II, Indochina has been the only significant source of such a threat.²¹ Thailand due to geopolitical and historical reasons considers the trans-Mekong region, which comprises Laos and most of Kampuchea, crucial for its security.²² The socialist regimes in the region are in Indochina and this represents a predominant threat to Thailand. Further, when Laos came under complete communist control in 1975, Bangkok lost one of its traditional buffers.

Being archipelagoes, both the Philippines and Indonesia did not perceive immediate threats to their respective territories. A military threat from the Indochinese states was insignificant to these countries, as the naval capabilities of these Indochinese countries were quite weak and practically non-existent. Further, the Philippines always viewed itself to be secure, primarily due to the presence of the American bases on its territory. As Thailand was pushed into establishing closer relations with the PRC, this had strong repercussions in Jakarta. Indonesia did not trust the PRC²³ due to the Beijing's alleged involvement in the coup attempt of 1965. Malaysia, on the other hand, being situated next to Thailand did perceive the threat from Vietnam to be quite immediate. With regards to China, Malaysia's domestic struggle with the Malayan Communist Party (MCP)²⁴, makes it very wary of the Sino-Thai alliance particularly as Beijing had cultivated ties with insurgent communist parties in Southeast Asia since its Cultural Revolution.²⁵

Singapore's security perceptions have also been strongly anti-communist. It was concerned about the close relations Indonesia had with Vietnam. On the issue of China,

²¹See Sheldon W. Simon, "ASEAN's Strategic Situation in the 1980's," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 60, No. 1, Spring 1987, p. 79.

²²See Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "Strategic Implications of the Indochina Conflict: Thai Perspectives," *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, Fall 1984, pp. 28-46.

²³For a detailed historical analysis of ASEAN's perceptions of the PRC during the Cambodian conflict see, Peter Polomka, "ASEAN Perspectives on China: Implications for Western Interests," *Current Issues: The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, No. 8, 1982, pp. 85-99.

²⁴See *Malaysian Buku Tahunan Rasmi (Official Yearbook 1964)*, (Kuala Lumpur, 1966), p. 33, for the term MCP.

²⁵See William R. Heaton, "China and Southeast Asian Communist Movements: The Decline of Dual Track Diplomacy," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXII, No. 8, August 1982, p. 779.

Singapore respected the views of Indonesia and did not accord China official diplomatic recognition until the late 1980s.²⁶

Thus, these countries viewed the Vietnamese invasion differently. Leszek Buszynski commented that "the Kampuchean issue affects the members of ASEAN differently and a distinction can be identified according to whether the security interests of members are directly or indirectly threatened."²⁷

This aspect of threat perception went beyond the immediate threat from the Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia. Domestic aspects did play a great importance in ASEAN members' threat perceptions of Vietnam either directly or indirectly, but this was not the only reason for the differences in opinion and attitude among ASEAN members. Indonesia, due to its past experience with the PRC and its own struggle for independence from the Dutch, to a great extent related to the Vietnamese, who had fought for their own independence and were also hostile to China.

ASEAN's ROLE IN THE KAMPUCHEAN CRISIS

ASEAN addressed the problem via a comprehensive multiple pronged attack. This encompassed political, economic, diplomatic and military pressure on Vietnam, and contained three inter-locking components. As stated by Pierre Lizée and Surpong Peou, by initiating this comprehensive approach, ASEAN wanted to "stabilise the region by way of getting Vietnamese troops out of Cambodia, establishing a democratically elected Cambodian government and promoting Cambodia's socio-economic development."²⁸ This ASEAN strategy will be discussed in a later section of this Chapter.

The initial reaction of ASEAN leaders with regards to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia was swift but extremely diplomatic in nature. On January 9, 1979, Indonesian

²⁶Singapore maintained that it would only recognise the PRC when Indonesia does the same, which it did in 1989. See Michael Leifer, "The ASEAN States: No Common Outlook," *International Affairs*, Vol. 49, October 1973, p. 604. See also Chew Sock Foon, *Ethnicity and Nationality in Singapore*, Athens: Ohio, 1987.

²⁷Leszek Buszynski, "ASEAN: A Changing Regional Role," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXVII, No. 7, July 1987, p. 766.

²⁸Pierre Lizée and Surpong Peou, *Cooperative Security and the Emerging Security Agenda in Southeast Asia: The Challenges and Opportunities of Peace in Cambodia*, Toronto, 1993, p. 2.

Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, issued a statement concerning the invasion. The statement deplored the armed conflict between the two Indochinese states and called for the immediate intervention of the Security Council of the United Nations.²⁹ As can be noted from the text, the significant aspect of this initial statement was that there was no reference to Vietnam as the aggressor in this conflict. Further statements by ASEAN as a whole, and individual members tended not to vilify Vietnam.³⁰ At this stage, ASEAN members did not want to isolate Vietnam and sought to leave its political and diplomatic options open, but this attitude changed with the Vietnamese military incursion into Thai territory, in mid-1979.

After the initial statement, ASEAN held a special meeting in Bangkok³¹, on 12 February 1979, to discuss the invasion. In their communiqué after the meeting, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers "strongly deplored the armed intervention" against Kampuchea, called for immediate and total withdrawal of "all foreign forces," and "strongly" urged the Security Council of the United Nations to take "the necessary and appropriate measures" to restore peace, security and stability in the area.³² But again there was no mention of Vietnam as the aggressor in the invasion of Kampuchea. The process of responding to the crisis greatly unified ASEAN. As Michael Leifer maintains: "ASEAN response to Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea was motivated by convergent considerations of principle, balance of power, and corporate solidarity."³³ On this notion of ASEAN principle, the invasion was against the 1976 Agreement of Amity and Cooperation signed by all the ASEAN members and which was opened to all other countries of the region. Also, the crisis brought to ASEAN's doorstep the actualities of the Cold War by proxy and balance of power considerations. It seemed to

²⁹Donald E. Weatherbee, (ed.), *Southeast Asia Divided: The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis*, Colorado, 1985, p. 1.

³⁰See the attached texts in Appendix H below. Initially various statements by ASEAN did not reflect that Vietnam was the occupying force in Kampuchea. These statements are taken from Donald E. Weatherbee, *Southeast Asia Divided: The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis*, Boulder, 1985, pp. 97-130.

³¹Bangkok was chosen to show that Thailand was the 'front-line' state in this crisis and also to maintain that ASEAN was unified in its stance in this crisis.

³²See That Tien Ton, *The Foreign Politics of The Communist Party of Vietnam: A Study of Communist Tactics*, New York, 1989, p. 161. Also see the full text of the Declaration in Appendix H. Also see Barry Wain, "ASEAN Closes Ranks to Denounce Hanoi," *Asian Wall Street Journal*, 16 January, 1979.

³³Michael Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia*, London, 1989, p. 98.

the ASEAN leaders that both the superpowers were using the region as an arena to flex their respective military might. As stated by Amitav Acharya: "The Cambodian conflict was not just a local conflict between different Khmer Rouge factions competing for power; it also engaged the far more consequential Sino-Vietnamese, Sino-Soviet and U.S.-Soviet rivalries."³⁴

There was some confusion immediately after the invasion among ASEAN members. The five members of ASEAN were shocked by the event and voiced their respective and somewhat differing opinions on the matter. Hence, ASEAN was seen by some observers to be not unified. As one unidentified ASEAN minister commented: "There are rumours being spread that there are differences. Some people have added to it by saying 'rift.' But we are still solidly together."³⁵ This rift was in part due to the fact that ASEAN at that time was not ready to deal with regional security matters. The respective member states within ASEAN wanted to handle the conflict from different perspectives. Theeravit and Brown have stated that "... ASEAN's response to and relations with Vietnam have been restrained by the fact she does not speak with one voice or one mind on how to deal with questions of regional stability and security."³⁶

This changed during the June 1979 ASEAN Meeting in Bali. The final communiqué "named Vietnam as the main reason for the problems in Indochina, especially the refugee problem."³⁷ As stated above, this identification of Vietnam as the aggressor was due to its incursion into Thai territory. In fact, Singapore wanted a stronger statement in support of Kampuchea.

In the meantime, the occupying Vietnamese forces in Cambodia established the People's Revolutionary Council headed by Heng Samrin: "On January 11, 1979, the People's Revolutionary Council proclaimed the People's Republic of Kampuchea, which was accorded immediate diplomatic recognition by Hanoi, the Soviet Union and

³⁴Amitav Acharya, *A New Regional Order in South-East Asia: ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era*, Adelphi Paper 279, 1993, p. 9.

³⁵See "Groping for an Initiative," *Asiaweek*, 28 December, 1979, p. 12.

³⁶Khien Theeravit and MacAlister Brown, *Indochina and Problems of Security and Stability in Southeast Asia*, Bangkok, 1981, p. 184.

³⁷K. K. Nair, *ASEAN-Indochina Relations Since 1975: The Politics of Accommodation*. Canberra, The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. The Research school of Pacific Studies. The Australian National University. 1984. p. 121. Also see the attached text in Appendix H.

its allies."³⁸ The rest of the world did not accord it such recognition. In fact, as will be discussed later, the UN decided to recognise the coalition government which encompassed the various ousted Cambodian factions. This coalition was initiated and sponsored by ASEAN. By undertaking such a move, ASEAN prevented recognition of the Vietnamese-installed government in Cambodia and also highlighted the illegitimacy of the invasion. The ASEAN strategy on this conflict is summarised here by K. K. Nair:

First, ASEAN supported the ousted Democratic Kampuchea government of Pol Pot as the legitimate government of Kampuchea and denied the Heng Samrin government claim of legitimacy. Second, it worked towards the diplomatic condemnation of Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea and of Vietnam's complicity in the 'escape' of scores of thousands of boat refugees. Third, ASEAN fostered the formation of a coalition of anti-Vietnamese resistance forces. Finally, ASEAN concurrently attempted to maintain ties of communications with Vietnam in order that discussion and resolution of tension might be possible.³⁹

At that particular moment only ASEAN was able to carry out the initiatives as stated above. Utilising its members to undertake various approaches to resolve the conflict, ASEAN as a whole was able to foster this so called 'multidimensional diplomatic approach.'⁴⁰ The front-line state, Thailand, extended military and economic aid to the anti-Vietnamese forces. While Indonesia and Malaysia used their diplomatic channels to pressure Vietnam's leaders to withdraw from Cambodia, Singapore and also Thailand were involved in forming the coalition government and supporting its recognition at the UN. ASEAN as a whole formulated and gathered support for respective UN resolutions. Some scholars have ascertained that Singapore provided weapons to the coalition forces. The island state, the main ASEAN arms supplier to the non-communist members of the Democratic Kampuchea coalition, donated 3,000 AK47 rifles in December of 1984.⁴¹

³⁸Micheal Leifer, "Kampuchea 1979: From Dry Season to Dry Season," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XX, No. 1, January 1980, p. 34.

³⁹K. K. Nair, *ASEAN-Indochina Relations Since 1975: The Politics of Accommodation*, p. 125.

⁴⁰This phrase conceptualises the practical manner in which ASEAN as a whole approached this crisis. 'Multidimensional' in the sense that every avenue was used and each member state had a specific role in trying to settle the conflict.

⁴¹For aid transfer to the Cambodian factions, see Paul Quinn-Judge, "Hollow Victory," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 June, 1984, p. 30.

At the United Nations, ASEAN globalised the Kampuchean conflict. It drafted resolution after resolution on a yearly basis to reach a settlement of the crisis. Such resolutions gained increased support through the years. ASEAN asserted diplomatic pressure at the UN, and kept the issue on the international organisation's agenda, thus displeasing the Vietnamese leaders. But ASEAN's perseverance did pay off in the end.

ASEAN's EFFORTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

ASEAN, after trying once⁴², became aware that it would be virtually impossible to pass a resolution at the Security Council, as the Soviet Union would veto any such initiative. Thus, ASEAN turned its attention to the UN's General Assembly. ASEAN maintained a unified stance at the UN. These countries came together to support Thailand as the front-line state. As Donald Weatherbee puts it: "It was the five nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that rallied its political friends and economic partners around the world into a solid front in opposition to Vietnam's position in Kampuchea."⁴³ ASEAN's tireless work and initiatives led to the prevention of the Vietnamese-installed Heng Samrin government in Cambodia being seated at the United Nations, thus nullifying that puppet regime.

This ASEAN effort at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) began in September 1979: "At the 34th UN General Assembly in 1979, ASEAN made a tremendous effort to mobilise international support for its position and gained overwhelming support from UN members."⁴⁴ On 21 September 1979, the United Nations General Assembly voted 71-35 in favour of Democratic Kampuchea (DK) being given the seat for Cambodia instead of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) of the Heng Samrin Regime. Further, the first resolution requiring the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia passed on the floor of the UN General Assembly on 14 November 1979.

⁴²ASEAN with consultation with the U.S. drafted a resolution calling for all parties to stop fighting and for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Kampuchea. This was quite a unique case, as never before a non-Security Council member tabled a draft resolution at the Security Council. This resolution failed to pass the Security Council of the UN as the Soviet Union used its veto. It was put to a vote by the President of the Security Council. 13 countries voted in favour for the resolution, but the Soviet Union vetoed it.

⁴³Donald Weatherbee, (ed.), *Southeast Asia Divided: The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis*, p. xiii.

After the success at the UN General Assembly in 1979, ASEAN globalized the issue further and between 1979 and 1981 the regional organisation continued with its efforts at the UN. In July 1981, an international conference sponsored by the UN⁴⁵, was held on the Cambodian problem. At that conference, after much debate a declaration was issued which advocated the following objectives;

cease-fire by all adversaries, withdrawal of all foreign troops in the shortest time possible under the supervision and verification of a UN peacekeeping force/observer group, the holding of free elections in Cambodia under the UN supervision, the post-conflict reconstruction of the Cambodian economy, and the social development of the Indochinese state.⁴⁶

Further, between 1980-82, ASEAN invested much of its diplomatic efforts in the formation of the Coalition (CGDK)⁴⁷, in order to put pressure on Vietnam.⁴⁸ Singapore hosted a meeting of Khmer resistance leaders in September of 1981⁴⁹ and in June, 1982, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea was officially established. Nair states: "The agreement brought into the coalition framework the Moulinaka group headed by Prince Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge under Khieu Samphan."⁵⁰ The coalition was proclaimed on Kampuchean soil on 7 July 1982. This was an essential move within ASEAN which wanted to back an anti-Vietnamese coalition force so as to gain greater respect in the international community rather than the former Pol Pot regime which was responsible for the genocide in Phnom Penh and other regions in Cambodia. The excitement of the eventual formation of the coalition was expressed by the Indonesians

⁴⁴Lau Teik Soon, "ASEAN and the Cambodia Problem," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXII, No. 6, June 1982, p. 548.

⁴⁵The 1980 UNGA session called for the Conference on Kampuchea by a vote of 93 to 23, with 22 abstentions. The Socialist bloc strongly objected to the call for a conference.

⁴⁶United Nations, *Report of the International Conference on Kampuchea*, New York; 13-17 July 1981, pp. 8-9. See Appendix H for the full text of the Declaration. This final declaration after the ICK conference follows closely the ASEAN framework for settlement, and thus legitimise it. See Appendix H for the ASEAN declaration after the Foreign Ministers conferences.

⁴⁷CGDK is the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea.

⁴⁸See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Kampuchea: The Diplomatic Labyrinth," *Asian Survey*, October 1982, pp. 1009-33.

⁴⁹Singapore played a very active role in this aspect of the conflict. The then Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Rajaratnam, and Foreign Minister, Mr S Dhanabalan flew to Bangkok in November 1981 to spur Khmer coalition building.

⁵⁰K. K. Nair, *ASEAN-Indochina Relations Since 1975: The Politics of Accommodation*, p. 183.

who went as far as to proclaim that "it is ASEAN which forms the UN General Assembly's backbone in safeguarding the DK's and now CGDK's UN seat."⁵¹ The UNGA seated the CGDK as the legitimate representative of Cambodia on 25 October 1982, with a 90-29 vote.⁵²

ASEAN basically pursued two main initiatives at the General Assembly. ASEAN argued that it was the right regional vehicle to initiate political pressure at the UN, as this matter stemmed from the foundations of regional security. As Micheal Leifer states: "The Association was able to invoke regional credentials to underpin its case in taking the lead at the United Nations to mobilise international support against Vietnam."⁵³

Its first move was to push the UN to recognise the deposed Pol Pot government of Kampuchea as the only legitimate regime of the country. ASEAN initiated such a debate from the onset. As K. K. Nair states: "At the United Nations General Assembly three-day debate on Kampuchea, ending on 15 November 1979, ASEAN argued for the seating of the Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea in the Assembly."⁵⁴ It was quite difficult for ASEAN to support the seating of the Pol Pot regime, but it had no option at that specific time. As Michael Leifer maintains: "ASEAN countries stated that whilst they had consistently attacked the genocidal policies pursued by the former Kampuchean regime [Pol Pot], the international community should not accept the principle of foreign military intervention."⁵⁵ On the other hand, Vietnam and its allies introduced a resolution at the UN to seat the Heng Samrin regime as the legitimate government of Kampuchea. This was rejected by the UN General Assembly. This was one of many victories for ASEAN at the UN. The second initiative undertaken by ASEAN at the UN was for the eventual withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. The record of the voting of UN members is shown by the table on the next

⁵¹Radio Jakarta, 27 October 1982 (FBIS, 28 October 1982), as quoted in Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Kampuchean Problem: Diplomatic Deadlocks and Initiatives," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 5, No. 3, December 1983, p. 266.

⁵² United Nations, *United Nations Yearbook 1982*, Department of Public Information, Netherlands, 1983.

⁵³Michael Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia*, p. 98.

⁵⁴K. K. Nair, *ASEAN-Indochina Relations Since 1975: The Politics of Accommodation*, p. 131.

⁵⁵K. K. Nair, *ASEAN-Indochina Relations Since 1975: The Politics of Accommodation*, p. 131-132. Also see Justus M. van der Kroef, "Kampuchea Between Conflict and Compromise," *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 244, No. 1419, April 1984, p. 177.

page. As can be seen from the table, the ASEAN sponsored resolution gained support through the years, with larger majorities. This increase in "yes" votes was mainly due to ASEAN pressure on its diplomatic friends at the UN.

TABLE 3.1 RESOLUTIONS SPONSORED BY ASEAN WITH REGARDS TO THE KAMPUCHEAN CRISIS IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
(1979-1989)

DATE	RESOLUTION	FOR	AGT	ABS
14 NOV. 1979	Calling for Withdrawal of Foreign Forces and Self-determination for Kampuchea. UN RESOLUTION 34/22.	91	21	29
22 OCT. 1980	Calling for Withdrawal of Foreign Forces; Including call for International Conference. UN RESOLUTION 35/6.	97	23	22
21 OCT. 1981	Affirming the ICK Declaration and Reaffirming Res. 34/22 and 35/6. UN RESOLUTION 36/5.	100	25	19
28 OCT. 1982	Calling for a Reconvening of the ICK and Reaffirming Previous Resolutions. UN RESOLUTION 37/6.	105	23	20
17 OCT. 1983	Calling for Withdrawal of Foreign Forces from Kampuchea and Affirming Previous Resolutions. UN RESOLUTION 38/3.	105	23	19
30 OCT. 1984	Calling for Withdrawal of Foreign Forces from Kampuchea and Affirming Previous Resolutions. UN RESOLUTION 39/5	110	22	18
5 NOV. 1985	Calling for Withdrawal of Foreign Forces from Kampuchea and Affirming Previous Resolutions. UN RESOLUTION 40/7	114	21	16
21 OCT. 1986	Calling for Withdrawal of Foreign Forces from Kampuchea and Affirming Previous Resolutions. UN RESOLUTION 41/6.	115	21	13
17 OCT. 1987	Calling for Withdrawal of Foreign Forces from Kampuchea and Affirming Previous Resolutions. UN RESOLUTION 42/3.	117	21	16
3 NOV. 1988	Calling for Withdrawal of Foreign Forces from Kampuchea and Affirming Previous Resolutions. UN RESOLUTION 43/19	122	19	13
15 NOV. 1989	Calling for Withdrawal of Foreign Forces from Kampuchea and Affirming Previous Resolutions. UN RESOLUTION	124	17	12

Source: Compiled from, Kessing's Contemporary Archives: Record of World Events, (ed.), Roger East, London. (Various Years from 1979-1989): United Nations Yearbook, Department of Public Information, Netherlands. (Various Years from 1979-1989). FOR = For the Resolution, AGT = Against the Resolution, and ABS = Abstained from Voting.

Further, ASEAN's response to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia was significant as it demonstrated its willingness to operationalise the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and to stand united behind Thailand, the front-line state⁵⁶ in this conflict. It is quite ironical that the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, signed in Bali, by the members of ASEAN, was an agreement to act as a political bridge between Vietnam and the Association.⁵⁷ Instead of a political bridge, ASEAN had to use it as a moat for its stand against the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam. As Michael Leifer maintains;

That invasion violated the cardinal rule of the society of states [ASEAN], which was central to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Apart from the requirement of regional partners to demonstrate solidarity with Thailand, whose strategic environment had been violated in a historically unprecedented manner, ASEAN would have been exposed as a strawman if its members had endorsed in any way Vietnam's overthrow of an independent neighbouring government by military means.⁵⁸

This concerted effort by ASEAN at the UN did not go unnoticed by Vietnam; in fact, Hanoi was infuriated by such international pressure. A brief encounter between Ha Van Lau (the then Vietnamese Permanent representative to the UN) and Dr Tommy Koh (the then Singapore's Permanent Representative to the UN), put forth Hanoi's position that ASEAN should not bother about the Kampuchean conflict, and that the world would forget the invasion in two weeks.⁵⁹ Vietnam threatened ASEAN, after witnessing the regional organisation's efforts to keep alive the Kampuchean issue at the international level. In July 1982, the then Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach, stated that Vietnam would encourage guerrilla insurgencies in ASEAN countries in "retaliation for ASEAN interference in Indochinese affairs."⁶⁰ This was followed by a Vietnamese

⁵⁶The "front-line state" practice is whereby the state that is most threatened in a conflict is supported and allowed to take the lead in trying to settle the issue. Further, the front-line state sets the agenda in *musjawarah* diplomacy. This state's views will be the lowest common denominator when it comes to taking a whole ASEAN group decision.

⁵⁷See Michael C. Williams, *Vietnam at the Crossroads*, London, 1992, p. 73.

⁵⁸Michael Leifer, "ASEAN Under Stress Over Cambodia," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 June 1984, p. 34. Also see Michael Leifer, *ASEAN Security in Southeast Asia*, p. 108.

⁵⁹Kishore Mahbubani, "The Kampuchean Problem: A Southeast Asian Perception," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 62, No. 2, Winter 1983/84, pp. 409-410. Confirmed in an interview with Professor Tommy Koh, Director, Institute of Policy Studies, and Ambassador-at-large (Singapore). Institute of Policy Studies. Singapore. 3.45 p.m. 7 April 1996.

⁶⁰*The Straits Times*, 20 July 1982.

threat in 1983 which stated that it "would begin supplying arms to insurgents in neighbouring Southeast Asian countries, presumably including Thailand, if these countries persisted in aiding the Khmer Rouge and the CGDK element."⁶¹ These threats were not taken very seriously by the ASEAN countries, and hence there was no significant policy change in their continued push for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. Moreover, these may have been empty threats as Vietnamese influences on guerrilla movements in ASEAN member-states were quite minimal.

Professor Tommy Koh, Singapore's then Permanent Representative at the UN, asserts that ASEAN was very effective at the UN. He maintains that; "what ASEAN achieved at the UN was truly miraculous."⁶²

Regionally, to settle the conflict, ASEAN proposed the so called, 'five plus two' proposal at the Seventh Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement Meeting (NAM) in New Delhi, in June 1983. At this NAM Meeting the Kampuchean seat was left vacant and the meeting called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and Vietnam. This proposal was conceived by the then Foreign Minister of Malaysia, Ghazali Shafie, who called for direct talks between the five members of ASEAN and Vietnam and Laos,⁶³ with Indonesia supporting the proposal. At first, Kampuchea was not included, as the ASEAN government did not recognise the installed Heng Samrin Regime. Vietnam agreed to this proposal which only called for increased contacts among the participants. Later in July of 1983, the Heng Samrin Regime in Kampuchea agreed to this formula as a basis for talks. Malaysia and Indonesia relented and agreed to include the Heng Samrin government. The participants also accepted that the PRC should be part of such a dialogue.

The main obstacle to this proposal was Beijing. The PRC had already abandoned this 'five plus two' talks at its inception, on the basis that it was strongly against the

⁶¹Justus M. Van der Kroef, "Kampuchea: Protracted Conflict, Suspended Compromise," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, March 1984, p. 318. Also see *The New York Times*, 10 April 1983.

⁶²He also argues that ASEAN was effective at the UN because it was possible for it to defeat the Soviet Union-Vietnam-Cuba alliance with regards to the yearly resolutions on Cambodia. Interview with Professor Koh, Director, Institute of Policy Studies, and Ambassador-at-large (Singapore). Institute of Policy Studies. Singapore. 3.45 p.m. 7 April 1996.

⁶³See Justus M. Van der Kroef, "Kampuchea: The Road to finalisation," *Asian Profile*, 13 June 1985, p. 228.

notion that ASEAN members should give recognition to the Heng Samrin Regime of the People's Republic of Kampuchea by way of accepting the 'five plus two' proposal. The CGDK was also against the proposal. Further, as this proposal was put forward during the NAM meeting in New Delhi, neither Thailand nor the Philippines were consulted as they were not members of the NAM. Thus, these two members of ASEAN opposed such talks and supported the stand of the PRC and the CGDK. Hence, this regional solution to the regional problem was unsuccessful. This was a prime example of the cleavages that were present within ASEAN. It seemed that at the international stage ASEAN was more united than at the regional level. When this issue is discussed at the regional level, fissures within the organisation at this time were obvious and were easily detected. As Gerard Hervouet states: "The association is inherently unstable and there are often splits between those countries which support a hard line towards Vietnam - Singapore and Thailand - and those more willing to negotiate - Indonesia and Malaysia."⁶⁴ Further, ASEAN as a regional body had to deal with the PRC and the CGDK respectively. The CGDK itself stood as a fragile alliance. Thus, the balancing act ASEAN had to play within the region created a great amount of complexity in resolving the conflict via peaceful means. The PRC itself exerted much influence on the parties of this conflict. ASEAN as a whole was caught in the middle among the PRC, the CGDK and most importantly the security interests of its individual members. A closer examination is needed on the aspect of how the individual members handled this matter as detailed later in this Chapter.⁶⁵

Also at the regional level Australia tried to aid in resolving the conflict. There was a change in the Australian perspective with the election of the Australian Labor Party as the federal government in March 1983. With this change, there was a shift from the Fraser Government which backed ASEAN initiatives, to Prime Minister Hawke's undertaking of an independent and concerted effort to bring the parties of the conflict together. The then Foreign Minister, William Hayden, undertook 'shuttle diplomacy' to resolve the Cambodian conflict. As H. S. Leng and S. Silwood have commented:

⁶⁴Gerard Hervouet, "The Cambodian Conflict: The Difficulties of Intervention and Compromise," *International Journal*, Vol. XLV, No. 2, Spring 1990, p. 274.

It [Australia] rejected the strategy of isolating Vietnam as counter-productive since that could only lead to a continuation of confrontation between communist and non-communist South-East Asia; and through Vietnam's continuing and deepened dependence on the Soviet Union the invitation for more than less great power interference in South-East Asia.⁶⁶

The Australian Government and the Australian Labour Party (ALP) wanted to resume bilateral development aid to Vietnam. This did not go down well with China, ASEAN and the U.S.⁶⁷ Australia due to regional pressure was forced to abandon such an initiative. Further, ASEAN was upset in 1983, when Australia refused to co-sponsor its resolution on the Cambodian conflict at the UN. Also the Australian Foreign Minister, William Hayden, did not condemn Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Kampuchea in that year's General Assembly address.⁶⁸ Such moves by Canberra caused its relations with ASEAN countries to be strained. Due to Canberra's refusal to support ASEAN's UN resolution, the regional grouping postponed its annual 1983 dialogue with Australia.⁶⁹ But these problems were resolved after some careful negotiation between Canberra and ASEAN.

INDONESIA AND THE CRISIS

Within ASEAN, the invasion had brought about a political division within the fragile grouping. For a long period, Indonesia and Thailand could not maintain a unified stance against Vietnam. The conflict had brought Thailand closer to the People's Republic of China, as Beijing provided money and military resources to the guerrilla

⁶⁵Brunei is excluded in this analysis as it only joined ASEAN in 1984 and the conflict started in 1978. Being a new member since 1984, its participation in solving this conflict was quite minimal and thus does not warrant comment.

⁶⁶H.S. Leng and S. Silwood, "Australia and the Kampuchean Crisis," *Australian Outlook*, Vol. 40, August 1986, p. 101.

⁶⁷*ibid.*, p. 102.

⁶⁸See "Head-on with Hayden," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 24 November 1983, p. 34.

⁶⁹See "Coming to Blows Over Cambodia," *Asiaweek*, 25 November 1983, p. 16. Also see "Fair-weather friend," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 27 October 1983, p. 32. The Australians were unhappy with the text of the ASEAN resolution dealing with the Cambodian resistance that included the Khmer Rouge led by Pol Pot. The impasse between Australia and ASEAN was resolved with a visit by Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke to Thailand, where he explained Canberra's position. See "Hawke plays Dove", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 1 December 1983, p. 16, for full analysis.

forces which were stationed on Thai territory. Jakarta, on the other hand, was more sympathetic to the Vietnamese and, to a great extent, strongly anti-PRC. The security priorities of ASEAN came into conflict, in particular between Jakarta and Bangkok. Although the New Order government led by President Suharto should have been adamant about not leaning towards socialist states, Vietnam was an exception. Indonesia's sentiments were based upon the 1965 coup attempt⁷⁰ and, since then, its distrust of the PRC and its policies. The impact of the Indonesian coup attempt should not be overlooked. Moreover, as Robert Tilman suggests: "In fact, if there is a single, most important, historical influence that affects Indonesian policy makers in all fields, foreign and domestic it is their revolutionary experience."⁷¹ Theeravit and Brown conclude:

In Indonesian eyes the major source of destabilisation in the region in the long term is in fact posed by the PRC and not Vietnam, and the military regime's involvement with the PKI and Gestapu has coloured its view of the Chinese role in the internal politics of the country and therefore of theirs. The latent ethnic antagonisms are further buttressed by contact with the domestic minority and it is not remarkable that the government should hold a more benign view of Vietnam, seeing the latter as a check on future Chinese ambitions.⁷²

Jakarta believed that Indonesia and Vietnam shared the same historic struggle for national liberation from European colonial powers. As Michael Leifer states, there were: "... sentimental considerations arising from the perceived shared experiences of the Indonesian and Vietnamese nationalist movements in challenging colonial rule."⁷³ But being a responsible ASEAN member, Indonesia had to foster some opposition to the Vietnamese invasion. This it did at the international and regional levels, but it also initiated talks with Vietnam. This was frowned upon by Thailand, as Bangkok perceived that Indonesia was unsympathetic to its security plight. But, in the long run, this

⁷⁰For a detailed discussion of the perceived role of the PRC and the October 1965 coup attempt in Indonesia see Benedict R. Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 coup in Indonesia*, Ithaca, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Interim Report Series, 1971.

⁷¹Robert O. Tilman, *Southeast Asia and the Enemy Beyond: ASEAN Perceptions of External Threat*, p. 75.

⁷²Khien Theeravit and MacAlister Brown, *Indochina and Problems of Security and Stability in Southeast Asia*, p. 184.

⁷³Michael Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of Southeast East Asia*, p. 91.

Indonesian approach helped to deal with Vietnam and avoided an environment that prevented negotiation between ASEAN and Hanoi.

Indonesia played a unique, sometimes divisive, role within ASEAN; Jakarta kept open lines of communication with Vietnam to resolve the solution. But on the other hand, as Michael Williams states "... President Suharto made it clear that Indonesia valued its role within ASEAN and would not sacrifice the organisation on the altar of a peace settlement."⁷⁴ The very need for such a statement from Suharto highlighted the unique role that the Indonesians played in trying to settle this conflict. Indonesia fluctuated between taking a tough stance against Vietnam and having bilateral talks with Hanoi. But the Indonesian leaders must have realised that its status in ASEAN was more important than having closer relations with Vietnam during the period of the crisis.

In July 1984,⁷⁵ Indonesia took a harder stance against Vietnam and with ASEAN jointly issued a strong statement against the invasion. As Rodney Tasker argues:

Some in ASEAN felt the fact that such a statement could be issued from Jakarta showed that the Indonesian leadership had substantially hardened its attitude towards Vietnam, adopting a more cynical approach similar to that of Thailand and Singapore.⁷⁶

This change in Indonesian attitude was due to Vietnam's opposition to President Suharto's plan for an ASEAN peace keeping mission in Cambodia.⁷⁷ Further, the domestic in-fighting between the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, and the Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Benny Murdani, on this issue had ended. Murdani undertook two missions to Hanoi to persuade the Vietnamese leaders to withdraw from Cambodia. He failed and, more significantly, made a controversial statement to the effect that Vietnam was not a security threat to Southeast Asia.⁷⁸ This statement was considered as extremely

⁷⁴Michael C. Williams, *Vietnam at the Crossroads*, p. 72.

⁷⁵9-10 July 1984, the Annual ASEAN Foreign Minister's Meeting in Jakarta. There were six Ministers there as Brunei officially became a member state in January of 1984.

⁷⁶Rodney Tasker, "ASEAN Toughs It Up," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 July 1984, p. 33.

⁷⁷The Vietnamese Foreign Minister, at that time, Nguyen Co Thah turned down this plan in March of 1984.

⁷⁸It has been verified that General Murdani made such a controversial statement, via interview with Professor Tommy Koh, who was then Singapore's Ambassador to the UN and who was part of ASEAN's efforts to resolve the conflict. Interview with Professor Tommy Koh, Director, Institute of

... footnote cont'd over ...

provocative by the other members of ASEAN. It also "implied that Indonesia, which had not had diplomatic relations with China since 1965 [the repercussion of the failed coup], considered the latter to be a greater threat than Vietnam."⁷⁹ Foreign Minister Mochtar was more favourable towards a unified stance against Vietnam.

Further, the General's comments ran counter to the prescribed norms of ASEAN, most importantly that of consultation and unanimous resolution in any comment or action that predisposes a regional stand. But, as such statements were highly publicised, this was "quickly modified or 'synthesised' into a new 'ASEAN policy', as evident in the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' call during their July 1984 meeting for Indonesia to act as a bridge towards Vietnam."⁸⁰


But if we look at the graph on the next page, which depicts the defence spending of Indonesia during the years 1970 to 1990, there is a marked increase in spending between the years 1979 and 1980. Although there is no published literature to suggest a correlation between this increase in defence spending and the Cambodian crisis, the graph suggests otherwise.

Policy Studies, and Ambassador-at-large (Singapore). Institute of Policy Studies. Singapore. 3.45 p.m. 7 April 1996.

⁷⁹Gerard Hervouet, "The Cambodian Conflict: The Difficulties of Intervention and Compromise," *International Journal*, Vol. XLV, No. 2, Spring 1990, p. 281.

⁸⁰M. R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "ASEAN and the Kampuchean Conflict: A Study of a Regional Organisation's Responses to External Security Challenges," in Robert Scalapino and Masataka Kasaka, (eds.), *Peace, Politics and Economies in Asia: The Challenge to Cooperate*, Washington, 1988, p. 156.

Figure 2. Military Expenditure: Indonesia 1970-1990.



Source: Data used to establish the graph was taken from SIPRI Yearbook, various issues.

MALAYSIA AND THE INVASION

Malaysia's perception of the Kampuchean crisis could be said to parallel that of the Indonesians, except that Malaysia's geographic position put it next to the front-line state of Thailand. But Malaysia's distrust of Thailand's ally, the PRC, in this matter was almost at the same level as that of the Indonesians. This was due to the scars from the Emergency years and the fact that most of the communist guerrillas in the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) were Chinese. But the rapprochement in 1974 between the two countries to a certain extent decreased mistrust.⁸¹ Khien Theeravit and MacAlister Brown argue that:

It would appear that Malaysia's underlying distrust of Chinese intentions fed by her domestic experience with an insurgent communist movement backed by the CCP and the competition of ethnic forces for political and economic power has predisposed her to favour Vietnam as the counterweight to an active Chinese role in the long term.⁸²

Also, China's reluctance to renounce completely the MCP reinforced Malaysia's negative perception of China.⁸³ Thus, Kuala Lumpur's reluctance to take a tough stance like Singapore and Thailand was due to the fact that it was extremely suspicious of the PRC. The Emergency, the support that the PRC extended to the MCP, and its own racial composition, were reasons for its mistrust and suspicion of the PRC.⁸⁴

On the issue of security, Malaysia increased its budget on defence spending during the Kampuchean crisis. This is graphically depicted in the graph on the next page. There seems to be a sudden surge in defence spending between the year 1978 and

⁸¹See Johan Saravanamuttu, "Malaysia-China Ties; Pre- and Post- 1974: An Overview," in Loh Koh Wah (ed.), *The Chinese Community of Malaysia-China Ties: Elite Perspectives*, Tokyo, 1981, pp. 39-45. This reappraisal of Malaysian relations with China can be related to two reasons: (1) Tun Razak wanted to appeal to his domestic Chinese population by establishing diplomatic relations with mainland China. After the race riots of 1969, he may have wanted to increase his domestic popularity and give himself needed legitimacy as leader of a multiracial country; (2) By getting China's support the appeal of the Communist Party of Malaya would diminish. See Chun-tu Hsueh, (ed.), *China's Foreign Relations: New Perspectives*, New York, 1982, p. 76.


⁸²Khien Theeravit and MacAlister Brown, *Indochina and Problems of Security and Stability in Southeast Asia*, p. 184.

⁸³See Hoong Khong Kim and Abdullah Abdul Razak, "Security Cooperation in ASEAN," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol.9, No. 2, September 1987, pp. 130-134.

⁸⁴See Robert O. Tilman, *Southeast Asia and the Enemy Beyond: ASEAN Perceptions and External Threat*, p. 91.

1979 by 56.18%. This runs counter to the notion that Malaysia did not perceive a security threat from Vietnam's incursion onto Kampuchean territory. On the other hand, this increase in military spending, as the analysis via the graph on the next page suggests, may have been due to its concern that the involvement of the PRC was a primary factor in Kuala Lumpur's security policy.

Figure 3. Military Expenditure. Malaysia. 1965-1990.



Source: Data used to establish the graph was taken from SIPRI Yearbook, various issues

SINGAPORE AND THE INVASION

Singapore was the active initiator, organiser and coordinator of most of ASEAN's activities to solve the Kampuchean conflict.⁸⁵ Singapore believed that the Cold War implications of the invasion were quite serious. A speech by the then Foreign Minister, Mr S. Rajaratnam, reiterated this aspect. He stated: "Currently, the Singapore leadership views the greatest threat to international peace and security in the region to be the Soviet Union, which, it argues, possesses both the will and the means to seek world domination."⁸⁶ Further, Singapore viewed the invasion of Kampuchea as a strengthening of the Soviet Union's hold in the region. It maintained that the Soviet Union's influence in the region was upsetting the regional balance of power.⁸⁷ Further, with the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Singapore and the other members of ASEAN became very suspicious about the expansionist designs of Moscow and Hanoi. It believed the Carter Administration had ignored the region and strongly held the notion that the states to the north were a buffer against the spread of communism.⁸⁸ As Pamela Sodhy argues:

In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, while the U.S. policy towards Kampuchea was closely related to America's policy towards Vietnam, President Carter did not have a clearly defined policy towards the region. This was the period of benign neglect of American military and diplomatic withdrawal from the region, and Indochina was accordingly, given low priority.⁸⁹

Thus, it can be observed that Singapore was strongly against the Vietnamese incursion into Kampuchean territory.

Since the occupation of Cambodia by Vietnamese forces, Singapore played the major role in the process of formulating a common Indochina policy for the ASEAN

⁸⁵See Peter Schier, "The Indochina Conflict from the Perspective of Singapore," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 4, No. 2, (September 1982), pp. 226-35.

⁸⁶Speech by Foreign Minister, Mr S. Rajaratnam. Quoted in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 34 August 1979.

⁸⁷Lee Boon Hick, "Constraints of Singapore's Foreign Policy," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXII, No. 8, June 1982, p. 531.

⁸⁸The domino theory was still prevalent. See Michael Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia*, p. 92.

states.⁹⁰ Singapore's basic interest in Southeast Asia was and continues to be maintaining its own function as a regional centre for finance, trade, and manufacturing.⁹¹ Therefore, regional security and stability were most important to the island-state. But as the graph on the next page depicts, there was no immediate increase in defence spending at the time of the conflict.

⁸⁹Pamela Sodhy, "A Survey of U.S. Post-Vietnam Policy and the Kampuchea Dilemma, 1975-89: A Southeast Asian View," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 11, No. 3, December 1989, p. 288.

⁹⁰See Peter Schier, "The Indochina Conflict from the Perspective of Singapore," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 4, No. 2, September 1982, pp. 226-35.

⁹¹See Werner Draguhn, "The Indochina Conflict and the Positions of the Countries Involved," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 5, No. 1, June 1983, p. 107.




Figure 4. Military Expenditure: Singapore, 1970-1990

Source: Data used to establish graph was taken from SIPRI Yearbook, various issues

THAILAND AND THE INVASION

The Third Indochina War pushed Thailand towards establishing warmer bilateral ties with the People's Republic of China⁹², because its traditional ally, the U.S., was reluctant to become involved due to its re-formulation of its foreign policy after its 1973 withdrawal from Vietnam.⁹³ When the PRC was formed in 1949, Thailand did not recognise it, but instead accorded diplomatic recognition to Taiwan.⁹⁴ Diplomatic recognition of Beijing was extended only in 1974, but relations were not close until 1978. With the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, Bangkok ascertained that the PRC would be a countervailing force in the region, providing a balance to the close relations that the Soviet Union enjoyed with Vietnam.

Thus, Thailand actively sought China's support as Bangkok believed that Chinese pressure on Vietnam would lessen the threat to itself.⁹⁵ Thai decision-makers took a very pragmatic step by welcoming Chinese participation in settling the conflict. Leszek Buszynski believed that "Thailand's flexibility in foreign policy largely derived from its experience of dealing with powers that were able to maintain only a temporary presence in the region."⁹⁶

In the context of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, China was needed by Thailand to oppose the Vietnamese threat. It was the only power within the region that could realistically have helped Thailand in this situation. However, Malaysia and Indonesia were strongly against the PRC's participation and these ASEAN states "expressed misgivings about the Thai position, based on long-standing perception that it

⁹²For an extensive analysis of the change in Thai Foreign Policy towards the PRC see, Gangunath Jha, "New Dimensions in Thailand's China Policy," *China Report*, Vol. XVI, No. 2, March-April 1980, pp. 29-38.

⁹³The U.S. did maintain that it would react under the Manila Pact, if Thailand's security was threatened. See Leszek Buszynski, "Thailand and the Manila Pact," *The World Today*, Vol. 36, No. 2, February 1980.

⁹⁴Yong Deng, "Sino-Thai Relations: From Strategic Co-operation to Economic Diplomacy," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 13, No. 4, March 1992, p. 361. It eventually established diplomatic relations with the PRC in July 1975, following the lead of Malaysia and the Philippines.

⁹⁵See Amitav Acharya, *A Survey of Military Cooperation Among the ASEAN States: Bilateralism or Alliance?*, York University, 1990, p. 8.

⁹⁶Leszek Buszynski, "Thailand: The Erosion of a Balanced Foreign Policy," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXII, No. 11, November 1982, p. 1037.

was China, rather than the Soviet Union, that posed the most serious long-term threat to regional security and stability."⁹⁷

The main reason Thailand sought Chinese support was the fact that it knew that the United States did not have the political will at that time to aggressively support the Thai position.⁹⁸ Although the United States maintained that it would support Thailand in the event of direct external aggression, it was not willing to provide the needed support for the anti-Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea. The United States had recently withdrawn from Vietnam due to not only the military situation of the War itself, but also due to the domestic outcry against American intervention. Thus, Thailand sensed that United States was not willing to intervene directly in the conflict. The U.S. indirectly provided support to Thailand via preferential loans to acquire weapons and also economic aid.⁹⁹ Further, the U.S. public would never permit an open alliance with Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge forces who were part of the resistance forces.¹⁰⁰ Even with the election of President Ronald Reagan, this attitude did not change.¹⁰¹ Further, the United States supported ASEAN's stance in the region as it envisaged that it would be a regional body that could be used to voice Washington's own stance on the matter.

Thailand, with help from the Chinese, provided material support for the Khmer Rouge and other factions of the anti-Vietnamese coalition. China provided about US\$80 million in annual aid to the Khmer Rouge.¹⁰² Thailand allowed most of the resistance groups, including the Khmer Rouge forces, to set camp along its border with Cambodia. As Michael Leifer states,

⁹⁷Amitav Acharya, *A Survey of Military Cooperation Among the ASEAN States: Bilateralism or Alliance?*, p. 8.

⁹⁸Khien Theeravit supports this argument in his article, "Thai-Kampuchean Relations: Problems and Prospects," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXII, No. 6, June 1982, p. 573. The United States did give military supplies to Thailand and sent ten warships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Gulf of Thailand between July and September of 1980, after the Vietnamese incursion onto Thai territory.

⁹⁹See Nayan Chanda, "CIA no, U.S. aid yes," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 16 August 1984, pp. 16-18. The US provided military aid to Thailand based on the Rusk-Thanat agreement.

¹⁰⁰Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, London, 1983, p. 440.

¹⁰¹See Lau Teik Soon, "ASEAN and the Cambodian Problem," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXII, No. 6, June 1982, p. 558.

¹⁰²See Nayan Chanda, *Brother Enemy: The War after the War: A History of Indochina Since the Fall of Saigon*, New York, p. 348. Also see Paul Quinn-Judge, "Hollow Victory," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 June 1984, pp. 29-30.

Secret negotiations with Chinese representatives in Bangkok in January 1979 paved the way for material provision for the Khmer Rouge insurgency against Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea and withdrawal of China's support for the Communist Party of Thailand.¹⁰³

There is some evidence to suggest that the United States also persuaded Thailand to serve as a conduit for Chinese aid to be passed to Pol Pot's forces.¹⁰⁴ This was the start of the military assistance Thailand gave to the anti-Vietnamese forces within Kampuchea. Khien Theeravit and MacAlister Brown suggest that

Thai suspicions and even antagonisms towards Vietnam have their roots in history. The Thai approach to her communist neighbours has shown a mixture of restraint, conciliation and toughness, though conciliation and accommodation were postures more obviously identified with her civilian politicians. The time-tested response of increased militarisation and reliance on U.S. backing is the military regime's approach to security problems.¹⁰⁵

Thailand's domestic response to the invasion was to increase rapidly its military expenditure. As the graph, on the next page depicts, there was a sudden and significant jump in military expenditure from 1978 to 1979, by 43.6%. As the graph demonstrates this jump was very noticeable.¹⁰⁶ Much of this increased military spending was on acquiring American weaponry, such weaponry included Harpoon ship-to-ship missiles, an integrated, computerised air defence system, and a squadron of F-16A fighter aircraft.¹⁰⁷ Most of this military equipment was offensive in nature, thereby suggesting that the Vietnamese threat must have been perceived as an immediate one by the Thais.

¹⁰³Michael Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia*, London, 1989, p. 91.

¹⁰⁴See Michael Haas, *Cambodia, Pol Pot, and the United States: The Faustian Pact*, New York, 1991, p. 15.

¹⁰⁵Khien Theeravit and MacAlister Brown, *Indochina and Problems of Security and Stability in Southeast Asia*, p. 186.

¹⁰⁶On this point of increased military expenditure, see Khien Theeravit, "Thai-Kampuchean Relations: Problems and Prospects," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXII, No. 6, June 1982, p. 571.

¹⁰⁷See M. R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "Can ASEAN Break the Stalemate?," *World Policy Journal*, Vol. III, No. 1, Winter 1985-86, p. 87.




Figure 5. Military Expenditure: Thailand. 1965-1990.

Source: Data used to establish graph was taken from SIPRI Yearbook, various years

THE PHILIPPINES AND THE INVASION

Like Indonesia, the Philippines' geographic position made the threat from Vietnam much less immediate. As Khien Theeravit and MacAlister Brown have maintained:

The Philippines, geographically distant from the Indochina sub-continent, does not share the same degree of involvement in or anxiety threats posed by the newly established communist power as the adjacent mainland and peninsular states.¹⁰⁸

Although remote from the crisis, Filipino's decision-makers did stand united with Thailand in this crisis. In early February 1979, the Philippines Foreign Minister made quite a surprising comment that he would approve the use of the American bases on the islands to help Thailand if it was threatened by Vietnam.¹⁰⁹ Due to the domestic instability of the country, the Kampuchean crisis seldom took center stage. The Philippines position was further complicated by the presence of American bases on its territory. As the graph on the next page depicts there was no sudden increase in defence spending at the time of the conflict.

¹⁰⁸Khien Theeravit and MacAlister Brown, *Indochina and Problems of Security and Stability in Southeast Asia*, pp. 184-185.

¹⁰⁹See *Bangkok Post*, 5 February 1979.




Figure 6. Military Expenditure: Philippines, 1965-1990.

Source: Data used to establish the graph was taken from SIPRI Yearbook, various issues

RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT

ASEAN identified that, without Soviet aid, Vietnam would have no option but to pull out of Cambodia. A common ASEAN approach towards the Soviet Union was made in February 1985 calling for the Soviets to restrain the Vietnamese during their 1984-1985 dry-season offensive against the Khmer coalition government.¹¹⁰ A change in leadership in the Soviet Union was one of the main factors which assisted the resolution of the conflict in Cambodia. The Kampuchean crisis took a turn for the better with the appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as the leader of the Soviet Communist Party, in March of 1985. Gorbachev endeavoured to settle the crisis and also to bring about closer relations with the PRC. He also eventually pulled Soviet forces out of Afghanistan. Thus, the direct consequence of Gorbachev's policy of perestroika¹¹¹ (economic restructuring) was the easing of Cold War tensions between the Soviet Union, China and the U.S. Gorbachev specifically adopted policies to encourage economic restructuring. This meant a considerable reduction of economic and military aid to client states including Vietnam which, due to wartime devastation and poor economic planning, was totally dependent on the Soviet Union for military and economic aid. It was not until the beginning of May 1985 that the Soviet Union agreed to serve as a go-between for ASEAN and Vietnam and to transmit ASEAN's proposal for 'proximity talks'.¹¹²

Following a conference of the three Indochinese Foreign Affairs Ministers, a Communiqué was issued on 16 August 1985 stating that Vietnamese troops would withdraw from Kampuchea by 1990. But this was on condition that national reconciliation and the elimination of the Pol Pot faction would take place. The need to eliminate Pol Pot became redundant as, on 2 September 1985, Khmer Rouge Radio reported that Son Sen had replaced Pol Pot as the Supreme Commander of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea. This basically eliminated one of the major hurdles to installing the CGDK as the government of Kampuchea. The removal of Pol Pot must

¹¹⁰See *The Straits Times*, 8 February 1985.

¹¹¹For an indepth analysis of perestroika see, Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, London, 1987.

¹¹²See Gerard Hervouet, "The Cambodian Conflict: The Difficulties of Intervention and Compromise," *International Journal*, Vol. XLV, No. 2, Spring 1990, p. 285.

have been done due to immense pressure from the PRC and this period was highlighted by mutual concessions from the Soviet Union and the PRC.

Gorbachev's reduction of political backing for the Vietnamese was "demonstrated in March 1988 by the absence of any supportive response to a Sino-Vietnamese naval clash in the Spratly Archipelago."¹¹³ The Soviet Union had a change of foreign policy as, due its own domestic situation, Moscow was trying to develop closer relations with both China and the United States.

ASEAN further helped this process of normalisation within Southeast Asia by staging talks¹¹⁴ between the various Kampuchean factions and Vietnam. The United Nations acknowledged that ASEAN's involvement in the Cambodian conflict aided in the resolution process. The UN pointed out specifically that the two JIMs in 1988 and 1989 were the prime basis for the Paris Peace Accord of October 1991 and the creation of UNTAC.¹¹⁵ Professor Tommy Koh agrees that the JIM paved the way and maintained the dialogue process.¹¹⁶ After such meetings, many of which were held on ASEAN territory, a joint statement was issued that 50,000 - 70,000 Vietnamese troops would withdraw from Cambodia before the end of September 1989. On 29 September 1989, Vietnam reported that all Vietnamese troops had been repatriated from Kampuchea.¹¹⁷ It was noted that "the impact of this announcement was substantial in that the anticipated withdrawal had been moved up by a year and was no longer linked to the need for a prior political agreement on Cambodia."¹¹⁸

Koh maintains that the JIM could not have brought a settlement because the timing was not right and the countries were not ready. He maintains that, in 1991, the

¹¹³Michael Leifer, "The Indochina Problem," in T.B. Millar and James Walter, (eds.), *Asia-Pacific Security after the Cold War*, Australia, 1993, p. 60.

¹¹⁴The Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM) were part of such talks between the relevant parties.

¹¹⁵See *The Straits Times*, 3 August 1994, p. 11. Also see Abdulgaffar Peang-Meth, "The United Nations Peace Plan, the Cambodian Conflict, and the Future of Cambodia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 14, No. 1, June 1992, pp. 33-46.

¹¹⁶Interview with Professor Tommy Koh, Director, Institute of Policy Studies, and Ambassador-at-large (Singapore). Institute of Policy Studies. Singapore. 3.45 p.m. 7 April 1996. He sustains the argument that the JIM could not have succeeded because the conflict was not purely regional and was international in nature.

¹¹⁷See "Paris Conference on Cambodia clears Path towards Peace," *UN Chronicle*, Vol. XXVI, No. 4, December 1989, p. 21.

¹¹⁸See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 20 April 1989, pp. 10-11.

Vietnamese government realised that the Cold War was over and that it was no longer in its national interest to maintain its occupation of Cambodia.¹¹⁹ The two year gap between 1989 and 1991 was crucial for all the parties concerned. This period was when all the permanent members of the Security Council had come to terms with problem and wanted a resolution as soon as possible.

The conflict was finally resolved on 25 October 1991, at an international conference on Kampuchea in Paris. The participants of this conference first met in 1989; in fact, the 1991 conference was essentially the second session of the 1989 meeting. Further, the ground work for the Paris Peace settlement was done at meetings in Indonesia and Thailand. There were two meetings in Pattaya, Thailand, where most of the key issues were finally resolved.¹²⁰ The 1991 Paris Conference officially reached agreement on the Kampuchean crisis,¹²¹ and ASEAN states also signed the agreement to endorse it. The United Nations agreed to fund and send the United Nations Transitional Authority of Cambodia (UNTAC), which was basically a peace-keeping force which had a mandate to ensure a peaceful transition of power in Cambodia. The Security Council of the UN unanimously accepted the terms of the Paris Agreements on 31 October 1991 via resolution 718/1991. Also, the General Assembly of the UN adopted resolution 46/18 on Kampuchea without a vote being required.

At a regional level, such international resolutions were further reinforced in July 1992 when both Vietnam and Laos acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation which was issued by ASEAN members in 1976. This accord, as mentioned before, was open to non-members of ASEAN as a political bridge to secure regional security in

¹¹⁹Interview with Professor Tommy Koh, Director, Institute of Policy Studies, and Ambassador-at-large (Singapore). Institute of Policy Studies. Singapore. 3.45 p.m. 7 April 1996.

¹²⁰See Thach Reng, "A Diplomatic Miracle: The Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict," *Indochina Report*, No. 29, October-December 1991.

¹²¹Four policy instruments were adopted and agreed upon at the conference. They were: (1) Final Act of the Paris Conference; (2) Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, with annexes on the UNTAC mandate, military matters, elections, repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons, and the principles of the new Cambodian constitution; (3) Agreement concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality, and National Unity of Cambodia; and (4) Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia.

Southeast Asia.¹²² Further, it was this Treaty and its rejection by Vietnam in 1978 with its invasion of Cambodia that provoked ASEAN to take its strong stance against Hanoi.

UNTAC which was formally established in 1992 by the UN brought its mandate to a successful completion in 1993.¹²³ Elections took place on schedule and a new Government of Cambodia was formed.

IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT ON ASEAN

ASEAN's approach to the resolution of the conflict can be understood via the three component basis. The first of these components was to foster an environment of political, diplomatic and economic isolation of Vietnam. To attain such isolation ASEAN developed three overlapping international coalitions. The security coalition encompassed the U.S., China and Khmer resistance factions as central players. The economic coalition comprised mainly dialogue partners of ASEAN, and the third coalition, that of political and moral pressure, comprised various international forums.¹²⁴ ASEAN developed, coordinated, and maintained such a strategy from the time of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978.

The second component was ASEAN's coordination of the application of military pressure on Vietnam by the PRC and the U.S. As was discussed in the preceding pages, ASEAN achieved this by moving closer to the PRC and the U.S. Both these countries provided military assistance, either directly or indirectly, to the resistance factions:

Related to these methods of applying pressure in Vietnam are the improvement of the ASEAN's countries respective armed forces, which increased expenditure since 1979, and increasing bilateral military cooperation among the members: these measures apart from enhancing defence capabilities, are [was] probably intended to communicate to

¹²²See Michael Leifer, "The Indochina Problem," in T.B. Millar and James Walter, (eds.), *Asia-Pacific Security after the Cold War*, p. 66.

¹²³For a clear analysis of the objectives and results of UNTAC, see Raoul M. Jenner, "UNTAC: 'International Triumph' in Cambodia?," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1994, pp. 145-156.

¹²⁴See M. R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "ASEAN and the Kampuchean Conflict: A Study of a Regional Organisation's Responses to External Security Challenges," in Robert Scalapino and Masataka Kasaka, (eds.), *Peace, Politics and Economies in Asia: The Challenge to Cooperate*, pp. 153-154.

Vietnam the ASEAN countries' collective and individual will to persevere with the present strategy.¹²⁵

The third component of ASEAN's strategy concerning Vietnam was the formulation of the settlement options and also the creation of an alternative exiled coalition government so as to concentrate international attention on the conflict. The creation of an coalition government, the resolutions at the UN, the International Conference on Kampuchea¹²⁶, and the other countless regionally discussed options could be grouped within this third ASEAN component to reach a resolution of the conflict. All options within this component were put forth on a non-negotiable basis. The terms of such international and regional options were discussed in detail in the preceding pages. It has been suggested: "Underlying this strategy is the assumption that a policy of attrition will work, that time is on ASEAN's side and that when sufficient pressure has been applied, Vietnam can be forced to leave Kampuchea on ASEAN's terms."¹²⁷

Such a three pronged strategy eventually brought the conflict to an end, but not without the intervention of external actors. What hampered ASEAN efforts was the very fact that it was not a neutral party in the conflict; there were also internal political differences, especially over divergent perceptions of China and Vietnam.¹²⁸ However, the tenacity and flexibility of the ASEAN strategy, and also the international recognition it attained from trying to resolve the conflict, have to be applauded.

During the conflict, ASEAN was drawn into the Cold War. As Sheldon Simon maintains: "From the standpoint of ASEAN diplomacy, one of the most disturbing

¹²⁵*ibid.*, p. 154.

¹²⁶At the International Conference of Kampuchea, the confrontation between the PRC and ASEAN showed to the rest of the Third World that ASEAN was not a stooge of the Chinese and was not playing a Chinese game. Professor Tommy Koh asserts that the ICK was an important watershed as it was the first time ASEAN took on the Chinese. At the ICK Professor Tommy Koh as the spokesman for ASEAN. Interview with Tommy Koh, Director, Institute of Policy Studies, and Ambassador-at-large (Singapore). Institute of Policy Studies. Singapore. 3.45 p.m. 7 April 1996.

¹²⁷M. R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "ASEAN and the Kampuchean Conflict: A Study of a Regional Organisation's Responses to External Security Challenges," in Robert Scalapino and Mastaka Kasaka, (eds.), *Peace, Politics and Economies in Asia: The Challenge to Cooperate*, p. 155. Also see, Kishore Muhbani, "The Kampuchean Problem: A Southeast Asian Perception," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1983/84, p. 408.

¹²⁸See Michael Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia*, 1989.

features of the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance is that it has forced the association to move towards the United States and China, thus compromising its preferred nonaligned posture."¹²⁹ Further, scholars such as K. K. Nair have argued that ASEAN had great difficulty in responding to the Vietnamese style of diplomacy, as ASEAN was always kept on the defensive by the deliberate ambivalence of Vietnamese policies and also by the differences in the threat perceptions that ASEAN members had about the security of the region.¹³⁰ Vietnam tried to exploit these differences in threat perceptions of ASEAN members. In the long run, ASEAN survived these Vietnamese manoeuvres and became a stronger and more unified regional organisation.

The division in ASEAN, an indirect consequence of the Vietnamese invasion, was primarily due to the different threat perceptions each respective member-state had at that time. This divergent view of security interests in the region translated from the lack of a security role for the grouping. Some of the ASEAN Ministers believe that the invasion provided a breath of life for the organisation. Indonesia's Foreign Minister, in 1985, claimed that "if we had not taken the stand that we did then it could well be that ASEAN would have gone into oblivion."¹³¹

The impact of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea was that it ultimately unified ASEAN. As Weatherbee maintains; "The establishment of a prompt, unified, and firm ASEAN position on the invasion of Kampuchea has been identified as a critical turning point for the group, giving concrete substance to its implicit political dimension."¹³² Further, the 1976 Bali Summit was used to justify ASEAN's actions with respect to the Cambodia crisis. Again Weatherbee states:

For the first time, measures were taken that gave effect to the 1976 Bali Summit's 'Declaration of ASEAN Concord,' which in its political program called for, "strengthening of political solidarity by promoting

¹²⁹Sheldon W. Simon, "ASEAN's Strategic Situation in the 1980s," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 60, No. 1, Spring 1987, p. 79. Also See Sheldon Simon, *The ASEAN States and Regional Security*, Stanford, 1982, p. 9; Sheldon Simon, "ASEAN Security Prospects," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 1, Summer/Fall 1987, p. 21.

¹³⁰K. K. Nair, *ASEAN-Indochina Relations Since 1975: The Politics of Accommodation*, p. 195.

¹³¹*Bangkok Post*, 7 August 1985.

¹³²Donald Weatherbee, (ed.), *Southeast Asia Divided: The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis*, p. 2.

the harmonisation of views, coordinating positions and, where possible and desirable, taking common action.¹³³

As mentioned many times above, and sustained here by Michael Leifer, it was the case that "Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Kampuchea did have the paradoxical effect of dividing as well as of uniting ASEAN."¹³⁴ But unity prevailed and ASEAN gained international recognition for its work on the conflict.

External views of ASEAN, especially those of the United States, changed with respect to its handling of the Kampuchean invasion. ASEAN's diplomatic initiatives against Vietnam changed the U.S.'s view of this regional grouping as, in the past, the U.S. dealt with ASEAN members on a bilateral basis. Pamela Sodhly has stated that: "Like the Nixon Administration, the early Carter Administration stressed bilateral ties with the members of ASEAN and did not deal with the Association as a composite entity."¹³⁵ As the Indochina crisis escalated, this American view changed.¹³⁶ Elliot observes: "By November 1979, the Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke, was declaring that the United States viewed ASEAN as 'the key to Southeast Asia' and Thailand as 'the key to ASEAN.'"¹³⁷ George Shultz, U.S. Secretary of State, in a speech to ASEAN ministers stated that:

You [ASEAN] recognise the need for strength-political and economic as well as military-to confront Vietnam with the clear choice between bearing the borders of aggression or enjoying the benefits of cooperation

¹³³*ibid.*

¹³⁴Michael Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia*, London, 1989, p. 90.

¹³⁵Pamela Sodhly, "A Survey of U.S. Post-Vietnam Policy and the Kampuchea Dilemma, 1975-89: A Southeast Asian View," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 11, No. 3, December 1989, p. 289.

¹³⁶For the official U.S. policy on Cambodia, see the statement by Assistant Secretary of State Richard C. Holbrooke before the House Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, June 13, 1979, in "Current Situation in Indochina," *Current Policy* series no. 71, June 1979. For an analysis of U.S. policy toward Cambodia, see Gareth Porter, "Kampuchea's UN Seat: Cutting the Pol Pot Connection," *Indochina Issues*, No. 8, July 1980. Further, the American support for the ASEAN endeavours served its own interests, ASEAN in 1984 was America's fifth largest trading partner and three members of the regional grouping command the straits connecting the Pacific and Indian oceans, and the Philippines was host to America's vital military bases. See Evelyn Colbert, "Southeast Asia: Stand Pat," *Foreign Policy*, No. 54, Spring 1984, p. 140.

¹³⁷David W.P. Elliot, "Recent U.S. Policy Toward Indochina," in Khien Theeravit and MacAlistar Brown, (eds.), *Indochina and Problems of Security and Stability in Southeast Asia*, Bangkok, 1983, p. 174.

with ASEAN and with countries, like my own, that firmly support you [ASEAN].¹³⁸

This very low-keyed response by the U.S. also ensured that ASEAN would be able to limit the influence of the superpowers in the conflict.

Within ASEAN, the continuation of the conflict would have increased tensions. Thailand's and Indonesia's positions on the matter have been clearly documented. But this increase in tension within ASEAN did not take place to the degree that some scholars and countries had expected. Due to the need to present a unified approach, ASEAN maintained cohesion and did not give the Hanoi government the opportunity to exploit the cleavages that were present in the regional grouping.

SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS

The involvement of ASEAN in the peaceful settlement of this crisis has brought this fledgling regional organisation to the global stage. As Leszek Buszynski has stated: "In addition to an institutional instrument regional consensus over the conduct of relations among member states, ASEAN has provided a basis for the management of relations with Vietnam."¹³⁹ The experience gained from helping to resolve the Kampuchean problem, laid the necessary foundations for ASEAN and also unified the regional body. As Weatherbee asserts: "It has been this outstanding record of opposition to Vietnam that has created the impression of real regional community in Southeast Asia."¹⁴⁰

As the Soviet Union's aid to Vietnam was suspended, Vietnam realised that it could not sustain its occupation of Cambodia permanently. By pulling out of Cambodia, Hanoi understood that it would free up resources used for military spending and that such resources could be used to reconstruct the economy. The poor state of the

¹³⁸An address by George P. Shultz, U.S. Secretary of State, *ASEAN as the Cornerstone of U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia*, United States Policy Statement Series, 1984, p. 7. The speech was addressed to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Jakarta, July 13, 1984. United States Information Service, Embassy of the United States of America.

¹³⁹Leszek Buszynski, "ASEAN: A Changing Regional Role," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXVII, No. 7, July 1987, p. 765.

¹⁴⁰Donald Weatherbee, *ASEAN After Cambodia: Reordering Southeast Asia*, The Asia Society, June 1989, p. 5.

Vietnamese economy can also be partly attributed to the ASEAN's international mobilisation that encouraged countries to create an economic embargo against Vietnam. With the end of the conflict, ASEAN members would be able to help Vietnam with its economic development.

At the political level, ASEAN successfully used the UN, the Commonwealth countries, the Organisation of Islamic States, the NAM, as well as its dialogue partners, to coerce Vietnam into peacefully resolving the conflict. The very structural nature of ASEAN helped it to sustain a multidimensional and flexible approach in trying to solve this Kampuchean conflict. Varied and sometimes independent approaches were used to create a peaceful settlement to the crisis. Thailand used all its economic, political, and military resources to secure its borders and also to push the Vietnamese out of Cambodia, so as to return to the status quo of having a buffer against its historical enemy. Thailand relied on the PRC and the United States to provide military and political aid. It joined with its fellow ASEAN members to avert military conflict and to advocate diplomatic means to settle the problem.

Indonesia, on the other hand, was the interlocutor¹⁴¹ which tried to keep open diplomatic channels with Vietnam. There were frequent diplomatic visits by leaders of both countries. Malaysia, to a lesser extent, also played such a role. It could be rightly argued that Indonesia and Malaysia took this stance as they were suspicious of the PRC's relationship with Thailand, but that is not the only pertinent reason. Indonesia provided a vehicle for constructive engagement of the type which is taking place now with relations between ASEAN and Myanmar. Thus, such an approach is not foreign to ASEAN, and has to be discussed within the context of the situation. Singapore by contrast initiated and organised support at the UN with the various resolutions, which in turn helped to internationalise the conflict. Hence, it can be concluded that ASEAN followed a dual track policy of organising strong opposition to Vietnam's aggression while keeping the channel of communication with Hanoi open via bilateral talks through

¹⁴¹This role was mandated by ASEAN. Indonesia's role as a mediator with Hanoi was orchestrated by ASEAN. Jakarta was given specific guidelines in their negotiations with Hanoi. Interview with Professor Tommy Koh, Director, Institute of Policy Studies, and Ambassador-at-large (Singapore). Institute of Policy Studies. Singapore. 3.45 p.m. 7 April 1996.

Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur.¹⁴² The other countries in ASEAN also played a role as discussed in detail in the preceding pages.

It is the "looseness" of this ASEAN structure that has fostered this approach. The flexibility of members taking individual positions within the association to a great extent has helped unify the regional body and solve the Cambodian conflict in the process.¹⁴³ Jeshurun argues: "The members of the organisation were simultaneously activating their collective potential in the regional security matrix while carrying on their own pet national diplomatic themes as independent actors at the broader international level."¹⁴⁴ The informal structural nature of ASEAN helped its members to pursue quite different strategies to help resolve the conflict. Due to the flexibility and informality of the organisation, political leadership within ASEAN held it together on the issue of ousting Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. Governmental leaders of Singapore and Indonesia played a significant role in deciding and assigning the stance that individual countries should take on the issue.¹⁴⁵

But here again, as discussed in Chapter One above, the decision-making process of ASEAN, did to a certain extent, hinder the availability of plausible options to resolve the conflict. The need for consensus basically meant that ASEAN's position on the Cambodian issue had to be the same as Thailand's foreign policy position at that time:

More Specifically, it has made ASEAN's policy toward Vietnam a function of Thailand's policy the same, which in turn is deeply influenced by the Thais' perceptions, suspicions, and fears of their traditional rival; at the same time, it has also discouraged or prevented

¹⁴²See William S. Turley (ed.), *Confrontation and Coexistence: The Future of ASEAN-Vietnam Relations*, Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 1985.

¹⁴³This statement is validated by a detailed interview with Professor Tommy Koh, who also asserts that it was the flexibility of the ASEAN approach that helped to resolve the conflict. ASEAN tried to convince Vietnam that it was not anti-Vietnam and pro-China.

¹⁴⁴Chandran Jeshurun, "ASEAN as a Source of Security in the Asian-Pacific Region: Some Emerging Trends," in T.B. Millar and James Walter, (eds.) *Asian-Pacific Security After the Cold War*, Australia, 1993, p. 83.

¹⁴⁵This is echoed by Professor Tommy Koh, who had a role as an observer and participant in many of the ASEAN meetings which dealt with the Cambodian conflict. Interview with Professor Tommy Koh, Director, Institute of Policy Studies, and Ambassador-at-large (Singapore). Institute of Policy Studies. Singapore. 3.45 p.m. 7 April 1996.

individual member's initiatives to find a more orderly framework of relations with Vietnam.¹⁴⁶

Singapore echoed such a Thai stance to bring about consensus among the ASEAN countries. Thailand's reactionary policies on this issue were the foundation for ASEAN's response to the conflict. Thailand was the front-line state as it perceived the greatest threat from Vietnam at that time. Within ASEAN, there is an informal policy that adheres to the notion of "front-line state". From various interviews I have gathered information to maintain that the country that is most involved in the situation sets the general perimeters for reacting to the situation for the regional organisation.

Although, the front-line states lays out the perimeters for reaction and resolution of the situation, each member of ASEAN still is allowed to handle the situation within the confines of its own respective foreign policy agenda and also historical context. But, each member still needed to articulate its agenda to the front-line state. Although, each member had a certain amount of latitude, there were limitations to their response to the situation if such responses went against Thailand's policies. By observing the ASEAN members reactions to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, we can ascertain that limitations to member policies were laid down informally by Thailand. Members could employ discrete measures to help resolve the situation. But member countries did not use covert measures, as they knew that this would cause a division within the organisation. Such limitations were discussed behind closed doors.¹⁴⁷ The main issue of maintaining a facade of unity was uppermost on the minds of ASEAN's political leaders.

In this specific case, Indonesia was employed to maintain an open mediating role with Vietnam. Singapore was asked to use its resources at the UN to spearhead international opposition to the invasion. The other members took on various other roles as discussed above.

ASEAN was unable to prevent the Cambodian conflict, but it was more successful, using its regional credentials, in containing the conflict. Without the

¹⁴⁶M. R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "ASEAN and the Kampuchean Conflict: A Study of a Regional Organisation's Responses to External Security Challenges," in Robert Scalapino and Mastaka Kasaka (eds.), *Peace, Politics and Economies in Asia: The Challenge to Cooperate*, p. 158.

¹⁴⁷Interview with Professor Tommy Koh, Director, Institute of Policy Studies, and Ambassador-at-large (Singapore). Institute of Policy Studies. Singapore. 3.45 p.m. 7 April 1996.

presence of ASEAN, this conflict may have spilled over to the rest of the region, increasing tensions between the superpowers. If ASEAN was not in existence no single country would have cared about Cambodia to the same extent.

After the end of the Indochina problem, ASEAN had to focus on other issues to sustain the unity of the organisation and also to sustain regional security.¹⁴⁸ Hence, we see the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) arriving from the successful resolution of the Kampuchean problem. Further, the end of the Cambodian conflict brought a new era of relative peace and stability, and a concerted effort by ASEAN to build a new regional order that would encompass the Indochinese states.

¹⁴⁸See Chin Kin Wah, "Changing Global Trends and Their Effects on the Asia Pacific," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 13, No. 1, June 1991, p. 14.

CHAPTER FOUR:

ASEAN RELATIONS WITH EXTRA-REGIONAL COUNTRIES

INTRODUCTION

ASEAN's dialogue arrangements with extra-regional countries have successfully tried to involve these external actors in regional affairs so as to increase its own economic and political linkages within the region and also internationally. This was undertaken at the 1976 Bali Summit, where ASEAN started to develop institutionalised relations with specific countries.

The 1976 Bali Summit not only brought the ASEAN Foreign Ministers together, but also, more importantly, the Economic Ministers too, who fostered an institutionalised approach in dealing with extra-regional actors. At this meeting, "existing discussions with the EC, Japan, Australia and New Zealand were placed on a more formal regularised basis, and in 1977, new dialogues were initiated with Canada and the United States."¹

ASEAN started formal dialogue with the EC (1972), Australia (1974), Canada (1977), Japan (1977), and the United States (1977). The People's Republic of China did not have the privilege of being an official dialogue partner with ASEAN. China and ASEAN have a consultative relationship. The reasons for ASEAN not maintaining such a status with China will be explored later in this Chapter. These dialogues were institutionalised under a collective form known as ASEAN Dialogue Partners System (ADPS) in 1977, except for ASEAN's relations with China. The ADPS was discussed at the 1976 Bali Summit. Jiro Okamoto acknowledges that: "ADPS has raised the profile

¹Charles E. Morrison, "Progress and Prospects in Foreign Policy and Cooperation Among the ASEAN Countries," in R.P. Anand, Purificacion V. Guisumbing (eds.) *ASEAN Identity, Development and Culture*, Philippines, 1981, p. 360

and the status of ASEAN in the international context.”² This system of meetings has brought about economic, political and security links between the ASEAN countries and the dialogue partners. During the Cambodian crisis, ASEAN successfully utilised this dialogue process to maintain international and regional pressure on the Government of Vietnam.

Presently, ASEAN via the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN-Post Ministerial Meeting (ASEAN-PMC) has extended this dialogue process to include other regional and international actors who are not part of the ADPS. This link between ASEAN and its dialogue partners will be useful to Vietnam and future members of ASEAN as an avenue to exploit regional and international resources. The ADPS is one of the main reasons or lures for the Indochinese countries wanting to be included in ASEAN.

The importance of ASEAN as a dialogue partner was exemplified when the August 1978 ASEAN-U.S. Ministerial Dialogue was attended by more than half the American Cabinet and the November 1978 dialogue with the EC was the first the Community had ever conducted with another regional organisation.³ These two significant events highlighted the growing importance of ASEAN during the late 1970s.

In this Chapter, ASEAN relations with Japan, the U.S., Canada, Australia, China and the EU will be discussed. With the inclusion of China, this Chapter goes beyond ASEAN's dialogue partnership system. All of these countries have played predominant roles in the development of the Southeast Asian region.

The dialogue process has institutionalised ASEAN relationships with major global and regional actors. The level of progress of ASEAN as a regional organisation can be measured by the depth of such links with extra-regional countries. Hence, analysis of government-to-government interactions is integral in coming to terms with ASEAN as a regional body.

²Jiro Okamoto, "ASEAN's New Role in the Asia Pacific Region: Can It Be a Driving Force of the Wider Regional Economic Cooperation?", in Michio Kimura (ed.), *Multi-Layered Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia after the Cold War*, Tokyo, 1995, p. 76.

³See Charles E. Morrison, "Progress and Prospects in Foreign Policy and Cooperation Among the ASEAN Countries," in R.P. Anand, Purificacion V. Guisumbing (eds.), *ASEAN Identity, Development and Culture*, p. 360.

Further, by exploring ASEAN's dialogue system we will come to understand the unique and functional aspect of its decision-making process. Dialogue relations with other countries underscore the importance of each member within the regional grouping.

ASEAN RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

Japan has been involved in ASEAN's economic, political, and security development since the early 1970s. Some Japanese analysts have argued that Japan wanted to be invited to join the regional grouping when it was formed in 1967.⁴ As this did not occur, the Japanese had an indifferent attitude towards ASEAN when it was initially formed.

Japan's major interests in Southeast Asia revolve around trade and security. Hamzah argues that: "Japanese foreign policy is built upon two fundamental imperatives promoting its own security needs and maintaining its economic prosperity."⁵ This could only be accomplished with strong relations with its neighbouring countries. The Southeast Asian region provides Japan with a major part of its resources and also is a tremendous market for Japanese products.

The waterways in Southeast Asia are strategically significant to Japan as most of the shipping that reaches it travels through them. 60 per cent of Japanese crude oil from the Middle East pass through the Straits of Malacca. This route is sometimes referred to as the "petroleum road," whereas the other shipping route is the "iron ore road," which starts in Western Australia and proceeds northward to Japan.⁶ Kinju Atarashi states that:

This is the reason why Japan established the Malacca Straits Council, whose activities involve hydrographic surveys, navigational aids and tidal and current studies, in order to improve navigational routes and ensure the safety of shipping passing through the Straits.⁷

⁴See Suelo Sudo, "Japan-ASEAN Relations: New Dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 5, May 1988, p. 510.

⁵B.A. Hamzah, "ASEAN and the Remilitarisation of Japan: Challenges or Opportunities?", *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Second Quarter, 1991, p. 142.

⁶See Susumu Yamakage, "Japan and ASEAN: Are They Really Becoming Closer?" in Werner Pfennig and Mark M.B. Suh, (eds.), *Aspects of ASEAN*, Munich, 1984, p. 311.

⁷Kinju Atarashi, "Japan's Economic Cooperation Policy Towards the ASEAN Countries," *International Affairs*, Vol. 61, No. 1, Winter 1984/85, p. 110.

Tokyo's domestic concept of 'comprehensive security' also dominates its relations with external countries. When it comes to the sea lanes their position is:

the ASEAN countries occupy important geopolitical positions along routes [used] for the supply of raw materials to Japan and have strong economic ties with Japan. Therefore, the security of ASEAN countries is essential to the security of Japan and Japan is watching developments there with great concern.⁸

As mentioned before, Japanese reactions to the formation of ASEAN were not positive. Tokyo was suspicious that the regional grouping would turn into a economic pressure group of primary producers.⁹ Further, in 1971, when ASEAN adopted the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), Japan became more negative towards the regional grouping, as it perceived that the ASEAN countries were keen to have Tokyo sever its security relations with the U.S. On the other hand, some ASEAN members viewed with contempt Japan's economic 'overpresence' in the region. This was marked by student protests in Bangkok and Indonesia in the early 1970s.¹⁰

Japan changed its attitude towards the Southeast Asian region in the mid-1970s. Tokyo felt that it had to repay these countries for the atrocities that occurred during the Second World War. Such destruction by the Japanese military left major emotional scars in the region,¹¹ and these memories bred distrust and suspicion towards the Japanese. Only Thailand, via an agreement, was not invaded by the Japanese during World War Two. Also troubling the minds of the people of Southeast Asia was the Japanese concept of "the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in which the individuals of Southeast Asia were to be treated as like a younger brother while older

⁸Japan Defence Agency, *Defence of Japan 1980*. Tokyo, 1981, p. 78.

⁹See Sueo Sudo, "Japan-ASEAN Relations: New Dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 5, May 1988, p. 510.

¹⁰See Masashi Nishihara, "Japan: Regional Stability," in James W. Morley (ed.), *Security Interdependence in the Asia Pacific Region*, Lexington, 1986, p. 80. In January 1974, Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei had to be escorted out of Indonesia due to violent student protests.

¹¹ASEAN leaders were deeply involved in the struggle during World War Two. President Suharto went through a Japanese-run military training school. Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew was in Singapore when the Japanese invaded. Hence, these ASEAN leaders must have had strong emotional feelings towards the Japanese even after the War.

brother Japan led the way."¹² However, Japan has been the major aid contributor to the region; Tokyo provided in the 1970s and 1980s one third of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) to ASEAN states.¹³ Such Japanese aid was also intended to enhance the political and economic stability of its neighbouring countries thus providing the essential environment to develop economic prosperity.

The economic ties that Japan fostered with ASEAN members derived from Tokyo's need for supplies and also the potential markets that would be available to Japan. For instance, in 1973, Japan accounted for 23.1 per cent and 29.7 per cent of ASEAN's exports and imports respectively, ahead of the U.S. and the EEC.¹⁴ Such economic integration between Japan and ASEAN is due to the geographic proximity of the two, but also due to the degree of complementarity in economic structure.¹⁵ ASEAN countries provided Japan in the past with as much as 99 per cent of its imports of natural rubber and zinc, and 95 per cent of tropical lumber. Japan was also heavily dependent on ASEAN for vegetable oil, nickel, copper, bauxite and many other resources.¹⁶

In the late 1980s, ASEAN had still not totally come to terms with the memories of Japanese actions in World War Two. To allay such fears, Japan through the 1970s and 1980s had reassured the countries in Southeast Asia that it never again would become a unbridled military power.¹⁷ As Barry Buzan argued, there are specific reasons for ASEAN to be suspicious of Japan:

The first is the fear that unconstrained Japanese nationalism might once again result in military aggression. The second is that Japanese behaviour

¹²William W. Haddad, "Japan, the Fukuda Doctrine, and ASEAN," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 2, No. 1, June 1980, p. 12.

¹³See Hideo Matsuzaka, "Future of Japan-ASEAN Relations," *Asia Pacific Community*, Summer 1983, p. 13. Also see Robert M. Orr, Jr., "The Rising Sun: Japan's Foreign Aid to ASEAN, the Pacific Basin and the Republic of Korea," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 1, Summer/Fall 1987, pp. 39-62. This figure rose to 70% to Asia including the ASEAN countries, in the 1990s.

¹⁴See Chee-Meow Seah and Linda Seah, "Japan-ASEAN Relations: New Perspectives on an Old Theme," *Pacific Community*, Vol. 9, No. 1, October 1977, p. 100.

¹⁵See Warren Hunsberger, "Economic Cooperation and Integration in the Asia and ASEAN Areas," *Asia Quarterly*, No. 2, 1974, pp. 128-146. Also see Kamal Salih, *ASEAN Economic Relations with Japan*, MIER Discussion Paper, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, No. 8, October 1987.

¹⁶See Hideo Matsuzaka, "Future of Japan-ASEAN Relations," *Asia Pacific Community*, Summer 1983, p. 13.

¹⁷See "Japan Calls for 'Creative Partnership' with ASEAN," *Japan Economic Newswire*, 30 June 1986, (On line), (Nexis).

during the war is still judged to have been so abnormally brutal as to place the country outside the acceptable boundaries of international behaviour.¹⁸

An example of such fear occurred in 1990, when Thailand suggested that both its and Japan's navies should exercise together: "There was quick negative reaction from Thailand's ASEAN partners Singapore and Malaysia, which stressed the region's purported consensus that Japan should be encouraged to expand its economic power in underpinning Southeast Asian prosperity, but leave its arms at home."¹⁹ But such unproductive ASEAN attitudes are slowly changing and, in the 1990s, the regional leaders are cautiously accepting a more independent and assertive Japan. To bring about a new understanding in the ASEAN region, the Japanese Emperor Akihito made a good will tour of three ASEAN countries. This 11-day tour saw him visit Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia.²⁰ When the Japanese Emperor visited Malaysia, he remarked that his visit would try to remove the suspicions of ASEAN people had about Japan.²¹

The late 1980s and early 1990s saw ASEAN countries insisting that Japan abandon its Cold War policy and develop a more regionally centred view of the world. Malaysia's insistence that Japan take the role of leader in the EAEC is a good example of this view. The 1995 APEC summit in Osaka has highlighted the problems it has with developing a coherent economic policy for the Asia-Pacific region. Japan's reluctance to adhere to APEC agricultural policy may see it eventually taking up the leadership of EAEC, but this remains unlikely at present.

The dialogue process between Japan and ASEAN members has produced economic and political success. Hamzah states: "ASEAN-Japan dialogue was first initiated in the second half of the 1970s with the first ASEAN-Japan Forum held in Tokyo in 1977."²² The 1977 Fukuda Doctrine pledged "heart-to-heart" relations and a

¹⁸Barry Buzan, "Japan's Future: Old History versus New Roles," *International Affairs*, Vol. 64, No. 4, Autumn 1988, p. 566.

¹⁹"Full astern," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 4 May 1990, p. 1.

²⁰See "Akihito to Asean trio he is visiting: We're peace-loving," *The Straits Times*, 1991, p. 21. This was the first tour by a Japanese Emperor since the end of World War Two to Southeast Asian or even Asian country.

²¹See "Emperor wants better ties with Asean," *The Star*, 25 September 1991, p. 2.

²²B. A. Hamzah, *ASEAN Relations With Dialogue Partners*, Malaysia, 1989, p. 18.

grant of US\$1 billion to finance ASEAN's industrial projects.²³ During the 1970s, ASEAN-Japanese relations were rather stormy marked by anti-Japanese movements on university campuses in ASEAN capitals, due the World War Two's legacy of mistrust. In direct response to this, Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda made visits to each ASEAN capital in 1977. The Fukuda Doctrine was announced in Manila at the end of his ASEAN tour. This Doctrine stated Tokyo's three principles towards Southeast Asia. These were

... that Japan rejected the role of a military power and, as a nation committed to peace, was resolved to contribute to the peace and prosperity of south-east Asia and of the world community; secondly, that as a true friend of the countries of south-east Asia, Japan would do its best to consolidate a relationship of mutual confidence and trust based on a 'heart-to-heart' understanding with these countries in wide-ranging fields,, that Japan would be an equal partner to ASEAN and its member states and cooperate positively with them in their efforts to strengthen their solidarity and resilience, ...²⁴

This Fukuda Doctrine has been the foundation on which future Japanese governments have based their relations with ASEAN. M. Rajendran, a Southeast Asian specialist, concludes that:

Therefore, while ASEAN recognised Japan as a major political and economic force in the region, the Fukuda Doctrine not only marked a positive commitment by the Japanese Government to the concept of ASEAN but also recognised the group's collective efforts to accelerate economic cooperation and development within the member states.²⁵

The main reason for the enactment of the Fukuda Doctrine was in response to the fall of South Vietnam and the withdrawal of American forces from Indochina. Hence, the Doctrine was an outgrowth from a Japanese initiative to take an active economic and political role in the region. The real intention of the Doctrine, as its

²³See John Wong, *ASEAN Economies in Perspective*, Philadelphia, 1979, p. 50. Also see William W. Haddad, "Japan, the Fukuda Doctrine, and ASEAN," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 2, No. 1, June 1980, pp. 10-29.

²⁴Kinju Atarashi, "Japan's Economic Cooperation Policy Towards the ASEAN Countries," *International Affairs*, Vol. 61, No. 1, Winter 1984/85, p. 112. Also see Suedo Suda, *The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN*, Singapore, 1992.

²⁵M. Rajendran, *ASEAN's Foreign Relations*, Kuala Lumpur, 1985, p. 59. Also see Thomas Pepper, "Japan's Asia Policy," *Pacific Community*, Vol. 9, No. 3, April 1978, p. 316.

drafters recall, was to bring about greater stability in Southeast Asia by encouraging coexistence between ASEAN and Indochina.²⁶ Japan wanted to fill the gap left by the American withdrawal from Vietnam and did not want the region to be directly influenced by the Soviet Union.

In the 1980s, Japan worked together with ASEAN to resolve the Cambodian conflict. In 1984, Japan offered three proposals to settle the conflict. Although, these proposals were not adopted by the causatory parties, it emphasises the active role undertaken by Tokyo in security matters in the region.

Prime Minister Nakasone's tour of ASEAN countries in the late 1980s, had the same effect as Fukuda's tour. The Nakasone tour was to assist some of the ASEAN countries which were facing economic difficulties and also to reassure the regional grouping that Japan was not becoming a major military power. At that time, there were concerns within ASEAN that Japan was increasing its military build up and enacting a defensive sea-lane plan.

Since the Fukuda Doctrine, Japan has been careful not to isolate its relationship either with Indochina or with ASEAN. Tokyo believed that investment input in either one sub-region would create Japanese domination of that region. Hence, "a Japan-ASEAN and Japan-Indochina divide rather than bridge might develop."²⁷

In recent years, Japan has been reasserting the Fukuda Doctrine in Southeast Asia. The principles of the Doctrine were not fostered after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. This was made clear when Prime Minister Kaifu in May 1991 stated in Singapore that he "believes that true peace and prosperity in entire Southeast Asia would become enduring when peace comes back to Indochina and its exchanges with ASEAN expand greatly in the future."²⁸ This reassertion of the Fukuda Doctrine, the active involvement in the Cambodian peace process²⁹, the enactment of the PKO Bill,

²⁶Quoted in Yoshihide Soeya, "Japan's Policy Towards Southeast Asia: Anatomy of 'Autonomous Diplomacy' and the American Factor," in Chandran Jeshurun, (ed.), *China, India, Japan, and the Security of Southeast Asia*, Singapore, 1993, p. 99.

²⁷*New Straits Times*, 26 February 1993, p. 14.

²⁸*The Straits Times*, 21 May 1991.

²⁹Japan has been actively helping to rebuild Indochina. Japanese Prime Minister in 1993, proposed that ASEAN and Japan come together and help reconstruct the Indochinese peninsula and war ravaged

... footnote cont'd over ...

the recent evolution of greater transparency in military acquisitions, and its support for the expanded activities of the ASEAN-PMC all point to a Japanese strategy to start a process of trust-building in the region. Such a process should have been undertaken by Japan in the 1970s. The PKO Bill did cause some initial concerns within ASEAN, but, after careful consideration, ASEAN lent its support for the Japanese initiative.³⁰ Since the early 1990s, Japan has taken a more assertive diplomatic role in its relations with ASEAN, primarily via the ASEAN-PMC.³¹ In the early 1990s, Tokyo fostered a new security initiative with ASEAN. It wanted to use the Japan-ASEAN dialogue process and the ASEAN-PMC as forums for discussing security issues.³² In the past these forums only discussed common and regional economic issues. This sudden change brought about concerns in some Asia-Pacific countries. Australia and some ASEAN members for instance perceived such an initiative with much concern.³³

Japan-ASEAN relations were confined to economic matters. Since the end of the Cold War, Japan has increased security discussions with ASEAN countries. The United States' insistence on security burden sharing has fostered such a move by Tokyo. In the past, Japan has steadfastly refused to enter into such agreements with ASEAN; Tokyo still refuses to supply arms and other military hardware to ASEAN countries but has allowed Singaporeans and Thais to attend their military academic colleges.³⁴ Chaiwat Khamcho argues: "Successive Japanese governments have nevertheless insisted that Japan engage in 'security-related cooperation' with ASEAN countries only in the

Cambodia. See *The Straits Times*, 17 January 1993, p. 15. Also see *The Star*, 18 January 1993, p. 22; *The Star*, 21st January 1993, p. 17.

³⁰See "Asean envoys 'approve of Japan's troops law,'" *The Straits Times*, 24 June 1992, p. 4.

³¹See Michael Vatikiotis, "The New Player: Japan takes a more assertive regional role," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 1 August 1991, p. 11. Also see "Stepping Carefully," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 9 May 1991, p. 19; Lokman Mansor, "Japan: Play More Active Role," *Business Times* (Malaysia), 17 May 1994, (On line) (Nexis).

³²See "Tokyo wants to use Japan-ASEAN Forum for talks on security," *The Straits Times*, 26 July 1992, p. 11. Also see "Tokyo makes new security initiative," *The Nation*, 22 June 1991.

³³See "Australia concerned over Japan's role," *New Straits Times*, 25 July 1992. Also see "ASEAN responds mildly to Tokyo's plan," *Bangkok Post*, 23 July 1991; "ASEAN wary of call for security forum," *The Nation*, 23 July 1991.

³⁴Between 1975 and 1988, 80 students came from these countries. See Japan Defence Agency, *Defence of Japan 1985*, Tokyo, 1985, p. 312.

economic field."³⁵ Such a view is changing and Japan is developing closer security relations with ASEAN via the ASEAN-PMC, Japan-ASEAN Summit, and the ARF. As for the ARF,

Japan would like to cooperate with ASEAN in fostering a three-stage development of ARF; the promotion of confidence building, development of preventive diplomacy and elaboration of approaches to conflicts.³⁶

With the withdrawal of the former Soviet Union forces, the closing of American bases in the Philippines, and the outward looking stance of the PRC, the region is in flux. Political stability is needed by Japan to maintain its position as an economic superpower, thus it has now awoken to the notion that its active involvement is necessary in the region. Its past isolationist view of the region and its reliance on the United States will not guarantee it peace and stability in the near future. On the other hand, the ASEAN countries do not want Japan to take a military role in the region. The region favours instead that Japan underwrite the financial costs of the U.S.-Japan strategic alliance. ASEAN prefers that Japan lead the region in political, economic and cultural spheres only.³⁷

Further, in the economic sphere, Japan wants ASEAN to present a form of open regionalism,³⁸ thereby not denying access to Japanese imports to the region. This it could build based on an active role in the EAEC proposal, but Tokyo does not want to create trade and security conflicts with its long-time ally, the United States. But Japan's relations with the U.S. are strained due to the unfortunate recent incident in Okinawa³⁹ and the reluctance of some Japanese to renew the lease of American bases on that island. This may cause Japan to forge a new security relationship with ASEAN. The question that arises is: Have ASEAN members forgiven Japan for the atrocities of

³⁵Chaiwat Khamcho, "Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Security: 'Plus ca change,'" *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 64, No. 1, Spring 1991, p. 13.

³⁶ASEAN Secretariat, *Twenty-Eighth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Post Ministerial Conferences with Dialogue Partners, & Second ASEAN Regional Forum*, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, Indonesia, 1995, p. 129.

³⁷See "Distrust of Japan must go before it can lead Asia," *The Straits Times*, 20 October 1991, p. 2.

³⁸See "Japan-Asean talks on 'open regionalism,'" *The Star*, 17 February 1993, p. 2.

³⁹US military personnel being charged and convicted for raping a young Japanese woman.

World War Two? That is a question that has to be answered before a security partnership can evolve.

ASEAN RELATIONS WITH AUSTRALIA

Australia was one of the earlier countries which developed close and fruitful relations with ASEAN. Both Australia and ASEAN have a mutually beneficial relationship; even though at times this is not apparent to one or both parties, both of them need each other. Preliminary talks between ASEAN and Australia took place in Canberra in May 1973 and in Bangkok in January 1974. B. A. Hamzah states:

The Asean dialogue talks received its initial inspiration from the talks in January, 1974 at Bangkok between officials of the Australian Government and the ASEAN Secretary-General. This informal meeting paved the way for the formal Inauguration of an Asean-Australian dialogue in Canberra in April 1974.⁴⁰

At the inaugural meeting it was agreed that the co-operation programme would be based on four conditions. These were:

- (1) co-operation with ASEAN as a group should not be at the expense of bilateral arrangements;
- (2) co-operation should serve to complement ASEAN's capabilities and not supplant them;
- (3) co-operation should be for regional projects conceived by ASEAN for the benefit of all ASEAN countries; and
- (4) co-operation should be carried out within the ASEAN region.⁴¹

On such constructive and well constructed principles, ASEAN and Australia set out to develop close economic and security relations. Australia had multifaceted relations with all of the ASEAN countries before the emergence of the regional grouping. Hence, at that first official meeting between the two, the Australian government committed A\$5 million to ASEAN-Australian Economic Co-operation programmes.⁴²

⁴⁰B. A. Hamzah, *ASEAN Relations With Dialogue Partners*, Malaysia, 1989, p. 16.

⁴¹"ASEAN and Australia," *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*, Vol. 54, No. 1, January 1983, p. 4.

⁴²See B. A. Hamzah, *ASEAN Relations With Dialogue Partners*, Malaysia, 1989, p. 16.

After a slow beginning, ASEAN members and Australia went through a period of animosity and stagnation of linkages. Hamzah states: "Australia has also been chided for its protectionist trade practices which deny markets to ASEAN producers."⁴³ ASEAN disapproved of Canberra's protectionist civil aviation policies which were a barrier to ASEAN countries capitalising on the profitable Europe-Australia "Kangaroo Route."⁴⁴ Also the 'White Australia' immigration policy offended many in Asia, especially the people in Southeast Asia due to its close proximity with Australia. Such a policy was eliminated by the eventual reversal by respective Australian governments. On the opposite side, the Australians viewed with disgust the human rights record of some of the ASEAN countries and also the violent annexation of East Timor by the Indonesians.⁴⁵ In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Australian policies towards ASEAN were viewed by Australian critics as "fumbling, reactive and lacking co-ordination."⁴⁶ This all changed in middle of the 1980s, when Australia finally realised the economic and political importance of Southeast Asia. Since the 1980s, ASEAN has become very important to the Australian economy. Hal Hill maintains that "ASEAN is now more important to Australia as an export market than either the U.S. or the EC."⁴⁷ During this period, with increased immigration and bilateral trade, Australia and ASEAN countries developed a very close economic and political relationship.

Australia has played a leading role in trying to form a multilateral economic caucus within the Asia-Pacific region. Prime Minister Bob Hawke was the prime mover in initiating the Asia Pacific Economic Caucus (APEC). Although Malaysia is totally

⁴³*ibid.*, p. 17.

⁴⁴See Hal Hill, "Neighbours forever," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 January 1993.

⁴⁵It is often argued that Australia's relations with Indonesia is a 'litmus test' of Australia's relations with the rest of Southeast Asia. See J.A.C. Mackie, "Australia and Southeast Asia," in C. M. Bell, (ed.), *Agenda for the Eighties: Contexts of Australian Choices in Foreign and Defence Policy*, Canberra, 1980, p. 137; John Ingleson, "Southeast Asia," in W.J. Hudson, (ed.), *Australia and the World Affairs*, Sydney, 1980, p. 284.

⁴⁶Rhonda M. Nicholas, "Misconception and Muddled Thinking in Australia-ASEAN Relations," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 5, No. 2, September 1983, p. 153. Also see Glen St. J. Barclay, "Fumbling with ASEAN: Australia's Diplomatic Difficulties in Southeast Asia," *Pacific Defence Reporter*, Vol. 8, No. 2, August 1981, pp. 10-12; Peter Hastings, "Near Northern and Pacific Neighbours," C. M. Bell, (ed.), *Agenda for the Eighties: Contexts of Australian Choices in Foreign and Defence Policy*, Canberra, 1980, p. 165; Nancy Vivani, "Australia's Relations with ASEAN," *World Review*, Vol. 19, No. 3, August 1980, p. 53.

⁴⁷Hal Hill, "Neighbours forever," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 14 January 1993. p. 45.

adamant in pushing for an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), APEC has met three times with varying degrees of success.

On the diplomatic front, Canberra tried to play a role in trying to resolve the Cambodian conflict. Respective governments of Australia developed different strategies to bring the causatory parties together. Friction arose between Canberra and the ASEAN states which wanted to take different routes to resolve the Cambodian problem. Australia derecognised the Democratic Kampuchea regime in the face of ASEAN's diplomatic efforts at the UN to maintain such recognition.⁴⁸ ASEAN's dissatisfaction with Australia's handling of the Cambodian issue was resolved when Prime Minister Hawke visited Bangkok in December 1983 and fully explained his government's position to his Thai counterpart.⁴⁹

Australia has long lasting security links with Singapore and Malaysia. Such links were established based on the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA). This sees Australia stationing military personnel and equipment in both these ASEAN countries. Canberra also has an agreement with Jakarta to train its officers in Australia's joint service colleges. After the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, Australia undertook to build its military ties with the respective ASEAN members. Through non-refundable grants and extending military training facilities, Canberra tried to enhance its defence cooperation with ASEAN.⁵⁰

ASEAN RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

U.S. relations and foreign policy with the Southeast Asian region could be considered as vacillating through the post-World War Two decades. During the 1950s to the late 1960s, the Americans were deeply involved in the region. After the implementation of the 1969 'Guam doctrine', Washington largely left conflict resolution in the region to local remedies. Since the withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973, America has tried to shy away from the region. During the Cambodian conflict it played its

⁴⁸See "Fair-weather Friend," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 27 October 1983, pp. 32-33; 'Head-on with Hayden,' *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 24 November 1983, p. 34.

⁴⁹See "Hawke Plays the Dove," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 1 December 1983, pp. 16-17.

⁵⁰See "Advice for ASEAN," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 10 September 1982, pp. 44-46.

'China card' and did not actively engage in conflict resolution. The 1970s saw the U.S. curtail its military expenditure in region and the 1980s saw Washington move further away from the region. Relations between Southeast Asia and America during the 1980s could be considered to have stagnated.⁵¹ The 1990s have seen new vigour in U.S.-ASEAN relations; America's active involvement with APEC and the ARF points to greater concern for the security of the region.

The establishment of ASEAN was welcomed by the U.S. in 1967, but the adoption of ZOPFAN in 1971 caused some problems between ASEAN and Washington. The U.S. thought that, by adopting ZOPFAN, ASEAN was totally ignoring the vital security needs of its members.⁵² ZOPFAN has been discussed in Chapter Two above, but the rationale for America's reluctance to accept such a Zone will be explored here. The United States was opposed to ZOPFAN because it thought that it would be difficult to maintain such a policy. As the Vietnam War had not been concluded, it would isolate American forces in the region and thus prevent such forces from undertaking their military obligations. Further, ZOPFAN would jeopardise the security of the countries in the region.⁵³ But the main American concern was their respective treaties with Thailand and the Philippines. Such uncertainty and lack of clarity, as argued by some scholars, was the mark of American relations with ASEAN during the 1970s, which originated with the 'Nixon' or 'Guam' doctrine.⁵⁴ Such a perception has not changed in the 1990s, due to America's reluctance to support the SEANWFZ.

After the 1976 ASEAN Bali Summit, the U.S. changed its indifferent attitude towards ASEAN. The Americans perceived that, with the adoption of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the ASEAN Concord, the regional organisation had taken a focussed political attitude.

⁵¹See Hans H. Indorf, "Critical Undercurrents in Future: U.S.-ASEAN Relations," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. XII, No. 4, October 1984, pp. 440-460.

⁵²See Norman D. Palmer, "The United States and the Security of Asia," in Sudershan Chawala and D.R. Sardesai, (eds.), *Changing Patterns of Security and Stability in Asia*, New York, 1980, p. 132.

⁵³See Muthiah Alagappa, "U.S.-ASEAN Security Relations: Challenges and Prospects," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 11, No. 1, June 1989, p. 8.

⁵⁴See Chin Kin Wah, "The Reawakening of U.S. Interest in Southeast Asia", in K. K. Nair and Chandran Jeshurum, (eds.), *Southeast Asia and the Great Powers*, Kuala Lumpur, 1980, pp. 120-135. See also reports of interviews in eight East Asian and Pacific Countries undertaken in mid-1981 in Bernard

... footnote cont'd over ...

Initially during the Cambodian conflict, the U.S. did not politically intervene to try to help achieve a resolution. Washington was not actively pursuing a resolution of the conflict but was allowing China, and to a lesser extent ASEAN, to set the agenda. This was primarily due to the post-Vietnam syndrome in the wake of the American withdrawal. One scholar summarises Washington's policy during that crucial period as:

... not a policy but a comfortable holding operation. The United States in effect says to the ASEAN states and China; you lead and we follow; any policy mutually acceptable to you, ... is acceptable to us Certainly it is not an approach designed to lead the United States into serious trouble ... it abrogates vitally needed American leadership.⁵⁵

Hence, ASEAN had to persuade the United States to take an active role in the Kampuchean crisis. Such constant dialogue with the Americans by ASEAN diplomats did manage to change the opinion of the decision-makers in the U.S. ASEAN presented itself as a coherent regional body, thus Washington related to it as a regional body representing the plight of the Cambodians. After the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, Washington's relations with ASEAN were on a regional basis rather than on an individual bilateral basis. Washington understood the political importance of the regional grouping. During this period U.S. security relations took the following forms,

- a) increased and regular dialogue at ministerial and official levels;
- b) exchange of intelligence;
- c) increase in U.S. security assistance;
- d) the initiation of regular and relatively large-scale combined exercises;
- e) increased military-to-military contact;
- f) U.S. support for ASEAN's Cambodia policy; and

K. Gordon and Lloyd R. Vasey, "Security in East Asia-Pacific", in Charles E. Morrison, (ed.), *Threats to Security in East Asia-Pacific*, Lexington, 1983, pp. 33-49.

⁵⁵Douglas Pike, "Southeast Asia and the Superpowers: The Dust Settles," *Current History*, Vol. 82, No. 483, April 1983, pp. 146-147.

g) acceptance and support for U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia by most ASEAN countries.⁵⁶

U.S. military assistance to ASEAN increased during the late 1970s, the direct result of the Kampuchea conflict. Sheldon Simon states that: "U.S. military assistance has been instrumental in providing Thailand with the firepower to resist Vietnamese encroachments along the Thai frontier."⁵⁷

The cornerstone of American security position with ASEAN was the deployment of American forces at its bases on the Philippines.⁵⁸ Further, such deployments were central to American policy to confront the Soviet threat from Cam Ranh Bay. Charles Morrison argues that: "The U.S. presence in the region was regarded as vital to counterbalancing a growing Soviet presence supported from the former U.S. base in Cam Ranh Bay, strategically placed alongside the South China Sea lanes of connecting the Indian and Pacific oceans."⁵⁹ Also, from the bases in the Philippines, America could deploy forces to the Indian Ocean; the Seventh Fleet was stationed in the region as a deterrent to any Soviet threat. During the 1980s, many ASEAN leaders believed that President Ronald Reagan and his Administration were over-emphasising the Soviet threat in the region. As Robert Horn states:

Washington is seen [by some of the ASEAN countries] to have a 'fixation' on the USSR, to attribute far too much of the responsibility for U.S. difficulties and global troubles to the Russians, and to have a world outlook that is over simplified in its harsh anti-Sovietism.⁶⁰

With the closure of its bases, the U.S. cannot respond in a rapid manner as it did in the past. Sheldon Simon argues that: "Without the bases' superb location and repair

⁵⁶Muthiah Alagappa, "U.S.-ASEAN Security Relations: Challenges and Prospects," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 11, No. 1, June 1989, p. 3.

⁵⁷Sheldon W. Simon, "The Great Powers and Southeast Asia: Cautious Minuet or Dangerous Tango?" *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXV, No. 9, 1985, p. 923. Since 1983, the Thai army due to U.S. supply of 155mm howitzers enabled it to repel Vietnamese incursions onto Thai territory.

⁵⁸See Doak A. Barnett, "The Future U.S. Role in East and Southeast Asia," *Pacific Community*, Vol. 8, No. 3, April 1977, p. 406.

⁵⁹Charles Morrison, "US Security Relations with Southeast Asia: Possibilities and Prospects for the Clinton Administration," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 2, October 1993, p. 240.

⁶⁰Robert C. Horn, "Southeast Asian Perceptions of U.S. Foreign Policy," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXV, No. 6, June 1985, p. 685.

facilities, there is no doubt that the size and duration of U.S. deployments in Southeast will be reduced as forces are relocated to the mid-Pacific, Japan, and Alaska."⁶¹ Even the American forward bases in Japan may be withdrawn in the future. The indirect problems which the base closures caused ASEAN countries are quite relevant to this discussion. Singapore volunteered its ports as service facilities to the U.S.⁶² This overture met with strong responses from Indonesia and Malaysia because Singapore had offered its territory to station American forces on a "permanent basis." Malaysia provided the most vocal response to the Singapore offer. The Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, said "our stand is we do not agree if Singapore is to be turned into a permanent U.S. military base. Malaysia is not against the American military using facilities in Singapore for supplies and repairing of warships and planes, but is opposed to the idea of a permanent base."⁶³ Indonesia, since the inception of ASEAN in 1967, wanted the U.S. bases on the Philippines to be closed. This was one of the stumbling blocks in establishing ASEAN, as discussed in Chapter One above. Hence, Singapore's willingness to support the servicing requirements of the Americans and logistics command⁶⁴ was initially met with strong opposition from some of the ASEAN countries. But after it was agreed that only Singapore's port facilities would be used to service American military equipment, there was considerable relief among some countries in the region. In 1992, Malaysia and Indonesia were considering allowing U.S. ships and aircraft to use their servicing facilities.⁶⁵ Such arrangements could be construed as a means to keep U.S. forces deployed in the region in response to potential Chinese aggression.

The end of the Cold War brought with it domestic calls in America for the downgrading of its forward deployment in the Southeast Asian region. President Clinton's foreign policy is subordinated to the need to revitalise the domestic

⁶¹ Sheldon W. Simon, "Regional Security in Structures in Asia: The Question of Relevance," in Sheldon W. Simon, (ed.), *East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era*, New York, 1993, p. 20.

⁶² See Muthiah Alagappa, "U.S.-ASEAN Security Relations: Challenges and Prospects," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 11, No. 1, June 1989, p. 33.

⁶³ "Whistling up a storm," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 31 August 1989, pp. 9-10.

⁶⁴ See "What kind of Defence?" *Time*, 17 May 1993.

⁶⁵ See "Bigger Security Role for ASEAN Likely," *The Straits Times*, 3 April 1992.

economy.⁶⁶ Thus, this has indirectly caused the evolution of an arms race in the region due to the perceived threat from China.

Trade problems between the U.S. and Japan may cause future problems for ASEAN members. Due to American trade friction with Tokyo and domestic sentiments in Japan, the U.S.-Japan alliance may be threatened. It is evident that the American military presence in the region is still required due to many reasons. Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) are only now forming in the region and are still in their infancy. The threat from China is apparent, although it is highly unlikely that China would jeopardise its strong economic ties with various Southeast countries. Also Southeast Asian countries are still not comfortable with a re-emerging Japan in the region. 'Burden-sharing' or 'responsibility sharing' between Japan and America within the confines of the Mutual Security Treaty (MST) is creating a tremendous impact among ASEAN countries. ASEAN members would prefer American forces to remain in the region and not see an increased security role undertaken by Japanese forces.

The post-Cold War environment in Southeast Asia has left Washington without a coherent policy in the region: "The two basic pillars of America's Cold War policy in Asia, economic supremacy and strategic engagement, are both in doubt."⁶⁷ The U.S. is at a cross-roads with regards to its relations with the Southeast Asian region. For the first time in recent history, America has been left with no military installation in Southeast Asia, with the closure of its bases in the Philippines,

Since the end of the Cold War, Washington's relations with ASEAN countries have changed. The U.S. has distanced itself from its closest friends in the regional grouping, namely the Philippines and Thailand, while it is now trying to foster extensive and significant relations with the other members of ASEAN.⁶⁸

ASEAN members are also suspicious of Washington's recent military withdrawal from the region. With the aggressive attitude displayed by China, these

⁶⁶See Sheldon W. Simon, "The Clinton Presidency and Asian Security," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 2, October 1993, p. 250.

⁶⁷*Federal News Service*, 'US Policy After the Cold War Towards Asia and Africa, 17 February, 1993, (Nexis), (On Line).

⁶⁸Norman D. Palmer, "The United States and the Security of Asia," in Sudershan Chawala and D.R. Sardesai, (eds.), *Changing Patterns of Security and Stability in Asia*, p. 130-131.

countries would like to see an increased American presence in the region. to reduce some of the fears of ASEAN countries. The Clinton Administration stated, after the 1994 ASEAN-U.S. dialogue, that the U.S. was still strongly committed to maintaining peace and security in the region,⁶⁹ but what this means in practice is yet to be seen.

Countries in the region maintain that the U.S. presence is still vital for regional security. This view is underlined by Singapore's Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong:

Asia's continued prosperity depends on a stable environment and friendly relations among the region's members that will encourage investment and trade to flow freely. The linchpin for this framework is an America which remains engaged, for a U.S. presence will facilitate more comfortable relationships among China, Japan, Korea, ASEAN and Indochina.⁷⁰

Below is a table which provides details of American security assistance to ASEAN countries from 1976 to 1990:

⁶⁹See *The Straits Times*, 12 May 1994, p. 3

⁷⁰Goh Chok Thong, cited in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 24 June 1993, pp. 24-25.

TABLE 4.1: U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO THE ASEAN COUNTRIES.
(IN MILLION U.S.\$)

Year	IND	MAL	PHIL	SIN	THAI	Total
1976	44.8	17.3	37.0	-	54.9	154.0
1977	39.4	36.3	36.4	-	47.0	159.1
1978	56.3	17.1	36.5	-	37.7	147.6
1979	35.8	8.0	32.0	-	32.3	108.1
1980	32.8	7.3	75.7	-	48.4	164.2
1981	32.3	10.3	75.3	0.01	54.6	172.5
1982	42.3	10.5	51.8	0.05	80.7	185.3
1983	27.3	4.7	52.0	0.05	96.2	176.6
1984	47.3	10.9	51.5	0.06	101.3	211.1
1985	34.8	5.0	41.9	0.05	102.3	184.1
1986	21.1	2.4	102.3	0.05	74.5	200.4
1987	12.1	1.0	102.5	0.05	52.3	167.9
1988	5.8	0.9	127.6	0.05	45.7	180.1
1989	2.8	1.0	127.6	0.05	24.2	155.6
1990	7.0	1.0	202.9	0.05	47.4	258.4

Notes: 1. Security assistance includes IMET, MAP/Grants, and FMS credits. 2. Brunei does not receive any security assistance from the U.S. IND = Indonesia, MAL = Malaysia, PHIL = Philippines, SIN = Singapore, and THAI = Thailand.

Source: Compiled from U.S. Defence Department. Military Aid Transfers, (Various Years). Documents were not available to compute figures for the period, 1991-1995.

On the economic front, the United States and ASEAN have had troubled relations. Due to the competitive nature of some of the ASEAN countries, the U.S. has maintained a trade deficit with the regional group over the years. Further, in the 1980s there was an imbalance in the trade figures. Horn states: "One measure of the asymmetry inherent in this is the interchange of trade between the two sides: while some 15 to 16 per cent of ASEAN's total trade is with the United States, only 5 per cent of

American foreign trade is with ASEAN."⁷¹ Of the ASEAN countries, Singapore is the main trading partner with the U.S.; in 1991, total trade between the two countries was U.S.\$29.24 million.⁷²

With the establishment of APEC, the U.S. is trying to rectify its bilateral economic situation via a multilateral trade agreement with the Asia-Pacific region. APEC is a significant example of the American push towards multilateralism, as beneficial to U.S. interests.

ASEAN RELATIONS WITH CANADA

Canada-ASEAN relations did not develop until the 1970s; the reason for this was the Canadian preoccupation with its own problems and thus its indifference towards relations with most Southeast Asian countries. Formal dialogue between Canada and ASEAN was first entered into in February 1977 after formal contacts were made between Canada and ASEAN in 1974. In March 1974, Canadian Secretary of State for External Relations, Mr Allan MacEachen, wrote to the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak, to inform him of Canada's wishes to extend development aid to ASEAN members.⁷³ Canada has had close and significant relations with Malaysia since the late 1950s via the Commonwealth connection.⁷⁴ At the 1977 meeting in Manila, the following principles were agreed by both parties:

1. the co-operation with ASEAN should not be at the expense of bilateral aid given to each of the members.
2. The projects for co-operation must benefit all members of ASEAN.
3. The projects for co-operation must be of a regional nature.

⁷¹Robert C. Horn, "U.S.-ASEAN Relations in the 1980s," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 6, No. 2, September 1984, p. 128.

⁷²IMF, *Directions of Trade*, Washington, D.C., IMF, 1990. In 1992, ASEAN became the third largest overseas export market for U.S. companies, after the EC and Japan. See *The Straits Times*, 14 March 1992, p. 19.

⁷³See Gerard Hervouet, "Canada and ASEAN: Renewed Interest between Two Distant Partners," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 4, No. 4, March 1983, p. 510.

⁷⁴For more detail about Canada-Malaysia relations see, Richard Stubbs, "Canada's Relations With Malaysia: Picking Partners in ASEAN," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 3, Fall 1990, pp. 351-366.

4. The co-operation should add to ASEAN's potential and should not supplant the Association's capability.⁷⁵

Since such an agreement was signed, little else developed between the two parties, but, due to the Cambodian crisis and the related refugee problem, Canada became aware of the significance of ASEAN and the related regional issues.

In the 1980s, ASEAN developed significant formal dialogue relations with Canada with the ASEAN-Canada Co-operation Agreement signed in September 1981. The provisions of this agreement were to encourage industrial cooperation, investment, taxation, and development cooperation. This shift in Canadian foreign policy was due to domestic economic changes within Canada. Gerard Hervouet states that:

The renewed interest in ASEAN was no doubt a result of the shift in emphasis of the Canadian economy towards its western provinces, and the efforts currently being made by Ottawa towards the Pacific region are inspired more by the business communities of Alberta and British Columbia than those of Toronto or Montreal.⁷⁶

Further, a compounding factor for increased ASEAN-Canada relations would be the increased number of Asian migrants going to Canada's Western provinces, while maintaining their business links with Southeast Asia. Such movement of individuals and capital have not had an immediate impact on Canadian foreign policy. Only in the 1980s did economic relations increase. Since the 1980s Canada has exported fertilisers, petroleum products, newsprint and paper-board, plastics, telecommunications equipment and tools. During this period two way trade between the original five members of ASEAN and Canada grew from 1 billion in 1980 to 1.5 billion in 1986.⁷⁷ ASEAN is a larger export market for Canada than France or Italy. Within ASEAN, Indonesia attracts the bulk of Canadian exports. Canada also provides Official Development Assistance (ODA) to ASEAN countries. This is a leading instrument of

⁷⁵See Douglas Small, "Le Canada et l'ASEAN," *Perspectives Internationales*, March-April 1978. Quoted in Gerard Hervouet, "Canada and ASEAN: Renewed Interest between Two Distant Partners," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 4, No. 4, March 1983, p. 510.

⁷⁶Gerard Hervouet, "Canada and ASEAN: Renewed Interest between Two Distant Partners," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 4, No. 4, March 1983, p. 511.

⁷⁷All these figures are in Canadian dollars. See Martin Rudner and Susan McLellan, "Canada's Economic Relations with Southeast Asia: Federal-Provincial Dimensions of Policy," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1990, p. 33.

Canadian foreign policy in Southeast Asia. Over 10% of Canada's total bilateral official development assistance goes to Southeast Asia.⁷⁸

Recently, Canada has taken an active role in providing the necessary prerequisites for increased membership of ASEAN. Singapore and Canada have started a joint English language training project for officials of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia: "The project is aimed at facilitating the integration of the three countries into ASEAN, as the main language used among the grouping's member states is English."⁷⁹ This can be viewed as an essential positive step to the future expansion of ASEAN.

Canada-ASEAN relations are quite unique as individual provinces within the Canadian federation do have separate relations with ASEAN countries: "Provincial governments have had a record of direct initiatives in international trade promotion for certain specialised product interests of their own, most notably the Western provinces' activities in international agricultural marketing."⁸⁰ As discussed earlier, this has to do with the increased migration of Asians into these provinces, the repercussions due to domestic Canadian policies, and also the multitude of opportunities in the ASEAN region for Canadian economic investments.⁸¹

Further, Canada has played a significant role in trying to establish a new regional security order in Southeast Asia. In 1993, at the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (ASEAN-SOM), Canada put forth two papers dealing with conflict prevention and the proliferation of conventional and nuclear weapons. The ASEAN countries were receptive to the Canadian proposals for regional peace and security. The ARF was an institutional outgrowth of such issues.

At present Canada is actively involved in trying to provide the necessary foundation for a peaceful resolution with regards to the dispute in the South China Sea. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is providing the necessary

⁷⁸See Martin Rudner and Susan McLellan, "Canada's Economic Relations with Southeast Asia: Federal-Provincial Dimensions of Policy," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1990, p. 37.

⁷⁹*The Straits Times*, (Weekly Edition), 5 August, 1995.

⁸⁰See Martin Rudner and Susan McLellan, "Canada's Economic Relations with Southeast Asia: Federal-Provincial Dimensions of Policy," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1990, p. 38.

⁸¹Most Canadian provinces have trade offices abroad, separate from the Federal diplomatic consular posts. For example, British Columbia has offices in Tokyo, Seoul, and Hong Kong. While Ontario and Quebec each have separate regional offices in Singapore.

monetary assistance and legal expertise to run the Secretariat for the South China Sea Informal Group. This Secretariat runs yearly conferences in Indonesia bringing all the claimants and other interested parties together to create a cooperative climate and build confidence among the disputing parties.

ASEAN RELATIONS WITH THE EU (EEC)

As with the other dialogue partners, the EU has undertaken economic, security, and political relations with ASEAN through the years. Initial discussion between the two parties took place in 1971. The EU is ASEAN's oldest dialogue partner. Like Canada, ASEAN's relations with the EU are based on a formal treaty; the ASEAN-EEC Co-operation Agreement signed between the two in Kuala Lumpur in March, 1980. Although the EU is ASEAN's oldest dialogue partner, both have not had good relations due to the EU's condemnation of ASEAN's human rights violations. The other difficulty is that both of these parties are regional organisations, hence it extremely cumbersome to come to a consensus. The other reasons may be due historical legacies; Britain, France, Portugal and the Netherlands were all colonial masters of countries in the region.

Both ASEAN and the EC maintain that the 1994 ASEAN-EU meeting in Karlsruhe, Germany was a turning point in relations between the two parties. That meeting, which was attended by 16 European countries⁸² and the six ASEAN members, showed that the regional grouping was taken seriously by the EU. Both parties realised the importance of each others resources. At that meeting, ASEAN was keen to raise the stake of the EC in its region, so as to not rely totally on Japan or the U.S.⁸³

In 1995, it was decided that ASEAN and the EU had to boost their relations through a Summit which was held in March of 1996 in Thailand. This meeting helped to serve as a platform for greater political and economic ties between the two sides.

⁸²The 12 members of the EC, plus 6 prospective members attended the meeting.

⁸³See *The Straits Times*, 4 October 1994, p. 26.

The EU totally welcomes the creation of APEC and the EAEC. The EU believes that both these two regional groupings will facilitate greater economic market access and create open regionalism.⁸⁴

ASEAN RELATIONS WITH CHINA

China's relations with ASEAN have evolved over time. The formation of ASEAN was partly due to the Southeast Asian regional resolve to stop the spread of Chinese Communism. Hence, the formation of ASEAN was not received warmly in Beijing. As the *Peking Review* noted:

In its Joint Declaration issued on August 8, this alliance of U.S. stooges openly supported the existence of the U.S. military bases in Southeast Asia, not even bothering to make any excuses for them. All this proves that this reactionary association formed in the name of economic cooperation is a military alliance directed specifically against China.⁸⁵

Such a reaction to the formation of ASEAN was due to two significant reasons; first, Chinese perceptions that ASEAN countries were anti-Chinese; second, Beijing perceived that the ASEAN countries were allies of the U.S. and that the formation of the regional organisation was designed to contain China.⁸⁶ Hence, the Chinese thought that the ASEAN states were too friendly with the Americans, who at that period were enemies of China. When ASEAN was formed, four of the five members neither recognised nor had diplomatic relations with China. Only Indonesia had diplomatic relations with Beijing, but such relations severely deteriorated after the 1965 coup attempt, and were officially suspended after the formation of ASEAN.

Beijing changed its attitude towards ASEAN in the late 1960s. After clashes with the Soviet Union and the Brezhnev Doctrine of 1969, coupled with the American Guam Doctrine of the same year, China realised that the Soviet Union was more of a security threat than the United States. Thus, Beijing tried to develop closer relations with ASEAN states.

⁸⁴See "EU 'welcomes APEC and EAEC,'" *The Star*, 27 January 1995, p. 2.

⁸⁵*Peking Review*, Vol. 10, No. 34, 18 August 1967, p. 40.

⁸⁶See Kao Shaw-Fawn, *China and ASEAN's Strategic Interests and Policy Prospects (Vol. I and II)*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Virginia, 1990, p. 46.

Both China and ASEAN have had close relations due to history, migration and geo-politics factors. The historical migration routes took Chinese from mainland China to all the ASEAN countries. Either through normal migration patterns or due to the colonial policy of providing cheap labour to Southeast Asia societies, Chinese have become an integral part of Southeast Asia societies.

When discussing Sino-ASEAN relations, there is a dichotomy within the regional grouping. Indonesia and Malaysia did not enjoy close relations with the PRC. Malaysia maintained that its communist insurgency (the MCP) was aided by the Chinese. This view changed in the early 1970s, when Kuala Lumpur extended diplomatic ties with China. A few months after relations were established between Malaysia and China, Manila announced that it would normalise relations with Beijing. Being a close ally of the United States, Manila waited for a rapprochement between the two before it restabilised relations with China, after the coming to power of the Communists. After the Indochinese debacle and the Communist victory in mid-1975, Thailand normalised its own relations with China. Hence, changing domestic and regional security threats forced some ASEAN members towards accommodating the Chinese side. Due to the perceived involvement of the Chinese in the 1965 coup attempt in Indonesia, Jakarta severed all ties with Beijing. In respecting the views of Indonesia, Singapore also did not have diplomatic relations with China during the 1970s and 1980s. During this period, many scholars have noted that Chinese support for Communist parties in Southeast Asia was ideological in nature rather than material and that there had been a reduction in the provision of arms and training.⁸⁷ The establishment of diplomatic relations with Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand during 1974-75 shows Beijing's changed preference for developing government-to-government relations over exerting its influence through the support of the various communist movements.

As "both China and Vietnam perceive the ASEAN states as erstwhile regional allies against each other,"⁸⁸ both Beijing and Hanoi have courted ASEAN through the

⁸⁷See G.W. Choudhury, "Post-Mao China and the World," *Pacific Community*, No. 2, 1977, p. 249.

⁸⁸Sheldon W. Simon, "China, Vietnam, and ASEAN: The Politics of Polarisation," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XIX, No. 12, December 1979, p. 1181.

years. Beijing placed pressure on Vietnam during the Cambodian conflict based on its pursuit of better relations with ASEAN states.⁸⁹

On political issues, China supported ASEAN's notion of non-interventionism in the Southeast Asian region. The PRC reinforced the ZOPFAN notion in 1971 when it was implemented.⁹⁰ Kao Shaw-Fawn argues: "Although China did not immediately express support for the Declaration, it must have considered its implications: a neutralised Southeast Asia would certainly keep the USSR and the United States from interfering in the affairs of the region, which would be in the interest of China."⁹¹ Hence, Beijing became less hostile towards the ASEAN countries. The beginning of the 1990s saw ASEAN and China drawing closer together, with Indonesia⁹² first and then Singapore and Brunei resuming formal ties. Thus all states in the regional organisation officially recognised the PRC. In 1991, ASEAN extended an invitation to China to attend the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) as a guest. An invitation to join the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was extended in 1993.

Economically, Sino-ASEAN trade was insignificant during the 1970s and 1980s. Imports into ASEAN from China only represented 2.6 per cent of total ASEAN imports.⁹³ On the other hand, China has been importing large amounts of commodities from ASEAN. ASEAN and China have not developed good economic relations because their economies are alike. Herschede contends: "Sino-ASEAN trade is not going to experience a leap forward unless there are changes in the structure and level of technological development in the respective economies as well as deliberate policies to broaden the base of trade partners."⁹⁴ It is only recently that Sino-ASEAN trade

⁸⁹John R. Cooper, "China and Southeast Asia," in Donald E. Weatherbee, (ed.), *Southeast Asia Divided: The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis*, p. 52.

⁹⁰See Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, "Extra-Regional Influences on Regional Cooperation in S.E. Asia," *Pacific Community*, Vol. 8, No. 3, April 1977, p. 418.

⁹¹Kao Shaw-Fawn, *China and ASEAN's Strategic Interests and Policy Prospects (Vol. I and II)*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Virginia, 1990, p. 50.

⁹²China and Indonesia resolved the 'stateless Chinese' problem in 1992. Both signed a Memorandum of Understanding in May 1992. See for example, *The Straits Times*, 6 May and 16 June 1992.

⁹³See Fred Herschede, "Trade Between China and ASEAN: The Impact of the Pacific Rim," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 64, No. 2, Summer 1991, p. 181.

⁹⁴*ibid.*, p. 192.

relations has developed.⁹⁵ The main stumbling block was Indonesia's reluctance to resume official relations with the PRC.

After the economic restructuring of the late 1970s, built on the Four Modernisations Programme, China is now experiencing good growth rates. China's official leader at that time, Deng Xiaoping, brought about economic liberalisation measures to try to correct the mistakes of Chairman Mao Zedong. China has maintained trade ties with various ASEAN countries at different levels.

A related aspect in the economic sphere between China and ASEAN is the concern that the PRC is competing with the respective countries for more international trade and investment to sustain its growth. The other factor that is worrisome to some members of ASEAN is the notion of a 'Chinese Economic Sphere' in the region. As Lee Lai To argues: "In that connection, the talk of forming some kind of economic circle or community that would include Taiwan, mainland China, Hong Kong, Macao, and even Singapore and other "overseas" Chinese to promote economic cooperation would cause misgivings among the non-Chinese in the region, particularly those who want to branch into the China market."⁹⁶ Some ASEAN scholars maintain that "there is a serious and lingering apprehension among ASEAN members that Chinese trade corporations establish sincere economic relations only with firms operated by overseas Chinese residing in Southeast Asia or ASEAN citizens of Chinese origin."⁹⁷ Such apprehension is basically visible in Malaysian and Indonesian attitudes. Such a 'sphere' is highly unlikely to be formed, due to the tensions that it would cause with the countries which are excluded from such a grouping.

ASEAN as a whole only recently has developed fruitful relations with China. Total enhancement of such a relationship depends on the unresolved sovereignty issue of the Spratly Islands. This will be discussed in Chapter Five below.

⁹⁵See "Sino-ASEAN Choice: Co-operation and Progress," *Beijing Review*, Vol. 35, No. 31, 3-9 August 1992, p. 4.

⁹⁶Lee Lai To, "ASEAN-PRC Political and Security Cooperation: Problems, Proposals, and Prospects," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 11, November 1993, p. 1097.

⁹⁷Fred Herschede, "Trade Between China and ASEAN: The Impact of the Pacific Rim," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 64, No. 2, Summer 1991, p. 191.

SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS

ASEAN has cultivated and maintained a significant dialogue partnership process with its extra-regional actors. It has endeavoured to create a multifunctional relationship with its respective dialogue partners. The ASEAN Dialogue Partnership Scheme "has been conducive in raising the profile and status of ASEAN in an international context."⁹⁸ ASEAN has exploited such links with other countries well.

Japan has been used by ASEAN countries as an aid-giver and as an export market for its raw materials. Tokyo respected the views of the ASEAN countries and took pains to develop and mature its relations with the regional grouping. From a slow beginning, Japan has now become the most important dialogue partner for ASEAN. The Japanese caution in its relations with the ASEAN members was due to its own 'war guilt.' Such war guilt is slowly disappearing with the emergence of a new generation of Japanese policy-makers.

The American military presence in the region, although not actively solicited, brought needed stability for the ASEAN members. Such stability encouraged these states to undertake economic development. With the end of the stationing of American military personnel and equipment in the Philippines, ASEAN countries have moved towards initiatives to establish a new regional order to guarantee their own security in the region

Australia, based on the FPDA with Malaysia and Singapore, is helping to guarantee security for the region. Canberra's active involvement in resolving the Kampuchean problem did enrage some members of ASEAN which thought that ASEAN should control the conflict resolution process.

ASEAN relations with the EU have been turbulent at times, due to the European insistence that these countries in Southeast Asia should not tolerate human rights violations. In recent times, EC-ASEAN relations have matured and these two parties have come to a common understanding of minimal interference in the domestic affairs of ASEAN states.

⁹⁸Hans C. Blomqvist, "ASEAN as a Model for Third World Regional Economic Co-operation," *ASEAN Economic Bulletin*, Vol. 10, No. 1, July 1993, p. 58.

Canada's relations with ASEAN are progressing at a steady rate. The future may see the Western provinces of the Canadian federation develop closer economic relations with Southeast Asia via ASEAN.

China-ASEAN relations may be tested in the near future with the dispute over the Spratly Islands. Claims and counter-claims by four of the present members of ASEAN and China of these islands in the South China Sea may have significant impact for both the ASEAN claimants and for China.

Thus, based on the ADPS, ASEAN has networked into the regional and global arenas. Such networking has provided ASEAN the necessary regional and international exposure, which has helped it lay strong foundations for economic and political development. Further, such links have been used for conflict management in the past and will be an asset for future resolution.

The question has to be posed; what is the main significance of these various dialogue relationships and their impact on intra-ASEAN decision making? What can be drawn this Chapter is that ASEAN as a whole and respective members within ASEAN have significant relations with other countries.

Although the members within ASEAN may have different agendas in their relations with other countries, these agendas could not be outside the foreign policy perimeters of the Association and also of other members. The prime example which was discussed in this Chapter was Singapore's stance that it would host American military forces after the United States shut down its operations in the Philippines. Both Malaysia and Indonesia were adamant this should not happen. Further, Singapore failed to comprehend that such a move was in contradiction of the 1967 Bangkok Declaration. Hence, again as discussed in the final section of the previous chapter, the common denominator for ASEAN's relations with its dialogue partners is the avoidance of contradicting the foreign policies of each member. In other words, ASEAN's policy platform as a regional organisation is primarily based on a composition of each member's domestic and foreign policy. Although, this brings about unity for ASEAN, it does not enhance flexibility and strength in relations with dialogue partners.

It can be argued that trade issues between ASEAN and its dialogue partners have been thrust upon the organisation by Singapore. Singapore's policy of global and regional trade has brought ASEAN as a whole to have regulated policies with its

dialogue partners. As increased trade has brought a certain amount of prosperity to the region, there has been little disagreement among ASEAN member countries.

Tensions between states in their respective dialogue relations with other countries do occur. Such tensions do usually happens when member countries unilaterally decide on a policy that may infringe on other member's foreign or domestic policy. Examples have been discussed in this Chapter. Tensions between members usually do not last long. Again as discussed in Chapter Three above, ASEAN unity always prevails. Regional policies are usually drafted with respect to individual ASEAN member's domestic and foreign policies in mind. When there is a contradiction, musjawarah diplomacy is brought to bear on the decision.

Though such a dialogue system has maintained links with the so-called "outside world", outside linkages is not an importance source of influence within the regional grouping. Although ASEAN does make some concessions when some of its policies are frowned upon by other countries, it seldom backs down from controversial issues. The next Chapter will look at the issue of constructive engagement that has brought international criticism of ASEAN. Outside linkages have not influenced ASEAN to change its regional policies.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE POST-COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT AND ASEAN

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War brought about a complex set of dynamics in the regional and global arenas. The Southeast Asian region, which was a major Cold War frontier between the superpowers, was one of the early recipients of the benefits of the conclusion of the Cold War. The main dispute in the region at the time, the Kampuchean conflict, came to an end in 1991 with the Paris Peace Agreement and as such marked a new phase of political development within the region.

Although superpower dynamics have been altered in the region, the economic and strategic importance of Southeast Asia has remained unchanged. In 1980, Morrison and Astri Suhrike argued: "This region's strategic importance derives from its geographical location, as it commands the sea routes between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and its rich natural resources of tin, petroleum, and timber."¹ This central importance has not changed and ASEAN, being the only regional body in the area, has become a key player in the post-Cold War era. Hence, as Jusuf Wanandi now argues: "ASEAN must take the lead because it is the only regional grouping in Asia with the authority and ability to do so."²

The post-Cold War era has seen a global move towards multilateralism in the areas of trade and security, and this phenomenon is also taking place in the Asia-Pacific region. With regard to Southeast Asia, the divide between communist and non-

¹Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrike, "ASEAN in Regional Defence and Development," in Sudershan Chawala and D.R. Sardesai, (eds.) *Changing Patterns of Security and Stability in Asia*, New York, 1980, p. 192.

²Jusuf Wanandi, "Securing Asia's Future," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 15 July 1993, p. 23. Also see "Call for ASEAN to lead in Asia-Pacific," *The Straits Times*, 28 September 1994, p. 15.

communist states has blurred with the inclusion of Vietnam as the seventh member of ASEAN.

An added dimension in the region is the evolution and development of an Asia-Pacific community. This will have significant future implications for ASEAN in particular. As Ganesan argues:

Whereas the collapse of the ASEAN-Indochina divide and state-centrism have reordered inter-state relations in Southeast Asia, attempts to realise an Asia-Pacific community have broader implications, as such a project would challenge the geographical political utility of treating Southeast Asia as a sub-system.³

If the regional delineations are blurring the demarcations of specific regions in Asia, the situation could diminish the importance or the dominant role ASEAN plays in Southeast Asia. A prime example of the evolution of an Asia-Pacific community is the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Therefore, there is some justification for Prime Minister Mahathir's insistence on the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC), as such a grouping would not dilute the importance of the East Asian countries in a larger Asia-Pacific community.

Since the late 1980s, ASEAN's role in the region has been changing rapidly. The establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Vietnam's inclusion as a member and other security and economic trends have centred global attention on the Southeast Asian region. The work of ASEAN towards securing peace in the region has created the necessary foundations for changes to occur in the region. Even though the Cambodian conflict was far from being resolved, some members of ASEAN had developed trade relations with Vietnam prior to 1991.⁴ The post Cold-War period also has seen the increase in interaction between 'pro-Western' and pro-Communist countries. The attractiveness of being part of ASEAN has drawn Indochinese countries nearer to this

³N. Ganesan, "Taking Stock of Post-Cold War Developments in ASEAN," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1994, p. 457.

⁴For a discussion of military relations between ASEAN members and Vietnam, See Carlyle A. Thayer, *Beyond Indochina*, Adelphi Paper No. 297, IISS, London, July 1995, pp. 41-45. As of August 1994, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia have in total invested US\$1.51 billion in Vietnam. The figure is calculated from Vietnam State Committee for Cooperation and investment statistics quoted in Carlyle A. Thayer, *Beyond Indochina*, Adelphi Paper No. 297, IISS, London, July 1995, p. 52, Table 1.

regional grouping. These countries, together with China and Russia, have increasingly been accepted by ASEAN.⁵ The end of the Cold War and the Gulf Crisis brought to the forefront the need for ASEAN to evolve into a more structured security and political body. The push for greater participation and to encourage new membership was tremendous.⁶

POST-COLD WAR IMPACT ON ASEAN

As the Cold War ended, it took along with it the existing patterns of established superpower relations. The present era of relative peace and stability has been marked with the implosion of the former Soviet Union, the withdrawal of Soviet influence, the American reduction of its military presence in the region, the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, and China's warmer relations with Vietnam and South Korea. The land-based threat to Thailand and the region from Vietnam came to an end officially in 1991. Such events not only decreased the security tensions in the region, but also provided the stable environment for new and innovative regional and global relations to take root.

The demise of communism in the Soviet Union and Moscow's termination of close relations with its former allies in the South East Asian region brought about an end to internal communist rebellions. The threat of internal communist insurgencies had come to an end. Richard Stubbs maintains that:

This change in the security environment of the region was best symbolised by the signing in December 1989 of agreements between the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and the Thai government and the CPM and the Malaysian government that formally ended the 41-year armed struggle against the Malaysian government.⁷

⁵See Bilveer Singh, "The Challenge of the Security Environment in Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 2, October 1993, p. 269.

⁶See Michael Vatikiotis, "Time to Rethink," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 21 March 1991, pp. 18-19. Michael Vatikiotis, "Brave New World," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 30 January 1992, pp. 19-20. Jusuf Wanandi, "Looming Challenge for ASEAN," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 January 1992, p. 15.

⁷Richard Stubbs "Subregional Security Cooperation in ASEAN: Military and Economic Integration and Political Obstacles," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXII, No. 5, May 1992, p. 399.

One clear exception to the decrease in domestic insurgence is in the Philippines, where the New People's Army (NPA) and the Moro National Liberation Front are still engaging the Philippines.⁸

Territorial disputes are still present in the Post-Cold War and have taken on a new dimension due to realignments in the region. One of the main security threats in the region is the Spratly Islands dispute. Contradicting claims and Chinese adventurism with regards to the Spratlys have and may cause problems in the near future. As four members of ASEAN are either partial or whole claimants of the Islands, or the territorial waters surrounding some of the islands, this problem will be explored extensively later in this Chapter.

One of the prominent characteristics of the post-Cold War environment is the concerted movement by countries in the Asian region with pressure from extra-regional countries to move towards multilateral security arrangements. The flood of multilateral options in the region can be traced to the Gorbachev Initiative Speech in Vladivostok in 1986.⁹

A clear example of this is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF formula took shape at the ASEAN-PMC Senior Officials Meeting held in Singapore in May 1992; at that meeting, "the participating countries focused exclusively on regional political and security questions."¹⁰ The other outcome of the meeting was the institutionalisation of the ASEAN-PMC as the preferred mechanism for conflict resolution.¹¹ Ganesan maintains that "the PMC constitutes a genuine attempt by ASEAN to address post-Cold War security issues in Southeast Asia."¹²

The partial American military withdrawal from the region has had repercussions for the ASEAN members. The US still has military bases in South Korea, Japan and Guam. The end of the Cold War and the reduction or even elimination of the

⁸See *ibid.*

⁹See Paul M. Evans, "Managing Security Relations After the Cold War: Prospects for the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. XXII, No. 1, First Quarter, 1994, p. 63.

¹⁰*The Straits Times*, 18 July, 1993, p. 43.

¹¹See Singapore Declaration of 1992 (ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting Press Release), p. 2.

¹²N. Ganesan, "Taking Stock of Post-Cold War Developments in ASEAN," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1994, p. 461.

superpower presence in the ASEAN region encouraged the ASEAN members to take a more assertive role in regional and international politics. ASEAN has become more autonomous and less dependent on external security guarantees. As argued by Bilveer Singh: "This is mainly to fill a seeming vacuum and a reflection of the increasing assertiveness of the countries in ASEAN in wanting to take their destinies into their own hands."¹³

ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF)

The need for a multilateral security forum was discussed in 1991, and it was decided that the existing ASEAN-PMC¹⁴ should be used as the appropriate body. As Desmond Ball maintains, the rationale of using the PMC as the security forum is that "it was already an institutionalised mechanism, and that it was practicable to extend it in membership, to include other Asia/Pacific countries and its agenda, to include regional political/security issues."¹⁵ Thus, it was agreed at the Kuala Lumpur AMM in July 1991 to have the ASEAN-PMC as the founding base to address regional security issues.¹⁶ It is at this body that the need for the creation of a separate regional forum to address the many regional problems was decided.¹⁷ Following the ASEAN summit in Singapore in January 1992, regional security was placed on the ASEAN-PMC agenda.¹⁸ The 1992 summit was the first time the leaders of the ASEAN member states gathered after the changes that flowed from the end of the Cold War. The 1992 Singapore summit is

¹³Bilveer Singh, "The Challenge of the Security Environment in Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 2, October 1993, p. 267.

¹⁴PMC is ASEAN's Post-Ministerial Conference, held after AMM at two levels, that is, individually (the so-called 7+1), and collectively (7+7). As mentioned in the previous Chapter above, the 7 dialogue partners are Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, United States of America, Canada, and the EU.

¹⁵Desmond Ball, "A New Era in Confidence Building: The Second-track Process in the Asia/Pacific Region," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1994, p. 167.

¹⁶*Joint Communique of the Twenty Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting*, Kuala Lumpur, 19-20 July 1991, p. 5.

¹⁷This decision was taken at the first ASEAN SOM (Senior Officials Meeting which was within the ASEAN-PMC) in May 1993. It was agreed that the first ASEAN Regional Forum should meet in July 1994, Bangkok, after the AMM and the PMC.

¹⁸See *The Straits Times*, 25 July 1992.

considered a watershed, as security issues were discussed and also the ASEAN Heads of Government meeting was institutionalised to meet every three years.¹⁹

In a 1993 ASEAN-PMC meeting, the United States expressed support for ASEAN's efforts to draw Russia and China into a security forum - the ASEAN Regional Forum.²⁰ The 18 members of the group included the ASEAN members, its dialogue partners and China, Russia, Vietnam, Laos, and Papua New Guinea. Hence, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was inaugurated in July 1993 at the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference.²¹ The ARF is a significant and visible by-product of the demise of the Cold War in the Asia-Pacific region. During the Cold War, the ideological dichotomy between East and West would have been a major obstacle towards the emergence of such a regional consultative body. Habib argues:

The ARF was basically the realisation of the changing political-security landscape and the emerging willingness of the United States to search for new political-security architectures, including multilateral security forums to which it has been an avenue before, contributed to a growing awareness and resolve within ASEAN that the Association must respond to the changes, and building on its achievements strengthen peace and stability in the region.²²

The ARF may also be perceived as a broader security forum to try to encompass the entire Asia Pacific region. At present, ASEAN, the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) formed in 1980, and the South Pacific Forum (SPF), established in 1971, are the main vehicles for security cooperation among countries in the region. There was a need to bring the interested countries together under one structure.

¹⁹Prior to the Singapore summit, the Heads of Government had only met in 1976, 1977, and 1987.

²⁰See *Agence France Press*, (On line), (Nexis), 24 July 1993. The discussion of ASEAN undertaking security issues were discussed extensively at this ASEAN-PMC meeting. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 3 June 1993, p. 18; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 15 July 1993, p. 23; *The Straits Times*, 18 July 1993, p. 6; *The Sunday Times*, 18 July 1993, pp. 1 and 6.

²¹All in all 18 countries, in August 1995, the inclusion of Cambodia increased the number to 19. The absence of India and North Korea may cause future problems for this infant consultative body.

²²A. Hasnan Habib, "The Post-Cold War Political-Security Landscape of the Asia-Pacific Region," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. XXII, No. 1, First Quarter, 1994, p. 57.

Although the initiative for the ARF came from non-ASEAN countries²³, ASEAN claims parentage of the forum because its own AMM provides a convenient venue and also because it represents and replicates a successful approach to achieving stability.²⁴ The ARF informality suits the Asian way of consensus-building and causal diplomacy. Tommy Koh argues:

The Asian preference, unlike the Western preference, is to take a very non-legalistic approach to things. We take actions step by step and allow things to evolve, rather than to sit down *a priori*, we want to create an institution, this is our character, this is our mission statement.²⁵

China's inclusion in the ARF was basically to engage it in constructive diplomacy. This can be considered as the same form of constructive engagement between ASEAN and Myanmar. But in forming the ARF, ASEAN wants China, the dominant regional actor, to be part of a consultative regional body. Also, as Michael Antolik suggests, "ASEAN's foundation required an accommodation between a dominant regional state, Indonesia, and the others in the region, today the region must incorporate China."²⁶ China indicated in 1993 that it was ready to be part of bilateral and multilateral security forums.²⁷

Another reason for ASEAN's interest in the ARF is the formation of APEC. Malaysia believes that APEC would fully mature and would eventually assimilate security issues within its mandate. This, they maintain, would overshadow the functioning of ASEAN as the main regional grouping.²⁸ Hence, ASEAN needs the ARF as a vehicle to channel security issues in the region.²⁹ Further, as Singapore's Foreign

²³Proposals for the ARF came from Australia, Canada the U.S.

²⁴See Michael Antolik, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: The Spirit of Constructive Engagement," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 2, September 1994, p. 118.

²⁵Quoted in Steven Holmes, "US Seeking New Asian Trade and Security Links," *New York Times*, 17 August 1993.

²⁶Michael Antolik, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: The Spirit of Constructive Engagement," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 2, September 1994, p. 118.

²⁷See "China Ready to Take Part in Asian Security Dialogues," *Beijing Review*, August 9, 1993, pp. 8-9.

²⁸See N. Ganesan, "Taking Stock of Post-Cold War Developments in ASEAN," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1994, p. 463.

²⁹See Michael Antolik, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: The Spirit of Constructive Engagement," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 2, September 1994, p. 120.

Minister Wong Kang Seng maintains, "If we in ASEAN do not move fast and stay ahead of developments we will be sidelined."³⁰

Further, Indonesia, which always refrained from security issues within the ASEAN environment, underwent a change in its foreign policy platform. The Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, stated, "Security and political issues are now going to be increasingly discussed. Such dialogue will contribute to better understanding and enhanced security."³¹

This change in Jakarta's stance on security issues is primarily due to the 'China factor' and Indonesia's regional concerns that China will fill the power vacuum left behind by the U.S. and the former Soviet Union in the region. But, on the eve of announcing the formation of the ARF, Ali Alatas changed Jakarta's approach to the situation and did not think that a multilateral institutional framework needed immediate attention.³² However, ultimately a consensus was attained. Michael Antolik states: "In the end, the naming of the forum after ASEAN and the use of the simplest format, a forum, represented an accommodation of concerns about institutionalisation and ASEAN's role."³³

External actors wanted the Southeast Asian states to take an active role in providing their own security. Both Japan and America wanted to see such a security forum fostered in the region. Washington had changed its foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region from one of bilateralism of the 1970s and 1980s, to the multilateralism of the 1990s.³⁴ Tokyo was anxious to ensure that a stable security structure emerged from the post-Cold War traumas.

³⁰"ASEAN: Security, Trade Top of Agenda of Foreign Ministers' Meet," *Inter Press Service*, 29 July 1995, (On Line), (Nexis).

³¹"Worries about China," *Asiaweek*, 7 August 1992, p. 21.

³²After the first ARF meeting, Ali Alatas insisted that the ARF was a strictly a consultative body and not a should be turned into a multilateral; platform to resolve security problems. See *The Straits Times*, 27 July 1994, p. 11.

³³Michael Antolik, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: The Spirit of Constructive Engagement," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 2, September 1994, p. 120.

³⁴See David P. Rapkin, "Leadership and Cooperative Institutions," in Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill (eds.) *Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region*, Boulder, 1995, p. 111.

At the Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) level, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP)³⁵ was also launched to complement ARF diplomacy. This is a second-track dialogue process for academics to discuss security matters within the Asia-Pacific region in support of the workings of the ARF.

The main goals and expectations of the ARF were outlined in its Chairman's statement in 1995. That statement made it clear that the ARF was a security body that wants to maintain stability via consultations and it also recognises the concept of comprehensive security for the region.³⁶ ASEAN's own security initiatives could be used within the confines of the ARF. It can be argued that ZOPFAN would be a practical tool to be fostered within the ARF; as Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas explained, "the United States, Russia, Japan and China are the four pillars of ZOPFAN."³⁷ While the U.S. and Japan are already dialogue partners with ASEAN and Russia seems to be less aggressive, the inclusion of China within the ARF framework completes the possibility of developing a ZOPFAN. China has been a regional actor that has had close ties with some of the ASEAN members since the early 1970s. And in the late 1970s China was involved with Thailand in trying to force Vietnam out of Cambodia. But only in the mid-1990s, with the establishment of official ties with Indonesia and then Singapore, can China be viewed as a true non-adversary in the region. As Singapore's former Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, now Senior Minister, has mentioned: "If you have a China out to make mischief, that increases the costs. Why

³⁵The concept for CSCAP was first articulated at a meeting in Seoul on 1-3 November 1992. CSCAP is under the auspicious of research institutions of the member states. The ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies include ISIS (Malaysia); Singapore Institute of International Affairs, (SIIA) (Singapore); ISIS (Thailand); and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Indonesia. Strategic Defence Studies Centre, ANU, Australia; University of Toronto-York University, Joint Centre for Asia-Pacific Studies, Canada; Japan Institute for International Affairs, Japan; The Seoul Forum for International Affairs, Republic of Korea; Institute for Defence and Development Studies, Philippines; and Public Forum/CSIS, United States of America. For detailed analysis of the evolution of CSCAP see, Paul M. Evans, "Managing Security Relations After the Cold War: Prospects for the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. XXII, No. 1, First Quarter, 1994, pp. 62-70; Desmond Ball, "The New Era in Confidence Building: The Second-track Process in the Asia/Pacific Region," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1994, pp. 169-172.

³⁶See *The Chairman's Statement of the Second ASEAN Regional Forum*, 1 August 1995, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, p. 2.

³⁷*The Straits Times*, 29 July 1990, p. 12.

not hoist this fellow on board?"³⁸ In that instance Lee was probably referring to China's claims to the Spratlys. His argument stresses the point that the region, instead of confronting the PRC, should try to accommodate it. In 1994, the ARF meeting only addressed one significant issue; that of Asia-Pacific security, its challenges, opportunities, and confidence-building measures in the context of preventive diplomacy.³⁹ At that meeting, the 18 members endorsed ASEAN's treaty of Amity and Cooperation as a code of conduct for governing relations between members.⁴⁰

Although the ARF has many positive features, one of the main drawbacks of it is the diverse nature of the consultative body itself. Ganesan argues that:

The most obvious liability of the ARF is that macro-regional security fora are unlikely to be able to deal with the specifics of regional dynamics, as these are often quite discrete and independent of external considerations.⁴¹

Also the other problem is that other countries may grow extremely impatient with the way ASEAN undertakes discussion in decisions within the ARF. ASEAN's consensual decision-making process will prevent the ARF from becoming a structured body. It will never develop into an executive body that has the ability to resolve conflicts. Dewi Anwar Fortuna asserts that the responsibility of maintaining regional order should be undertaken by sub-regional bodies within the ARF and believes that the ARF may be renamed in the future with a new structure and that ASEAN could be a body within the ARF.⁴²

Multilateralism was not a common form of relationship in the Asia-Pacific region. But it seems that the emergence of the ARF is helping to build a unified community in the Asia-Pacific region. The former Australian Minister for Foreign

³⁸House and Lehner, "Singapore's Lee Says the Time Has Come to Treat China as a Partner and Not a Pariah," *Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly*, 15 November 1993, p. 3. Also Interview of Lee Kuan Yew by the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 18 November 1993, pp. 18-19.

³⁹See *The Straits Times (Overseas Edition)*, 16 July 1994, p. 12.

⁴⁰See *The Straits Times*, 26 July 1994, p. 1.

⁴¹N. Ganesan, "Taking Stock of Post-Cold War Developments in ASEAN," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1994, p. 461.

⁴²Interview with Dewi Anwar Fortuna, Head, Regional and International Affairs Division, Centre for Political and Regional Studies, Indonesian Institute of Science (PWW-LIPI), 2.30 p.m. 20 January 1996, Jakarta, Indonesia.

Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, commented after the first ARF meeting that: "What we are beginning to see is the development of a consciousness of community, with a small 'c', a sense of an Asia-Pacific community..."⁴³

THE IMPACT OF THE ARF

The establishment of the ARF brought to the forefront ASEAN as an organisation that can provide the norms and functional structure to deal with regional actors like Russia, Japan, and China. Michael Antolik states: "They [ASEAN states] have come to balance and engage established enemies and potential antagonists and, in so doing, they have laid down the principles, norms, and rules of a security regime."⁴⁴ ASEAN's role in the region, from helping to resolve the Cambodian conflict to bringing old enemies like China and Vietnam together, does guarantee its position as important and the foremost element of the ARF.

The nearest the ARF has come to sort of formalisation is with adoption of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) as a code of conduct for the member countries.⁴⁵ Thus, the treaty also now applies to the non-ASEAN countries. It applies as a code of conduct but, these countries have not endorsed the TAC. Indonesia was reluctant to have other countries to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, because of future conflict-resolution problems.⁴⁶

Void of a formal structure, the ARF can accommodate to the changes of a post-Cold War region with a changing environment: "Rather than focussing on problem-solving or negotiations, the ASEAN Regional Forum stands on the pragmatic benefits of preventive diplomacy: constructive engagement will foster understanding, confidence,

⁴³*The Straits Times*, 4 August 1994, p. 2.

⁴⁴Michael Antolik, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: The Spirit of Constructive Engagement," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 2, September 1994, p. 133.

⁴⁵This was decided at the first ARF meeting in Bangkok, 1994.

⁴⁶Edy Prasetyono argues that Indonesia does not want extra-regional countries to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), as these countries may try to enforce the notion of 'High Council' to resolve regional problems. If these countries sign the TAC it will have serious implications for ASEAN Interview with Edy Prasetyono, Researcher, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, Indonesia, 2.30 p.m, 31 January 1996.

and stability."⁴⁷ The informal structure does lead to the creation of constructive proposals to deal with security matters in a region which is based on cultural, political, strategic and social diversities.

At the June 1995 ARF meeting it was agreed that due to its infancy, a consolidation period is needed before new members would be admitted. Countries like India, the UK, and France want to be members of the ARF.⁴⁸ In a turnaround of policy, at the ARF meeting in July 1996, both Myanmar and India became members.⁴⁹

GROWTH IN ASEAN MEMBERSHIP

The key turning point for future potential increase in membership in ASEAN was the revolutionary changes that took place in the former Soviet Union and also the Paris Peace Agreement of 1991. Both these aspects brought the Indochinese and ASEAN states nearer and blurred the East-West divide. Sukhumbhand Paribatra maintains that, although the Paris Peace Plan did not bring comprehensive peace for Cambodia,

it did mean that Vietnam, the country around which the question of regional peace and war had revolved since 1945, ceased to be the central arena, the primary cause or the prime mover of conflict and tension in the region.⁵⁰

With the end of the conflict and the break-up of the Soviet Union, the stage was set for the establishment of official diplomatic and trade ties by ASEAN members with the Indochinese countries. Some countries within ASEAN had unofficially created economic relations with Vietnam in 1989, when it became apparent that a peace settlement would be brokered in the near future. Since then, ASEAN members have

⁴⁷Michael Antolik, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: The Spirit of Constructive Engagement," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 2, September 1994, p. 134.

⁴⁸See "Regional Security: Where are we going," *Insight*, 5 September 1995, p. 9. Both France and the UK want to be members in their own right and not be just represented by the EU.

⁴⁹See *The Straits Times (Overseas Edition)*, 27 July 1996, p. 14. The ARF now has 21 members. But more importantly, the inclusion of Myanmar in the ARF, brings it closer to becoming a member of ASEAN in the near future.

⁵⁰Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "From ASEAN Six to ASEAN Ten: Issues and Prospects," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 3, December 1994, p. 245.

established relations with the military government in Burma (Myanmar) as well. ASEAN's official position on such relations is known as 'constructive engagement.'

CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT

At the ASEAN Foreign Minister's Meeting in Bangkok, in 1992, Myanmar participated as an observer, via an invitation extended by Thailand. Myanmar's presence at the meeting was construed by many extra-regional countries as legitimising the military regime of that country. ASEAN tried to deflect some of the criticism by maintaining that Myanmar was invited as a guest of Thailand and not of the regional grouping.⁵¹ The United States, the European Community and Australia all opposed the presence of Myanmar at the Meeting.⁵²

ASEAN ministers believed that inviting Myanmar to the ASEAN meeting was within the notion of constructive engagement. Michael Antolik states that: "Constructive engagement implies that states with differences and conflicts of interests are, nonetheless, committed to consultations and will follow agreed upon norms and rules."⁵³ Further, it can be elaborated: "The constructive engagement approach involves encouraging Myanmar to modify policies through frequent contacts and quiet diplomacy rather than isolating it or imposing economic sanctions."⁵⁴ Thus relations with Myanmar were encouraged so as to bring it into the fold and to speed up economic and political reforms. This is contrary to the view of the majority of countries which basically placed Myanmar in quarantine because of the regime's human rights violations. ASEAN believes that constructive engagement with Myanmar has met with much success.⁵⁵

⁵¹See *The Straits Times (Overseas Weekly Edition)*, 30 April 1994.

⁵²See "ASEAN Rejects EC attempt to isolate Yangon," *The Straits Times*, 28 July 1993, p. 22. Also see, *The Australian*, 21 July 1994. To establish the American position, US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher did not attend the ASEAN-PMC and the ARF meeting that were held after the regular ASEAN meeting.

⁵³Michael Antolik, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: The Spirit of Constructive Engagement," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 2, September 1994, p. 124. Also see *The Straits Times*, 9 May 1994, p. 17. In this article ASEAN stated that it would refuse the implementation of certain prerequisite conditions before maintaining constructive engagement with Myanmar.

⁵⁴"Bangkok and Jakarta reaffirm ASEAN's policy on Myanmar," *The Straits Times*, 25 February 1994, p. 16.

⁵⁵See "ASEAN policy towards Myanmar 'a success,'" *The Sunday Times*, July 24 1994, p. 13.

This notion of constructive engagement is a basic tenet within intra-ASEAN relations and ASEAN relations with China and Myanmar and is enshrined in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord endorsed in 1976.⁵⁶ The Concord states: "the basis of mutually advantageous relationships, and in accordance with the principle of self-determination, sovereignty, equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of nations."⁵⁷ This is the argument used by ASEAN states as the rationale for inviting leaders from China even after the Tianamen Square incident.

ASEAN's constructive engagement with Myanmar, which ASEAN leaders believe has been successful, has convinced some Western states to soften their respective stance that isolating Myanmar would dispose the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) of Burma to be more liberal. Thai Foreign Ministry spokesman, Suvidhya Simasakal, stated after the 1994 ASEAN-PMC in Bangkok that "several dialogue partners - the U.S., European Union, Australia, Canada, Japan and South Korea - had agreed isolation was not the answer."⁵⁸ But even after the inaugural ARF meeting in Thailand after the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, Australia still insisted that Myanmar should not have been invited to the meeting.

Further, domestic Burmese response by the opposition leader, Ms Aung San Suu Kyi, asserts that constructive engagement has not helped Myanmar: "I (Ms Aung San Suu Kyi) think it has to be recognised that constructive engagement doesn't work and also a Burma led by a regime like SLORC is not going to be an asset to ASEAN."⁵⁹ Such internal and external criticisms of ASEAN policy of "constructive engagement" will have a tremendous impact on the issue of Burma becoming a member of ASEAN. At the recent ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in July 1996 Myanmar has been given official ASEAN "observer status".⁶⁰

⁵⁶See Michael Antolik, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: The Spirit of Constructive Engagement," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 2, September 1994, p. 129.

⁵⁷See Appendix F for the Declaration.

⁵⁸"West learns how Asian ways help," *New Straits Times*, 28 July 1994, p. 21. Also see "Softer Line on Myanmar Follows ASEAN Talks," *The Australian*, 28 July 1994, p. 8. Before the 1994 ASEAN-PMC, the U.S. respected ASEAN's formula for constructive engagement with Myanmar, but it preferred to isolate it. See, *The Straits Times*, 4 May 1994, p. 4.

⁵⁹"Sun Kyi criticises ASEAN policy," *The Australian*, 28 May 1996, p. 2.

⁶⁰It became a member in July of 1997.

The other major issue that came out of the meeting (ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, Bangkok, 1992), was the confirmation that Vietnam⁶¹ would become a full member by the end of 1995. Rapid improvement in ASEAN-Vietnam relations established the necessary foundations for Hanoi's entry into ASEAN. Significantly, Vietnam was backed by Indonesia, a key ASEAN voice.

With the promise that Vietnamese forces would withdraw from Cambodia by September 1989, there was talk about welcoming Vietnam into the ASEAN fold. However, there was major disagreement within ASEAN on the speed at which Vietnam would become a full member within the regional grouping.⁶² Both Malaysia and Indonesia were strong supporters of having Vietnam within ASEAN. The Malaysian Prime Minister stated that "if Vietnam subscribes to the idea of ASEAN, the system of government it practises should not be something that stands in the way of becoming a member of ASEAN."⁶³ Indonesia wanted to foster greater cooperation within the region with the inclusion of Vietnam⁶⁴, and saw Vietnam as a anti-China shield. Singapore was adamant that Vietnam should not be allowed to join ASEAN until the Cambodian conflict was settled and until Vietnam's economic and political situation had changed.⁶⁵ Thailand, which considered Vietnam as a traditional enemy, was reluctant to have Vietnam a member until all past disputes were settled, but it was the case that: "Relations between Bangkok and Hanoi have never been so good for nearly two centuries."⁶⁶ The Thai military still believes that a Vietnam now with increased economic prosperity is a potential security threat.⁶⁷ After the Cambodian withdrawal and the acceptance of the Bali Treaty, ASEAN became more disposed to accept Hanoi's application to become ASEAN's seventh member. But in July 1994, Thailand's attitude towards Hanoi changed dramatically; Bangkok maintained that Vietnam has to take into

⁶¹Both Vietnam and Laos acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in July 1992 and gained observer status to ASEAN.

⁶²See Mutiah Alagappa, "Bringing Indochina into ASEAN," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 29 June 1989, pp. 21-22.

⁶³*Bangkok Post*, 16 December 1988, p. 2.

⁶⁴See *The Straits Times*, 14 January 1989.

⁶⁵See *The Straits Times*, 17 January 1991.

⁶⁶Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "From ASEAN Six to ASEAN Ten: Issues and Prospects," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 3, December 1994, p. 254.

⁶⁷"Military Thinks Vietnam May Still Big Security Threat," *The Nation*, 22 September 1994, p. A5.

consideration the practical aspects of becoming a member of ASEAN. At the ASEAN meeting in Bangkok, the Thai Foreign Minister maintained that "Nobody is against Vietnam's application in principle, but the question is whether Vietnam has the ability or the readiness to participate in ASEAN."⁶⁸

Jakarta, as far back as the early 1970s⁶⁹, wanted new members to be part of ASEAN; President Suharto, stated that Indonesia would, "welcome as members Southeast Asian nations like Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and, should they so desire, both North and South Vietnam."⁷⁰ Again in 1985, President Suharto raised the possibility of the future membership of Vietnam.⁷¹ Indonesia in 1994 was adamant that Vietnam should become a member of ASEAN as soon as possible. During a visit by the President of Vietnam, Mr Lee Duc Anh, to Jakarta, President Suharto gave his blessing for Vietnam's inclusion in ASEAN.⁷² Also, at that meeting, it was agreed that Vietnam should also become an observer member at APEC meetings. Malaysia also believed that increased membership would strengthen ASEAN. In 1991, Mahathir's initiative to hold talks between ASEAN countries and Vietnam was welcomed by the Vietnamese government. The Malaysian Prime Minister paid a visit to Hanoi in April 1992. At that successful meeting, several agreements were signed.⁷³ Mahathir stated that "Malaysia will welcome Vietnam as an additional member and we will seriously consider Laos and

⁶⁸Leah Makabenta, "ASEAN: Vietnam Entry Almost Certain," *Inter Press Service*, July 22, 1994, (On line), (Nexis). Also see "Thailand: ASEAN Work may Need More Time Hanoi's Quick Entry in Balance," *Bangkok Post*, 24 July 1994, (On line), (Nexis). "Thailand: Vietnam Likely to Join Grouping by Next Year," *Business Times (Malaysia)*, 23 July 1994, (On line), (Nexis).

⁶⁹See "Communist Vietnam Joins ASEAN's Capitalist Club," *The Age*, 29 July 1995, p. 15: "Brunei: Vietnam Enters the ASEAN Fold as Future Members Stand By," *Bangkok Post*, 28 July 1995, (One Line), (Nexis). ASEAN approved Vietnam's membership at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting in Bangkok, in July 1994. See "Here Comes Number Seven," *Asiaweek*, 3 August 1994, p. 26. Also see Lee Kim Chew, "Vietnam becomes part of ASEAN," *The Straits Times, (Weekly Edition)*, 5 August 1995.

⁷⁰*New York Times*, 18 March 1973, p. 4.

⁷¹See Donald Weatherbee, *ASEAN After Cambodia: Reordering Southeast Asia*, The Asia Society, June 1989, p. 15.

⁷²See Patrick Walters, "Suharto Backs Early Vietnam ASEAN entry," *The Australian*, 28 April 1994. Also see "Indonesia, Vietnam to set up efforts to resolve two issues," *The Straits Times, (Overseas Weekly edition)*, 30 April 1994.

⁷³See *The Xinhua General Overseas News Service*, 21 April 1992, (On line), (Nexis). The agreements signed were in the areas of economic and technological cooperation, agriculture, tourism and sports.

Cambodia should they show any interest to join."⁷⁴ The Philippines was the most enthusiastic supporter of Vietnam's inclusion in ASEAN; it was Manila that had sponsored Vietnam's observer status. After the ASEAN meeting in Bangkok, the communiqué maintained that ASEAN would endorse Vietnam's inclusion.

Vietnam finally became a member of ASEAN on 28 July 1995 at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Brunei.⁷⁵ This step-by-step process for full membership will have to be followed by other prospective members. This now leaves Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar to join ASEAN, making it a ten-member regional grouping that would comprise the entire Southeast Asian region. Cambodia wants to formally become a member of ASEAN in 1997.⁷⁶ Myanmar has been accorded observer status, and Laos will become a member eventually.⁷⁷ This possible future expansion to ten members was the dream of the founding fathers of ASEAN: "Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas said upon arrival here [the Brunei meeting] ... ASEAN's and Indonesia's dream of a 10-nation Southeast Asian community was going to be realised."⁷⁸

Vietnam's membership is an example of the blurring of the dichotomy between Communist and non-Communist States in Southeast Asia. Vietnam's membership has been viewed favourably by other countries. Beijing has publicly welcomed it, although privately it may be apprehensive due to the Spratly Islands claims. The United States has been forced to quicken its own normalisation of relations with Hanoi, so as to keep in step with ASEAN. There are many reasons for Vietnam being allowed to be part of ASEAN. Economically, Vietnam provides an enormous undeveloped market that can be

⁷⁴"Strengthen ASEAN with more members: Mahathir," *The Straits Times*, 20 October 1994, p. 14. In that speech to the 15th ASEAN International Parliamentary organisation General Assembly in Manila, Mahathir also welcomed Myanmar to be a member of ASEAN. This speech was delivered by Tan Sri Mohamed Zahir Haji Ismail the leader of the delegation to the meeting. Mahathir has a view of increased membership since 1992. See *The Straits Times*, 20 April 1992. Laos gained admittance in 1997.

⁷⁵"Brunei: Vietnam Enters the ASEAN Fold as Future Members Stand By," *Bangkok Post*, 28 July 1995, (One Line), (Nexis).

⁷⁶See *The Straits Times*, 15 February 1996, p. 19. Cambodia applied for full membership on 3 April 1996. The application for membership was delivered to Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, who is also the Chairman of the ASEAN Steering Committee. See *The Straits Times*, 2 April 1996, p. 18. The membership application was accepted by ASEAN at the last meeting.

⁷⁷Both these countries became members in July of 1997.

⁷⁸It has to be remembered that Adam Malik, the past Foreign Minister of Indonesia worked tirelessly in the late 1960s to persuade Vietnam Cambodia and Laos to become members of ASEAN.

exploited by the other ASEAN members.⁷⁹ The AFTA policy would bring down trade barriers so that investments can flow into Vietnam: "Among the ASEAN countries, Singapore and Malaysia are now the biggest foreign investors in Vietnam with US\$186 million and US\$163 million respectively."⁸⁰ Also Vietnam will enjoy the economic benefits of being part of a regional body like ASEAN. Hanoi will have enhanced diplomatic access to the leading industrial countries via the ASEAN-PMC and the ASEAN Partnership Dialogue System (APDS).

There is also the strategic argument for Vietnam being part of ASEAN. Hanoi's close relations with other countries in the region, via membership of ASEAN, form a bridge that links the ideological divide.⁸¹ China and Vietnam share a land border.

It [Vietnam's membership] will change the strategic landscape, creating a counterbalance to the growing economic and military power of China, which most regional nations privately see as their bogeyman.⁸²

Potential membership into ASEAN has tremendous advantages for the Indochinese countries. Economically, these countries have sectors that are concentrated on agriculture and are labour-intensive; these can be complementary to the advancing industrialised members of ASEAN. On the other hand, the undeveloped status of these Indochinese countries is also an obstacle to becoming proper members of ASEAN. Questions have been raised concerning the nature and structure of how these countries will relate to AFTA and more specifically to the CEPT. These policies are the economic corner-stones on which ASEAN intends to proceed with greater economic integration in the future. Vietnam has been given specific concessions before it needs to adhere to the AFTA regulations. Further, the impact of a long period of communism on these countries is an added concern. Vietnam's history is a record of a nation's proud struggle to become and remain independent, and the course of its post-colonial political development has been shaped by a corps of communist party cadres whose strengths

⁷⁹See "Thailand: ASEAN Ticket Opens Gate to Vietnam Trade," *Bangkok Post*, 21 July 1995.

⁸⁰Hoang Anh Tuan, "Why Hasn't Vietnam Gained ASEAN Membership," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 15, No. 3, December 1993, p. 281. Figures were taken from the Office of Vietnam State Committee for Cooperation and Investment (SCCI), June 1993.

⁸¹See Michael Antolik, "ASEAN's Bridges to Vietnam and Laos," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 15, No. 2, September 1993, pp. 195-210.

⁸²"Communist Vietnam Joins ASEAN's Capitalist Club," *The Age*, 29 July 1995, p. 15.

have been, and continue to be, a relatively high degree of homogeneity, continuity, solidarity and pride.⁸³

Some analysts have argued that the tremendous costs associated with being a member of ASEAN may delay the eventual entry of the other Indochinese countries. Even Vietnam found it difficult to pay the US\$1 million required by members as a contribution to the ASEAN fund⁸⁴ and also the costs involved in sending representatives to the more than 200 meetings⁸⁵ held by various ASEAN members on a yearly basis.⁸⁶ But in the past, ASEAN's sixth member, Brunei, was never forced to attend all ASEAN meetings and a moratorium on the ASEAN contribution could be arranged for Vietnam. It could also be allowed the same privileges as were given to Brunei. In 1996 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided Hanoi with US\$1 million to aid in Vietnam's integration into ASEAN.⁸⁷

An off-shoot of increased membership is a Thai proposal to bring about a ten member grouping of Southeast Asian countries outside of the ASEAN framework: "SEA-10 is expected to bring the countries of the region closer sooner, since it does not require the same stringent standards of membership that ASEAN does, for example adherence to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation."⁸⁸ This proposal has been met with much opposition and has been sidelined for future consideration by the other ASEAN members.

Further, there has been suggestions that both Australia and New Zealand would be allowed to be members of ASEAN. Some ASEAN countries are quite favourable to

⁸³Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "From ASEAN Six to ASEAN Ten: Issues and Prospects," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 3, December 1994, p. 254.

⁸⁴The ASEAN Standing Committee decided in July 1994 to set up such a fund to pursue strategic regional initiatives. See "ASEAN Fund to be set to pursue regional initiatives," *New Straits Times*, 21 July 1994, p. 20.

⁸⁵See Appendix 1, which lists about 120 ASEAN meetings for 1996. Only the major meetings appear on this list. There are also another 80 preparatory meetings that ASEAN officials need to attend.

⁸⁶See "Southeast Asia: Vietnam Leads Indochinese Countries into ASEAN," *Inter Press Service*, 12 July 1995, (On Line), (Nexis).

⁸⁷See *The Straits Times*, 8 March 1996, p. 26.

⁸⁸Lee Siew Hua, "The Straits Times (Overseas Weekly Edition), 16 July 1994. Also see Sinfah Tansarawuth, "SEA-10 'will operate outside ASEAN,'" *The Straits Times*, 27 July 1994, p. 14. This idea has been opposed by other members as they maintain that this would dilute the legitimacy of ASEAN.

such a suggestion. The Prime Minister of Singapore, Goh Chok Tong has been quoted as saying that he would like to see both Australia and New Zealand as members of ASEAN.⁸⁹ The Foreign Minister of New Zealand, Don McKinnon, has expressed his own country's interest in being part of ASEAN.⁹⁰ Malaysia has been extremely vocal in its opposition against these countries to be part of ASEAN: "[It] objected categorically to proposals by certain counterparts in ASEAN to expand membership to non-South-east Asian nations, asserting that the grouping's identity should be preserved."⁹¹

Hence, there are pertinent issues that prevent the inclusion of non-Southeast Asian countries into ASEAN. First, there is the problem of identity. Domestic sentiments in New Zealand and Australia may prevent these two countries from being new members of ASEAN.⁹² Further, as mentioned above, ASEAN countries like Malaysia would be against such a proposal.

Moreover, the inclusion of these non-Southeast Asian countries would dilute the identity of the regional grouping. As Professor Tommy Koh asserts: "Where do you draw the line? Countries in South Asia may also want to be part of ASEAN."⁹³ With this notion of regional identity, the inclusion of these external countries would cause certain amount of problems with the established decision-making process of ASEAN, which, as discussed on Chapter One above, is based on concepts of accommodation and consensus.

THE SPRATLYS ISSUE

As mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter, the end of the Cold War has brought to the forefront the unresolved territorial disputes in the region. One such dispute involves the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.

⁸⁹See *The Straits Times*, 16 January 1996, p. 1. Also see, *The Business Times*, 16 January 1996, p. 6.

⁹⁰See *The Star*, 18 January 1996, p. 23.

⁹¹*The Straits Times*, 5 March 1996, p. 16.

⁹²Dewi Anwar Fortuna argues in these countries there is domestic opposition to being considered part of Southeast Asia. Interview with Dewi Anwar Fortuna. 2.30 p.m. 30 January 1996, Jakarta, Indonesia.

⁹³Interview with Professor Tommy Koh, Director, Institute of Policy Studies, and Ambassador-at-large (Singapore). Institute of Policy Studies. Singapore. 3.45 p.m. 7 April 1996.

The Spratly Islands group consists of over 230 islets, reefs, shoals and sand banks, located in the South Eastern part of the South China Sea and covers an area of about 250,000 square kilometres.⁹⁴ This area is both a strategic and an economic prize, as it is situated astride the major sea lanes between the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia, and also is very rich in fish resources and mineral-laden seabeds.⁹⁵ Besides oil and natural gas, offshore minerals such as tin, manganese, copper, cobalt, nickel and other metals, are likely to be found on the broad shelf areas of South East Asia and specially the South China Sea.⁹⁶

The maps provided below illustrates the strategic importance of the sea-lanes in the region. Amon Varon states that: "All the important East Asian air and sea lanes of communication (A&SLOC) to Europe, the Middle East, Africa and South Africa and South Asia pass through or near the Spratlys territorial waters."⁹⁷


⁹⁴For a detailed analysis of the geographic location of the islands and the various names given to the respective islands, atolls, and reefs see, Dieter Heinzig, *Disputed Islands in the South China Sea*, Hamburg, 1976, pp. 17-19.

⁹⁵See Sheldon W. Simon, "ASEAN Security in the 1990s," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXIX, No. 6, June 1989, pp. 593-594. The economic potential has not been fully explored yet. But it seems to be highly promising. See Neymour Haile, "Bathymetry and Geology in Asian Seas - A Review" in Chie Lin Sien and Colin MacAndrews, (eds.) *Southeast Asian Seas: Frontiers for Development*, Singapore, 1981, pp. 3-19; Mark Valencia, *South China Seas: Oil Under Troubled Waters*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985; Dzurek Daniel J. "Boundary and Resource Dispute in the South China Sea," *Ocean Yearbook*, Vol. 5, 1985, pp. 254-284.

⁹⁶See Eoin H. Macdonald, "Offshore Minerals other than Hydrocarbons in Southeast Asia," in Chie Lin Sien and Colin MacAndrews, (eds.), *Southeast Asian Seas: Frontiers for Development*, Singapore, 1981, p. 56.

⁹⁷Amon Varon, *The Spratly Islands Embroilment: A Test Case in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia*, La Trobe Politics Working Paper Number 3, La Trobe University, Australia, 1994, p. 2.

FIGURE 7. MAP OF SOUTHEAST ASIA SHOWING MAIN SHIPPING ROUTES.



Source: Wing Commander R.W. Grey, A Proposal for Cooperation in Maritime Security in Southeast Asia, Strategic Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Working Paper No. 274, 1993, p. 2.

FIGURE 8. MAP OF THE SPRATLY ISLANDS.

Taken From: Sheldon Simon, Future of Asian-Pacific Security Collaboration, Lexington Books, Lexington, 1989, p. 106.





FIGURE 9. OCCUPATION OF THE SPRATLY ISLANDS.

Taken From: Mark J. Valencia, *China and the South China Sea Disputes*, IISS, Oxford University Press, London, October 1995, p. 5.




Mainland China (number of occupations: 7): Yongshu Jiao (Fiery Cross Reef), Chigua Jiao (Chigua Reef), Zhubi Jiao (Subi Reef), Huayang Jiao (Cuarteron Reef), Nanxun Jiao (Gaven Reefs) and Dongmen Jiao (Hughes Reef). China recently admitted to having built fishing shelters at Meiji Jiao (Mischief Reef).

Taiwan (1): Taiping Dao (Itu Aba Island)

Vietnam (27): Hongxiu Dao (Namyit Island), Nanzi Dao (Southwest Cay), Dungan Shazhou (Sand Cay), Zhong Jiao (Central Reef), Nanwei Dao (Spratly Island), Jinghong Dao (Sin Cowe Island), Anbu Shazhou (Amboyne Cay), Rangqing Shazhou (Grierson Reef), Bisheng Jiao (Pearson Reef), Bei Jiao (Barque Canada Reef), Xi Jiao (West Reef), Wumie Jiao (Tennent Reef), Riji Jiao (Ladd Reef), Daxian Jiao (Discovery Great Reef), Dong Jiao (East Reef), Liumen Jiao (Alison Reef), Nanhua Jiao (Cornwallis South Reef), Chuanlan Jiao (Petley Reef), Nailuo Jiao (South Reef), Guihan Jiao (Collins Reef), Qiong Jiao (Len Dao), Pengbu Bao Jiao (Bombay Castle), Guangya Jiao (Prince of Wales Bank), Wan'an Tan (Vanguard Bank), Xiwei Tan (Prince Consort Bank), Lizhun Tan (Grainger Bank), Renjun Tan (Alexandra Bank).

The Philippines (8): Mahuan Dao (Nanshan Island), Shuanhuang Shazhou (Loaita Nan), Feixin Dao (Flat Island), Zhongyie Dao (Thitu Island), Nanyao Dao (Loaita Island), Beizi Dao (North Reef or Northeast Cay), Xiyue Dao (West York Island), Siling Jiao (Commodore Reef).

Malaysia (3): Danwuan Jiao (Swallow Reef), Nanhai Jiao (Mariveles Reef) and Xingguangzi Jiao (Ardasier Breakers). Malaysia also set sovereignty signs in six other reefs and banks.



Prepared in the Cartography Unit, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University in accordance with the list of occupations compiled by Dr. Sheng Lijun.

Source: Sheng Lijun, *China's Policy Towards The Spratly Islands in the 1990s*, Working Paper No. 287, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, June 1995, pp. 26-27.

The archipelago⁹⁸ is named after Richard Spratly, the captain of a British whaling ship, who reportedly explored the islands in 1840.⁹⁹ Chin-Kin Lo maintains that: "By nearest-point measures, it is less than 100 nautical miles from the coast of either Philippine Palawan or Malaysia Borneo."¹⁰⁰ It is about 350 nautical miles east of the southern coast of Vietnam.¹⁰¹

These islands are either claimed entirely or partly by four ASEAN states (Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, and Vietnam), and by China and Taiwan (Republic of China). The establishment of the Economic Exclusive Zone Resolution in the region widened the scope of the conflict. China and Vietnam claim the entire Spratly Islands. There have been claims and counter claims to the entire region and or to some parts of the region. Sheldon Simon states: "Conflicting claims were further staked when Hanoi seized six of the Spratly Islands in 1975, in violation of what China declared had been Vietnam's earlier recognition of Chinese sovereignty there."¹⁰² China incorporated the Paracels and Spratlys into its new Hainan Province. Beijing in 1979 stated that it would grant concessions to Hanoi if it would be reasonable about its (Beijing's) claims to the Gulf of Tokin¹⁰³ in the South China Sea.¹⁰⁴ In the past, Vietnam's claims in the South China Sea have been intertwined with its invasion of Kampuchea and its expansionist attitude.¹⁰⁵ China has not taken a tough stance against Taiwan on its occupation of some of the Spratly Islands. Simon argues: "China's tacit acceptance of the Kuomintang's occupation of the largest Spratly island, Itu Aba, since 1946 gives China a stronger

⁹⁸See the maps above.

⁹⁹See R. Hallen Trost, *The Spratly Islands: A Study on the Limitations of International Law*, Occasional Paper No. 4, Canterbury, 1990, p. 4.

¹⁰⁰Chin-Kin Lo, *China's Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands*, London, 1989, pp. 10-11.

¹⁰¹See Marwyn S. Samuels, *Contest for the South China Sea*, New York, 1982, Appendix F: A basic gazetter. Also see the map of the area on the next page.

¹⁰²Sheldon Simon, "ASEAN Security Prospects," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 1, Summer/Fall 1987, p. 28.

¹⁰³This is in reference to Vietnam's 1974 claim of two-thirds of the Gulf of Tokin.

¹⁰⁴See Cheng Pao-min, "The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute," *Asia Pacific Community*, Vol. 24, Spring 1984, pp. 37-46.

¹⁰⁵See Sheldon Simon, "ASEAN Security Prospects," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 1, Summer/Fall 1987, p. 28. Also see Sheldon Simon, *The Future of Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation*, Lexington, 1988, p. 105.

claim to the Spratlys than Vietnam."¹⁰⁶ China may be uninterested in Taiwan's occupation of Itu Aba because of its own future ambition for reunification. Hence, in the minds of the Chinese decision-makers, there is no point stating sovereignty over territory that would eventually be returned.

Malaysia occupies three of the islands and the Philippines maintains that eight of the islands belong to it, and has incorporated them into its Palawan Province.¹⁰⁷ The Malaysian Government's claims encompasses,

Commodore Reef (also called Terumbu Laksamana or Rizal Reef as the Philippines calls it), Amboyna Cay (Pulau Kecil Amboyna or An Bang as the Vietnamese call it) and Marivales Reef (Terumbu Mantanani); the rocks on Swallow Reef (Terumbu Layang-Layang), Louise Reef (Terumbu Samarang Barat Kecil), Royal Charlotte Reef (Terumbu Samarang Barat Besar), Ardasier Reef (Terumbu Ubi), Dulles Reef (Terumbu Laya) and Barque Canada Reef (Terumbu Perahu), and the low-water sandbanks of James Shoal.¹⁰⁸

Both Malaysia and the Philippines have either stationed troops on the islands or have upgraded naval and air facilities around some of their claims. The Philippines has a garrison of Marines and also an airstrip on its main island stronghold of Thitu (Pagasa).¹⁰⁹ Both these countries have also had an altercation over the Spratlys. In April 1988, 49 Filipino fishermen were seized in waters claimed by Malaysia, which apparently led to the mobilisation of certain segments of the Filipino military.¹¹⁰ Brunei only claims the Lousia Reef, although a 200-mile EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone)

¹⁰⁶Sheldon Simon, *The Future of Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation*, Lexington Books: Lexington, 1988, p. 105. In relation to this aspect of Chinese policy towards the Taiwanese claim to the Spratly Islands, see Cheng Pao-min, "The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute," *Asia-Pacific Community*, Vol. 24, Spring 1984, pp. 37-48.

¹⁰⁷In 1994, Malaysia officially stated that the islands it claims in the South China Sea are not part of the Spratlys. The deputy Foreign Minister, Dr Abdullah Fadzil Che Wan claimed that other countries considered the same 16 islands as being part of the Spratlys. See *The Straits Times*, 27 October 1994, p. 18. This may be a diplomatic manoeuvre by the Malaysians to claim outright sovereignty over these islands.

¹⁰⁸*Asiaweek*, 20 May 1988; and Lee Yong Leng, "The Malaysian-Philippines Maritime Dispute", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 11, No. 1, June 1989, pp. 71-72. Quoted in Richard Stubbs, "Malaysian Defence Policy: Strategy versus Structure," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 13, No. 1, June 1991, p. 46.

¹⁰⁹See Lee Yong Leng, "The Malaysian-Philippine Maritime Dispute," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 11, No. 1, June 1989, p. 70.

¹¹⁰See *The Straits Times*, 14 September 1988.

around the reef would extend to the Southern Spratlys. Brunei's claim is based solely on its proximity to the reef. Hence, its claims overlap the larger Filipino claim.

Since early 1956 the Philippines has laid claim to some of the islands in the Spratly group: "At a press conference on 19 May 1956, the Philippine Foreign Minister, Carlos Garcia, made a general comment that some of the Spratly Islands should rightly belong to the Philippines because of their proximity."¹¹¹ The Philippines physically claimed some of the islands in 1968 by investing five islands with active occupation. On 10 July 1971, President Marcos issued a statement which, for the first time, articulated an official claim by the Philippines to part of the Spratly Islands.¹¹² Such a claim extended to eight islands by the early 1980s. There were basically three factors that the Philippines maintains provides it the legitimate right to claim part of the Spratlys. These are (1) The proximity of Itu Aba (Ligaw by the Philippines) poses a serious threat to the Philippines as the presence of foreign troops there would be a security threat; (2) The Allied forces (Americans) had de facto trusteeship of the Spratlys and no military troops can be stationed there without prior permission; (3) Some 53 islands had been discovered by Tomas Cloma, a Filipino, and thus they have to be regarded as *res nullius*.¹¹³ Such a discussion on the validity of the Filipino claim is beyond the scope of this research and, hence, it will not be analysed here.¹¹⁴

Malaysia's claims for part of the Spratlys did not materialise until 1979, when Kuala Lumpur released a map identifying its continental shelf and thus the extent of its territorial claims.¹¹⁵ In 1983, the Malaysian Government undertook occupation of

¹¹¹Chin-Kin Lo, *China's Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands*, London, 1989, p. 29.

¹¹²*New Philippines*, "Government States Position," p. 10. In 1976, the Philippines extended another reason for their claim, that of rights to the continental shelf. See Corazon M. Sidaayao, *The Offshore Petroleum Resources of Southeast Asia: Potential Conflict Situations and Related Economic Considerations*, Kuala Lumpur, 1978, p. 89; *The Straits Times*, 16 June 1976.

¹¹³See Chin-Kin Lo, *China's Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands*, London, 1989, pp. 143-144.

¹¹⁴But there is a detailed analysis in Chin-Kin Lo, *China's Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands*, London, 1989, pp. 144-145.

¹¹⁵See Alan J. Day (ed.), *Border and Territorial Disputes*, London, 1982, p. 126. Malaysia's claim for certain islands of Spratly is based on the 1958 Convention of Continental Shelf. The islands lay within the continental shelf of Sabah.

Swallow Reef in the archipelago.¹¹⁶ This may have been a direct consequence of the expansion of the Filipino claim during the same period. The Malaysian occupation of Swallow Reef incurred a strong protest from Vietnam.

To a great extent, Indonesia is also extremely worried about the Spratlys dispute. Jakarta has not been informed by Beijing about the extent of its claim in the South China Sea. Indonesia is extremely concerned that the Chinese territorial claims in the region may include the Natuna gas deposit which lie well to the South-West of the Spratlys. Patrick Walters maintains that: "The Chinese map easily encompasses Indonesia's Natuna gas field - one of the country's biggest offshore natural gas deposits located to the north-west of the Natuna Islands."¹¹⁷

Further, the Indonesian Natuna islands EEZ overlaps the Chinese claims of the territorial waters of the Spratly Islands.¹¹⁸ An Indonesian analyst has commented that: "Everyone with a claim to the Spratlys would like to have Natuna as part of their own territory But any challenge to Indonesia's sovereignty would represent a major strategic security situation."¹¹⁹ Hence, one can observe Jakarta trying to bring the Spratly claimants together, so as to set the agenda for a resolution that would not include the Natuna oil fields. Jakarta is also trying to hasten economic development in the region via joint oil exploration deal between Exxon and Pertamina and to increase commercial activities on the surrounding islands. Further, Jakarta has offered to supply Beijing with gas from Natuna, thus trying to prevent any dispute. Such an Indonesian proposal would essentially identify that Jakarta has sole sovereignty over the Natuna oil fields.

¹¹⁶There is some confusion on exactly when occupation took place. The *Far Eastern Economic Review* reported that it took place in June of 1983 under the cover of the FPDA Starfish exercise. See K. Das, "Perched on a Claim," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 28 September 1983, pp. 40-41. But a Malaysian Defence Ministry spokesman reported that the occupation took place in late August 1983. BBC, SWB, FE/7434/A3/1, 9 September 1983.

¹¹⁷Patrick Walters, "Jakarta Fears Chinese Move on Gas Field," *The Weekend Australian*, 4-5 March 1995, p. 19.

¹¹⁸See Leszek Buszynski, "Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era: Regionalism and Security," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXII, No. 9, September 1992, p. 835.

¹¹⁹Patrick Walters, "Jakarta Fears Chinese Move on Gas Field," *The Weekend Australian*, 4-5 March 1995, p. 19.

Publicly, Beijing has maintained that "while sovereignty over the islands is non-negotiable, joint ventures to exploit the natural resources of the area can be negotiated on a bilateral basis."¹²⁰ As Chin-Kin Lo argues, a popular interpretation of Chinese policy towards territorial disputes "was that they were dictated by insatiable irredentist ambitions."¹²¹ There is some empirical evidence to support this irredentist view of Chinese foreign policy. A book published in China in the 1950s contains remarks made by Mao Zedong, and also a map that depicts certain neighbouring areas bordering China were within its territories.¹²² The Chinese have since then denied the existence of such a map, but many scholars may still maintain that such a map acknowledges the extreme irredentist view of Beijing in the past and possibly in the future. The People's Republic of China has maintained its claim over the Spratlys since 1949 when the communists first seized power. The official position was put forth by China's Foreign Minister at that time, Zhou Enlai, in his response to the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference and the U.S.-Draft Treaty with Japan. He stated that

the Draft Treaty stipulated that Japan should renounce all rights to Nan Wai (Spratly) Island and Si Sha Islands (Paracels), but again deliberately makes no mention of the problem of restoring sovereignty over them. As a matter of fact, just like all the Nan Sha Islands (Spratlys), Chung Sha Islands (Macclesfield Bank) and Tung Sha Islands (Pratas), Shi Sha Islands and Nan Wei Island have always been China's territory.¹²³

¹²⁰Esmond D. Smith Jr, "China's Aspirations in the Spratly Islands," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 3, December 1994, p. 275.

¹²¹Chin-Kin Lo, *China's Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands*, p. 3.

¹²²See Chin-Kin Lo, *China's Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands*, p. 3. Also see Harold C. Hinton, *Communist China in World Politics*, Boston, 1966, p. 273. These areas included southeastern part of Kazakhstan, the Soviet Far East, the Soviet Maritime Province, the island of Sakhalin, Korea, the Ryuku Islands, Taiwan, the Sulu Islands in the Philippine archipelago, Malaya, Thailand, Myanmar, the Andman Islands, ASEAN and the Northwest Frontier Agency, Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal, and Ladakh. Also see Dieter Heinzig, *Disputed Islands in the South China Sea*, Hamburg, 1976.

¹²³Taken from a quote in Chin-Kin Lo, *China's Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands*, p. 28. Supplement to *People's China*, 1 September 1951, pp. 1-6. Also see Allan Shephard, "Maritime Tensions in the South China Sea and the Neighbourhood: Some Solutions," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 17, pp. 189-192; Yin Zhiping, "China's Sovereignty Over the Nansha Islands Indisputable," *Beijing Review*, Vol. 31, No. 21, 23-29 May 1988, pp. 4-5. for detailed analysis of the Chinese claims over the entire Spratly Islands.

But such historical claims by China are not supported by modern international law or the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).¹²⁴ The continental shelf provision of the UNCLOS can only be used to solve problems of how to determine the sea borders between two states, but cannot be used to change sovereignty.

Also in reference to the San Francisco Conference, the Vietnamese delegation stated its historical claim upon the entire Spratly Islands group.¹²⁵ Both China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) were absent from the San Francisco Conference. At this time the Spratly Islands was not an issue high on the political agenda for Beijing; it had to settle on-going disputes involving Korea, Taiwan and Tibet. Hence, throughout the 1950s and 1960s the disputes over the Spratly Islands were dormant. But, since the 1980s, the views of the respective claimants have changed. The post-Cold War situation has also brought about new tensions in the region.

The islands are economically vital to the countries that claim them, further the area is of great strategic importance to the Chinese. As Esmond D. Smith argues:

A glance at a chart shows what Chinese control of the Spratly Islands mean to the maritime interests of the United States and our Asian friends. Naval bases capable of supporting submarines and surface combatants in the Spratlys would provide China with a capability to maintain and potentially to interdict shipping of any nationality transiting the South China Sea.¹²⁶

Potential Chinese aggression in the South China Sea is perceived by other countries as a reason to fill the post-Cold War 'power vacuum': "Most Asian states believe that the struggle has already begun to fill the vacuum among regional actors, especially China and Japan."¹²⁷ The withdrawal of the former Soviet Union's naval forces from Cam

¹²⁴Mark J. Valencia, "China and the South China Sea Disputes," *Adelphi Paper No. 298*, The International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, Oxford University Press, October 1995, p. 23. The reason being the fact that China is not a signatory to the Law of the Sea Treaty and thus its claims pre-date the Treaty. But, the PRC at the 1995 ARF meeting Brunei has mentioned that would acceded to the Treaty.

¹²⁵Marwyn S. Samuels, *Contest for the South China Sea*, New York, 1982, p. 79. Also see Allan Shephard, "Maritime Tensions in the South China Sea and the Neighbourhood: Some Solutions," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 17, pp. 192-193.

¹²⁶Esmond D. Smith Jr, "The Dragon Goes to Sea," *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 44, No. 3, Summer 1991, p. 44.

¹²⁷Hee Kwon Pak, "Multilateral Security Cooperation," *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1993, p. 259.

Rahn Bay not only decreased its influence in the region, but also isolated Vietnam by withdrawing needed support. With the American withdrawal from its bases in the Philippines, the South China Sea is a region where China could flex its military and naval might: "China can now build a navy without the fear that this will provoke a response from Russia and the U.S."¹²⁸ Some analysts have argued that China has hegemonic intentions in the region, and, therefore, "this incipient conflict is of concern to both the other countries of Southeast Asia and to extra-regional states concerned with the potential growth of Chinese power and influence."¹²⁹

In terms of armed conflict, China and Vietnam have had military skirmishes over the Spratlys. China has used military force against Vietnam since 1974 to maintain its sovereignty over the disputed Islands. Chang Pao-Min has argued that the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War was fought over boundary issues which included the South China Sea Islands.¹³⁰

Also, in 1988, the Chinese and Vietnamese navies clashed again around the Spratlys. Without Soviet backing¹³¹, Vietnam was seen as fair game by the Chinese.¹³² Vietnam's inclusion into ASEAN adds a new and interesting dimension to the dispute. Beijing's reaction to its traditional enemy has to be gauged carefully now. Not only has the end of the Cold War brought about a "power vacuum" in the Asian region, but also the inclusion of Vietnam in ASEAN has added a new and unstable dimension to the security equation in the Southeast Asian region.

The Philippines is taking a new confrontative position in this potential conflict. It announced in June 1995 that it will build seven lighthouses in the Spratlys at a cost of

¹²⁸Eric Hyer, "The South China Sea Disputes: Implications of China's Earlier Territorial Settlements," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 1, Spring 1995, p. 46.

¹²⁹Esmond D. Smith Jr, "China's Aspirations in the Spratly Islands," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 3, December 1994, p. 278.

¹³⁰See Chang Pao-Min, *The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Disputes*, New York, 1986, p. 86. For a detailed analysis of Sino-Vietnamese relations with specific reference to the Paracel and Spratly Islands dispute see Chin-Kin Lo, *China's Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands*, pp. 84-136.

¹³¹The Soviet naval ships operating from Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam stayed out of the conflict.

¹³²See Esmond D. Smith Jr, "China's Aspirations in the Spratly Islands," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 3, December 1994, p. 281. During that clash, the Chinese sank three Vietnamese transport ships, killed 72 seamen and took 9 prisoners.

178.8 million pesos (S\$10.2 million).¹³³ Such lighthouses are a means to monitor the possibility of "foreign" intrusions onto the claimed islands. This is a direct repercussion of the February 1995 discovery of a Chinese built structure on Mischief Reef within the Filipino Economic Exclusive Zone¹³⁴ of the disputed Spratly Islands. Also the Philippines Navy, in April 1995, destroyed a number of Chinese markers on several other reefs, all closer to its coast than Mischief Reef. The Philippines has ruled out the use of force against China, with regards to Beijing's incursion onto and the removal of Filipino fishermen from Mischief Reef. As the Filipino Foreign Secretary, Roberto Romulo, has stated: "Aggression is not an option and I believe that at this point there is some agreement between us and the People's Republic of China."¹³⁵ The Chinese have maintained that the structures built on Mischief Reef were to shelter their fishermen. Manila, however, asserts that the Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef is in violation of the 1992 Manila ASEAN Declaration which binds all claimants to refrain from making destabilising moves in the region.¹³⁶ It forgets that the PRC is not a member of ASEAN.

Lee Lai To, a political scientist at the National University of Singapore who has been extensively involved in South China Sea discussions for several years, maintains that the incursion on Mischief Reef was executed because Beijing rightly perceived that Manila does not have strong military capabilities and also because the Philippines was seen as not being very close to its fellow ASEAN members.¹³⁷

¹³³See *The Straits Times*, (Overseas Weekly Edition), 10 June 1995, p. 11; Also see "Treacherous Shoals," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13 August 1992, p. 17; *New Straits Times*, 15 June 1995, p. 23.

¹³⁴See "Chinese troops occupying Philippine reef in Spratlys: Ramos," *Agence France Presse*, 8 February 1995, (On Line), (Nexis). Also see "Disputes: Islands of Discord: Manila and Beijing Square off in a Spat Over the Spratlys," *Asiaweek*, 24 February 1995, (On line), (Nexis). The Filipinos are justifying the erection of such lighthouses on the UN Law of the Sea treaty which requires countries to delineate their territorial base lines. See UN Document A/CONF 67/122 of 7 October 1982. An abridged text is contained in T.B. Millar (ed.), *Current International Treaties*, Sydney, 1984, pp. 145-174. Further under the United Nations Law of the Sea, an archipelago state enjoys the right of sovereignty over its waters and may suspend passage in areas of its waters for security reasons. Also see Michael Leifer, "The Maritime Regime and Regional Security in East Asia," *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1991, pp. 126-136.

¹³⁵Malcolm Davidson, "Manila rules out armed response in Spratlys," *Reuters World Service*, 10 February 1995, (On line), (Nexis).

¹³⁶See Martin Abbugai, "Spratlys need political quick solution to forestall armed conflict," *Agence France Presses*, 12 February 1995, (On line), (Nexis).

¹³⁷See *The Straits Times*, 2 April 1995, p. 15.

To a certain extent this may be true, but the argument that Manila is not close to its fellow members in ASEAN is not valid. ASEAN did strongly protest the Chinese incursion onto Mischief Reef. If ASEAN did not object strongly against Beijing's incursions onto Mischief Reef, then the claims of Brunei and Malaysia would also be challenged by China. A plausible explanation of China's strategic calculations for proceeding with its incursion onto Mischief Reef could be directly linked to the American military base closures in the Philippines. Of all the claimants the Philippines has the weakest armed forces. In response to the Chinese incursion onto Mischief Reef, Manila responded by activating "five (out of seven) ageing F5-fighters with four jet trainers, two support helicopters and some naval patrol craft,..."¹³⁸

It is also doubtful that China would militarily challenge the Malaysian claim to part of the Spratlys because of Kuala Lumpur's security ties via the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) and other relevant bilateral and multilateral security arrangements. Further, the Chinese would realise that the Malaysian Armed Forces are better equipped than those of the Philippines.

China has responded with a certain amount of restraint towards the claims of Malaysia and, in the past, to the claims of the Philippines. In the 1970s and early 1980s, China only strongly reaffirmed its sovereignty over the Spratlys when both Kuala Lumpur and Manila asserted their respective claims parts of the Spratlys. The reason for such a response by Beijing is due to the geopolitical position that both Malaysia and the Philippines have in relation to China.

Regionally, ASEAN as a whole adopted the "Declaration of the South China Sea" at the AMM, on 22 July 1992.¹³⁹ In that Declaration, the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN "urged all parties concerned to exercise restraint with a view to creating a positive climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes," and "commend all parties concerned to apply the principles contained in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia as the basis for establishing a code of international conduct over the

¹³⁸"Spratly islands: China likely to continue claiming territory," *The Straits Times*, 25 March 1995. p. 34. The Philippines has only one old frigate and 40 patrol craft and such equipment lack the range to operate in the Spratlys.

¹³⁹See *The Straits Times*, 23 July 1992.

Southeast China Sea."¹⁴⁰ Vietnam strongly supported the Declaration. Hence, the ASEAN formal expression on the resolution of the conflict was clearly expressed in response to China. This was not a threat, but a mechanism to resolve the issue peacefully. ASEAN does not have the collective military might or the political will to embark on a confrontation with China with regards to the Spratly Islands dispute. Beijing did express its support for the Declaration.¹⁴¹

Further, Indonesia stepped forward as an honest broker, trying to settle the Spratly Islands dispute. Indonesia has hosted all the claimants to the South China Sea territories at Conferences in Bali in January 1990¹⁴², Bandung in July 1991 and Yogyakarta in June 1992 in an attempt to establish useful dialogue.¹⁴³ The August 1993 conference saw a Chinese delegate reiterate Beijing's position that it was not prepared to enter into formal negotiations over the conflicting claims.¹⁴⁴ In October 1994, the annual South China Sea conference was held in Bukittingi, Sumatra. The 1990 Bali conference was only attended by ASEAN members. In August 1990, Beijing announced that it was ready to discuss the Spratly Islands with the other claimants and was prepared to attend the Indonesia conferences in the future. The Indonesian Conferences had a specific process:

The process was designed in line with the traditional approach to political negotiation in Southeast Asia. Its aim was to bring all claimant states together, with a view to discussing not their conflicting claims, but such issues as pollution, marine research and resources development. The assumption was that the seminar would produce practical proposals and positive atmosphere between the parties, which would in turn lay the

¹⁴⁰See "ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea," *ASEAN Economic Bulletin*, Vol. 9, No. 2, November 1992, pp. 240-241. Also see Tommy T.B. Koh, *The United States and East Asia: Conflict and Co-operation*. Singapore, 1995, pp. 87-88.

¹⁴¹See "Sino-ASEAN Choice: Co-operation and Progress," *Beijing Review*, Vol. 35, No. 31, 3-9 August 1992, p. 4.

¹⁴²For detailed report of the first workshop, see Hasjim Djalal, (et. al.), *Report of the First Workshop on "Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea"*, Jakarta: Research and Development Agency, Department of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia, 1990. For further detailed analysis of the other conferences see Hashim Djalal, *Indonesia and The Law of the Sea*, Jakarta, 1995, pp. 395-403.

¹⁴³See Leszek Buszynski, "ASEAN Security Dilemmas," *Survival*, Vol. 34, No. 4, Winter 1992-93, pp. 90-107. Jakarta has hosted, annually since 1990, *Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea*.

¹⁴⁴See Nayan Chanda and Tai Ming Cheung, "Reef Knots," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 30 August 1990, p. 8; *New Straits Times*, 13 August 1990.

basis for further and more official discussions by the governments concerned.¹⁴⁵

At a Bandung meeting, in 1991 the Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, expressed the need for cooperation and the need to work, "to prevent the South China Sea from becoming the next focal point of conflict in the region."¹⁴⁶ These meetings organised by Indonesia have become a yearly affair where representatives, academics, legal experts and government officials from all the contesting countries and other regional states¹⁴⁷ come together to discuss the Spratlys. At the 1994 Conference, no country made any concessions. China and Taiwan hardened their positions where the discussions touched on the sensitive issues of jurisdiction and sovereignty.¹⁴⁸ At the 1995 Meeting in East Kalimantan, the consensus was "that governments should give positive consideration to cooperative projects which could help reduce the risk of confrontation in the region."¹⁴⁹ This meeting addressed confidence building measures between claimants and also particular interest was expressed in the code of conduct agreed to by the Philippines and China in response to the Mischief Reef incident.¹⁵⁰ The next Conference was held on Batam island, Indonesia in 1996. At these Conferences the Chinese view has always been that the aspect of sovereignty is non-negotiable and what could be discussed is the notion of joint exploration of the islands. One of the convenors of these meetings, Professor Ian Townsend-Gault, maintains that the Chinese prefer to have a slow measured pace, whereas the Filipinos and Vietnamese want a quick resolution to the conflict.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁵Amon Varon, *The Spratly Islands Embroilment: A Test Case in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia*, La Trobe Politics Working Paper Number 3, La Trobe University, Australia, 1994, pp. 18-19.

¹⁴⁶Paul Jacob, "Alatas Appeals to Countries Claiming the Spratlys to Co-operate Instead," *The Straits Times*, 16 July 1991, p. 15.

¹⁴⁷At the last meeting in October 1995, in Kalimantan, these countries were Indonesia, being the host, Singapore, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia.

¹⁴⁸See *The Straits Times*, 28 October 1994. Also see *The Straits Times*, 3 November 1994, p. 28.

¹⁴⁹*The Straits Times* 12 October 1995, p. 1.

¹⁵⁰See "Southeast Asian Legal Studies," *Centre for Asian Legal Studies Newsletter*, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. Vol. 3, No. 1, 1995, p. 6.

¹⁵¹Telephone Interview with Professor Ian Townsend-Gault, Director, Canadian Secretariat for the South China Sea Informal Group, University of British Columbia, Canada. 10.00 a.m. Tuesday, 30 July 1996.

Such meetings have to be viewed as confidence building measures in the region, undertaken by Indonesia to defuse potential conflict. But these conferences hosted by Indonesia have created a network linking legal advisers of claimants and thus providing the necessary foundation for future resolution of the conflict.¹⁵² This view is shared by Professor Townsend-Gault who believes that these Conferences are a 'first track' in the conflict resolution process for the disputed Spratly Islands.¹⁵³

Indonesia has a history of undertaking such a role as a honest broker. It was based on discussions at the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM) that the Cambodian crisis was largely resolved. Indonesia plays such a role based not on cultural traits but on its 1945 Constitution. The preamble to the Indonesian Constitution maintains that it has an obligation to play an active role in promoting international peace. It has also been active in international peace with a long history in United Nations Peace-keeping Operations. There is now mention that Indonesia should become the mediator between North and South Korea.¹⁵⁴

IMPACT OF THE SPRATLY ISLANDS CONFLICT

It is highly probable that the impact of the Spratly conflict is directly correlated to the naval and air force modernisation programmes of some ASEAN countries.¹⁵⁵ Despite powerful economic incentives against military confrontation and the spectre of strained relations, ASEAN fears of Chinese hegemony are still strong enough to motivate a regional defence modernisation drive.¹⁵⁶ Four of the ASEAN members

¹⁵²See *The Straits Times*, 4 September 1995, p. 41.

¹⁵³Telephone Interview with Professor Ian Townsend-Gault, *ibid*. His talks with the participants of these Conferences have revealed that the countries involved are not ready to formalise the talks in a conflict resolution mechanism.

¹⁵⁴This was articulated during the interview with Dewi Anwar Fortuna. Indonesia has quite good relations with North Korea. North Korea is also a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. She further mentioned that Indonesia may play a role in mediating a solution for the conflict between India and Pakistan. India has a close relation with Indonesia. This last assertion by Dewi Fortuna cannot be taken seriously as India would be quite suspicious of Indonesian involvement in trying to resolve the dispute because both Pakistan and Indonesia are Muslim countries.

¹⁵⁵See Sheldon W. Simon, "ASEAN Security in the 1990s," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXIX, No. 6, June 1989, p. 594.

¹⁵⁶See Time Huxley, "South-East Asia's Arms Race: Some notes on Recent Developments," *Arms Control*, Vol. 11, No. 1, May 1990, pp. 69-79; A. Karp, "Military Procurement and Regional Security

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jointly undertake military exercises with the U.S. in the South China Sea. As Simon has stated:

Indonesia and Malaysia have defined a common security interest in developing their South China Sea jurisdictions. They exercise regularly together and with Singapore and Thailand. In effect, a series of bilateral and multilateral exercises through the 1980s reveals a growing ASEAN capacity to monitor and perhaps defend each state's respective maritime jurisdiction with the assistance of such security partners as the United States (Thailand and possibly the Philippines) and Australia (Malaysia via the Five Power Defence Arrangement).¹⁵⁷

Such increases in military exercises and expenditure are in direct response to Beijing's increase in its own military budget. China's recent economic success has enhanced its ability "to disburse funds in support of this role [projection of power] by the armed forces in general and the navy in particular."¹⁵⁸ There has been a significant increase in China's annual defence expenditure. Bilveer Singh maintains that "the defence budget announced for 1993 totalled 42.5 billion yuan (\$12 billion). This compared to a military budget in 1992 of 37 billion yuan in 1992 and 21.5 billion yuan in 1988."¹⁵⁹ The official budget for 1995 increased planned expenditure by 21% from the previous year.¹⁶⁰ According the 1995 edition of *The Military Balance*, the defence budget for 1995 is estimated to be 63.1 billion yuan or (US\$ 17.48 billion).¹⁶¹ The

in Southeast Asia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 11, No. 4, March 1990; D. Saw, "Politics and Defence Modernisation in Southeast Asia," *Military Technology*, No. 4, 1992, p. 10. On the other hand, Dewi Anwar Fortuna argues that ASEAN countries are modernising due to their low threshold of professional military capability. She maintains with increased wealth and the impact of the Law of Sea Treaty, these countries would buy new weapons to defend their new acquired territories. Due to this she argues that there needs to be greater transparency among ASEAN countries. Interview with Dewi Anwar Fortuna, 30 January 1996, 2.30 p.m., Jakarta, Indonesia.

¹⁵⁷Sheldon W. Simon, "ASEAN Security in the 1990s," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXIX, No. 6, June 1989, p. 594.

¹⁵⁸Michael Leifer, "Chinese Economic Reform and Security Policy: The South China Sea Connection," *Survival*, Vol. 37, No. 2, Summer 1995, p. 44.

¹⁵⁹Bilveer Singh, "The Challenge of the Security Environment in Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 2, October 1993, p. 271. Also See. David Shambaugh, "Growing Strong: China's Challenge to Asian Security," *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 2, Summer 1994, p. 54.

¹⁶⁰See James Pringle, "China increases its military spending," *The Times*, 7 March 1995, p. 11.

¹⁶¹See *The Military Balance (1995/96)* London, The International Institute of Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 178. SIPRI Yearbook for 1995, only states the 1994, Chinese budget for

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acquisition of in-flight fuelling¹⁶² and specific offensive aircraft, such as the twenty four advanced SU-27s and MiG-31s, has had a tremendous spiralling effect with the ASEAN countries.¹⁶³ If stationed at Hainan, these planes could attack or defend the Spratlys with in-flight refuelling.¹⁶⁴ China has also taken delivery of the first of 10 Russian Kilo-class submarines.¹⁶⁵

The necessary infrastructure for such a Chinese arms build-up has been the development of the Paracels as a strategic naval base, with an intention to provide attack capabilities in the Spratlys in the 1980s. Richard Fisher argues:

In particular, the facilities on Woody Island could be used as a staging point for a future campaign to capture the Spratlys. It contains facilities to service the major warships of the Southern Fleet, projected to become the country's largest.¹⁶⁶

defence, which is 54.4 billion yuan or US\$ 6.65 billion). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, London, 1995, pp. 436 and 442.

¹⁶²China has developed refuelling technology and has also signed an agreement with a British company to purchase air-to-air refuelling equipment to be fitted to Chinese H-6 (Badger) bombers to be used as tankers. See *Janes' Defence Weekly*, 17 September 1988, p. 603 and 9 June 1990, p. 1156; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 4 October 1990, p. 8; Nayan Chanda, "China Acquires Sensitive Military Gear," *Asian Wall Street Journal*, 23 March 1992, p. 2. As of 1995, the Chinese Air Force has 120 H-6s. See *The Military Balance (1995/96)* London, The International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995, p. 178.

¹⁶³See *New York Times*, 18 June 1992; David Jenkins, "The Arming of Asia - Chinese Emperors Said 'Tremble and Obey!'", *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 1 March 1993. The Chinese also have forty-eight SU-27s on order with Russia. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 26 August 1991, p. 6, 5 September 1991, p. 9, 19 March 1992, p. 13, 26 March 1991, p. 7. As of 1995, the Chinese Air Force has 22 SU-27s and 4 SU-27Bs. See *The Military Balance (1995/96)* London, The International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995, p. 178. Also see, Desmond Ball, "The New Era in Confidence Building: The Second-track Process in the Asia/Pacific Region," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1994, pp. 159-160.

¹⁶⁴The SU-27 has a combat radius of 1488 kilometres. With aerial refuelling it could reach the Spratlys and back. Nearly 25 SU-27s are stationed at Hainan. See D. Lague, "Chinese takeaway," *The Australian*, 14 October 1992, p. 9.

¹⁶⁵See *The Straits Times*, 25 March 1995, p. 34.

¹⁶⁶Richard D. Fisher, "Brewing Conflict in the South China Sea," *Asia Studies Background*, Washington, D.C., 25 October 1984, pp. 7-8. The Chinese navy by the end of this century is likely to include: (1) a relatively large radius of action, reaching the first island chain of the North and South China Sea; (2) a strong rapid response capability; (3) reasonably effective amphibious power; (4) independent air protection and attack forces; and (5) a credible second-strike nuclear capability. You Ji and You Xu, "In Search of Blue Water Power: The PLA Navy's Maritime Strategy in the 1990s", *Pacific Review* Vol. 4, No. 2, 1991, p. 141. For further analysis of the Chinese Navy's capability see Shigeo Hiramatsu, "China's Advance: Objectives and Capabilities," *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 2, Spring 1994, p. 121.

China's programme to acquire a blue-water navy encompasses "the development of the navy's first guided missile destroyer, a new generation of 4,200t destroyers, more than 25 Jianghu class frigates and a 130-strong submarine force."¹⁶⁷ China's intention to purchase 22 new patrol submarines and 10 Kilo-class Russian submarines will dramatically improve China's power projection in the region.¹⁶⁸ Sheng Lijun argues that "... the PLA Navy, through strenuous efforts to modernise, has acquired sufficient military capability to take over successfully the Spratly islands occupied by other claimants if there is not outside interference, though it is still very weak compared with big naval powers such as the United States."¹⁶⁹

A summary of the other claimant's power projection¹⁷⁰ in the region sustains the appraisal that Malaysia has the most modern air force with MiG 29s and U.S. F/A-18Ds. As of July 1995, Kuala Lumpur took possession of 10 of 18 MiG-29s.¹⁷¹ The MiG-29s, which could be used in the Spratlys, are stationed in Sabah, as they would not need in-flight refuelling. Further, Malaysia's eight fast missile craft and four anti-submarine warfare frigates could provide the defence of its Spratly claims.¹⁷²

The Spratlys issue is one that involves the entire Southeast Asian region.¹⁷³ As the Prime Minister of Singapore, Goh Chok Tong, pointed out it involves not only the issue of sovereignty but also right of nations to navigate the sea-lanes surrounding the group of islands.¹⁷⁴ Further, Prime Minister Goh, at a conference in Beijing, stated that

¹⁶⁷Amitav Acharya, *An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia: Prospects for Control*. Pacific Strategic Papers, Singapore, 1994, p. 34.

¹⁶⁸Mark J. Valencia, "China and the South China Sea Disputes," *Adelphi Paper No. 298*, The International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, October 1995, p. 17.

¹⁶⁹Sheng Lijun, *China's Policy Towards The Spratly Islands in the 1990s*, Working Paper No. 287, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, June 1995, p.5.

¹⁷⁰For a detailed analysis of weapon acquisition in 1993 and 1994, see SIPRI analysis, *The Straits Times*, 11 July 1994, p. 6.

¹⁷¹See *The Australian*, 10 May 1995, p. 8. Malaysia placed the order for the Russian MiG-29s in 1992. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 24-31 December 1992, p. 20.

¹⁷²See *The Straits Times*, 25 March 1995, p. 34. Also see *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 9 April 1992; *The Straits Times*, 28 February 1992.

¹⁷³For specific territorial allocative solutions to the dispute see Mark J. Valencia, "China and the South China Sea Disputes," *Adelphi Paper No. 298*, The International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, October 1995, pp. 50-67.

¹⁷⁴See *The Straits Times*, 13 May 1995, p. 4.

"In Asia, China's rising power and arms build-up have stirred anxiety."¹⁷⁵ Such a view from the Singapore leader is significant as the city-state has close economic relations with China and it is a non-claimant in the dispute.

An indirect impact of the Spratlys dispute and China's determination in staking its claim is the potential for an era of escalation, an arms race in the region. In 1992, in reaction to China's naval build-up, the ASEAN claimants hurriedly tried to build-up their respective navies in response to a potential Chinese threat.¹⁷⁶ The increased arms purchases by ASEAN states can be seen in part "as a statement of concern over the heightened tension in the South China Sea and their seriousness in enforcing their claims if necessary."¹⁷⁷

Vietnam's inclusion in ASEAN prevents Beijing from isolating Vietnam in the organisation. Hoang Anh Tuan argues that "particularly in the conflict over the Spratly Islands, China would find it more difficult to isolate Vietnam as it would no longer be possible to treat Vietnam separately from the other ASEAN claimants to the islands."¹⁷⁸ In relation to Vietnam's membership of ASEAN, some argue that Hanoi needs ASEAN more than ASEAN needs Vietnam. So who are the suitors? China's recent aggressive stance on the Spratlys has to a great extent pushed both ASEAN and Vietnam to come to terms with the notion that each needs each other. Some say that ASEAN needs Vietnam as it is the ultimate bulwark against China,¹⁷⁹ while others maintain that Vietnam, looking towards China, feels more comfortable being part of ASEAN.¹⁸⁰

There have been suggestions that the ARF is the right forum to discuss the Spratlys dispute, but China has consistently refused to agree to allow the conflict to be

¹⁷⁵"ASEAN's Own China Syndrome," *The Australian*, 28 July 1995, p. 11.

¹⁷⁶See Tai Ming Cheung, "Fangs of Dragons: Peking's naval build-up sparks ASEAN reaction," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13 August 1992, pp. 19-20. The Philippines planned to replace its entire fleet of obsolete ships. Malaysia ordered two frigates from Britain and has a tentative agreement for the purchase of two Swedish submarines.

¹⁷⁷Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "The Rise in Arms Purchases: Its Significance and Impacts on the Southeast Asian Political Security," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. XXII, No. 3, Third Quarter, 1994, pp. 258-259.

¹⁷⁸Hoang Anh Tuan, "Vietnam's Membership in ASEAN: Economic, Political and Security Implications," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 3, December 1994, p. 269.

¹⁷⁹See John Rodgers, "Security is key theme in Vietnam - ASEAN link," *Reuters World Service*, 19 February 1995, (On line, (Nexis).

¹⁸⁰*ibid.*

put on the agenda; "... Beijing refused to take up the Spratly problem at the forum [ARF], arguing it should be discussed only by the claimants."¹⁸¹ China is afraid that, by placing the Spratly Islands dispute on the ARF agenda, the dispute would be manipulated by the United States or others.¹⁸² Hence, it was not discussed by the participants at the first ARF meeting in Bangkok in 1994 but, at that meeting, China tried to calm the fears of the other countries.¹⁸³ At the ARF meeting in July 1995 in Brunei, China managed to successfully keep the Spratlys dispute off the agenda. However, the Spratly Islands issue dominated the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Brunei in July 1995. There was a common consensus at that meeting that developments in the South China Sea may jeopardise peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.¹⁸⁴ But the ARF at that meeting endorsed the stand that third parties should stay out of the Spratly Islands dispute, and that settlement process should only be confined to claimant countries.¹⁸⁵ ASEAN officials stressed that, due to Beijing's reluctance to resolve the dispute via the forum, it was unrealistic to expect the ARF to evolve into anything more than a informal consultative body.¹⁸⁶ China did, however, allude to the fact that it was willing to discuss the dispute with all the seven ASEAN members on the basis of international law and the UNCLOS.¹⁸⁷ Hence, China may be softening its stance and also revising its claims to certain sections of the Spratly Islands.

When all these factors are taken together and added to the fact that both China and Vietnam signed an agreement in 1993 maintaining that all border disputes would be

¹⁸¹"Here Comes Number Seven," *Asiaweek*, August 3, 1994, p. 26. Also see "Divide and Rule: Beijing scores points on South China Sea," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 11 August 1994, p. 18; Derwin Pereira and Chai Kim Wah, "Towards a New Security Order," *The Straits Times*, 18 July 1993, pp. 1 and 6.

¹⁸²See Mark J. Valencia, "China and the South China Sea Disputes," *Adelphi Paper No. 298*, The International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, Oxford University Press, October 1995, p. 15.

¹⁸³See "Gentle Giant: China seeks to calm Southeast Asia's fears," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 4 August 1994, pp. 15-16.

¹⁸⁴See "ASEAN: Security, Trade Top of Agenda of Foreign Ministers" Meet," *Inter Press Service*, 29 July 1995, (On Line), (Nexis).

¹⁸⁵See *The Star*, 2 August 1995, p. 2.

¹⁸⁶See Patrick Walters, "China keeps Spratlys off forum agenda," *The Australian*, 31st July 1995, p. 7.

¹⁸⁷Mark J. Valencia, "China and the South China Sea Disputes," *Adelphi Paper No. 298*, The International Institute of Strategic Studies, October 1995, p. 23.

settled peacefully¹⁸⁸, there seems to be a low probability of force being used in the South China Sea. Further, it is highly unlikely that China would jeopardise the favourable trade status that it enjoys with ASEAN countries: "Trade between China and ASEAN members is set to double between now [1994] and the year 2000 to US\$20 billion."¹⁸⁹ Also as Michael Leifer asserts, China needs ASEAN as a friend to balance against the U.S. and Japan.¹⁹⁰ Further, the weak Philippines reaction to the incident at Mischief Reef, ASEAN's quite diplomacy and the U.S. silence¹⁹¹ seem to suggest that the risk of armed conflict in the region would be low. The Chinese are also "astute enough to ensure that their territorial claims are never dramatic enough to inspire a forceful regional and international response."¹⁹² Both China and the Philippines have pledged not to wage war over the Spratly Islands and have also agreed on a code of conduct concerning navigational issues in the South China Sea.¹⁹³ Vietnam and China have also agreed not to use force to resolve their territorial differences.¹⁹⁴

Further relations between ASEAN and China have reached a new stage. During the Cambodian conflict China provided aid to the factional groups in Cambodia via Thailand and also played a major diplomatic role with ASEAN. With Indonesia and Singapore extending full diplomatic recognition to Beijing, ASEAN as a whole has

¹⁸⁸This treaty was signed on the 19th of October 1993. The agreement also included a prohibition on the threat of use of force and on any action that would complicate their border disputes. See John F. Morton, "US optimistic that Spratly Islands dispute will resolve peacefully," *Asian Defence Journal*, December 1993, p. 36.

¹⁸⁹"China's trade with ASEAN 'to double by 2000,'" *The Straits Times*, 10 October 1994, p. 2. Also see "Beijing-ASEAN trade to hit RM\$50b," *The New Straits Times*, 10 October 1994, p. 20. In 1993, the trade between China and ASEAN was US\$10.68 billion. ASEAN is China's fifth largest trade partner.

¹⁹⁰Interview with Michael Leifer, 19 March 1996, 12.30 p.m., Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

¹⁹¹Warren Christopher, the U.S. Secretary of State, refused to take sides in the wake of the Chinese seizure of Mischief Reef. See Michael Leifer, "Chinese Economic Reform and Security Policy: The South China Sea Connection," *Survival*, Vol. 37, No. 2, Summer 1995, p. 55. For a detailed statement of U.S. policy in the South China Sea, see *United States Government Policy on the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea*, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 1994; *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, US Department of Defence, Office of International Security Affairs, Washington, D.C., 27 February 1995.

¹⁹²See *The Straits Times*, 25 March 1995, p. 34.

¹⁹³See *The Straits Times*, 15 August 1995, p. 15. Also see *The Straits Times*, 12 August 1995, p. 1; *New Strait Times*, 12 August 1995, p. 17.

¹⁹⁴See *The Straits Times*, 3 December 1995, p. 2.

fostered closer relations with Beijing. China has agreed to have regular security meetings with ASEAN.¹⁹⁵ This is apart from the ARF. China has also stressed that ASEAN is a major part of its foreign policy agenda.¹⁹⁶ An Australian military commentator suggests: "Nevertheless, while China lacks transparency to the ASEAN nations they will need to find ways to detect early indicators of changes to Beijing policies."¹⁹⁷

If the PRC accedes to the UNCLOS treaty, then any resolution undertaken based on that treaty will have compulsory application for the Chinese. Professor Tommy Koh, one of the main proponents of the treaty, maintains that China will be bound by all the provisions of the treaty, and cannot state reservations to certain parts of the treaty.¹⁹⁸

Thus, the Spratly Islands dispute is still deadlocked. The nature of some of the claims by certain countries is changing. The People's Republic of China has to this date not asserted the extent of its claims over the Spratly Islands. Vietnam, which recently acceded to the Law of the Sea Convention, is modifying its claims based on the legal conventions of the treaty. The Philippines is also trying to legitimise its claims so as to provide a strong foundation for its otherwise shaky claims to some islands of the Spratlys.¹⁹⁹

SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS

Some strategists have argued that ASEAN itself intends to fill the power void that has been left behind after the contraction of the superpowers in the region: "This would mean that the power position of the states in the region has had and can be expected to grow, and countries in the region can be expected to invest more in military

¹⁹⁵See "China agrees to regular meetings on security issues," *The Straits Times*, 24 July 1994, p. 15. Also see "ASEAN to strengthen ties with China, India: Report" *The Sunday Times*, 30 May, 1993, p. 17. China has 'consultative partner,' status with ASEAN. It also has regular bilateral talks with ASEAN members.

¹⁹⁶See "ASEAN 'an important part of Chinese foreign policy,'" *The Straits Times*, 22 July 1993.

¹⁹⁷Wing Commander R. W. Grey, *A Proposal for Cooperation in Maritime security in Southeast Asia*, Working Paper No. 274, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1993, p. 4.

¹⁹⁸Interview with Professor Tommy Koh, Director, Institute of Policy Studies, and Ambassador-at-large (Singapore). Institute of Policy Studies. Singapore. 3.45 p.m. 7 April 1996.

¹⁹⁹Statements based on telephone interview with Professor Ian Townsend-Gault.

equipment in order to close the gap between themselves and the other powers in the region."²⁰⁰

Also the Americans have not totally abandoned the region. The U.S. had signed an agreement with Singapore to use its port facilities to service the Seventh Fleet.²⁰¹ Michael Leifer argues:

In modernising its military forces so that they can project power far from China's shores, Beijing had unprecedented regional latitude as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the diminished military posture of the U.S. and the persistent reluctance of Japan to assume a conventional security role in the region.²⁰²

There are basically two scenarios that may arise from the perceived Chinese threat in the region. Firstly, the countries in the region may inculcate a containment policy, similar to the Cold War strategy in the 1950s and 1960s. This view is represented by the argument that China can flex its muscles in the South China Sea as there is no counterbalancing force in the region. As Eric Hyer argues, "Beijing can now more directly challenge the claims of the other parties to the dispute without too much concern that this will adversely affect the regional balance of power; in other words, the counterbalancing effect of the Soviet Union and United States in the 1970s and 1980s has disappeared, and Beijing is thus acting more confidently."²⁰³ The constraints of the superpower presence in Southeast Asia have significantly diminished.

The second scenario which seems more attractive and plausible is that the states in the region will accommodate the rise of China. This view is sustained by Samuel Huntington who maintains this might happen via "acquiescence and an acknowledged return to the traditional hierarchical pattern of international relations which historically

²⁰⁰Bilveer Singh, "The Challenge of the Security Environment in Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 2, October 1993, p. 268.

²⁰¹See Rodney Tasker, "Facing Up to Security," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 6 August 1992, pp. 8-9. The U.S. is also likely to forge similar agreements with Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines.

²⁰²Samuel Huntington quoted in Michael Richardson, "ASEAN's own China Syndrome," *The Australian*, 28 July 1995, p. 11.

²⁰³Eric Hyer, "The South China Sea Disputes: Implications of China's Earlier Territorial Settlements," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 1, Spring 1995, p. 47. (34-54)

has prevailed in East Asia."²⁰⁴ Accommodation is also a policy of the U.S. when it considers the South China Sea in relation with China. This can be ascertained by a statement by Admiral Richard Macke who was the former Commander of the American Pacific forces:

What we have to do is to make China one of our friends. We can't confront them, we can't isolate them, we don't need a security treaty or anything like that with China. We just need to work with them to stay in dialogue.²⁰⁵

Rather than providing the environment for stabilisation in the region, ASEAN should increase constructive engagement with China: Yong Paw Ang argues "the ASEAN countries should position themselves for the new regional security order in which China will be a key player."²⁰⁶ Accommodation with China at present could involve ASEAN countries agreeing to Beijing's proposal of joint exploration of the region and settling the question of sovereignty in the future. China is prepared to shelve the question of sovereignty and cooperate with other states in joint development.²⁰⁷ The Philippines and China are now open to have more talks on co-operative efforts and joint operations in the disputed area.²⁰⁸

Further, as suggested by Mark Valencia, a communications committee should be established by the claimants to the Spratly Islands as part of an initial process of demilitarising the conflict area.²⁰⁹

Also due to internal divisions within ASEAN in its attitude towards China, accommodation may be the eventual outcome. As argued by Tim Huxley, beneath the superficiality of a common ASEAN position on the South China Sea, opinion within

²⁰⁴Samuel Huntington quoted in Michael Richardson, "ASEAN's own China Syndrome," *The Australian*, 28 July 1995, p. 11.

²⁰⁵Michael Richardson, "US Admiral Warns of China's Big New Navy," *International Herald Tribune*, 8 March 1995, p. 1.

²⁰⁶Yong Pow Ang, "ASEAN should accommodate China's rise as superpower," *The Straits Times*, 10 August 1993, p. 27.

²⁰⁷See Nayan Chanda and Tai Ming Cheung, "Reef Knots," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 30 August 1990, p. 8.

²⁰⁸See "Manila, Beijing to discuss piracy and Spratlys," *The Straits Times*, 22 February 1996, p. 12.

²⁰⁹See "Don: Establish communication committee on Spratly Islands," *New Strait Times*, 8 July 1995, p. 6.

ASEAN regarding this complex issue is quite diverse.²¹⁰ An example of an alleged absence of a common ASEAN position was its "deafening silence in response to the diplomatic protest by the Philippines at China's seizure of Mischief Reef."²¹¹ Hence, one can see the phenomenon of the Cambodian conflict which, in one way, has led Jakarta to undertake again the role of the honest broker. In this instance, Indonesia's fostering of such a position may be due, as discussed above, to maintaining its own sovereignty over the Natuna gas fields. In reaction to tension in the South China Sea over the disputed Spratly Islands, the Indonesian army chief, General Felsal Tanjung, asserted that its Armed Forces are ready to forcefully defend the gas-fields.²¹² Further, in 1995 the Indonesian Navy and Air Force conducted war games around the disputed Spratly Islands.²¹³ But what would be interesting is to see a policy of economic accommodation with China coupled with a policy of strategic containment on the security front. Such a policy could be maintained by ASEAN. This could be a win-win situation.

With regards to China, as discussed in Chapter Three above, ASEAN members have had contrasting views. As Mark Valencia has rightly argued: "There has long been a divergence of views within ASEAN regarding the 'China threat' and since ASEAN makes decisions by consensus this divergence could reappear under stress."²¹⁴ With the inclusion of Vietnam, ASEAN has another problem. If it now comes out strongly against China, Beijing may perceive such a stance as Hanoi setting ASEAN's agenda. Internally too, ASEAN faces problems as four of the claimants have not compromised on the Spratly Islands on the issue of sovereignty. With the inclusion of Vietnam in ASEAN, there is one more intra-regional dispute among four of the members. Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines all have overlapping claims to the Spratly Islands. Vietnam claims sovereignty over the entire Spratly Islands, thus this affects the partial claims of the four ASEAN members. But there has always been territorial disputes

²¹⁰See Tim Huxley, *Insecurity in the ASEAN Region*, London, 1993, p. 34.

²¹¹Michael Leifer, "Chinese Economic Reform and Security Policy: The South China Sea Connection," *Survival*, Vol. 37, No. 2, Summer 1995, p. 56.

²¹²See *The Straits Times*, 1 June 1995, p. 1.

²¹³See *The Straits Times*, 17 December 1995, p. 4.

²¹⁴Mark J. Valencia, "China and the South China Sea Disputes," *Adelphi Paper No. 298*, London, October 1995, p. 42.

within ASEAN. Rodney Tasker maintains: "There is a desire to push aside disagreements, to keep on talking to maintain relations without resolving issues."²¹⁵ Hence, membership may make it easier to settle the Spratly islands dispute within the regional grouping, as joint exploration of the region may be decided upon. Malaysia and Vietnam have agreed to jointly develop the Spratlys where their respective claims overlap.²¹⁶

The recent occupation of Mischief Reef by the Chinese has prompted ASEAN to take a more active role in the dispute: "Ironically, China's southward thrust could also inject new life into ASEAN as a political entity just when the UN-brokered peace settlement in Cambodia seemed to have removed one of the main reasons for a unified ASEAN diplomatic stance."²¹⁷ This it would do by raising international awareness of the dispute, providing high-level forums for claimants and interested parties and trying to contain and manage the dispute itself.²¹⁸ Vietnam's inclusion in ASEAN may see the claimants within this regional grouping developing the Spratlys jointly.²¹⁹ Joint exploration of the region would be a form of CBM. Such an activity would bring the parties together and good-will could be built up among them,²²⁰ which may reduce the possibility of conflict in the South China Sea.

The People's Republic of China has been in the past extremely aggressive in fostering its claims over the Spratly Islands. But recently, with accord with Vietnam and the Philippines, it seems to be more accommodating to the notion of joint exploration and sovereignty of the islands. China seems to be probing the issue with the ASEAN claimants. Some ASEAN commentators assert the reason why it withdrew from its reassertive stance is the fact that ASEAN presented a very collective and unified

²¹⁵Rodney Tasker, Adam Schwarz and Michael Vatikiotis, "Growing Pains," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 28 July 1994, p. 36.

²¹⁶See Michael Antolik, "ASEAN's Singapore rendezvous: Just Another Summit?", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 14, No. 2, September 1992, p. 147.

²¹⁷"Treacherous Shoals," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13 August 1992, p. 14.

²¹⁸See *The Straits Times*, 7 April 1995, p. 3. Also see *The Straits Times*, 8 April 1995, p. 18.

²¹⁹Vietnam has agreements with the Philippines and Malaysia on the aspect of peaceful settlement of the dispute and also joint development of overlapping claims.

²²⁰See Lee Lai To, "The South China Sea: Concerns and Proposals for Confidence-Building and Conflict Reduction," in Bunn Nagara and K. S. Balakrishnan, (eds.), *The Making of a Security Community in the Asia-Pacific*, Malaysia, Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1994, p. 256.

position²²¹ on the issue and with Mischief Reef it positioned itself behind the Philippines through quiet diplomacy.²²² ASEAN may have been silent, but it was not inactive.

²²¹Indonesia not a claimant, but has backed the collective stance. Thailand, Indonesia, and Singapore can play a mediating role in the South China Sea Dispute. In 1995, China was probing for the nature of the ASEAN response to its aggression in the region. ASEAN closed ranks and spoke with one voice against such aggression. "The way China behaves on the Spratly Islands would be seen by Southeast Asia as a litmus test on how a powerful China would behave towards her smaller neighbours. Under this kind of pressure, the Chinese took a more positive approach and respect international law." Interview with Professor Tommy Koh, Director, Institute of Policy Studies, and Ambassador-at-large (Singapore). Institute of Policy Studies. Singapore. 3.45 p.m. 7 April 1996.

²²²This view is presented by Dewi Anwar Fortuna. Interview with this scholar was conducted on 30 January 1996, 2.30 p.m., Jakarta, Indonesia.

CHAPTER SIX: REGIONALISM AND ASEAN

INTRODUCTION

With increased membership, the emergence of APEC, EAEC and the ARF, and the slow withdrawal of American presence in the region, the future direction for ASEAN seems quite uncertain. But within such changing uncertainties there is a projected goal to which ASEAN seems to be heading. With increased membership ASEAN is trying to cut across the Cold War dichotomy of two ideologically opposing groups of countries. A parallel could be drawn to the widening of NATO to bring in the former Eastern Bloc countries.

As discussed in Chapter One above, ASEAN does not readily fit the contemporary theoretical concepts of a regional grouping. With the future increase in membership, ASEAN will at least be considered a fully legitimate regional endeavour. The subregional label attached to ASEAN will disappear and it will represent the view of the geographic and political region of Southeast Asia. Hence, this chapter will explore the theoretical basis of the present state of ASEAN and its future.

Before a theory can be constructed or modified to fit the ASEAN experience and future regional endeavours, there is an overwhelming need to comprehend thoroughly the specific main underlying tenets of this regional grouping. Thus, the first section of this chapter will address the notions of 'non-interference', also the unique bilateral security arrangements of ASEAN will be analysed to emphasis its multi-functional aspirations in securing regional and extra-regional peace and security. Because of the post-Cold War uncertainties, we are likely to see ASEAN moving towards a collective military alliance, one that would help define ASEAN's security role in the region. The

American withdrawal from the region and, to a lesser extent, the Gulf War have goaded ASEAN into rethinking its options and building a new security architecture.¹

The chapter will also address the reasons for ASEAN's successes in certain areas and failures in others. But, the most important aspect of this chapter will be ASEAN's future both regionally and globally.

THE ISSUE OF NON-INTERFERENCE

The notion of 'non-interference' has been internalised within ASEAN via the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation which states that "non-interference in the internal affairs of one another is a 'fundamental principle' guiding the relations of the contracting Parties."² Further, 'non-interference' is a significant characteristic of developing countries which have recently attained nationhood. As Desmond Ball and David Horner state:

In the process of nation-building, the principle of non-interference becomes a very positive instrument - while concerns for ethnic self-determination and particular notions of human rights (such as those which concern civil rights or political rights rather than rights to sustenance and economic development) are not merely disruptive but can even cripple the process.³

There are many examples of this notion of non-interference.⁴ A credible reason for adherence to 'non-interference' by ASEAN members is the lingering memories of the Konfrontasi years between Malaysia and Indonesia. ASEAN leaders would try to prevent the recurrence of such an event by all available means. A significant example was the annexation of East Timor by Indonesia. Jorgensen-Dahl states: "Despite initial reservations on the part of Singapore, the united ASEAN support for the Indonesian

¹See "Assessing the threat," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 20 June 1991, pp. 28-29.

²See Appendix G for the *Treaty of Amity and Cooperation*.

³Desmond Ball and David Horner (eds.) *Strategic Studies in a Changing World: Global, Regional and Australian Perspectives*, Canberra Papers on Strategic and Defence No. 89, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1992, p. 9.

⁴The Thai authorities threaten to arrest participants in Bangkok, when a human rights group wanted to discuss Indonesia's human rights record in July 1994. The forum was moved to the outskirts of Bangkok. In relation to this see, *The Australian*, 21 July 1994.

annexation of East Timor served to sanction actions by Indonesia..."⁵ The issue of East Timor flared up again in 1994 when domestic groups in the Philippines organised a seminar to discuss the annexation of East Timor. The Foreign Minister of Indonesia warned that bilateral relationships would suffer if Manila did not deter the staging of the planned conference.⁶ The Filipino government, being democratic in nature, morally could not employ illegal means to stop the proceedings.⁷ But due to extreme pressure from Jakarta, it refused to issue tourist visas and also expelled some external delegates who were speakers at the conference, hence diluting the media and political impact of the event.⁸

On the other hand, the importance of 'non-interference' in ASEAN has been contradicted by recent events between the Philippines and Singapore. The 'Flor Contemplacion Affair', as it has come to be known, brought about the suspension of economic and political relations between Singapore and the Philippines and thus also strained ASEAN unity. The Affair centred around the execution of a convicted Filipino maid for the murder of another Filipino maid and a Singaporean child in 1991. Manila maintained that the accused was innocent and that the evidence against the executed individual was fabricated.⁹ It has to be noted that, during the period when this affair was broiling, the Philippines was embarking on a general election. Some analysts have correctly commented that this dispute between the two countries was intertwined with the domestic political situation in the Philippines. At the height of the dispute, Singaporean flags were burnt in the Philippines, Singapore's Prime Minister's visit to the Philippines was postponed, respective envoys were recalled, and there were calls for the severing of official diplomatic ties between these two ASEAN states.¹⁰ The

⁵Arfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, "Regional Organisation and Stability in the ASEAN Region," in Kusuma Snitwongse and Sukhumbhand Paribatra (eds.), *Durable Stability in Southeast Asia*, Singapore, 1987, pp. 67-68.

⁶See Patrick Walters, "Jakarta warns Philippines on seminar," *The Australian*, 18 May 1994.

⁷See *The Australian*, 1 June 1994 and 28-29 May 1994. A lower court allowed the conference to be banned by the government. But, the Philippines Supreme Court allowed the conference to proceed.

⁸See "Jakarta softens on E.Timor talks," *The Australian*, 2nd June 1994. The Filipino government expelled Nobel peace laureate Ms Mairead Maguire and others and were place on a plane to Bangkok. see "E.Timor delegates expelled," *The Australian*, 30 May 1994, p. 6.

⁹In relation to the case see articles in *The Straits Times*, 19 March 1995 - 30 April 1995. This case was debated extensively in the newspapers and other forms of the media.

¹⁰See *The Straits Times*, 14 April 1995.

Philippines' Foreign Affairs Secretary, Roberto Romulo, and Labour Secretary, Nieves Confesor, resigned due to the dispute surrounding the execution of Flor Contemplacion.¹¹ It came to a stage when other ASEAN states, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, expressed respective concerns and hoped that the dispute would not jeopardise ASEAN unity.¹² The Affair finally came to end when the Philippines accepted the findings of an independent American forensic panel established that the extensive physical evidence against Flor Contemplacion was not fabricated.

Why did this issue reach such a feverish state between two founding members of ASEAN? As discussed in Chapter Two above, Indonesia and Singapore had such a squabble due to the hanging of two Indonesian marines by Singapore. That incident was finally amicably settled between the two countries. In this dispute between Singapore and the Philippines, the domestic situation in the Philippines in 1995 played a significant role. The Elections in the Philippines created a suitable environment to create political instability. By focussing on external issues, politicians in the Philippines distracted the indigenous population from the domestic problems, like poverty, lack of jobs, etc. Further, an added reason would be the domestic economic situation of Singapore and the Philippines. The poor state of the Filipino economy is reflected by the export of its workers to a prosperous Singapore. The difference between the two economies must have manifested itself in the mindset of ordinary Filipinos. Further, the change in leadership in both countries could have made matters worse; the informality between the two leaders was not present. ASEAN unity did not prevail because the newer leaders of these ASEAN countries did not share the historical legacies of the past.¹³

Thus, the weak link of ASEAN is again exposed in the events discussed above. With a low level of institutionalisation, divisions based on economic wealth among the members, and new leaders who do not possess the comradeship of the past, unity within ASEAN may be difficult to be maintained in the future.

¹¹See *Straits Times*, 18 April 1995; *The Straits Times*, 7 May 1995.

¹²See *The Straits Times*, 24 March 1995, p. 3. A direct result of this dispute was the Indonesians calling for the enactment of extradition treaties. Also see *The Straits Times*, 18 and 19 April 1995, p. 14. Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia stayed neutral during the dispute between the other two founding members of ASEAN.

Institutional-building has been uppermost on the minds of ASEAN leaders in the past and also in the present. But due to the deep-rooted feelings of mistrust among some of the members of ASEAN and also the recent membership of a "former enemy", institution-building has not been fully successful. The next section will deal with ASEAN's forays in trying to build institutions and multilateral linkages in the security arena.

ASEAN AS A MILITARY ALLIANCE OR SECURITY COMMUNITY?

Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has successfully avoided the perception that it is a regional security body.¹⁴ Security issues were either dealt within the confines of bilateral agreements between members states or with external actors like the U.S., Britain, Australia and New Zealand.¹⁵ Through the years, there have been proposals for greater military ties among ASEAN members put forth by some members states. Some of the proposals were the following: in 1976, Indonesia pushed for the creation of a "joint defence council"; in the wake of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, Thailand called for ASEAN military exercise; the Philippines, under President Marcos, called for joint cooperation to stem the tide of insurgency in the region. In 1982, Malaysia wanted to have trilateral military exercises with Indonesia and Singapore in response of a perceived threat from the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance, calling for a ASEAN "joint command", in response to a possible spillover from the Indochinese conflict.¹⁶ But none of these proposals actually materialised. ASEAN members relied on bilateralism in the security sphere. As Lau Teik Soon states: "But this did not preclude member countries

¹³President Suharto is the only remaining founding father of ASEAN.

¹⁴In relation to this see, "The Non-alliance Pact," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 18 March 1977, pp. 13-14.

¹⁵See "What Kind of Defence?" *Time*, 17 May 1993.

¹⁶See Dick Wilson, *The Neutralisation of Southeast Asia*, New York, 1975, p. 133; Frank Frost, "The Origins and Evolution of ASEAN," *World Review*, Vol. 19, No. 3, August 1980, p. 10; *The Straits Times*, 4 March 1980; *Bangkok World*, 9 June 1979; Michael Richardson, "ASEAN Extends Its Military Ties," *Pacific Defence Reporter*, November 1982, pp. 55-85; "ASEAN Exercises?" *Asiaweek*, 24 September 1982, p. 13; *The Straits Times*, 5 November 1979. Quoted in Amitav Acharya, "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: 'Security Community' or 'Defence Community'?", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 64, No. 2, Summer 1991, p. 161.

from meeting common threats through bilateral arrangements."¹⁷ The post-Cold War environment has forced ASEAN to rethink security issues. With the decrease in the American presence in the region, ASEAN has to develop a strong regional security structure to replace the presence of the U.S. and its security guarantees.

The basic difference between a 'security community' and a 'defence community' is that in the latter there is a need for some form of multilateral military arrangement, whereas the former focuses on cooperation to resolve disputes and conflicts within the regional grouping.¹⁸ There was considerable discussions in the mid-1970s on the need for a defence community: "In fact the ASEAN leaders debated the idea calling for a 'defence community' in the first ASEAN Summit held in Bali in 1976 but rejected the alliance option."¹⁹

There are many reasons for this direct avoidance of the security issue among ASEAN members. Firstly, due to the divergent views of the founding countries in the late 1960s, ASEAN did not want to be seen as another SEATO. Prominently, Indonesia wanted to have the Indochinese states as members and any Western-leaning sentiments would have had a negative effect. Further, Jakarta did not want to jeopardise its own non-alignment status.

Secondly, due to the differing threat perceptions of ASEAN members, there would be great difficulty in postulating a common defence or security policy as needed in an integrated regional grouping.²⁰ Even the adoption of ZOPFAN was difficult. ASEAN members asserted that ZOPFAN was a form of security alliance and there was no need to create other forms of alliances within the regional grouping. ZOPFAN was a tool that was used by ASEAN to project a region where non-interference was respected. As Amitav Acharya describes it: "ZOPFAN was a political concept which enabled

¹⁷Lau Teik Soon, "ASEAN and the Bali Summit," *International Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 4, July 1976, pp. 543-544.

¹⁸See Amitav Acharya, "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: 'Security Community' or 'Defence Community'?", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 64, No. 2, Summer 1991, pp. 159-160. Also see Lynn Miller, "The Prospects of Order Through Regional Security," in Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz, (eds.) *Regional Politics and World Order*, San Francisco, 1973, p. 51.

¹⁹Paridah Abdul Samad and Mokhtar Muhammad, "ASEAN's Role and Development as a Security Community," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, First Quarter, 1995, p. 74.

²⁰See Michael Leifer, "Is ASEAN ready to pay the price for new security environment," *The Straits Times*, 29 July 1993, p. 26.

ASEAN states to project the image of an autonomy-seeking regional community without the need for formal security functions characteristic of a traditional alliance."²¹ Although, presently, there is a common threat or uncertainty in the region, the PRC, no member has come out and articulated such a perceived threat in a bold and open manner.

The third and most significant obstacle towards a security or defence community within ASEAN is the underlying mistrust that exists among members states. Members still have nagging territorial claims that have not been settled. Indonesia is extremely dissatisfied with Malaysia for fortifying its claims on Sipadan Island off Sabah. Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, and now Vietnam have respective overlapping claims in the Spratlys. The other problem is the fear of Indonesia. Both Singapore and Malaysia, after the Konfrontasi years, do have a certain amount of apprehension in developing closer security relations with Jakarta.

Directly related to such territorial disputes is the present military modernisation programmes undertaken by all ASEAN states. This causes mistrust among the ASEAN members. For example, in 1994 Malaysia criticised Thailand for seeking to acquire a helicopter carrier as a move to bolster its offensive capabilities.²² Such opposition was also directed to Singapore with its acquisition of a training submarine.

One of the main problems ASEAN would have to come to grips with if it tries to move towards a military alliance is the issue of standardisation of the respective members' military weaponry. Standardisation of equipment, development of a common doctrine and language, and the development of common logistics facilities are necessary for ASEAN to develop into a unified military alliance.²³ There are similarities in weaponry as most members in ASEAN do have F-5E fighters, A-4 attack aircraft and Exocet SSM, however, all this is only by chance and not design.²⁴ Although officials

²¹Amitav Acharya, *A New Regional Order in South-East Asia: ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era*, Adelphi Paper 279, 1993, p. 54.

²²"Regional navy: Time not right," *The Straits Times*, 8 April 1994, p. 34.

²³See Amitav Acharya, "Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 29, No. 1, 1992, p. 15.

²⁴See Susanne M. Feske, *ASEAN and Prospects for Regional Arms Control in Southeast Asia*, Berlin, 1986, p. 41. Also see Paridah Abdul Samad and Mokhtar Muhammad, "ASEAN's Role and

... footnote cont'd over ...

from respective ASEAN countries have requested weapon standardisation and joint procurement policies, no such regional policy has ever been implemented.²⁵ The political will to enact such policies and programmes is lacking in most ASEAN countries. However, in January 1983, naval leaders of ASEAN were reported to have agreed on cooperation in weapons acquisition programmes which "would not only bring down the cost of military purchase but make it more convenient for ASEAN to exchange weapons."²⁶

In the past, ASEAN countries had some form of multilateral security arrangements. During the 1970s, ASEAN tried to move towards a makeshift military alliance. The main intention of these exercises was to bring about standardisation of weapons and procedures among ASEAN members. In the 1970s, the KISTA²⁷ exercises were considered as an ASEAN military alliance. Such exercises started in 1974, but ended prematurely in 1978. Chandran Jeshurun maintains that "This was a series of annual seminars lasting some seven weeks each for senior civilian and military officers that Indonesia initiated in 1974."²⁸ They took place in all member states except Brunei, as it ended in 1978, before the admission of Brunei into ASEAN. Through such meetings Standard Operating Procedures were adopted for the member military forces. Dewi Anwar Fortuna maintains that a new form of KISTA has been established and it is under the notion of ASEAN Regional Resilience.²⁹

At present there is a three tiered structure of military exercises which operate in the region. At the first tier, the involvement of the United States is apparent. The

Development as a Security Community," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. XXII, No. 1, First Quarter, 1995, p. 74.

²⁵See Sheldon W. Simon, "ASEAN Security in the 1990s", *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXIX, No. 6, June 1989, p. 114.

²⁶*Canberra Times*, 24 January 1983.

²⁷KISTA stands for Kurus Istimewa or Special Course. Not much information is available on KISTA.

²⁸Chandran Jeshurun, "ASEAN as a Source of Security in the Asian-Pacific Region: Some Emerging Trends," in T.B. Millar and James Walter (eds.) *Asian-Pacific Security After the Cold War*, Canberra, 1992, p. 84.

²⁹Dewi Anwar Fortuna further informed me that Australia, Canada and Asia-Pacific countries have sent observers to such ASEAN military conferences. According to her these conferences are held on a rotating basis in ASEAN countries yearly. She believes that KISTA was not continued because it was an "Indonesian baby." She informed me that in 1995, the Asia Foundation sponsored a regional resilience conference in Indonesia. Interview with Dewi Anwar Fortuna, 30 January 1996, 2.30 p.m., Jakarta, Indonesia.

Americans train bilaterally with most of the ASEAN members. American involvement in the security matters in the region was unlike its involvement in Europe with the formation of NATO: "Rather, the American presence was manifest in a series of bilateral arrangements, summing to what has been termed a 'hub and spoke' pattern with the US as the hub and virtually no coordinated security interaction among the Asian spokes."³⁰

A significant aspect of such security relations is the U.S.'s close relations with Thailand and the Philippines which extend from pre-ASEAN days. At the second level, external actors are again involved. The Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA)³¹ involves joint exercises between two ASEAN members, Singapore and Malaysia with the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. Malaysia and Singapore have also undertaken joint exercises. The FPDA was largely moribund for the last two decades. As Richard Stubbs argues: "With the recent revival of the Five-Power Defence Arrangements - which brings together Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom - Malaysia has an institutional mechanism through which to develop common defence strategies with Singapore."³² The most recent FPDA military exercise took place in Singapore on 23 March 1996.³³

Further, indirectly the FPDA in association with the ANZUS Treaty could see United States involvement in a crisis in the region. It has been suggested: "In the ANZUS Treaty, Washington is committed to aiding Australia and New Zealand forces if they come under attack. Thus if Australia and New Zealand troops become involved in hostilities while protecting Malaysia and/or Singapore, Canberra and Wellington could

³⁰David P. Rapkin, "Leadership and Cooperative Institutions," in Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill (eds.) *Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region*, Boulder, 1995, p. 111.

³¹The Five Power Defence Agreement was initiated in 1971 between the five countries. This agreement was different to its predecessor the Anglo-Malayan (Malaysian after 1963) Defence Agreement, as the onus for defence responsibilities rested with Malaysia and Singapore, rather than the external Commonwealth allies.

³²Richard Stubbs, "Malaysian Defence Policy: Strategy versus Structure," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 13, No. 1, June 1991, p. 54.

³³It was a eight day exercise codenamed Major Adex. The exercise brought together 80 aircraft and 2 ships from all the members of the FPDA. See *The Straits Times*, 23 March 1996, p. 3.

invoke ANZUS in requesting American assistance."³⁴ There has been some discussion about including Brunei in the FPDA. This was first mentioned by the then British Secretary of State for Defence, George Younger, in March 1987 during his visit to Southeast Asia: "Mr Younger made it clear that Britain would give its full support for Brunei's inclusion in the pact ..."³⁵ During the late 1980s, Malaysia was initiating moves to get Brunei to join the FPDA.³⁶

With regards to the FPDA, "the political commitment of the FPDA members was reaffirmed in April 1991 when defence ministers met in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur to discuss security matters."³⁷ Again in 1994, the FPDA was mentioned as a significant element of the regional security framework by all the countries involved.³⁸ Although the FPDA was a Cold War outcome in response to the British policy of 'East of Suez', it continues to be relevant to Singapore's and Malaysia's security.³⁹

On the other hand, Malaysia maintains that the FPDA will not be used if a dispute arises in the South China Sea. "... because Australia is wary of becoming involved in such disputes, Kuala Lumpur doubts the FPDA's value in effecting Malaysia's security interests."⁴⁰ In 1995, Singapore and Malaysia further agreed to undertake a bilateral defence forum and cooperation.⁴¹

³⁴Kao Shaw-Fawn, *China and ASEAN's Strategic Interests and Policy Prospects, (Vol. I and II)*, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Virginia, 1990, p. 346. Note: New Zealand is no longer an active member of ANZUS

³⁵K.U. Menon, "A Six Power Defence Arrangement in Southeast Asia?", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 10, No. 3, December 1988, p. 308.

³⁶*Malay Mail*, cited in *The Sunday Times*, 19 July 1987.

³⁷Richard Stubbs, "Subregional Security Cooperation in ASEAN: Military and Economic Imperatives and Political Obstacles," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXII, No. 5, May 1992, p. 405.

³⁸See *Reuters World Service*, 20 September 1994, (On line), (Nexis).

³⁹See Bilveer Singh, "The Challenge of the Security Environment in Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 2, October 1993, p. 275.

⁴⁰Sheldon W. Simon, "U.S. Strategy and Southeast Asian Security: Issues of Compatibility," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 14, No. 4, March 1993, p. 311.

⁴¹See "New Milestone in S'pore-KL Ties," *The Straits Times*, 18 January 1995. Also see "KL-S'pore Defence Ties," *The Straits Times*, 17 January 1995. The Defence Forum was inaugurated on January 17, 1995. The two countries agreed to have military exercises that would involve the three services of the countries.

Brunei has a separate defence agreement with Britain that provides for the continued stationing of a Gurkha battalion on its territory. Furthermore, "Brunei is forging close defence links with Australia and Singapore."⁴²

In December 1995, Indonesia signed a defence agreement with Australia (Agreement on Maintaining Security): "For Indonesia, it is the first time since its proclamation of independence 50 years ago, that it has engaged in a security arrangement with another country."⁴³ Further, the signing of this treaty "has laid to rest any lingering perceptions that Indonesia is a potential, if publicly unidentified, enemy."⁴⁴ Hence, we see that six ASEAN countries have security relations with extra-regional actors, and Vietnam formerly had a relationship with the Soviet Union.

At the third level, bilateral military arrangements among ASEAN states are prominent. Some of these arrangements pre-date ASEAN, while others have been established after the formation of the regional grouping. For example, bilateral cooperation between Thailand and Malaysia was established in 1959 and the Indonesia-Philippines border agreement was signed in 1964. Hence, the foundation was laid for military cooperation among the countries in the region. The establishment of ASEAN expanded such ties and to a certain extent enveloped the region. Amitav Acharya maintains that: "Over the years, these bilateral ties have developed into an overlapping and interlocking network."⁴⁵ Further, these bilateral relations among ASEAN countries fall into two specific categories. The first includes border treaties, sharing of intelligence to combat internal communist insurgencies, and extradition treaties. The second category addresses external threats to regional security. Sheldon Simon states that: "All of these strengthen regional military capabilities and enhance the security community by reducing potential misunderstandings about each other's military intentions."⁴⁶ At the

⁴²Donald Weatherbee, *ASEAN After the Cambodia: Reordering Southeast Asia*, The Asia Society, June 1989, p. 19.

⁴³Ikar Nusa Bhakti, "Strange Neighbours," *ISEAS Trends*, 27-28 January 1996, p. III.

⁴⁴Milton Osborne, "Burying Old Fears," *ISEAS Trends*, 27-28 January 1996, p. III.

⁴⁵Amitav Acharya, "Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 29, No. 1, 1992, p. 10.

⁴⁶Sheldon W. Simon, "U.S. Strategy and Southeast Asian Security: Issues of Compatibility," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 14, No. 4, March 1993, p. 311.

1976 ASEAN Summit, it was agreed that bilateral military and security ties would be increased, but that this should be undertaken outside the framework of ASEAN.

Within ASEAN, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia have the most developed bilateral military arrangements.⁴⁷ Singapore has stated that it needs to strengthen existing military ties among ASEAN countries as a new security framework evolves in the region.⁴⁸ Singapore and Indonesia have since the early 1970s undertaken comprehensive military exercises.⁴⁹ Such arrangements encompass yearly joint military exercises, other technical endeavours and training stints in respective countries. Both, Singapore and Indonesia seem to want ASEAN to move towards greater military integration and develop a security community. The security relations of Singapore and Indonesia have rapidly developed since 1988, when Jakarta allowed the Singapore Armed Forces access to the Siabu firing range in Sumatra.⁵⁰ Further, these two countries held their first joint exercise, Safkar Indopura, in December 1989. Recently, these two countries offered the other ASEAN members the use of the Air Combat Manoeuvring Range (ACMR) in Sumatra to promote further integration of the respective air forces.⁵¹ Indonesia has volunteered to make available any area that Singapore requires to train its armed forces and hence on Ratu Raja, south of Sumatra, a forty thousand hectare site has been identified as training ground for Singapore's land troops.⁵²

Malaysia and Thailand have also had quite a long history of military cooperation. In 1949, Britain, Malaya and Thailand established an informal

⁴⁷Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore have sent their respective military officers to each other's military schools.

⁴⁸See *The Straits Times (Overseas Weekly Edition)*, 6 August 1994, p. 1.

⁴⁹See Bilveer Singh, *Singapore-Indonesia Defence Cooperation: A Case Study of Defence Bilateralism Within ASEAN*, Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Malaysia, 1990.

⁵⁰Leszek Buszynski, "Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era: Regionalism and Security," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXII, No. 9, September 1992, p. 8413.

⁵¹See Simon Sinaga, "Defence chief offer range to Asean countries," *The Straits Times, (Overseas Weekly Edition)*, July 15, 1995. This range was developed jointly by Singapore and Indonesia and was opened in March of 1994.

⁵²Amitav Acharya, "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: 'Security Community' or 'Defence Community'?", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 64, No. 2, Summer 1991, pp. 167-168.

understanding with regards to communist activities in each other's territory. In 1959, after Merdeka, these two states signed a specific border agreement.⁵³

Indonesia's and Malaysia's armed forces have also exercised together. Hence, within the ASEAN region there has been a long history of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) and it is not a recent phenomenon. CBMs are more of a Western-institutionalised endeavour that have recently been initiated by the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region. The table on the next page highlights the extent of bilateral military exercises in ASEAN. Indonesian Army Commander General Try Sutrisno, has commented on ASEAN's security cooperation as a "spider's web" of bilateral and trilateral security relations."⁵⁴

⁵³For a full historical analysis of Thai-Malaysian military ties see, B.A. Hamzah, "ASEAN Military Cooperation without Pact or Threat," *Asia Pacific Community*, Fall 1983, pp. 40-24.

⁵⁴Leszek Buszynski, "Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era: Regionalism and Security," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXII, No. 9, September 1992, p. 841. Quote taken from the article in *The Straits Times (Overseas Weekly Edition)*, 9 December 1989.

TABLE 6.1: BILATERAL MILITARY EXERCISES IN ASEAN; 1972-1995.

Countries Involved	Name of Exercise	Year Started	Comments
Indonesia/Malaysia (Army)	Kekar Malindo	1977	Annual
	Tatar Malindo	1981	Intermittent
	Kripura Malindo	1981	Intermittent
Indonesia/Malaysia (Air)	Elang Malindo	1975	Annual
Indonesia/Malaysia (Navy)	Malindo Jaya	1973	Annual(?)
Indonesia/Malaysia (All Services)	Darasasa Malindo	1982	Twice since 1982
Indonesia/Singapore (Army)	Safakar Indopura	1989	Annual
Indonesia/Singapore (Air)	Elang Indopura	1980	Annual
Indonesia/Singapore (Navy)	Englek	1974	Biennial
Indonesia/Thailand (Air)	Elang Thainesia	1981	Annual
Indonesia/Thailand (Navy)	Sea Garuda	1975(?)	Intermittent
Indonesia/Philippines (Navy)	Philindo/Corpatphilindo	1972	Intermittent
Malaysia/Singapore (Army)	Semangat Bersatu	1989	Intermittent
Malaysia/Singapore (Navy)	Malapura	1984	Annual (Suspended)
Malaysia/Thailand (Air)	Air Thamal	1981	Annual
Malaysia/Thailand (Navy)	Thalay	1980	Intermittent(?)
Malaysia/Brunei (Navy)	Hornbil (and others)	1981(?)	Intermittent
Singapore/Thailand (Air)	Sing-Siam	1981(?)	Intermittent
Singapore/Thailand (Navy)	Thai-Sing	1983	Annual
Singapore/Brunei (Navy)	Pelican	1979	Annual
Singapore/Brunei (Army)	Termite/Flaming Arrow/Juggernaut	1985	Annual
Singapore/Philippines (Army)	Anoa-Singa	1993	Annual(?)
Singapore/Brunei (Air)	Rapier	1995	Annual

Source: Table taken from Amitav Acharya, *An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia: Prospects for Control*. Pacific Strategic Papers. Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994, pp. 36-37.⁵⁵ Also see *The Straits Times*, 26 October 1995, p. 20.

⁵⁵The author's sources are *New Straits Times*, 17 November 1983; *Star*, 17 August 1988; *New Straits Times*, 21 February 1981; Donald Weatherbee, "ASEAN Security Co-operation and the South China Sea," (Paper Presented in East/Asia Pacific", Waikoloa, Hawaii, 6-8 February 1982); *New Straits Times*, 30 August 1983; *The Star*, 20 August 1983; Personal Interviews in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 16 August 1989; *Asian Defence Journal*, No. 5, (1976), p. 26; *New Straits Times*, 9 May 1984; *The Star*, 18 November 1982; *The Star*, 20 November 1986; *Indonesia Observer*, 10 August 1989; *The Straits Times*, 16 December 1989; *Pioneer*, no. 82 (August 1984); *Pioneer*, No. 109 (November 1986); *Bangkok Post*, 7 January 1982; *The Straits Times*, 28 January 1975; *China News*, 4 November 1975; *The Straits Times*, 28 January 1973; Personal interview with the Defence Attache of the Philippines, Jakarta, 10 August 1989; *Star*, 26 May 1989; *The Sunday Times* (Singapore), 21

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As on the previous table details, joint Army exercises by ASEAN countries are quite irregular. Amitav Acharya states: "Although army exercises initially formed only a small part of these [joint military exercise], largely due to sensitivities of the host country regarding the presence of foreign troops on its soil, recent trends point to an increase in army exercises as well."⁵⁶

Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand have called for greater security integration for ASEAN on the basis of annual military exercises.⁵⁷ With the recent closures of the American Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base in the Philippines, it is highly likely that Manila also wants closer security arrangements. Singapore's Minister of State for Defence, Rear Admiral Teo Chee Heon, maintained that: "This [close security arrangements] was necessary as the six ASEAN countries were far from a region-wide security system, having diverse threat perceptions and bilateral disputes between them."⁵⁸ Malaysia is not too enthusiastic to enact close military ties among ASEAN states. The Malaysian rationale for avoiding increased ASEAN security relations is that other extra-regional countries may perceive such an activity as a security threat and also that ASEAN was not ready for multilateral security cooperation.⁵⁹ The Malaysians have always resisted trilateral or multilateral security cooperation within ASEAN.⁶⁰ Leszek Buszynski argues that: "The Malaysians, however, have resisted any expansion of

May 1989; *Pioneer*, no. 141 (July 1989); *Pioneer*, no. 84 (October 1984); B.A. Hamzah, "ASEAN Military Cooperation Without Pact or Threat", *Asia Pacific Community*, no. 22 (Fall 1983), pp. 42-43; *The Straits Times*, 3 August 1989; *New Straits Times*, 21 August 1980; K.U. Menon, "A Six Power Defence Arrangement in Southeast Asia", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 10, no. 3, (December 1988); *The Straits Times*, 18 August 1983; *Pioneer*, no. 72 (October 1983); *Pioneer*, no. 120 (October 1987); *Asian Defence Journal* (January 1988), p. 18; *The Straits Times* 6 July 1990; *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter* (June-July 1992), p. 26; *The Straits Times*, 16 June 1993, p. 16; and *The Straits Times*, 15 March 1990, p. 18.

⁵⁶Amitav Acharya, "Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 29, No. 1, February 1992, p. 14.

⁵⁷See *The Straits Times*, 8 October 1991, 26 July 1990, and 29 February 1992; *Bangkok Post*, 6 November 1991.

⁵⁸*The Straits Times*, (Overseas Weekly Edition), August 6, 1994, p. 1.

⁵⁹See *The Straits Times*, 2 March 1992, and *The Sunday Times* (Singapore), 8 March 1992.

⁶⁰Amitav Acharya points out in his article, "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: "Security Community" or "Defence Community"?, *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 64, No. 2, Summer 1991, p. 159, that the former foreign minister of Malaysia, Abu Hassan called for ASEAN to form a Defence Community. It has to be realised that this might have been the personal view of an ex-cabinet minister but may not have been the view of the Malaysian government of the day.

security cooperation beyond the bilateral level, which reflects a concern that they might be overwhelmed by Indonesia or subordinated to the Singaporeans."⁶¹ Malaysia is not keen on increased military cooperation in the region beyond the FPDA;⁶² Kuala Lumpur favours bilateral military ties in the region. The Chief of the Malaysian Armed Forces stated in 1990 that:

Bilateral defence cooperation is flexible and provide[s] wide ranging options. It allows any ASEAN partner to decide the type, time and scale of aid it requires and can provide. The question of national independence and sovereignty is unaffected by the decision of others as in the case of an alliance where members can evoke the terms of the treaty and interfere in the affairs of another partner.⁶³

There has been a change in Indonesia's stance on the formation of an ASEAN military pact. In the past, Jakarta had rejected this idea. Even in 1991, Ali Alatas maintained that ASEAN "should remain true to its essence and that is economic, social, cultural and even now political co-operation, but not a defence pact."⁶⁴

Singapore, on the other hand, due to its precarious geographic location, sandwiched between two larger Muslim countries has always maintained the need for a military pact in the region. A military alliance would institutionalise regional security and quell intra-ASEAN threat perceptions for the Singapore leaders. The same geographic nature of the island-state has helped it to indirectly develop close security relations among some of the other ASEAN countries. Due to space constraints, Singapore needs wide land and air areas for its armed forces to train regularly. Hence, Singapore has established such land-use and air-space agreements with Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines, and Thailand.⁶⁵ Singapore has very substantive military relations with Brunei. The city-state has a permanent military camp in Temburong in the

⁶¹Leszek Buszynski, "Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era: Regionalism and Security," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXII, No. 9, September 1992, p. 841.

⁶²See "Regional Navy: Time Not Right," *The Straits Times*, 8 April 1994, p. 34.

⁶³Hashim Mohammed Ali (General), "Regional Defence from the Military Perspective," *ISIS Focus*, Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Malaysia, No. 58, January 1990, pp. 41-42.

⁶⁴*The Straits Times*, 29 March 1991, p. 20.

⁶⁵Singapore maintains air force training facilities in the Philippines, army training facilities in Thailand and Brunei, and has developed a joint air-weapons training facility in Sumatra, Indonesia. Land area has also been set aside in Indonesia for Singapore's army to train.

eastern enclave of Brunei.⁶⁶ This indirectly has increased the tendency for security cooperation among these countries.

Cold War legacies and external military alliances are obstacles for closer security relations among ASEAN countries. The FPDA is a significant barrier towards the establishment of a military alliance in the region. Among the core countries of ASEAN, Indonesia views the FPDA as an impediment for the enactment of a military community in ASEAN.⁶⁷ ASEAN has avoided the conception of a military alliance and has undertaken to circumvent this notion by having joint military exercises and training.

With the withdrawal of the U.S. military from the Southeast Asian region, countries like Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand have to adjust their respective security policies accordingly. But it is doubtful whether ASEAN is ready to undertake a multilateral defence alliance. Even the head of the United States military forces in the Pacific, Admiral Charles Larson, has argued that ASEAN is not ready for a NATO-like⁶⁸ collective security organisation or a loose forum akin to the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe.⁶⁹

But the question arises: Has ASEAN turned into a 'security community'? Some scholars maintain that ASEAN has not reached such a stage.⁷⁰ The present push towards the evolution of a security community among ASEAN members is primarily due to the U.S. withdrawal from the region and also the instability in the South China Sea. But the issue of the overlapping claims of the Spratly Islands will create future dispute within the regional grouping. As mentioned in Chapter Five above, four ASEAN members are claimants and have overlapping claims. These claims may be settled peacefully due to ASEAN traditions of compromise and consensus-building. But, until such an agreement is reached, which will be difficult without an agreement with China, consequently the

⁶⁶K. U. Menon, "A Six Power Defence Arrangement in Southeast Asia?", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 10, No. 3, December 1988, p. 313.

⁶⁷See Richard Stubbs, "Subregional Security Cooperation in ASEAN: Military and Economic Imperatives and Political Obstacles," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXII, No. 5, May 1992, p. 409.

⁶⁸See *The Straits Times*, 30 May 1992, p. 18.

⁶⁹See "Asian Countries, in Shift, Weigh Defence Forum," *The New York Times*, 23 May 1993, p. 16.

⁷⁰See Amitav Acharya, "Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 29, No. 1, February 1992, p. 12.

eventual creation of a truly bonafide security community will be delayed. The inclusion of Vietnam in ASEAN has created problems in reaching an intra-ASEAN agreement on the issue of the Spratly Islands. Vietnam does not have the ASEAN historical tradition of conflict resolution and the reaching of consensus.

Even with the recent establishment of the ARF, ASEAN officials have reinforced the notion that the regional grouping is not heading towards a security or military pact either internally or externally with other countries. ASEAN maintains that the ARF is a significant form of building security cooperation in the region.⁷¹ However, ASEAN still prefers to deal with its own members' security links outside the ASEAN framework.

Sheldon Simon identifies six obstacles towards building a defence community within ASEAN. They are:

1. the absence of a common threat(s) to the ASEAN-six [now seven, soon to be ten];
2. the need to resolve conflicts arising from overlapping EEZs in the South China Sea;
3. a lack of interoperability among ASEAN armed forces;
4. differing military doctrines and orientations, for example, between Singapore's forward defence out into the South China Sea and Indonesia's defence in depth;
5. continued reluctance to expand bilateral exercises to multilateral manoeuvres despite advantages to the latter;
6. reliance of ASEAN members on outside powers via the FPDA, Manila Treaty, and Mutual Defence Treaty.⁷²

All of these points have been raised in the preceding discussion. Further, Noordin Sopiee in 1983 remarked on the reasons for ASEAN's rejection of a military alliance:

First, alliances demand commitment and a certain loss of political independence and are not beneficial unless there are benefits on the other side of the scale. Second, military alliances with militarily weak states or between such states have little military utility... Third, the idea that one ASEAN state will actually militarily go to the assistance of another in a meaningful and substantial way has lacked credibility (due to doubts

⁷¹See "Asean 'is not' heading for a security pact," *New Straits Times*, 16 July 1994, p. 21.

⁷²See Sheldon W. Simon, "U.S. Strategy and Southeast Asian Security: Issues of Compatibility," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 14, No. 4, March 1993, p. 310.

about political will and actual capability). Fourthly, the transformation of ASEAN into a military alliance would run counter to ... the continuing desire to reassure the communist Indochina states that ASEAN's goals and activities are peaceful in nature. Fifth, military alliances and a defence community have been seen to be largely superfluous, given that informal, semi-formal and formal mechanisms of military cooperation already exist and are judged to be adequate. Sixth, Vietnamese taunts from the sixties that ASEAN was a military organisation have resulted in a defensive mindset that is loath to even think of a military option.⁷³

Hence, if ASEAN embarks on an integrated security or defence alliance, past underlying differences may surface. Michael Leifer states: "Any attempt to promote defence cooperation under ASEAN's aegis would provoke intra-mural discord and so prejudice its valuable but more limited security achievements."⁷⁴ This may bring about a counteralliance or sub-alliances and further widen the fissures within ASEAN.

Although ASEAN does not have a military pact, it is highly commendable that the member states have developed and maintained close bilateral military relations without the perception of a common threat. B. A. Hamzah states: "... it is also unnatural to expect the ASEAN countries to cooperate on more substantive issues in the absence of an external threat that is common to all."⁷⁵ European models of military cooperation are held in place by a common threat. During the Cold War it was the divide between East and West. Such is not the case in ASEAN. This may change based on the perception that the PRC is increasing its hegemonic tendencies in the region by some ASEAN members.

But some scholars view ASEAN as a limited security community:

Insofar as ASEAN has developed into a security community, it is principally because its members have come to accept rules of conduct by which they agree to refrain from interfering in each other's internal

⁷³Noordin Sopiee, "The Political and Security Policies of the ASEAN States with Particular Reference to the United States and Japan," Paper presented at the Conference on "The United States, Japan and Southeast Asia: The Issues of Interdependence", The East Asian Institute and the International Economic Research Center, 14-18 December 1983, pp. 22-23.

⁷⁴Michael Leifer, "Is ASEAN ready to pay the price for new security environment," *The Straits Times*, 29 July 1993, p. 26.

⁷⁵B. A. Hamzah, "ASEAN Military Cooperation Without Pact or Threat," *Asia Pacific Community*, Fall 1983, p. 44.

affairs and to settle their disagreements peacefully and without outside interference.⁷⁶

ASEAN: SUCCESS OR FAILURE?

The contentious issue of ASEAN's failure to enhance regional economic development is perhaps an appropriate starting point in this discussion of the regional body's performance.⁷⁷ As discussed in Chapter Two above, ASEAN did not and has not achieved all it wanted to in the area of economic development. But we cannot end this analysis without looking into future possibilities. The implementation of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) may establish the needed pre-requisites for the Southeast Asian region to become an integrative open regional body. AFTA has been enacted as there was fear that, without an ASEAN economic agreement, member-states of ASEAN may join other Free Trade Blocs. This stance has been stated by the Indonesian Trade Minister, Arifin Siregar, in December 1991, "If ASEAN does not rapidly form the AFTA, it is feared that ASEAN countries might join other planned free trade zones outside ASEAN which would only weaken ASEAN unity."⁷⁸ Hence, the fear of disintegration has forced ASEAN to take a concrete step towards economic integration. The regionalist tendencies in North America and Europe have in fact brought about greater economic unity within ASEAN. The intangible centrifugal force that binds members of ASEAN will help to develop greater economic integration in the future.

Although it is too early to analyse the impact of AFTA in the region, some analysts have suggested that it will be minimal.⁷⁹ Viewing the implementation from a

⁷⁶Kusuma Snitwongse, "Strategic Development in Southeast Asia," in Desmond Ball and David Homer (eds.), *Strategic Studies in a Changing World: Global, regional and Australian Perspectives*, (Canberra Papers on Strategic and Defence No. 89, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1992, pp. 273-274. Also see Tan Lian Choo, "Members' internal affairs 'off-limits to Asean,' *The Straits Times*, 18th September 1994, p. 13.

⁷⁷Here only the success and failure of ASEAN as a regional body will be discussed. As individual member's successes and failures is outside the scope of this study.

⁷⁸Quoted in See Michael Antolik, "ASEAN's Singapore Rendezvous: Just Another Summit?," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 14, No. 2, September 1992, pp. 142.

⁷⁹See Jiro Okamoto, "ASEAN's New Role in the Asia Pacific Region: Can It Be a Driving Force of the Wider Regional Economic Cooperation?," in Michio Kimura (ed.), *Multi-Layered Regional*

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wider perspective, it can be judged a success on the basis that it is form of trade liberalisation and increased political cooperation that encompasses all members of ASEAN.

One of the criteria that can be used to measure ASEAN's performance would be in its conflict-resolution or security role within the region. As early as 1968, the formation of ASEAN helped to resolve the conflict between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah. As Jorgensen-Dahl maintains:

The organisation has served as an alternative channel for informal discussions when official bilateral relations have been strained, at times almost to the point of complete rupture. This was, for example, the case during the second Sabah crisis in 1968-69, when the organisation almost collapsed. In this respect, we may refer to ASEAN's conflict defusing, or abating, rather than conflict resolution function.⁸⁰

The pre-ASEAN period was marked by poor relations among the countries as compared to the period after the formation of the regional grouping.⁸¹ The major disputes during this period were the Sabah issue between Malaysia and the Philippines, and the Konfrontasi episode between Indonesia and Malaysia. Bilson Kurus states: "So the benefits and advantages that ASEAN provides its member states beyond the confines of intra-ASEAN economic cooperation are technically the benefits of regionalism, and there is no question that without an organisation such as ASEAN these benefits would not have been forthcoming."⁸² Muthiah Alagappa argues that: "By helping to strengthen the political and territorial status quo in the region, ASEAN has contributed to the transformation of a volatile region into a stable and prosperous one."⁸³

Cooperation in Southeast Asia after the Cold War, I.D.E Symposium Proceedings No. 15, Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo, 1995, p. 81.

⁸⁰Arfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, "Regional Organisation and Stability in the ASEAN Region," in Kusuma Snitwongse and Sukhumbhand Paribatra (eds.), *Durable Stability in Southeast Asia*, p. 66.

⁸¹See Somsakdi Xuto, "ASEAN and Regional Security: A Perspective on ASEAN Contribution," in ASEAN Symposium Committee, (ed.), *Security in the ASEAN Region*, Tokyo, 1983, pp. 55-64.

⁸²Bilson Kurus, "Understanding ASEAN: Benefits and Raison d'Etre," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 8, August 1993, p. 830.

⁸³Muthiah Alagappa, "Regionalism and Conflict Management: A Framework For Analysis," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 21, 1995, p. 374.

During the 1970s and 1980s ASEAN adopted agreements to maintain peace and stability in the region to enhance the security environment. As Bilveer Singh, has argued:

ASEAN's establishment, the declaration of ZOPFAN, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the ASEAN Concord, the proposal for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone and the activist role in the Cambodian problem were clear manifestation of Southeast Asians, especially ASEAN, becoming more assertive in dictating the nature of their regional security environment.⁸⁴

Based on the last thirty years, ASEAN has succeeded in dispute management. As argued by Hoang Anh Tuan, such success can be attributed to five techniques:

- (a) adherence to the ground rules enshrined in ASEAN's diverse declarations and communiqués,
- (b) stressing the virtue of self-restraint,
- (c) adoption of the practices of *musyawarah* and *mufakat* (consultation and consensus),
- (d) using third party mediation to settle disputes, and
- (e) agreeing to disagree or shelve disagreements for a later settlement.⁸⁵

Of all these above attributes of ASEAN conflict management process, the notion of *musjawarah* diplomacy is extremely important to ASEAN. It is the foundation on which ASEAN resolves its internal conflicts.

Another event would be the Kampuchean conflict and ASEAN's role in its peaceful resolution. The resolution of this conflict established ASEAN as a reputable international actor. ASEAN played a leading role in defining the terms of the debate concerning a possible conflict resolution and also hosting a number of dialogue sessions. Sukhumbhand Paribatra has stated that, if ASEAN was not present during the incursion,

⁸⁴Bilveer Singh, "The Challenge of the Security Environment in Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 2, October 1993, p. 265.

⁸⁵Hoang Anh Tuan, "ASEAN Dispute Management: Implications for Vietnam and an Expanded ASEAN," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 18, No. 1, June 1996, p. 63.

It is probable, first of all, that Vietnam would have asserted on an effective and sustained basis its mastery over Kampuchea; second, that rather than being isolated and asked to justify its actions to the international community, it would by now have launched itself into tasks of economic reconstruction and put itself into a position more or less to dictate the pattern of power distribution within the region; and third, that Vietnam would have greatly accentuated Thailand's sense of insecurity, with adverse repercussions on Thai internal stability and cohesion.⁸⁶

Thus, ASEAN provided the containment barrier for perceived communist expansionism in the region. Within ASEAN, the argument that it is a success is sustainable as this regional body did help block the expansion of Communism within the region. Communism did not get a foot-hole within the ASEAN region due to the presence of the regional body which galvanised international and regional support in the case of the Kampuchean conflict. Jorgensen-Dahl maintains that: "In most respects, ASEAN is a congregation of states, each of which jealously seeks to protect its sovereign prerogatives and which therefore functions best when it can focus on issues external to itself."⁸⁷ Charles Morrison and Astri Suhrike state:

In assessing ASEAN, we should be careful not to put strawmen by judging its performance against such criteria as an integrated economic community or a military security pact. The member governments did not have such encompassing intentions when establishing the organisation and - for good and obvious reasons - have continued to entertain much more limited objectives.⁸⁸

The recent evolution of the ARF can also be considered as a success for ASEAN and the region as a whole. This regional security consultative body, which cuts across ideological lines, has met twice and has been successful in bringing disputes to the

⁸⁶M. R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "ASEAN and the Kampuchean Conflict: A Study of a Regional Organisation's Responses to External Security Challenges," in Robert Scalapino and Masataka Kasaka, (eds.), *Peace, Politics and Economy in Asia - The Challenge to Cooperate*, Washington, 1981, p. 157.

⁸⁷Arfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, "Regional Organisation and Stability in the ASEAN Region," in Kusuma Snitwongse and Sukhumbhand Paribatra (eds.), *Durable Stability in Southeast Asia*, p. 70.

⁸⁸Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrike, "ASEAN in Regional Defence and Development," in Sudershan Chavala and D.R. Sardesai, (eds.), *Changing Patterns of Security and Stability in Asia*, pp. 212-213.

forum. This forum provides the basis for all the regional and extra-regional actors to discuss political and security issues of the Asia-Pacific region.⁸⁹

Ambiguity has been a notion often used by observers in criticising the performance of ASEAN. To a great extent ambiguity or the vagueness of declarations and actions has helped ASEAN to maintain the facade of solidarity. Michael Antolik states that: "It [ambiguity] allows individual states to perceive the ASEAN process as serving its particular interests. Moreover, ambiguity applied to foreign policy, through broad articulations and displays of unity, keeps down the cost of solidarity."⁹⁰

As stated in Chapter Two above, ASEAN did not meet with as much success as it expected in the economic field. But, it has to be noted that ASEAN, although publicly founded to improve economic performance, that goal may have been an ideal for media and public consumption. Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie has stated that:

We [himself and Gen. Ali Moertop]⁹¹ also suggested that for the organisation to have a chance of success, its political function should be of a low profile. Stress should be put on its economic character to avoid burdening the organisation with airing political issues in the press, which very often were hostile to good initiatives.⁹²

Ghazalie's comments suggest that ASEAN was undertaken to solve political conflicts, but publicly stressed the economic agenda so as to provide the breathing space necessary for such an infant grouping to succeed. ASEAN was formed just after the cessation of confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, and also the Sabah dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia had subsided. This, together with the understanding that the economies involved were at various degrees of development and their weak complementary nature, meant economic integration was and still is difficult to accomplish.

⁸⁹See Frank Ching, "Creation of a Security Forum Is a Feather in ASEAN's Cap," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 12, 1993, p. 27.

⁹⁰Michael Antolik, *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation*, London, 1991, p. 107.

⁹¹These two men helped their respective foreign ministers to end Konfrontasi and undertake the foundation to set-up ASEAN

⁹²Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, "Politics in Command," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 22 October 1992, p. 30. Also see "Partnership in Spirit of Togetherness," *New Straits Times*, 4 June 1994, p. 13.

ASEAN's accomplishments at the strategic political level have entrenched its international position. In the last 30 years, ASEAN has gradually developed its norms and rules of behaviour. The 1967 Bangkok Declaration instilled the notion of togetherness and the need for unity. The 1971 ZOPFAN initiative was a measure of ASEAN's commitment towards the non-interference of extra-regional actors in the Southeast Asian region. The 1976 Bali concords brought about the institutionalisation of conflict resolution and the need for economic integration. Lately, ASEAN restructured its bureaucracy at the Singapore ASEAN Summit in 1992, which is reflected through the changes in the region and also the increased international recognition of the regional body. The most significant structural change at the 1992 meeting was with the office of the ASEAN Secretariat. It can now initiate, recommend and supervise policies and action plans, and is headed by the Secretary of ASEAN, a position which is filled by recruitment instead of the traditional practice of rotation among members.⁹³

Although this is a positive step towards greater institutionalism of the regional body, time will tell where the ASEAN secretariat will take on the function of a supra-national body. Since the 1992 meeting, the ASEAN Secretariat has not unilaterally initiated new policies without the prior consensus of the member countries. I doubt that the ASEAN secretariat will actively pursue its new powers. Via the interviews that I have conducted, scholars have maintained that these new powers were enacted to paint a positive picture of modernisation and institutionalisation taking place within the regional organisation to the rest of the world.

Hence, it is difficult to assess whether ASEAN has been a pure success or failure. It would be extremely naive and simplistic to maintain that ASEAN is one or the other. ASEAN has had a number of successes and failures. It has had a mixed record as an international organisation. But it has to be stated based on the above discussion that ASEAN is a measured success.

⁹³See Michael Antolik, "ASEAN's Singapore Rendezvous: Just Another Summit?," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 14, No. 2, September 1992, pp. 142-53.

THE THEORETICAL DEBATE

In this section, this thesis will try to analyse the actualities of ASEAN in its present form and in the next section present a theoretical argument that can be used to explain the ASEAN experience. Although a theory of regionalism has to accommodate all aspects of inter-member relations, ASEAN's economic and political relations are within the confines of weak multilateral institutionalism. It is only when we discuss ASEAN's security framework that we to modify the theoretical underpinnings of multilateral institutionalism. Thus, the discussion presented below will address the uniqueness of ASEAN's security relations with its member states and extra-member actors.

As suggested below, most of the current theoretical literature concerning ASEAN deals with trying to underpin its security foundation. In other words, ASEAN theorists are mostly concerned with the development and maintenance of security ties within this regional organisation. The main reason for such a preoccupation is due to the past instability in the region and also the level of mistrust among many of the members of ASEAN. So the analysis below is based on issues of security and how it can be related to a theoretical framework.

The next evolutionary step of security enhancement through confidence-building measures (CBMs) is being undertaken by ASEAN in the 1990s. Various security institutions are being designed as CBMs in the region. As discussed in the previous Chapter, the ARF was established by ASEAN. Although the framework of the ARF extends to the Asia-Pacific region, ASEAN is trying to come to grips with contemporary security issues. The post-Cold War era is marked by security aspects that go beyond the sub-regional concentration of the past.

Let us first look at the unique security fundamentals of ASEAN. Specific concepts and issues that ASEAN has developed or endorsed in its security linkages within the regional organisation and also with extra-ASEAN actors are that of 'regional resilience', informal structure, non-interference, pluralistic security complex and also collective political defence.

Let us first begin with a clearer understanding about the notion of 'regional resilience'. Amitav Acharya states that:

The concept of national and regional 'resilience,' advanced by the New Order regime of President Suharto of Indonesia, and adopted as something of an ASEAN motto by other members of the group, highlights the importance of domestic order and regime stability as an objective of the regional agenda.⁹⁴

David Irvine relates security with regional and national resilience as:

National resilience is an inward-looking concept, based on the proposition that national security lies not in military alliances or under the military umbrella of a great power, but in self-reliance deriving from domestic factors such as economic and social development, political stability and a sense of nationalism.⁹⁵

Another peculiarity of ASEAN's regionalism is the reliance on the 'ASEAN spirit' to resolve intra-ASEAN and also extra-ASEAN conflicts. Although, ASEAN has formally institutionalised mechanisms for conflict resolution like the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, these have never been employed. As Jorgensen-Dahl observes:

ASEAN served a useful purpose by providing a framework within which the parties could discuss their differences in a 'neutral' atmosphere The multilateral framework allowed the parties to remain in contact in circumstances which either had caused a collapse of bilateral channels or placed these channels under such stress they could no longer function properly Through the steadily increasing scope of range of activities, ... it produced among government officials of the five [now seven], attitudes which were much more receptive and sensitive to each other's peculiar problems, and which made compromise solutions to conflicting interests a much more likely outcome than before ... the multilateral setting served to discourage extreme behaviour, modify extravagant demands, and inspire compromise.⁹⁶

Further, ASEAN has taken such norms and procedures for conflict resolution and have applied them to extra-regional conflict management. The Cambodian conflict and ASEAN's approach to it is a good example. Also Indonesia's involvement via a conference mechanism to resolve the South China dispute is another.

⁹⁴Amitav Acharya, "Regionalism and Regime Security in the Third World, Comparing the Origins of the ASEAN and the GCC," in Brian Job (ed.), *The Security Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*, Boulder, 1992, pp. 148-149.

⁹⁵David Irvine, "Making Haste Slowly: ASEAN from 1975," in Alison Broinowski, ed. *Understanding ASEAN*, London, 1982, p. 40.

The second peculiarity of ASEAN security dimension is its preoccupation with informality in its activities. Compared to other autonomous or hegemonic alliances is the fact that ASEAN's military-security cooperation is informal in nature. This is an extension of the 'ASEAN spirit'. Again, during the Cambodian conflict, ASEAN members gathered around Thailand and addressed the entire issue with specific reference to Thailand being the 'front-line state.'

Another ASEAN characteristic, as discussed in the preceding pages, is the view that non-interference in the domestic affairs of respective member-states should be placed beyond all other considerations. The East Timor incursion, Human Rights issues in some of the ASEAN members, the Flor Contemplacion affair, and other incidents have shown that non-interference is important among ASEAN countries, if not always strictly observed.

Some scholars have argued that ASEAN is a pluralistic security community arrangement.⁹⁷ Johan Saravanmuttu and others have argued that ASEAN since the mid-1970s emerged as a Deutschian "pluralistic security community."⁹⁸ The Deutschian notion of a security community suggests that the countries involved have high mutual responsiveness and low expectations of violent mutual conflicts.⁹⁹ A 'security community' is defined as a group of states which have developed dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' in intra-regional relations and ruled out the use of force as a means of problem solving in inter-member relations.¹⁰⁰

Via specific treaties, ASEAN has ruled out the use of force with regards to conflict resolution. However, ASEAN has been established on very weak and fragile foundations. Common historical, cultural, and ideological experiences are absent and

⁹⁶Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, "The Significance of ASEAN," *World Review*, Vol. 19, No. 3, August 1980, pp. 56-57.

⁹⁷See Muthiah Alagappa, "Regional Arrangements and International Security in Southeast Asia: Going Beyond ZOPFAN," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 12, No. 4, March 1991, p. 301.

⁹⁸See Johan Saravanamuttu, "ASEAN Security for the 1980s: The Case for a Revitalised ZOPFAN," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 6, No. 2, September 1984. Others who have sustained such an argument are Barry Buzan and N. Ganesan.

⁹⁹See Paridah Abdul Samad and Mokhtar Muhammad, "ASEAN's Role and Development as a Security Community," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, First Quarter, 1995, p. 72.

¹⁰⁰See Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton, 1957, pp. 5-6.

there is also no apparent common threat.¹⁰¹ Further, although ASEAN has come a long way towards reducing tensions between its members, some serious territorial disputes still exists. As Yuen Foong Khong suggests: "While there is a norm against the use of force to settle disputes among the ASEAN states, it would be too much to suggest that these states have completely ruled out the use of force against each other."¹⁰² Hence, ASEAN has not completely met the Deutschian criteria for a pluralistic security community.

Other ASEAN scholars have advanced the notion of 'collective political defence' to explain to a certain extent ASEAN political and security composition. As stated in Chapter Two above, the two accords that were signed at the 1976 Bali Summit, - the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation - to a great extent redefined the founding Bangkok Declaration and also conceptualised ASEAN within a formal operating structure. Charles Morrison points to 'collective political defence' as an ASEAN concept. He states:

The term collective political defence, coined by former Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, denotes the ability of the ASEAN governments to derive political and psychological support by cooperating closely, thus enhancing their internal resilience and international bargaining leverage.¹⁰³

Morrison further elaborates on this concept by arguing that: "Collective political defence connotes solidarity and mutual support and can be useful in dealing with outside powers as well as defending foreign policy adjustments that are difficult to explain to domestic audiences."¹⁰⁴ There are many examples of the use of 'collective

¹⁰¹B. A. Hamzah, "ASEAN Military Cooperation without Pact and Threat," Paper presented at Conference on Regional Development and Security: The Ties that Bind, the 2nd Meeting of ASEAN Institute of Strategic Studies, 12-16 January, Kuala Lumpur, 1986, p. 11 and 23. An apparent common threat may come from the People's Republic of China.

¹⁰²Yuen Foong Khong, "ASEAN and the Southeast Asian Security Complex," in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*, Pennsylvania, 1997, p. 321.

¹⁰³Charles E. Morrison, "Progress and Prospects in Foreign Policy and Cooperation Among the ASEAN Countries," in R.P. Anand, Purificacion V. Guisumbing (eds.), *ASEAN Identity, Development and Culture*, Philippines, 1981, p. 369.

¹⁰⁴Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrike, "ASEAN in Regional Defence and Development," in Sudershan Chawala and D.R. Sardesai, (eds.), *Changing Patterns of Security and Stability in Asia*, New York, 1980, p. 204.

political defence' in ASEAN history. From the recognition of the new government of Vietnam in 1975, to the recent declaration on the South China Sea, major ASEAN decisions have all been within this doctrine of 'collective political defence.'

These are some of the unique terms and concepts that are used to identify ASEAN's security framework. Many scholars have tried to use such unique notions to enhance a theoretical analysis of ASEAN's security dimension without much success. This thesis proposes something new based on a modified version of the multilateral institutional theory.

ASYMMETRICAL MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONALISM

Based on the above section which deals with the different views of some ASEAN scholars on the issue of theory building to fit the regional organisation, this thesis proposes a somewhat new proposition based on a wider perspective of multilateral institutionalism.

First we have to restate that ASEAN needs to be considered as an international organisation. Further ASEAN has to be considered multilateral as its activities, however formal or informal, transgress from the fields of economics to security. Its decision-making process in such fields based on *musjawarah* diplomacy adheres to its multilateral dimension. As Ruggie states; "multilateral organisation is a separate and distinct type of institutional behaviour, defined by such generalised decision-making rules as voting or consensus procedures."¹⁰⁵

Although, ASEAN evolved on the basis of a informal structure, in recent years it has tried to institutionalise its activities and organisation. As discussed above, with the adoption of a stronger ASEAN secretariat, the establishment of the ARF based on the ASEAN SOM, and the eventual institutionalisation of AFTA, ASEAN has moved towards a institution-building within the framework of *musjawarah* diplomacy.

Asymmetry can be defined as the unequal development of various components within a system. In the case of international institutions, this definition should

¹⁰⁵Ruggie, "Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution", *International Organisation*, Vol. 46, No. 3, (Summer 1992), p. 574.

encompass the process and end result of the various states development in different areas.

The previous five chapters have proven that ASEAN is a multilateral institution, based on inter-member economic, political and security relations. Further, its process of decision-making which is based on consensus and accommodation also fits into Ruggie's definition of a multilateral institution. Thus, as discussed in Chapter One above, the ASEAN experience has evolved theoretically within the multilateral institutional framework. But, to study within the present multilateral institutional framework there has to be certain modifications to the theory.

In the case of ASEAN, a asymmetrical multilateral institutionalism model fits due to three different aspects. Firstly, there is the issue of the development status of member countries at the time of regional integration in 1967 and also at the present time. As mentioned above in various chapters, ASEAN member states were at different levels of economic, political, and cultural development. Thus, there was no common economic, cultural and political foundation present in all of these states for regional integration. They came to the ASEAN table for varied reasons, either tangible or intangible.

Further, at the present time, ASEAN members still have few commonalities to be identified as a purely multilateral incitation. For example, due to the different state of the economic makeup of member countries, ASEAN is still having problems evoking AFTA or even some of the APEC resolutions.

The second component for requiring to include the adjective asymmetry when discussing ASEAN as a multilateral institution is the fact that member-states have taken different roles when relating to non-members of the international community. As Chapter Four of the thesis has proven, via the ASEAN Dialogue Partnership Scheme, members of the regional organisation have different attitudes when dealing with the Association's dialogue partners. Further, many extra-regional countries do not conduct relations with ASEAN as a whole but with specific members of the organisation. Thus, we see a asymmetrical relations between ASEAN members of extra-regional actors. This asymmetrical relationships extend to the nature of the issues discussed.

The third and most prominent reason related to the issue of asymmetry is when we discuss ASEAN's security dimension. When dealing with the security dimension in

relation to multilateralism, we have to understand the notions of indivisibility and nondiscrimination behaviour of states:¹⁰⁶ "In security relations, nondiscriminatory behaviour entails that the members of a collective agree to treat each other in identical fashion by offering the same security guarantee to all members."¹⁰⁷ To a certain extent, the multilateralist would agree that ASEAN behaved in such manner during the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Also with the adoption of ZOPFAN and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), ASEAN has maintained a nondiscriminatory stance within its regional framework.

But here again the asymmetrical nature of ASEAN's multilateral institutional approach is apparent: "States deeply committed [to multilateralism] would promise to war on behalf of one of their membership threatened or attacked by another state."¹⁰⁸ This was not the case with ASEAN and the Cambodian conflict. When Vietnamese troops encroached onto Thai soil, ASEAN did not respond as a multilateral institution should. It looked for extra-regional aid to contain Vietnamese military force. Hence, ASEAN cannot be considered as a strong multilateral institution. It has a asymmetrical nature that transcends to specific economic, political and security issues.

As discussed in Chapter One above, another principle of multilateralism is indivisibility. The definition of this term changes when we relate it to the security dimension:

Indivisibility refers to the understanding among the cooperating states that critical conditions or premises that define the nature or purpose of the group or institutions in question be treated in equivalent fashion by and for all members. Thus, in a security institution, the nature of the 'peace' of the character of 'aggression,' for example, should be viewed (a) in similar terms by all members and (b) as applying equally to all members.¹⁰⁹

It can be argued that the concept of indivisibility when used in the ASEAN context is extremely weak. A prime example is ASEAN's members having security ties

¹⁰⁶Chapter One of the thesis has detailed these general concepts within the perspective of multilateralism.

¹⁰⁷Brian L. Job, "Matters of Multilateralism: Implications for Regional Conflict Management," in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*, Pennsylvania, 1997, p. 167.

¹⁰⁸*ibid.*, p. 169.

¹⁰⁹*ibid.*

with extra regional powers. FPDA and the recent defence treaty signed between Australia and Indonesia point to this premise. If ASEAN is indivisible in collective security terms, then it should adopt a strong security alliance within its own membership. But the lack of strong indivisibility again points to the notion of asymmetry within the regional organisation. Some members have strong alliances with outside powers, whereas others have weak alliances.

But as discussed in Chapter Three above and again in the previous section in this Chapter, ASEAN has no common threat perception. As this thesis has argued, this is one reason and maybe the paramount reason for the lack of a defence alliance or a well integrated security pact. Although, as discussed above, the unique notion of regional resilience, the lack of a strong security alliance among the members point to the fact that the potential for aggression from outside the membership is not shared by all ASEAN members. Some members of ASEAN fear aggression from within the membership.

Also with increased membership, new members will bring into the organisation various threat perceptions. These perceptions may be actual or perceived. A clear example is Vietnam and its claim to the Spratly Islands. Although other members of ASEAN have laid such claims to the Spratly Islands, Vietnam has used military force against the PRC to lay claim to the Islands.

SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS

Since the pullout of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, ASEAN has been evolving into a more institutional body. This ASEAN move towards a more institutional structure is on two fronts. These two fronts are in terms of its economic and security relations with members and also with extra-regional actors.

Hence, ASEAN is trying to build a larger regional security order by advancing the ARF as a regional focal point. ASEAN's security role is ever changing. The ARF is ASEAN's response to a changing security order in the region. Although it is highly unlikely that ASEAN itself would move towards a tighter security pact, it has institutionalised security dialogue in the region via the ARF.

With regards to the movement towards a security or a military pact, the Cambodian crisis had a significant impact on such an endeavour: "At the height of the

Cambodian conflict, it was claimed that some bilateral exercises could be geared to providing a common response to a Vietnamese threat."¹¹⁰ Now, with the partial withdrawal of America's influence in the region, ASEAN will undoubtedly miss the U.S. tacit security guarantee. Dewi Anwar Fortuna believes that:

ASEAN should develop more regional defence cooperation to provide more coherence to the multiple defence bilateralism that is present now. This would be beneficial and reasonable for economies of scale. It would provide credibility to a ASEAN security community.¹¹¹

ASEAN has also become more institutionalised on its economic front. With the adoption of AFTA and its involvement with APEC, ASEAN has been either pushed or pulled by extra-regional actors to become more involved in regional and global economic matters. Such ASEAN institutionalism on the economic front is primarily due to its fear that APEC may overrun its own economic activities.

The recent growth of APEC has overshadowed ASEAN activities in the region to a certain extent, although, after three summits, it seems highly likely that APEC will be more an informal forum than a binding grouping.¹¹² But the existence of APEC has pushed ASEAN to set a new and specific agenda for itself.

The creation of APEC has indirectly affected the way ASEAN makes decisions and also has pushed the members to maintain a stronger institutional framework. *Musjarawah* diplomacy is changing and ASEAN is coming to concrete decisions without delay, an example being the haste with which ASEAN has now decided to speed up the implementation of AFTA. The reason for the haste, as detailed in Chapter Two above, is due to the establishment of APEC.¹¹³ The relevance of ASEAN may be lost if APEC rolls over this regional grouping. Bilson Kurus argues that: "Equally important is their concern to maintain the relevance of ASEAN, and by extension, their

¹¹⁰ Amitav Acharya, "Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 29, No. 1, 1992, p. 14.

¹¹¹ From an Interview with Dewi Anwar Fortuna, 20 January 1996, 2.30 p.m. Jakarta, Indonesia.

¹¹² See, "Loose-Knit Family," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 2 December 1993, pp. 12-13.

¹¹³ For a detailed analysis for the evolution and significance of APEC, see Tommy T. B. Koh, *The United States and East Asia: Conflict and Co-operation*. Singapore, 1995, pp. 16-21.

collective weight in shaping the future of the Asia-Pacific region."¹¹⁴ Hence, when extra-regional influence interferes in the preservation of ASEAN, it seems that national interests give way to regional interests, in particular the interest of ASEAN. Thus, there are nuances of regionalism in the ASEAN experience.

Moreover, there is a certain amount of anxiety among leaders from Indonesia and Malaysia that APEC would dilute the functions and activities of ASEAN. If we look at the first principle of ASEAN's participation in the APEC process, it states that: "ASEAN's identity and cohesion should be preserved and its cooperative relations with its dialogue partners and with third countries should not be diluted in any enhanced APEC." Hence, there is some apprehension among the ASEAN countries over the establishment of APEC. ASEAN states would like to maintain APEC as purely a consultative body in economic matters, without any policy-binding mechanism. But, it seems highly unlikely that ASEAN members could prevent APEC from developing into a more institutional body with a binding decision-making mechanism if that is what the major APEC players want.

¹¹⁴Bilson Kurus, "The ASEAN Triad: National Interest, Consensus-Seeking, and Economic Cooperation," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 4, March 1995, p. 417.

CONCLUSION

After all that has been explored in this research, we have to address the question: What is ASEAN and what it is evolving into? There have many definitions used to explain the ASEAN experience. Michael Antolik maintains that ASEAN is more of a notion or spirit that amalgamates different concepts than anything else. He states: "‘ASEAN’ can refer to an inter-governmental organisation, a consultative process among members, and a geographic expression."¹ Further he says that, "states learned the utilities of accommodation and co-operation, so often referred to as the ‘ASEAN spirit’..."² So how did ASEAN develop this spirit? As analysed in the first chapter of this study, the Malay notions of *Musjawarah* and *Mufakat* contributed to the enhancement of the ASEAN spirit. Without consensus in decisions, it would have been difficult for ASEAN to survive the first few years. This ASEAN spirit helped to bring about flexibility and a multidimensional approach to conflict resolution in the political field, but in terms of economic integration it produced an unwillingness or inability to set well-defined goals.

This intangible ASEAN spirit was cultivated by the respective leaders of the regional grouping throughout the 1970s. It was this blend of leadership that helped ASEAN survive the turbulent years.

Can we say whether an international body is a success or failure? It is extremely naive and simplistic to maintain one or the other. If ASEAN is to be judged purely on the stated purpose for its formation, it is a failure. It did not bring about economic prosperity for its members. But, if we judge ASEAN on broader parameters of sustaining regional peace and stability, then it is a ‘measured success.’ Without ASEAN, territorial conflict between the Southeast Asian countries may have brought violence and instability to the region. Further, it is highly likely that the Vietnamese troops would still be in Cambodia. There would have been no regional organisation to

¹Michael Antolik, *ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation*, London, 1991, p. 4.

²*ibid.*, p 7.

focus regional and international attention on the plight of the Cambodians. To have helped bring an end to the Cambodian tragedy was achievement enough.

Let us now look at the second question stated in the introduction of the conclusion; what is ASEAN evolving into? As we see today, regionalism is the wave of the future. With the regionalisation of international economic and security relations in the post-Cold War era, multilateral institutions are a prevalent international phenomenon. Thus, the ASEAN experience will grow in the future and be important in managing relations among the members and extra-regional countries.

One of the major concerns is whether ASEAN will have any relevance when APEC 2020 is implemented. Before this is implemented ASEAN will still have a role to play. In security terms, sub-regionalism has relevance in managing the regional order. At present, due to the fact that there is a reduction of tension in the region, the Southeast Asian regional order will have the needed stability to develop and encompass all ten countries.

The underlying argument that is made throughout this thesis is the fact that the lack of a institutional approach has helped to ensue the viability and utility of ASEAN in the past. Although, such a "loose" structure aided the development of the regional grouping since 1967, that feature now seems to be a hindrance for future growth. At present, institutional rigidity is needed to help ASEAN overcome pertinent economic and security issues. ASEAN has noted the lack of institutionalisation and encouraged a more established way to undertake its own activities and relations with extra-regional actors.

Coupled with a move institutional approach to ASEAN activities and structure, it has undertaken the expansion of the organisation. The admission of Vietnam as the seventh member of ASEAN not only represents an expansion of the regional grouping, but also has emphasised the economic and political importance of ASEAN to the Indochinese states. Vietnam joined in 1995, Cambodia is expected to be the eighth member in 1997.³ Both Laos and Myanmar have observer status and could become the ninth and tenth members in a matter of years.⁴

³In 1997 Cambodia did not become a member of ASEAN.

⁴Both became members in 1997.

It appears to be the case that ASEAN is moving too rapidly in terms of membership expansion. The main reason for such haste to increase membership is the fact that ASEAN wants to be relevant in the ever-changing political-economic scene in Southeast Asia. The emergence of APEC has to a great extent diluted the significance of ASEAN. Thus, by increasing its membership to include the entire Southeast Asian region, ASEAN raises the status of the regional organisation.

At present ASEAN is engaged in both simultaneously 'broadening' and 'deepening' the regional organisation, 'broadening' in terms of an increase in membership, 'deepening' in terms of building a stronger institutional that would undertake greater responsibility for regional order. As mentioned above, it has already undertaken to institutionalise its activities by bestowing more political power on the Secretariat in Jakarta and also by developing regular dialogue sessions with extra-regional actors.

But the 'widening' or 'broadening' of ASEAN to include the entire Southeast Asian region may curtail the 'deepening' of the regional body. The informality of ASEAN and the indigenous decision-making process will prevent the new members from fully integrating into the regional association. There will be pressure for the new members to adapt to this issue. It will be difficult for Vietnam to come to terms with such a decision-making process. As we have seen during the conflict with Cambodia, Vietnam's approach was an extremely assertive style of negotiation.⁵

Although, *Musjawarah* and *Mufakat* will not be common to the Indochinese countries and Myanmar, the concepts have to be taught to them and also modified to suit the new facet of ASEAN. Consensus on decisions cannot be obtained when dealing with ten participants with varying historical, cultural, political and strategic differences and legacies. Hence, we will see a move from 'absolute consensus' which is inherent in *Musjawarah* diplomacy to 'flexible consensus', where decisions will not be based on a common denominator.⁶ Flexible consensus has already been discussed by ASEAN members. It specifically entails the notion that a decision will be taken when a majority is attained on the issue. But only secondary issues on regional economic matters can be

⁵This is maintained by Dewi Anwar Fortuna. Interview, 30 January 1996, 2.30 p.m., Jakarta, Indonesia.

decided upon using flexible consensus. Before a discussion is open on an issue it has decided upon by all members when flexible or absolute consensus will be used. But when it comes to security issues, absolute consensus will be fostered by ASEAN members.⁷

Also new members bring with them their respective historical legacies. Border disputes are prevalent among Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and Myanmar with Thailand. Some of these countries also have unsettled territorial disputes with the other existing ASEAN members. Hence, with ASEAN's poor history of intra-ASEAN conflict resolution, conflict between new members and between new and old members will arise.

On the other hand, the inclusion of new members may make it possible to enact the 'High Council' of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. A larger ASEAN may foster a conducive climate that sees the functioning of ASEAN's conflict resolution mechanism.

On the issue of extending ASEAN membership to non-Southeast Asia countries, it is highly unlikely that this would occur. Presently, Malaysia is absolutely opposed to having non-Southeast Asian countries becoming part of ASEAN. If non-Southeast Asian countries become ASEAN members, this would blur the regional boundaries of Southeast Asia and dilute the regional organisation. Further, the presence of 'non-Asians' within ASEAN could hamper the decision-making process of the regional organisation.

Unity within ASEAN is quite fragile. Malaysia's insistence on an East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) will be an issue that effects ASEAN unity. The EAEC initiative may be resolved either by Japan being more receptive to the idea or with a change in Malaysian leadership. Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir may be forced, due to domestic pressure, to relinquish the Prime Ministership in the near future. Since it was unveiled, the EAEC proposal has been met with tremendous opposition from within ASEAN and from external actors. Hence, rather than providing the basis for

⁶This view is echoed by Dewi Anwar Fortuna. Interview with Dewi Anwar Fortuna, 2.30 p.m., 30 January 1996, Jakarta, Indonesia.

⁷Material gathered from the various interviews that I undertook for this study.

greater East Asia economic unity, the EAEC proposal has brought divisive concerns with ASEAN,

Regional uncertainties will force ASEAN to redefine its security agenda; the South China Sea dispute will force it to take an even more active role in regional security matters. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) will have to mature into a formal security body with the blessings of ASEAN. This Southeast Asian regional organisation has to come to terms with its new economic and security roles.

The future of ASEAN is strongly tied to the evolution of APEC as a strong Asia-Pacific regional grouping and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Some scholars have argued that ASEAN countries, especially Malaysia with its insistence on the EAEC, share a fear that APEC will eventually eclipse or even dilute ASEAN.⁸ Such a fear "is unlikely to be assuaged by assurances from non-ASEAN members of APEC."⁹ With the evolution and development of other multilateral regional forums, the agenda and representation of ASEAN may eventually narrow. This would inhibit ASEAN's goal of greater integration and an increase in membership. Since the early 1980s, some ASEAN states have argued that the evolution of a Pacific community would devalue the worth of ASEAN as a representative of the ideals of Southeast Asia.¹⁰ Further, the consistent use of alternative channels by some members of ASEAN, may make this regional organisation irrelevant over time. The fear of such an outcome, may be the reason why ASEAN itself has tried to set the regional agenda recently, by way of enacting the ARF with a core membership of ASEAN and also the institutionalisation of ASEAN-PMC. Further, the speed at which Vietnam was admitted and the extending of observer status to the other Indochinese countries can be related to this aspect.

Essentially, ASEAN has to move away from being a reactive regional body and has to become more proactive and develop and establish policies for the region. As

⁸Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "From ASEAN Six to ASEAN Ten: Issues and Prospects," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 3, December 1994, p. 252.

⁹Richard Stubbs, "Competing Conceptions of Economic Regionalism: APEC versus EAEC in the Asia Pacific," *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1995, p. 524.

¹⁰Malaysia and Indonesia were strongly against the idea of the Pacific community in the 1980s. See Hadi Soesastro, "ASEAN and the Political Economy of Pacific Cooperation," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXIII, No. 12, December 1983, pp. 1255-1270. For a detailed analysis of the regional initiatives in the 1980s see Richard L. Sneider and Mark Borthwick, "Institutions for Pacific Regional Cooperation," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXIII, No. 12, December 1983, pp. 1245-1254.

Bilson Kurus states: "ASEAN runs the danger of being overtaken by developments beyond its control."¹¹ As discussed above, the future maturity of APEC will have a severe consequence for the role ASEAN plays for the region.

Due to all these factors, ASEAN has to develop into a more institutionalised, dynamic, multi-faceted, proactive regional body that should establish the pre-eminence of the region. It has to undertake a significant security role in Southeast Asia. With the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from the Philippines and the instability in the South China Sea, ASEAN has to emerge as an institution that will maintain peace and stability in the region. The establishment of the ARF is only a partial answer to the issue of securing stability for Southeast Asia. ASEAN itself as a regional entity has to move towards some form of institutionalised security community. Such a development would have a positive impact when ASEAN states deal with non-ASEAN states on the issue of security for Southeast Asia.

If ASEAN intends to keep pace with its changing environment, it has to expand functionally and structurally. Functionally it has already significantly expanded by undertaking the establishment of the ARF. But, the full potential of the ARF has yet to be reached. Although it is highly unlikely that the ARF would turn into a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), it is hoped by some Western countries, like the U.S. and Canada, that a more structured formula will evolve in the future. Like all ASEAN endeavours, the ARF will grow in statue and structure in an evolutionary manner. ASEAN cannot be criticised for such deliberate pace in enacting CBMs, due to the various differences and historical legacies that exist in the Asia-Pacific area in general, and Southeast Asia in particular. The inclusion of Vietnam brings the South China Sea dispute closer to home. Not only has Vietnam added a new dimension to the problem with its historical antagonism with China, it also has created intra-ASEAN conflict as it is another claimant to the Spratlys.

For ASEAN to be a reputable regional organisation in the future, the key ingredient is institutionalisation. Stronger established relations among ASEAN members and increased economic and security cooperation are essential for this body to

¹¹Bilson Kurus, "As Asean which is far too reactive," *The Business Times* (Weekly Edition), March 30-31, 1996, p. IV.

survive future uncertainties. Hence, a stronger institutionalised body would indirectly establish stronger ties among the membership. The "loose" structure of the past has to be replaced by a greater sense of institutionalisation, as greater variables are added to the ASEAN mix, variables such as new members with their own respective agendas, security and trade issues, and also a new political leaders. All of this points to the need for greater institutionalisation of ASEAN. As Michael Leifer has stated, "ASEAN cannot carry on as it has done in the past."¹²

The search for an overarching general theory of regionalism to cover completely the ASEAN experience to date has proved illusory at the present time. ASEAN remains a very Southeast Asian organisation in style and character. This thesis has tried in its analysis to encompass the uniqueness of ASEAN and has proposed the asymmetrical multilateral institutional approach to understand ASEAN. Future developments within the regional organisation may help to refine the asymmetrical approach stated above. On the other hand, it may be the case that, as ASEAN evolves further, both in membership and style, it may be forced to adopt organisational features common to broader regional groups, in which case mainstream international organisation theories will be applicable.

¹²Interview with Michael Leifer, 19 March 1996, 12.30 p.m., Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. At that period Professor Michael Leifer was on a Visiting Professorship at the Institute.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A:	The Bangkok Declaration of 1967. (Taken from ASEAN Documents Series. 1967-1988. (Third edition). Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. 1988.) 254
APPENDIX B:	Organisation Structure of the ASEAN Secretariat. (Given to researcher by the Librarian at the ASEAN Secretariat. Jakarta. Indonesia) 257
APPENDIX C:	Excerpts of Speeches by Various ASEAN Ministers Between: 1967-1987, Referring to Musjawarah and Mufakat. (Taken from Queck, Beng Cho. "ASEAN Resilience: The Mufakat Factor." (Academic Exercise. National University of Singapore. 1989.) 258
APPENDIX D:	Declaration of Admission of Brunei into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, signed on 7 January 1984. (Taken from ASEAN Documents Series. 1967-1988. (Third edition). Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. 1988.) 264
APPENDIX E:	The ZOPFAN Declaration. (Taken from ASEAN Documents Series. 1967-1988. (Third edition). Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. 1988.) 266
APPENDIX F:	Declaration of ASEAN Concord. (Taken from ASEAN Documents Series. 1967-1988. (Third edition). Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat.) 1988. 268
APPENDIX G:	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. (Taken from ASEAN Documents Series. 1967-1988. (Third edition). Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. 1988.) 272

APPENDIX H:	Various Statements by ASEAN Concerning the Vietnamese Invasion and Occupation of Cambodia. (Taken from Donald E. Weatherbee. Southeast Asia Divided: The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis. Boulder: Westview Press. 1985.)	275
APPENDIX I:	Schedule of ASEAN Meetings in 1996: As of 22 January 1996. (Given to researcher by the Librarian at the ASEAN Secretariat. Jakarta: Indonesia.)	289

APPENDIX A

THE ASEAN DECLARATION (BANGKOK DECLARATION) BANGKOK, 8 AUGUST 1967

The Presidium Minister for Political Affairs/ Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, The Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Singapore and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand:

MINDFUL of the existence of mutual interests and common problems among countries of South-East Asia and convinced of the need to strengthen further the existing bonds of regional solidarity and cooperation;

DESIRING to establish a firm foundation for common action to promote regional cooperation in South-East Asia in the spirit of equality and partnership and thereby contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity in the region;

CONSCIOUS that in an increasingly inter-dependent world, the cherished ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and economic well-being are best attained by fostering good understanding, good neighbourliness and meaningful cooperation among the countries of the region already bound together by ties of history and culture;

CONSIDERING that the countries of South-East Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples;

AFFIRMING that all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of States in the area or prejudice the orderly processes of their national development;

DO HEREBY DECLARE

FIRST, the establishment of an Association for the Regional Cooperation among the countries of South-East Asia to be known as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

SECOND, that the aims and purposes of the Association shall be:

1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress, and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian Nations;
2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter;

3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields;
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the educational, professional, technical and administrative spheres;
5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilisation of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of international commodity trade, the improvement of their facilities and the raising of the living standards of their peoples;
6. To promote South-East Asian studies;
7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves.

THIRD, that to carry out these aims and purposes, the following machinery shall be established;

(a) Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which shall be by rotation and referred to as ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers may be convened as required.

(b) A Standing Committee, under the chairmanship of the Foreign Minister of the host country or his representative and having as its members the accredited Ambassadors of the other member countries, to carry on the work of the Association in between Meetings of Foreign Ministers.

(c) Ad-Hoc Committees and Permanent Committees of specialists and officials on specific subjects.

(d) A National Secretariat in each member country to carry out the work of the Association on behalf of that country and to service the Annual or Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers, the Standing Committee and such other committees as may hereafter be established.

FOURTH, that the Association is open for participation to all States in the South-East Asian Region subscribing to the aforementioned aims, principles and purposes.

FIFTH, that the Association represents the collective will of the nations of South-East Asia to bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their peoples and for posterity the blessings of peace, freedom and prosperity,

DONE in Bangkok on the Eighth Day of August in the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Sixty-Seven.

For the Republic of Indonesia:

ADAM MALIK

Presidium Minister for Political Affairs/
Minister for Foreign Affairs

For Malaysia:

TUN ABDUL RAZAK

Deputy Prime Minister,
Minister of Defence and
Minister of National Development

For the Republic of the Philippines:

NARCISO RAMOS
Secretary of Foreign Affairs

For the Republic of Singapore:

S. RAJARATNAM
Minister of Foreign Affairs


For the Kingdom of Thailand:

TEANAT KHOMAN
Minister of Foreign Affairs

ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE OF THE ASEAN SECRETARIAT

(4 July 1995)

APPENDIX B: ORGANISATION STRUCTURE OF ASEAN



APPENDIX C: EXCERPTS OF SPEECHES BY VARIOUS ASEAN MINISTERS
BETWEEN 1967-1987, REFERRING TO MUSJAWARAH AND MUFAKAT

- (1) Opening statement by H.E. Adam Malik, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia at the 3rd ASEAN Foreign Ministerial Meeting, Cameron Highlands, 16-17 December 1969 :

"The progress of ASEAN was made possible by the untiring efforts of the Secretaries-General and their representative staffs...They were able to overcome seemingly insurmountable difficulties in their gatherings by their exercise of a high degree of tolerance and admirable patience in their desire to reach a consensus amongst themselves."

- (2) Opening statement by H.E. Tun Abdul Razak Bin Hussein, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia at the 3rd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Cameron Highlands, 16 - 17 December 1969:

"... it is only by mixing together and discussing in an informal and friendly atmosphere ... that we can rebuild the genuine good faith, goodwill and understanding among us."

- (3) Thanat Khoman in a press interview during sensitive ASEAN discussions in early 1969:

"We shall have to keep talking and consulting with our friends and colleagues we hope that a consensus will emerge, a consensus based on practicality, discarding all the formalities."

- (4) Closing statement by H.E. Tun Ismail Bin Dato Abdul Rahman, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, at the 4th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, 13 March 1971:

"The conclusion to our discussions and deliberations have been most successful we have been able to quickly agree to a long list of recommendations, exchange views affecting the region, and familiarize ourselves with the different approaches and policies of our various countries."

- (5) Opening statement by H.E. Mr Adam Malik, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia at the 5th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 13 April 1972:

"Proof again that the ASEAN spirit of cooperation has become more apparent is the consensus reached at the meeting in Bangkok and Lima to maintain close and continuous consultations among the ASEAN Ministers."

- (6) Opening statement by H.E. Carlos P. Romulo, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Philippines, at the 6th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Pattaya, 16 April 1973:

".....consultations would be of great benefit to the ASEAN group candor and openness lead to mutual trustthe need for consultation is particularly important."

- (7) Opening statement by H.E. Carlos P. Romulo, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Philippines, at the 7th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Jakarta 7 May 1974:

"We should strive to resolve intra-regional differences in the spirit of ASEAN. The ASEAN way is that of dialogue rather than confrontation. One goal should be neither victory for one nor defeat for the other, but mutual concession or accommodation."

- (8) Closing statement by H.E. Adam Malik, Foreign Minister of Indonesia, at the 7th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Jakarta, 9 May 1974:

"The manner in which we have reached a consensus once again demonstrated ASEAN's capacity to arrive at important decisions inspired by a strong sense of brotherly unity and solidarity."

- (9) Closing statement by H.E. Major-General Chatichai Choonhavan, Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand at the 8th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 15 May 1975:

"The informal political discussions which we hold traditionally during each Ministerial Meeting have been extremely successful this year."

- (10) Closing statement by H.E. Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen, Foreign Minister of Malaysia at the 8th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 15 May 1975:

"The manner in which we have reached a consensus on this matter is a testimony of ASEAN's strong sense of cooperation and unity."

- (11) Closing statement by H.E. Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen, Foreign Minister of Malaysia, at the 9th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, 26 June 1976:

"In the course of our deliberation, we have been able to reach a decision on most of the matters that were brought before us."

- (12) Closing statement by H.E. Bichai Rattakul, Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand at the 9th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, 26 June 1976:

"Our deliberations and frank discussions have led to the meeting of minds on a wide range of subjects affecting the interests of the ASEAN region as a whole I have found the consultations on political matters of common interests to be most valuable. This practice has contributed greatly to the promotion of better understanding among the member countries of ASEAN and fuller appreciation of the issues and ramifications involved in these matters."

- (13) Closing statement by H.E. Carlos P. Romulo, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Philippines at the 9th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, 26 June 1976:

"We have our discussions. We have our debates. We have our differences of opinion. But in the end, after the sparks have flown, there is cordiality. There is mutuality. There is friendliness. There is harmony and there is concord."

- (14) Closing statement by H.E. Adam Malik, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, at the 10th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 8 July 1977:

"The skilful and elegant manner in which our discussions were carried out has no doubt contributed a great deal towards the conclusions we have reached."

- (15) Closing statement by H.E. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia at the 11th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Pattaya, 16 June 1978:

"In the traditional ASEAN spirit of cordiality, through mutual understanding and frankness in our deliberations and discussions, differences of opinion among us could be solved to the satisfaction of all."

- (16) Opening statement by H.E. Arturo M. Tolentino, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Philippines, at the 13th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 25 June 1980:

"Mutual consultations, the free and friendly exchange of views and perceptions in a spirit of equality should contribute to the growth of greater understanding and unity among the ASEAN states."

- (17) Opening statement by H.E. S. Danabalan, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Singapore at the 15th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 14 June 1982:

"There is a willingness and overriding desire to solve these problems at the conference table a desire to solve these problems quietly among the leaders without whipping up public emotion and rancour."

- (18) Statement by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, at the 15th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 14 June 1982:

"We have made progress in an Asian manner, not through rules and regulations, but through *musjawarah* and consensus. We have developed a mutual appreciation for differences in culture, and learned to make allowances for differences in style."

- (19) Closing statement by H.E. Carlos P. Romulo, Foreign Minister of the Republic of the Philippines at the 15th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 16 June 1982:

"Our achievements are not inconsiderable....they have been made possible by a revived ASEAN spirit in which each listens to the other as equal and sovereign partners yet, are often willing to subordinate narrower interests for

the sake of broader regional goals."

- (20) Closing statement by H.E. S. Danabalan, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Singapore, at the 15th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Singapore, 16 June 1982:

"We have been able to reach decisions easily and our discussions and our deliberations were conducted in the traditional spirit of ASEAN warmth and candour."

- (21) Opening statement by H.E. S. Danabalan, Foreign Minister of Singapore, at the 17th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Jakarta, 9 July 1984:

"This perhaps says something about Indonesia's contribution to ASEAN, as a spiritual birthplace of *musjawarah* and *mufakat*. These wise concepts of decision-making have fostered mutual understanding and accommodation of our different approaches to regional cooperation. *Musjawarah* and *mufakat* have played an important role in keeping us together. These principles have produced wise decisions which take into account the interests and aspirations of all member countries."

- (22) Closing statement by H.E. Arturo M. Tolentino, Foreign Minister of the Republic of the Philippines at the 17th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Jakarta, 10 July 1984:

"We have listened carefully to each other's perceptions and thinking on problems that concern ASEAN. We have reached a closer understanding of each other's views and have defined more clearly the basic policies and objectives of our association."

- (23) Closing statement by H.E. Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen, Foreign Minister of Malaysia, at the 19th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, 24 June 1986:

"We have deliberated at length on a wide range of issues affecting our interests in an ASEAN manner."

- (24) Closing statement by H.E. Salvador H. Laurel, Foreign Minister of the Republic of the Philippines, at the 19th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, 24 June 1986:

"During the past two days, we discussed issues of mutual interest. Guided by a spirit of harmony, we arrived at most judicious decisions our unanimity in many points was indicative of shared sentiments."

- (25) Opening statement by H.E. ACM Siddhi Savetsila, Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand, at the 20th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 15 June 1987:

"ASEAN has been hailed as an exceptional grouping of developing countries effectively practising the cooperative spirit of political consensus."

- (26) Opening statement by H.R.H. Prince Mohamed Bolkiah at the 20th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 15 June 1987:

"Issues are thoroughly thrashed out before a decision is madethis process of decision-making has already ensured ASEAN's success. We make a move when all is ready. In this way, the move has the full support of all members."

- (27) Closing statement by H.E. Salvador H. Laurel, Vice-president and Foreign Minister of the Republic of Philippines, at the 20th ASEAN Foreign Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, 16 June 1987:

"..... once again, we have, through the ASEAN spirit of friendship and our traditional method of consensus, strengthened our solidarity and made firmer our resolve to promote closer cooperation among ourselves within our Association."

- (28) Statement made by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore at the Third ASEAN Summit in Manila, the Philippines, 14 December, 1987:

"ASEAN has a record of twenty years of quiet progress and consolidationthere were steady and continuing consultations that led to consensus and sound decisions on all major issues."

APPENDIX D

DECLARATION OF THE ADMISSION OF BRUNEI DARUSSALAM INTO THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA NATIONS

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Singapore, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand

Having considered the communication of Brunei Darussalam expressing her desire and interest to become a member of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN);

Having regard to the ASEAN Declaration of 1967 establishing ASEAN wherein it was declared that the Association is open for participation to all States in the Southeast Asian Region subscribing to the aims, principles and purposes of ASEAN;

Having regard to the Declaration of ASEAN Concord of 1976; and

Having regard to the unanimous expression by the member states of ASEAN of their agreement to admit Brunei Darussalam to membership;

and

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Brunei Darussalam representing Brunei Darussalam

Having solemnly accepted the conditions of membership;

and

Having agreed to subscribe or accede as the case may be to all the Declaration and Treaties of ASEAN;

Now therefore, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers and the Foreign Minister of Brunei Darussalam hereby agree and declare as follows:

1. Brunei Darussalam becomes the sixth member state of ASEAN,

Brunei Darussalam solemnly agrees to subscribe or accede as the case may be, to all the Declarations and Treaties of ASEAN.

This Declaration of Admission of Brunei Darussalam, done at Jakarta on the seventh Day of January in the YEAR One Thousand Nine Hundred and Eighty-Four, shall be deposited with the ASEAN Secretariat.

For Brunei Darussalam

H.H. PRINCE MOHAMAD BOLKIAH

The Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Negara Brunei Darussalam

For Indonesia

PROF. DR. MOCHTAR KUSUMAATMADJA

The Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Indonesia

For Malaysia

TAN SRI M. GHAZALI SHAFIE

The Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Malaysia

For the Phillipines

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO

The Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of the Phillipines

For Singapore

S.DHANABALAN

The Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Singapore

For Thailand

A.C.M. SIDDHI SAVETSILA

The Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Kingdom of Thailand

Notes:

Done and signed at Bangkok on 7 January 1984.

ZONE OF PEACE, FREEDOM AND NEUTRALITY DECLARATION

We the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and the Special Envoy of the National Executive Council of Thailand:

FIRMLY believing in the merits of regional cooperation which has drawn our countries to cooperate together in the economic, social and cultural fields in the Association of South East Asian Nations;

DESIROUS of bringing about a relaxation of international tension and of achieving a lasting peace in South East Asia;

INSPIRED by the worthy aims and objectives of the United Nations, in particular by the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, abstention from threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of international disputes, equal rights and self-determination and non-interference in the affairs of States;

BELIEVING in the continuing validity of the "Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation" of the Bandung Conference of 1955 which, among others, enunciates the principles by which states may coexist peacefully;

RECOGNISING the right of every state, large or small, to lead its national existence free from outside interference in its internal affairs as this interference will adversely affect its freedom, independence and integrity;

DEDICATED to the maintenance of peace, freedom and independence unimpaired;

BELIEVING in the need to meet present challenges and new developments by cooperating with all peace and freedom loving nations, both within and outside the region, in the furtherance of world peace, stability and harmony;

COGNIZANT of the significant trend towards establishing nuclear-free zones, as in the "Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America" and the Lusaka Declaration proclaiming Africa as a nuclear-free zone, for the purpose of promoting world peace and security by reducing the areas of international conflicts and tension;

REITERATING our commitment to the principle in the *Bangkok Declaration* which established ASEAN in 1967, "that the countries of South East Asia share a

primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples";

AGREEING that the neutralization of South East Asia is a desirable objective and that we should explore ways and means of bringing about its realization; and


CONVINCED that the time is propitious for joint action to give effective expression to the deeply felt desire of the peoples of South East Asia to ensure the conditions of peace and stability indispensable to their independence and their economic and social well-being;

DO HEREBY STATE:

1. that Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are determined to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect for, South East Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers;
2. that South East Asian countries should make concerted efforts to broaden the areas of cooperation which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship.


DONE at Kuala Lumpur on Saturday, the 27th of November 1971.

On behalf of the Republic of Indonesia:




ADAM MALIK
Minister of Foreign Affairs

On behalf of Malaysia:



TUN ABDUL RAZAK BIN HUSSEIN
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs


On behalf of the Republic of Singapore:



S. RAJARATNAM
Minister for Foreign Affairs

On behalf of the Kingdom of Thailand:

On behalf of the Republic of the Philippines:



CARLOS P. ROMULO
Secretary of Foreign Affairs



THANAT KHOMAN
Special Envoy of the National Executive Council

NOTES:

Done and signed by the original member states of ASEAN at Kuala Lumpur on 27 November 1971.

Notification of Adherence was given by Negara Brunei Darussalam at Jakarta on 7 January 1984.

Source of text: ASEAN Documentation Series

Cited in the following documents:

Declaration of ASEAN Concord:

(76-002)

Joint Press Communique of the Meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government.

(76-003)

Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.

(76-004)

Joint Communique of the Ninth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.

(76-009)

Joint Communique of the Special Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers (To Commemorate the First Anniversary of Bali Summit Meeting).

(77-003)

Joint Communique of the Tenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.

(77-008)

Meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government — Final Communique.

(77-010)

Joint Communique of the Eleventh ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.

(78-002)

Joint Communique of the Twelfth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.

(79-006)

Joint Communique of the Thirteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.

(80-010)

Joint Communique of the Fourteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.

(81-005)

Joint Statement of Foreign Ministers Meeting of the Member States of the European Community and ASEAN.

(81-013)

Joint Communique of the Fifteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.

(82-005)

Joint Communique of the Sixteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.

(83-003)

Joint Communique of the Seventeenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.

(84-005)

DECLARATION OF ASEAN CONCORD

The President of the Republic of Indonesia, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore and the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand:

REAFFIRM their commitment to the Declarations of Bandung, Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur, and the Charter of the United Nations;

ENDEAVOUR to promote peace, progress, prosperity and the welfare of the peoples of member states;

UNDERTAKE to consolidate the achievements of ASEAN and expand ASEAN cooperation in the economic, social, cultural and political fields;

DO HEREBY DECLARE:

ASEAN cooperation shall take into account, among others, the following objectives and principles in the pursuit of political stability:

1. The stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region is an essential contribution to international peace and security. Each member state resolves to eliminate threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national and ASEAN resilience.

2. Member states, individually and collectively, shall take active steps for the early establishment of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality.

3. The elimination of poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy is a primary concern of member states. They shall therefore intensify cooperation in economic and social development, with particular emphasis on the promotion of social justice and on the improvement of the living standards of their peoples.

4. Natural disasters and other major calamities can retard the pace of development of member states. They shall extend, within their capabilities, assistance for relief of member states in distress.

5. Member states shall take cooperative action in their national and regional development programmes, utilizing as far as possible the resources available in the ASEAN region to broaden the complementarity of their respective economies.

6. Member states, in the spirit of ASEAN solidarity, shall rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences.

7. Member states shall strive, individually and collectively, to create conditions conducive to the promotion of peaceful cooperation among the nations of Southeast Asia on the basis of mutual respect and mutual benefit.

8. Member states shall vigorously develop an awareness of regional identity and exert all efforts to create a strong ASEAN community, respected by all and respecting all nations on the basis of mutually advantageous relationships, and in accordance with the principles of self-determination, sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of nations.

AND DO HEREBY ADOPT

The following programme of action as a framework for ASEAN cooperation:

A. Political

1. Meeting of the Heads of Government of the member states as and when necessary.
2. Signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.
3. Settlement of intra-regional disputes by peaceful means as soon as possible.
4. Immediate consideration of initial steps towards recognition of and respect for the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality wherever possible.
5. Improvement of ASEAN machinery to strengthen political cooperation.
6. Study on how to develop judicial cooperation including the possibility of an ASEAN Extradition Treaty.
7. Strengthening of political solidarity by promoting the harmonization of views, coordinating position and, where possible and desirable, taking common actions.

B. Economic

1. Cooperation on Basic Commodities, particularly Food and Energy
 - (i) Member states shall assist each other by according priority to the supply of the individual country's needs in critical circumstances, and priority to the acquisition of exports from member states, in respect of basic commodities, particularly food and energy.

- (ii) Member states shall also intensify cooperation in the production of basic commodities particularly food and energy in the individual member states of the region.

2. Industrial Cooperation

- (i) Member states shall cooperate to establish large-scale ASEAN industrial plants, particularly to meet regional requirements of essential commodities.
- (ii) Priority shall be given to projects which utilize the available materials in the member states, contribute to the increase of food production, increase foreign exchange earnings or save foreign exchange and create employment.

3. Cooperation in Trade

- (i) Member states shall cooperate in the fields of trade in order to promote development and growth of new production and trade and to improve the trade structures of individual states and among countries of ASEAN conducive to further development and to safeguard and increase their foreign exchange earnings and reserves.
- (ii) Member states shall progress towards the establishment of preferential trading arrangements as a long term objective on a basis deemed to be at any particular time appropriate through rounds of negotiations subject to the unanimous agreement of member states.
- (iii) The expansion of trade among member states shall be facilitated through cooperation on basic commodities, particularly in food and energy and through cooperation in ASEAN industrial projects.
- (iv) Member states shall accelerate joint efforts to improve access to markets outside ASEAN for their raw material and finished products by seeking the elimination of all trade barriers in those markets, developing new usage for these products and in adopting common approaches and actions in dealing with regional groupings and individual economic powers.
- (v) Such efforts shall also lead to cooperation in the field of technology and production methods in order to increase the production and to improve the quality of export products, as well as to develop new export products with a view to diversifying exports.

4. Joint Approach to International Commodity Problems and Other World Economic Problems

- (i) The principle of ASEAN cooperation on trade shall also be reflected on a priority basis in joint

approaches to international commodity problems and other world economic problems such as reform of international trading system, the reform of international monetary system and transfer of real resources, in the United Nations and other relevant multilateral fora, with a view to contributing to the establishment of the New International Economic Order.

- (ii) Member states shall give priority to the stabilization and increase of export earnings of the commodities produced and exported by them through commodity agreements including buffer stock schemes and other means.

5. Machinery for Economic Cooperation

Ministerial meetings on economic matters shall be held regularly or as deemed necessary in order to:

- (i) formulate recommendations for the consideration of Governments of member states for the strengthening of ASEAN economic cooperation;
- (ii) review the coordination and implementation of agreed ASEAN programmes and projects of economic cooperation;
- (iii) exchange views and consult on national development plans and policies as a step towards harmonizing regional development; and
- (iv) perform such other relevant functions as agreed upon by the member Governments.

C. Social

1. Cooperation in the field of social development, with emphasis on the well being of the low-income group and the rural population, through the expansion of opportunities for productive employment with fair remuneration.
2. Support for the active involvement of all sectors and levels of the ASEAN communities, particularly the women and youth, in development efforts.
3. Intensification and expansion of existing cooperation in meeting the problems of population growth in the ASEAN region, and where possible, formulation of new strategies in collaboration with appropriate international agencies.
4. Intensification of cooperation among member states as well as with the relevant international bodies in the prevention and eradication of the abuse of narcotics and the illegal trafficking of drugs.

D. Cultural and Information

1. Introduction of the study of ASEAN, its member states and their national languages as part of the curriculum of schools and other institutions of learning in the member states.

2. Support of ASEAN scholars, writers, artists and mass media representatives to enable them to play an active role in fostering a sense of regional identity and fellowship.

3. Promotion of Southeast Asian studies through closer collaboration among national institutes.

E. Security

Continuation of cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis between the member states in security matters in accordance with their mutual needs and interests.

F. Improvement of ASEAN machinery

1. Signing of the *Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat*.

2. Regular review of the ASEAN organizational structure with a view to improving its effectiveness.

3. Study of the desirability of a new constitutional framework for ASEAN.

DONE at Denpasar, Bali, this Twenty-Fourth Day of February in the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Six.

For the Republic
of Indonesia:

SOEHARTO
President

For Malaysia

DATUK HUSSEIN ONN
Prime Minister

For the Republic
of the Philippines:

FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President

For the Republic
of Singapore:

LEE KUAN YEW
Prime Minister

For the Kingdom
of Thailand:

KUKRIT PRAMOJ
Prime Minister

NOTES:

Done and signed by the original member states of ASEAN at Bali on 24 February 1976.

Notification of Adherence was given by Negara Brunei Darussalam at Jakarta on 7 January 1984.

Source of text: ASEAN Documentation Series

Cited in the following documents:

Joint Press Communique of the Meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government.
(76-003)

Joint Press Statement of the Second ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting.
(76-005)

Joint Communique of the Special Meeting of ASEAN Labor Ministers and the Program of Action Adopted.
(76-006)

Joint Communique of the Ninth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.
(76-009)

ASEAN Declaration for Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters.
(76-007)

NOTES:

Done at Denpasar, Bali on 24 February 1976..

Source of text: ASEAN Documentation Series

State	Date of Signing	Date of Ratification
Indonesia	24 February 1976	•
Malaysia	24 February 1976	•
Philippines ¹	24 February 1976	8 April 1976
Singapore	24 February 1976	•
Thailand	24 February 1976	•

* No data available as of date of printing.

¹ Entered into force for the Philippines on 22 June 1976.

Cited in the following documents:

Joint Press Communique of the Meeting of ASEAN
of Government.
(76-003)

Joint Communique of the Ninth ASEAN Ministerial
Meeting.
(76-009)

TREATY OF AMITY AND COOPERATION IN SOUTH EAST ASIA

PREAMBLE

The High Contracting Parties:

CONSCIOUS of the existing ties of history, geography and culture, which have bound their peoples together;

ANXIOUS to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law and enhancing regional resilience in their relations;

DESIRING to enhance peace, friendship and mutual cooperation on matters affecting Southeast Asia consistent with the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Ten Principles adopted by the Asian-African Conference in Bandung on 25 April 1955, the Declaration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations signed in Bangkok on 8 August 1967, and the Declaration signed in Kuala Lumpur on 27 November 1971;

CONVINCED that the settlement of differences or disputes between their countries should be regulated by rational, effective and sufficiently flexible procedures, avoiding negative attitudes which might endanger or hinder cooperation;

BELIEVING in the need for cooperation with all peace-loving nations, both within and outside Southeast Asia, in the furtherance of world peace, stability and harmony;

SOLEMNLY AGREE to enter into a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as follows:

CHAPTER I Purpose and Principles

ARTICLE 1

The purpose of this Treaty is to promote perpetual peace, everlasting amity and cooperation among their Peoples which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship.

ARTICLE 2

In their relations with one another, the High Contracting Parties shall be guided by the following fundamental Principles:

- a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations;
- b. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion;
- c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another,
- d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;
- e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force;
- f. Effective cooperation among themselves.

CHAPTER II Amity

ARTICLE 3

In pursuance of the purpose of this Treaty the High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to develop and strengthen the traditional, cultural and historical ties of friendship, good neighbourliness and cooperation which bind them together and shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under this Treaty. In order to promote closer understanding among them, the High Contracting Parties shall encourage and facilitate contact and intercourse among their peoples.

CHAPTER III Cooperation

ARTICLE 4

The High Contracting Parties shall promote active cooperation in the economic, social, technical, scientific and administrative fields as well as in matters of common ideals and aspiration of international peace and stability in the region and all other matters of common interest.

ARTICLE 5

Pursuant to Article 4 the High Contracting Parties shall exert their maximum efforts multilaterally as well as bilaterally on the basis of equality, non-discrimination and mutual benefit.

ARTICLE 6

The High Contracting Parties shall collaborate for the acceleration of the economic growth in the region in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of nations in Southeast Asia. To this end, they shall promote the greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade and the improvement of their economic infra-structure for the mutual benefit of their peoples. In this regard, they shall continue to explore all avenues for close and beneficial cooperation with other States as well as international and regional organisations outside the region.

ARTICLE 7

The High Contracting Parties, in order to achieve social justice and to raise the standards of living of the peoples of the region, shall intensify economic cooperation. For this purpose, they shall adopt appropriate regional strategies for economic development and mutual assistance.

ARTICLE 8

The High Contracting Parties shall strive to achieve the closest cooperation on the widest scale and shall seek to provide assistance to one another in the form of training and research facilities in the social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields.

ARTICLE 9

The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to foster cooperation in the furtherance of the cause of peace, harmony, and stability in the region. To this end, the High Contracting Parties shall maintain regular contacts and consultations with one another on international and regional matters with a view to coordinating their views, actions and policies.

ARTICLE 10

Each High Contracting Party shall not in any manner of form participate in any activity which shall constitute a threat to the political and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of another High Contracting Party.

ARTICLE 11

The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to strengthen their respective national resilience in their political, economic, socio-cultural as well as security fields in conformity with their respective ideals and aspirations, free from external interference as well as internal subversive

activities in order to preserve their respective national identities.

ARTICLE 12

The High Contracting Parties in their efforts to achieve regional prosperity and security, shall endeavour to cooperate in all fields for the promotion of regional resilience, based on the principles of self-confidence, self-reliance, mutual respect, cooperation and solidarity which will constitute the foundation for a strong and viable community of nations in Southeast Asia.

CHAPTER IV Pacific Settlement of Disputes

ARTICLE 13

The High Contracting Parties shall have the determination and good faith to prevent disputes from arising. In case disputes on matters directly affecting them shall refrain from the threat or use of force and shall at all times settle such disputes among themselves through friendly negotiations.

ARTICLE 14

To settle disputes through regional processes, the High Contracting Parties shall constitute, as a continuing body, a High Council comprising a Representative at ministerial level from each of the High Contracting Parties to take cognizance of the existence of disputes or situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony.

ARTICLE 15

In the event no solution is reached through direct negotiations, the High Council shall take cognizance of the dispute or the situation and shall recommend to the parties in dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation. The High Council may, however offer its good offices, or upon agreement of the parties in dispute, constitute itself into a committee of mediation, inquiry or conciliation. When deemed necessary, the High Council shall recommend appropriate measures for the prevention of a deterioration of the dispute or the situation.

ARTICLE 16

The foregoing provision of this Chapter shall not apply to a dispute unless all the parties to the dispute agree to their application to that dispute. However, this shall not preclude the other High Contracting Parties not

party to the dispute from offering all possible assistance to settle the said dispute. Parties to the dispute should be well disposed towards such offers of assistance.

ARTICLE 17

Nothing in this Treaty shall preclude recourse to the modes of peaceful settlement contained in Article 33 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations. The High Contracting Parties which are parties to a dispute should be encouraged to take initiatives to solve it by friendly negotiations before resorting to the other procedures provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.

CHAPTER V General Provision

ARTICLE 18

This Treaty shall be signed by the Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore and the Kingdom of Thailand. It shall be ratified in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each signatory State.

It shall be open for accession by other States in Southeast Asia.

ARTICLE 19

This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification with the Governments of the signatory States which are designated Depositories of this Treaty and of the instruments of ratification or accession.


ARTICLE 20

This Treaty is drawn up in the official languages of the High Contracting Parties, all of which are equally authoritative. There shall be an agreed common translation of the texts in the English language. Any divergent interpretation of the common text shall be settled by negotiation.

IN FAITH THEREOF the High Contracting Parties have signed the Treaty and have hereto affixed their Seals.


DONE at Denpasar, Bali, this twenty-fourth day of February in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy-six.

For the Republic of Indonesia:




SOEHARTO
President

For Malaysia:




DATUK HUSSEIN ONN
Prime Minister

For the Republic of the Philippines:




FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President

For the Republic of Singapore:



LEE KUAN YEW
Prime Minister

For the Kingdom of Thailand:



KUKRIT PRAMOJ
Prime Minister

1 ASEAN Statement on Indochina,
January 9, 1979

[Indonesian Foreign Minister Dr. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja in his role as Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee made the first consensual ASEAN statement on the Kampuchean conflict. The text is that given by the Indonesian news agency Antara, January 10, 1979, as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Asia and Pacific, January 11, 1979, p. N-1.]

1. The ASEAN member countries strongly regret the escalation and expansion of the armed conflict now taking place between the two Indochinese states. The ASEAN member countries have expressed their great concern over the implications of this development and its impact on peace, security and stability in Southeast Asia.

2. The ASEAN member countries have reaffirmed that peace and stability are very essential for the national development of each country in the Southeast Asian region.

3. In accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, and the Bandung declaration, and bearing fully in mind the pledges made by the states in Southeast Asia they appeal to all countries in the region to firmly respect the freedom, sovereignty, national integrity and political system of the respective countries, to restrain themselves from the use of force or threat of the use of force in the implementation of bilateral relations, to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of the respective countries and disassociate themselves from engagement in subversive activities either directly or indirectly against one another, and to resolve all existing differences between these countries through peaceful means by way of negotiations in a spirit of equality, mutual understanding and mutual respect.

4. The ASEAN member countries are convinced that in the interest of peace, stability and development in Southeast Asia, the countries concerned should fully honor those principles and pledges.

5. The ASEAN countries welcome and support the holding of a United Nations Security Council meeting to discuss the Vietnam-Kampuchea conflict, and urgently call for steps being taken by the Security Council toward restoration of peace, security and stability in Indochina. In this context, these countries are of the view that a visit by the United Nations secretary general or his special deputy to the region would be of great benefit.

APPENDIX H: VARIOUS STATEMENTS BY ASEAN CONCERNING THE
VIETNAMESE INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA

II Joint Statement by ASEAN Foreign
Ministers, January 12, 1979

[The ASEAN Foreign Ministers gathered in Bangkok, January 12 and 13, 1979, to consider the Kampuchea crisis. Their "joint statement" on Cambodia formalized the January 9, 1979 statement by Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar. The text is as given by Bangkok radio, as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Asia and Pacific, January 15, 1979, p. A-1.]

Determined to display ASEAN's unity and solidarity in the face of threats to the peace and stability of the Southeast Asian region and recalling the pledge given by Vietnam to the ASEAN member countries to strictly respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of each country and to cooperate with those countries in maintaining and strengthening regional peace and stability, the ASEAN foreign ministers held a meeting in Bangkok on 12 and 13 January 1979 and reached the following agreements.

1. All ASEAN foreign ministers support the statement issued on 9 July 1979 in Jakarta by the Indonesian foreign minister in his capacity as chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee on the expansion of armed conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea.
2. All ASEAN foreign ministers deplore the armed intervention threatening the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea.
3. All ASEAN foreign ministers affirm the right of the Kampuchean people to decide their own future without external interference or influence so that they may exercise their right to self-determination.
4. In order to achieve the above-mentioned goals, all ASEAN foreign ministers demand the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Kampuchean territory.
5. All ASEAN foreign ministers support the decision made by the UN Security Council to give immediate attention to the situation in Kampuchea and vigorously encourage the Security Council to take the necessary and suitable measures to restore peace stability and safety to the area.

III ASEAN Joint Statement on Refugees,
January 12, 1979

[As new refugees from the war in Kampuchea flooded the Thai border regions, joining those who had fled to Pol Pot regime and the Vietnamese "boat people" were arriving on ASEAN shores the ASEAN Foreign Ministers addressed the problem in a statement issued as part of the special Bangkok meeting, January 12 and 13, 1979. The text is as given by Bangkok radio, as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Asia and Pacific, January 15, 1979, p. A-1.]

During a special meeting in Bangkok on the 12 and 13 January 1979, the ASEAN foreign ministers jointly considered and discussed the problem of refugees and displaced persons or those who illegally migrate from Indochina. The ASEAN foreign ministers expressed their grave concern over the increasing influx of those persons into the ASEAN countries. They emphasized that the influx is causing severe economic, social, political and security problems, particularly to those countries bearing the heavy burden of the influx, such as Thailand and Malaysia.

The ASEAN foreign ministers agreed on the urgency of intensifying joint ASEAN efforts to secure more expeditious and increased departures of such people for permanent settlement in third countries as well as to secure a wider range of countries offering permanent settlement opportunities to those people.

In this context the ASEAN foreign ministers welcomed the efforts of the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) to solve the problem and urged the international community to give more meaningful support to the UNHCR as a follow-up to the consultative meeting in Geneva last December on refugees and displaced persons in the Northeast Asian region.

The ASEAN foreign ministers urged the international community to recognize the heavy burden borne by the ASEAN countries, which have been forced by circumstances to become countries of transit.

They stressed that all measures for solution of the refugee problem must be based on guarantees that the countries of transit will not be burdened with any residual problems.

The ASEAN foreign ministers emphasized that the continuation of the refugee problem, apart from causing difficulties to ASEAN countries, will seriously effect regional stability.

The meeting noted that the outflow of people from Indochina has reached alarming proportions. The foreign ministers stressed that the government of Vietnam which has pledged to promote regional peace and stability, and other countries from which such people come should take appropriate measures to tackle the problem at the source.

The ASEAN foreign ministers are convinced that such measures would make an effective contribution toward the solution of the refugee problem, thereby contributing to regional peace and stability.

IV ASEAN Statement on the Vietnam-China Border War, February 20, 1979.

[Alarmed by the widening of conflict in Indochina after the Chinese attack on Vietnam, February 17, 1979, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers had a special meeting in Bangkok on February 20, at which time they called for a withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Indochina areas of conflict. The text is as given by Bangkok radio, as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Asia and Pacific, February 23, 1979, p. A-1.]

The ASEAN countries are gravely concerned over the rapid deterioration of the situation in this region since the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Bangkok on 12 and 13 January 1979. The conflicts and tensions in and around this region have gradually escalated into the use of arms and the expansion of trouble plagued areas. The ASEAN countries reiterate their firm commitment to the principles of peaceful coexistence, and the UN charter and international law. The ASEAN countries urgently appeal to the conflicting countries to stop all hostile activities against each other, and call for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the areas of conflict in Indochina to avoid the deterioration of peace and stability in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN countries also appeal to the countries outside this region to exert utmost restraint and to refrain from any action which might lead to escalation of violence and the spreading of the conflict.

✓ Communique of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, June 30, 1979

[The Thirteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting -- the regular annual meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers -- was held on the Indonesian island of Bali June 29-30, 1979. In a forty-four point final communique, ASEAN considerably hardened its line on Kampuchea and addressed the growing threat to ASEAN of not only Vietnamese armed aggression but the destabilizing impact of the increasing flow of refugees. We include here those parts of the final communique relevant to the Kampuchea and refugee crisis. The text is as given in Australian Foreign Affairs Record, 50:6 (June 1979), pp. 380-383.]

SITUATION IN INDOCHINA

The Foreign Ministers reviewed recent development in the region. They expressed grave concern that the situation in Indochina has become more serious, involving countries outside the region. They noted that since their last meeting in Bangkok on 12-13 January 1979 the situation had worsened. In view of the presence of Vietnamese forces along the Thai-Kampuchean border, there is now a greater threat of the conflict escalating over a wider area. The unrestricted flow of Indochinese displaced persons/illegal immigrants (refugees) has further exacerbated the situation in the region.

The Foreign Ministers reaffirmed the joint statement of the special meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers on current political development in the South-East Asian region, Bangkok, 12 January 1979, which has strongly deplored the armed intervention against the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea. The Foreign Ministers reiterated their support for the right of the Kampuchean people to determine their future by themselves, free from interference or influence from outside powers in the exercise of their right of self-determination and called for the immediate and total withdrawal of the foreign forces from Kampuchean territory. They noted that ASEAN's constructive efforts to restore peace and stability in the area have received the overwhelming support of the international community, particularly the support of a large majority of the UN Security Council members.

The Foreign Ministers expressed support for the right of the people of Kampuchea to lead their national

existence free from interference by Vietnam and other foreign forces in their internal affairs. They called upon the international community to support Kampuchea's right of self-determination, and continued existence free from interference, subversion or coercion.

The Foreign Minister noted the explosive situation on the Thai-Kampuchean border. They agreed that any further escalation of the fighting in Kampuchea or any incursion of any foreign forces into Thailand would directly affect the security of the ASEAN member states, and would endanger peace and security of the whole region. In this regard the ASEAN countries reiterated their firm support and solidarity with the Government and people of Thailand, or any other ASEAN country in the preservation of its independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Foreign Ministers called on Vietnam to demonstrate its positive attitude towards Thailand and the other ASEAN member states by withdrawing its forces from the Thai-Kampuchean border.

THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

The Foreign Ministers expressed grave concern over the deluge of illegal immigrants/displaced persons (refugees) from Indochina which has reached crisis proportions and has caused severe political, socio-economic and security problems in ASEAN countries and will have a destabilizing effect on the region.

The Foreign Ministers agreed that Vietnam is responsible for the unending exodus of illegal immigrants and has a decisive role to play in resolving the problem at the source. They strongly deplored the fact that Vietnam had not taken any effective measures to stop the exodus. The Foreign Ministers further expressed serious concern over the incessant influx of Kampuchean illegal immigrants into Thailand arising out of the armed intervention and military operations in Kampuchea.

The Foreign Ministers agreed that in the efforts at the international level to find a solution, emphasis should be given to solving the problem at the source. They further agreed that as the country responsible for the exodus, Vietnam, has a decisive role to play in the resolution of the problem. The Foreign Ministers appealed to the international community to prevail upon Vietnam to stop the exodus. Any illegal immigrants/displaced person (refugees) leaving Vietnam or any other Indochinese state continue to be the responsibility of their respective countries of origin which must accept them back under existing international law and practice. This responsibility also applies to

those who are not in camps in ASEAN countries. The Ministers retained the right of ASEAN countries to return such persons to Vietnam and to their respective countries of origin.

VI Proposal on Easing Tension Between the PRK and Thailand, July 18, 1980

[The Second Indochinese Foreign Ministers Conference held in Vientiane, Laos, July 17-18, 1980, renewed the proposals of the First, January meeting, and added a four point program for the demilitarization of the Thai-Kampuchean border zone. The text excerpted is as given by Vientiane radio, as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Asia and Pacific, July 23, 1980, p. 1-5.]

1. Laos, Kampuchea and Vietnam renew their fundamental proposals as set forth in the January 5, 1980 joint communique of the Phnom Penh conference of the foreign ministers of Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam, and make the following proposals:

A. To sign bilateral or multilateral treaties between Laos, Kampuchea, Vietnam, and Thailand pledging non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and refusal to allow any other country to use one's territory as a base against the other country or countries.

B. To sign a bilateral treaty of non-aggression and peaceful coexistence between the Lao People's Democratic Republic, The Kampuchean People's Republic, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the other Southeast Asian countries.

C. The Indochinese countries are prepared to discuss with the other countries in the region the establishment of a Southeast Asian region of peace and stability and to peacefully settle together disputes in the Eastern Sea.

2. The Lao People's Democratic Republic and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam fully support that sacred right to self-defence of the Kampuchean People wipe out the Pol Pot clique and the other Khmer reactionaries belongs entirely to the sovereignty of Kampuchea. The People's Republic of Kampuchea respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Thailand, but this does not mean that the Thai authorities may arrogate to themselves the right to interfere in the internal affairs of Kampuchea and violate its sovereignty and territorial integrity with impunity. The peoples of Laos and Vietnam fully support that sacred right to self-defence of the Kampuchean people.

The Lao People's Democratic Republic and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam fully support the following four point proposal of the People's Republic of Kampuchea aimed at easing tension and proceeding to

turn the Kampuchea-Thailand border into one of peace and friendship:

A. Kampuchea and Thailand undertake to preserve peace and stability in border areas, to refrain from using border areas as springboards to violate each other's sovereignty.

To establish a demilitarized zone in the border areas between the two countries and to set up a joint commission to implement agreements guaranteeing peace and stability in border areas and agree upon a form of international control.

B. Kampuchea and Thailand shall cooperate with each other and with international organizations to find a satisfactory solution to the problem of refugees in order to alleviate Thailand's burden and contribute to ensuring peace and stability in border areas between the two countries, to afford every facility to the Kampuchean refugees in Thailand to resettle in other countries in accordance with their wishes, and to negotiate a settlement on the question of repatriation of the Kampuchean refugees in Thailand. The refugee camps should be established far from the border to avoid border clashes.

In keeping with the international law on neutrality, the armed Khmers belonging to the Pol Pot clique and the other reactionary forces who have taken refuge in Thailand must be disarmed, regrouped into separate camps far from combat areas. They must not be regarded as refugees and will not be helped to return to Kampuchea to oppose the Kampuchean people.

C. The People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea is prepared to discuss with international humanitarian organizations so as to carry out their relief programme from Kampuchea in the most effective way on the basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of Kampuchea.

Humanitarian aid must not be used as a means to induce Kampucheans to leave their country and become refugees, thus depriving border areas of peace and stability. Humanitarian aid must not be used to feed armed Khmers belonging to the Pol Pot clique and other reactionary forces who fled to Thailand.

Aid to Kampuchean people in Kampuchea must be distributed on Kampuchean territory and not on Thai territory.

The transportation of aid to Kampuchea must be subject to an agreement between the international organizations and the Kampuchean Administration.

D. In order to solve the relevant questions between Kampuchea and Thailand, negotiations could be conducted directly between the government or between non-governmental organizations of Kampuchea and Thailand or indirectly through a country representing Kampuchea

and another representing Thailand, or through an intermediary mutually agreed upon.

The agreements and understandings reached between the parties on the above questions could be confirmed and their implementation guaranteed by an international conference or by some form of international guarantee mutually agreed upon.

VII ICK Declaration on Kampuchea,
July 17, 1981

[The United Nations International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) was held July 13 to 17, 1981. A total of ninety-three countries attended, of which 79 were full participants. The ICK was chaired by Austrian Foreign Minister Willibald Pahr. The Conference adopted a "Declaration on Kampuchea" and a resolution establishing an Ad Hoc Committee to assist the Conference in realizing a settlement. The "Declaration" became the basis of later ASEAN and UN approaches to a comprehensive political settlement. The text is as given in the UN Monthly Chronicle, XVIII:9 (September-October 1981), pp. 37-39.]

Pursuant to Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and to General Assembly resolution 35/6 of 22 October 1980 the United Nations convened the International Conference on Kampuchea at its Headquarters in New York from 13 to 17 July 1981, with the aim of finding a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem.

The Conference reaffirms the rights of all States to the inviolability of their sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and stresses their obligation to respect those rights of their neighbours. The Conference also reaffirms the right of all peoples to determine their own destiny free from foreign interference, subversion and coercion.

The Conference expresses its concern that the situation in Kampuchea has resulted from the violation of the principles of respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of States, non-interference in the internal affairs of States and the inadmissibility of the threat or use of force in international relations.

The Conference takes note of the serious international consequences that have arisen out of the situation in Kampuchea. In particular, the Conference notes with grave concern the escalation of tension in South-East Asia and major power involvement as a result of this situation.

The Conference also takes note of the serious problem of refugees which has resulted from the situation in Kampuchea and is convinced that a political solution to the conflict will be necessary for the long-term solution of the refugee problem.

The Conference stresses its conviction that the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea, the restoration and preservation of its independence,

sovereignty and territorial integrity and the commitment by all states to non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of Kampuchea are the principal components of any just and lasting solution to the Kampuchean problem.

The Conference regrets that the foreign armed intervention continues and that the foreign forces have not been withdrawn from Kampuchea, thus making it impossible for the Kampuchean people to express their will in free elections.

The Conference is further convinced that a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean conflict is vital to the establishment of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in South-East Asia.

The Conference emphasizes that Kampuchea, like all other countries, has the right to be independent and sovereign, free from any external threat or armed aggression, free to pursue its own development and a better life for its people in an environment of peace, stability and full respect for human rights.

With a view to reaching a comprehensive political settlement in Kampuchea, the Conference calls for negotiations on, inter alia, the following elements:

(a) An agreement on a cease-fire by all parties to the conflict in Kampuchea and withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea in the shortest time possible under the supervision and verification of a United Nations peace-keeping force/observer group;

(b) Appropriate arrangements to ensure that armed Kampuchean factions will not be able to prevent or disrupt the holding of free elections, or intimidate or coerce the population in the electoral process; such arrangements should also ensure that they will respect the result of the free elections;

(c) Appropriate measures for the maintenance of law and order in Kampuchea and the holding of free elections, following the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the country and before the establishment of a new government resulting from those elections;

(d) The holding of free elections under United Nations supervision which will allow the Kampuchean people to exercise their right to self-determination and to elect a government of their own choice; all Kampucheans will have the right to participate in the elections.

The Conference also deems it essential for the five permanent members of the Security Council, all States of South-East Asia as well as other States concerned to declare, in conjunction with the paragraph above, that:

(a) They will respect and observe in every way, the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aligned and neutral status of Kampuchea and

recognize its borders as inviolable;

(b) They will refrain from all forms of interference, direct or indirect, in the internal affairs of Kampuchea;

(c) They will not bring Kampuchea into any military alliance or other agreement, whether military or otherwise, which is inconsistent with its declaration under paragraph 11 or invite or encourage it to enter into such alliance or to conclude any such agreement;

(d) They will refrain from introducing into Kampuchea foreign troops or military personnel and not establish any military bases in Kampuchea;

(e) They will not use the territory of any country, including their own, for interference in the internal affairs of Kampuchea;

(f) They will not pose a threat to the security of Kampuchea or endanger its survival as a sovereign nation.

The Conference expresses the hope that, following the peaceful resolution of the Kampuchean conflict, an intergovernmental committee will be established to consider a programme of assistance to Kampuchea for the reconstruction of its economy and for the economic and social development of all states of the region.

The Conference notes the absence of Viet Nam and other states and urges them to attend the future sessions of the Conference. In this context, the Conference takes note of the current bilateral consultations among the countries of the region and expresses the hope that these consultations will help to persuade all countries of the region and others to participate in the future sessions of the Conference.

The Conference expresses the hope that Viet Nam will participate in the negotiating process which can lead to a peaceful solution of the Kampuchean problem and to the restoration of peace and stability to the region of South-East Asia. This will enable all the countries of the region to devote themselves to the task of economic and social development, to engage in confidence-building and to promote regional cooperation in all fields of endeavour, thus heralding a new era of peace, concord and amity in South-East Asia.

VIII Principles on Relations Between Indochina and ASEAN, October 7, 1981

[Indochina's comprehensive response to ASEAN's UN diplomacy and the ICK came in Laotian Foreign Minister Phoun Sipescut's speech to the 36th UN General Assembly in October, 1981. After attacking Chinese policy as the root of the problems of peace and stability in Southeast Asia, and again rejecting the results of the ICK, he presented seven principles to govern relations between Indochina and ASEAN. Although in many respects a restatement of positions adopted by the semiannual Indochinese Foreign Ministers Conferences, it also included a proposal for a structured setting for regular ASEAN-Indochinese exchanges. The text excerpted is as given by Vientiane radio, October 7, 1981, as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Asia and Pacific, October 14, 1981, p. 1-1.]

The three countries in Indochina will continue to talk with the various ASEAN countries concerning their proposals in order to seek ways to resolve the points of conflict between the two groups of countries.

In such conditions, our delegation after discussing with and with the approval of the SRV and PRK, would like to have the honor to present some principles on relations between the Indochinese and ASEAN states as follows:

1. To respect each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, equality, mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence between the two groups of countries -- Indochina and ASEAN -- for peace, stability and cooperation in Southeast Asia.

To respect the right of the people of each country to choose and develop freely their political, social, economic and cultural systems, and to decide freely their domestic and foreign policies in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Nonaligned Movement and of the Charter of the United Nations. To not impose one side's will on the other.

The internal and external affairs of each country in the two groups of countries -- Indochina and ASEAN -- shall be decided by its own people. No other country shall have the right to interfere therein, individually or collectively, directly or indirectly.

2. To solve disputes and differences in the

relations between the two groups of countries -- Indochina and ASEAN -- as well as among other countries of the region by peaceful means through negotiations and in the spirit that all problems of Southeast Asia should be settled by the Southeast Asian countries themselves on the principles of equality, friendship, mutual respect, mutual understanding and taking into account each country's legitimate interests, by mutual agreement and without imposing one side's will on the other, without outside interference, without the use of force or threat to use force in their relations.

To respect the right of each country of Indochina and ASEAN and other countries in Southeast Asia to individual or collective self-defense treaties to serve its particular interests and oppose other countries in the region.

3. To pursue and develop bilateral or multilateral cooperation in the economic, scientific, technical, cultural, sports and tourist fields between the two groups of countries -- Indochina and ASEAN -- as well as other countries in Southeast Asia on the principles of equality and mutual benefit with a view to strengthening mutual understanding and trust, and friendship and good neighborly relations, in the interest of the cause of national construction in each country with its own specific conditions.

The various countries concerned in the region will cooperate in the exploitation of the Mekong River for their respective economic development and for the common prosperity of the region.

4. To respect the sovereignty of the coastal countries of the South China Sea over their territorial waters as well as their sovereign rights over their exclusive economic zones and continental shelves.

To ensure favorable conditions for the land-locked countries in the region regarding the transit to and from the sea, jointly guarantee maritime rights and advantages to the same countries in accordance with international law and practice.

To solve disputes among the coastal countries of the South China Sea over maritime zones and islands through negotiation. Pending a resolution, the parties concerned undertake the refrain from any actions that might aggravate the existing disputes. The various countries in the region will act jointly to seek modalities of cooperation among themselves and with other countries inside or outside the region in the exploitation of the sea and seabed resources on the basis of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit, preservation of the environment against pollution, guarantee international communications and the freedom of the sea and air navigation in the region.

5. The various countries outside the region must

respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries in the region. To end all forms of pressure and threats from the outside creating tensions and hostility among the countries in the region.

The countries in the region shall not allow any country to use their territory as a base for aggression and intervention, direct or indirect, against other countries.

The various countries in the region are ready to cooperate with countries outside the region and international organizations to receive their aid with no political preconditions attached.

Bilateral or multilateral cooperation between the countries of Indochina and ASEAN as well as other countries in the region with countries outside the region shall not, under any circumstances, be detrimental to the security and interests of other countries in the region or directed against a third country.

6. To ensure an efficient implementation of the above-mentioned principles, a standing body in charge of the dialogue and consultation between the countries of Indochina and ASEAN eventually with the participation of Burma should be established. This body, the composition of which is to be agreed upon the two sides, may consist of one or many countries representing each group and hold annual meetings to solve problems concerning relations between the members of the two groups, or extraordinary meetings in case of emergency or crisis.

7. The above-mentioned principles shall constitute a basis for the current dialogue and consultation aimed at concluding agreements or some other form of commitment between the two groups of countries -- Indochina and ASEAN -- which are ready to invite the other countries of the region to take part in them.

XI ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Statement
on Kampuchea, March 23, 1983

[During the Seventh Nonaligned Summit Conference, Malaysian Foreign Minister Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach explored the possibility of a regional conference between ASEAN and Indochina excluding the PRK. Despite interest in pursuing this from Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, at a special ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting on March 23, 1983, ASEAN deferred to the policy of its front line state Thailand and insisted on the ICK formula. The text is as from Agence France Presse reported by Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Asia and Pacific, March 23, 1983, p. J-1.]

The foreign ministers of the member countries of ASEAN viewed with serious concern that, despite overwhelming support during the past four years for relevant UN resolutions on Kampuchea, Kampuchea is still being occupied by foreign military forces and the Kampuchean people are still being denied their right to self-determination.

The foreign ministers further believed that there was real danger that the continuation of such a situation would further intensify power rivalry in the region, thereby further threatening peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

They considered it of utmost importance to the countries of Southeast Asia that a comprehensive political settlement be found to the question of Kampuchea through negotiations on the basis of total withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea, the restoration to the people of Kampuchea of their right to self-determination free from intimidation and coercion and the establishment of a non-aligned and neutral Kampuchea.

In this context, the foreign ministers reiterated their call to Vietnam to join in international efforts for a solution to the question of Kampuchea. In this regard, they took note of the idea of talks between ASEAN member countries and Vietnam in order to bring Vietnam to the International Conference of Kampuchea.

The foreign ministers reaffirmed their willingness to explore appropriate avenues to facilitate the realization of comprehensive political settlement of the problem of Kampuchea within the framework of the International Conference on Kampuchea and on the basis of the relevant UN resolutions.

XII An Appeal for Kampuchean Independence,
September 21, 1983

[In order to recapture the diplomatic initiative that seemed to have been lost to Vietnam's regional conference proposal, the ASEAN states drafted a document that incorporated "practical steps" leading towards a comprehensive political settlement. For the first time in an ASEAN consensual statement, the ASEAN position provided for consultation outside the ICK framework. The text is as published in The Straits Times [Singapore], September 22, 1983.]

1. The central issue in the Kampuchea problem is the survival of the Kampuchean nation and the restoration of its independence and sovereignty. The total withdrawal of foreign forces, the exercise of self-determination and national reconciliation are essential elements for the survival of an independent and sovereign Kampuchea. The continuing foreign occupation of Kampuchea and violation of Kampuchean sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity threaten regional and international peace and security.

2. The Foreign Ministers therefore call on the international community, particularly Vietnam and the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council as well as other states concerned, to join them in intensifying efforts to achieve a just solution whereby Kampuchea can emerge once again as an independent and sovereign nation in fact as well as in law.

3. In order to restore Kampuchea's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the Foreign Ministers further appeal to all countries concerned to refrain from all interference, direct or indirect, in the internal affairs of Kampuchea and to respect the neutral and non-aligned status of Kampuchea, which is essential to the legitimate security concerns of all countries in South-east Asia.

4. Moreover, following the total withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea, the Kampuchean people must be able to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination through internationally-supervised elections in which all Kampucheans shall participate and all political groups in Kampuchea should be encouraged to work towards the goal of national reconciliation.

5. In consonance with the on-going international efforts, the Foreign Ministers reiterate their willingness to consult with all parties concerned regarding possible initial steps that could be taken in pursuit of a comprehensive political settlement of the

Kampuchean problem. These steps could include the following:

* With regard to the declared intention of Vietnam to conduct partial troop withdrawals, such partial troop withdrawals should take place on a territorial basis, and could begin with withdrawal from the western-most territory of Kampuchea along the Thai-Kampuchean border. These withdrawals should begin as soon as possible in phases within a definite period to be worked out as part of a comprehensive political settlement.

* In this context, a ceasefire should be observed in these areas, which should then be constituted as safe areas for uprooted Kampuchean civilians under UNHCR auspices. In addition, peace-keeping forces-observer groups should be introduced to ensure that the withdrawals have taken place and the ceasefire and safe areas are respected. International economic assistance programmes should be encouraged in these safe areas.

6. The Foreign Ministers, conscious of the plight of the Kampuchean people resulting from the ravages of war and mindful of the need for the economic reconstruction of Kampuchea and the rehabilitation of the social and cultural life of the Kampuchean people, hereby appeal to the international community to mobilize resources for a programme of assistance as part and parcel of the comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem.

An international conference for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Kampuchea should be convened at an appropriate time.

XIII Communique of the Indochinese Foreign Ministers, January 28, 1984

[The eighth regular meeting of the Indochinese Foreign Ministers took place in Vientiane at the end of January, 1984. Part 4 of their final communique renewed the call for a regional conference in the "five plus two" configuration. The statement can be viewed as the official response to the ASEAN "appeal". The text is as given by Vietnam radio, as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Asia and Pacific, January 31, 1984, p. K-9.]

The conference clearly indicated that the ASEAN and the Indochinese countries share a long term and most fundamental common interest, which is the maintenance of a lasting peace and stability in Southeast Asia, permanently excluding all foreign intervention there and concentrating energy and resources on the solution of each country's urgent problems i.e., economic construction and development. The ASEAN and the Indochinese peoples share the ardent wish to live together in peace and to develop relations of cooperation, friendship and good neighbourliness for the sake of peace and prosperity of each respective country.

On the other hand, there remains disagreement between the two groups of countries as to the cause of the present situation in Southeast Asia and measures to restore peace and stability in that region. Thailand and a few other ASEAN countries hold the view that a solution to the Kampuchea problem is needed before the question of peace and stability in Southeast Asia may be settled and it is their intention to impose an absurd solution with regard to Kampuchea, demanding that Vietnam unilaterally withdraw its forces from Kampuchea while China, Thailand and the Pol Pot against the Kampuchean people thus allowing the so-called coalition government of Pol Pot to be reinstalled back in Kampuchea, liquidating the legal administration of the People's Republic of Kampuchea opposing the Kampuchean people's rebirth and turning Kampuchea into a client of Thailand, American imperialism and Chinese reactionaries. Such a solution constitutes a gross violation of the Kampuchean people's right to self-determination and contributes to the furtherance of China's schemes against the three Indochinese countries and against peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

The three Indochinese countries consider that a global solution to the problems of Southeast Asia is needed, on the basis of equality, respect for the

legitimate interest of each group of countries, non-imposition on each other and exclusion of imposition from outside. The contemporary history of Southeast Asia, particularly in the last forty years, has allowed to derive four characteristics [as given]:

The threat to the independence of Southeast Asian nations has always come from outside: namely from various colonialist, imperialist, and expansionist forces.

The main victims of the various aggressions, interventions and dominations have been the three Indochinese countries. The aggressions and interventions against the Indochinese countries as well as peace and stability in Southeast Asia by colonialist, imperialist and expansionist forces from outside would not have been possible without the assistance and the use of the territory of some countries in the region, in particular Thailand.

The imperialists and expansionist forces have constantly resorted to the policy of divide to rule and driven the ASEAN and the Indochinese countries into a state of confrontation.

Any solution that is to bring about solid and lasting peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia will have to take these characteristics into account, ensure respect for the independence and sovereignty of the three Indochinese as well as the other countries in Southeast Asia and bring about peaceful coexistence in friendship and cooperation between two groups of countries.

The conference is of the view that the present situation in Southeast Asia could evolve in five possible directions:

The adoption of a global solution to the problems related to peace and stability in Southeast Asia on the basis of the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from the region, an end to external intervention and the establishment in Southeast Asia of a zone of peace, friendship and cooperation. This global solution could lead a solid and lasting peace in the region. Its content has been mentioned in the resolution on Southeast Asia adopted in March 1983 by the Seventh Non-aligned Summit Conference, and conforms with the ASEAN countries' proposal on a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality set forth in 1971, and with the seven-point proposal expounded on behalf of the three Indochinese countries by the foreign minister of the People's Democratic Republic of Laos at the 36th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1981.

The adoption of a partial settlement involving the three Indochinese countries and China aimed at the total withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea paired with a termination of the Chinese threat, of the

utilization of Thai territory as a base of action against the three Indochinese countries and the use of Pol Pot remnant troops and other Khmer reactionaries against the people of Kampuchea.

The adoption of a partial settlement involving the three Indochinese countries and Thailand on the basis of an equal security for both sides and the setting up of a safety zone along both sides of the Kampuchea-Thailand border. Both sides shall jointly decide on a form of international control of the terms of the agreement.

Pending a global solution or a partial settlement as mentioned above, a framework agreement on principles governing relations between the ASEAN and Indochinese countries with a view of checking the danger of escalation of the present situation into a major conflict and to paving the way for a gradual solution of the immediate as well as latent points of disagreement between the two groups of countries or among the countries in the region. Both sides shall examine an international form of guarantee and observation of what will have been agreed upon by both sides.

The continuation of the present situation, neither a global nor a partial solution being reached. In this case, the disagreements between the two groups of countries will be aggravated, thus possibly leading to an explosive, uncontrollable situation that China could take advantage of to provoke a large scale war in Southeast Asia.

The reality of the past five years shows that the nations of Southeast Asia can choose but one alternative which consists in joint discussions between the two groups of countries to settle all problems raised by each side on the basis of equality, respect for each other's legitimate interests and absence of intervention from outside. The past five years bear evidence that this is the only way to ease tension, strengthen mutual understanding, reduce disagreement between the two groups of countries, and gradually move toward peace and stability, in conformity with the interests of all countries in the region and for the sake of peace. Any other path can only lead to tension and impasse, deepening disagreement between the two groups of countries and creating conditions favourable to indepth foreign intervention within the countries of the region.

As for a form of regional or international conference, the three Indochinese countries' viewpoint is that this is a question that can and should be agreed upon by the two groups of countries on the basis of equality and non-imposition.

The three Indochinese countries are prepared to undertake bilateral consultations as well as to start immediately conversations between the two groups of ASEAN and Indochinese countries. All proposals set

forth by each side shall be a matter for discussion on the basis of equality. The People's Republic of Kampuchea reaffirms its good will not to let the question of its participation hinder the initiation of dialogue between the two groups of countries. The conference agreed to designate Laos and Vietnam as representatives of the Indochinese countries to take part in the conversations between the two groups of countries. It welcomes the formula put forward by the Malaysian foreign minister on talks between the five ASEAN countries, and Vietnam and Laos and its prepared to examine any formula regarding dialogue between the two groups of ASEAN and Indochinese countries.

The conference notes that a growing number of ASEAN countries are manifesting their wish to promote dialogue with the Indochinese countries, and once again appeals to the governments of all countries in the world to foster this trend for the sake of peace in Southeast Asia and in the world.

The conference welcomes the results achieved in the talks between the People's Democratic Republic of Laos and the Kingdom of Thailand on the settlement of mutual problems and the conversion of the Mekong River into their border of peace.

XIV ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Statement, Jakarta, May 8, 1984

[In an "extraordinary" meeting, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers sought to recover the consensual unity that had been strained by Indonesia's dual track diplomacy of Spring, 1984. The text as given in press release from Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs]

1. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers met in Jakarta on May 7-8, 1984.

2. They were received in audience by the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Suharto, during which they were briefed by the President on the latest efforts made in the search for a comprehensive political solution to the Kampuchean problem. The President welcomed the convening of the Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers as an opportunity to show the world of the complete unity of ASEAN on the Kampuchean problem.

3. They reviewed recent political and military developments with regard to the Kampuchean problem. In particular, they discussed the Vietnamese Foreign Minister's recent visits to Jakarta and Canberra, and his stopovers in Bangkok. They noted that, immediately after his return to Hanoi, the Vietnamese launched attacks on Kampuchean civilian encampments in Western Kampuchea and made incursions into Thailand. These attacks caused the loss of civilian lives both in Kampuchea and Thailand and drove more than 75,000 Kampuchean Civilians into Thailand thus compounding the already heavy burden borne by Thailand and the international community in the provisions of humanitarian assistance.

4. The Foreign Ministers condemned the Vietnamese military attacks on the Kampuchean civilian encampments and the violation of Thai sovereignty and territorial integrity. They called on Vietnamese leaders to refrain from such acts which affects the security of the whole region. They fully supported Thailand's actions in the exercise of her legitimate rights to self-defence and reiterated ASEAN's solidarity with the Government and people of Thailand in the preservation of Thai independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

5. The Foreign Ministers reiterated the essential elements for a solution to the Kampuchean problem as enumerated in their previous statements particularly the ASEAN Appeal for Kampuchean Independence of 20 September 1983 and the Joint Communique of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in June 1983. The Foreign Ministers reaffirmed their position that the total withdrawal of foreign

forces, the exercise of self-determination and national reconciliation are essential elements for the survival of an independent and sovereign Kampuchean. They also held the view that national reconciliation among the Kampuchean people will be conducive to the success of efforts towards a political solution of the Kampuchean problem.

6. The Foreign Ministers also reaffirmed their support for the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea under the Presidency of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and for its efforts to restore the Kampuchean people's inalienable rights to self-determination.

7. The Foreign Ministers reiterated their willingness to consult with all parties concerned on a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem, despite continued Vietnamese provocations on the Thai-Kampuchean border which had undermined the trust and confidence that ASEAN had always attempted to forge with Vietnam.

8. The Foreign Ministers considered it appropriate and desirable to convene the meeting of the Senior Officials' working group as soon as possible to continue monitor and examine developments in the search for a comprehensive political solution.

ATTACHMENT 1
SCHEDULE OF ASEAN MEETINGS IN 1996
as of 22 Jan 1996

JANUARY 1996

6 - 12	ASEAN Tourism Forum 1996	Surabaya
8 - 10	2nd Meeting of the 27th ASEAN Senior Economic Officials (SEOM)	Jakarta
8 - 10	2nd ASEAN - SOM	Bali
8 - 10	12th Project Steering Committee (PSC) of the ASEAN Institute of Forest Management (AIFM)	Johor Bahru
9	SEOM - USTR Meeting	Jakarta
9 - 11	ASEAN Expert Group Meeting on New and Renewable Sources of Energy (NRSE)	Jakarta
*10 - 11	<i>Ministerial Meeting on HRD</i>	<i>Manila</i>
10 - 12	12th Meeting of the ASEAN Power Utilities/Authorities (HAPUA)	Bali
*10 - 12	<i>Women and Technology in Southeast Asia</i>	<i>Jakarta</i>
*10 - 12	<i>Environmental Priorities in Southeast Asian Nations</i>	<i>Bangkok</i>
13 - 15	1st Meeting of ASEAN Negotiation Group on Services	Bandung
15 - 17	7th Meeting of the ASEAN Consultative Committee on Standards and Quality (ACCSQ)	Bandar Seri Begawan
15 - 28	4th Seminar Workshop on the Analysis of Foreign Policy for Mid-Career Level Diplomats	Mandaluyong City, Philippines
16 - 17	Preparatory Meeting for the 17th ASEAN-Australia Forum	Bandar Seri Begawan
17 - 19	Special Meeting of the ASEAN Food Security Reserve Board (AFSRB)	Bangkok
17 - 25	Marine Ecology Camp	Trang Prov & Phe Island
*17 - 18	<i>10th APEC - IST Working Group Meeting</i>	<i>Jakarta</i>

18 - 19	6th ASEAN - Australia Economic Cooperation Programme Joint Planning Committee (AAECP JPC)	Bandar Seri Begawan
*19 - 20	<i>APEC Seminar on Industrial Technology Education</i>	<i>Jakarta</i>
29 - 30	3rd Meeting of the Board of Advisors of the Masterplan on Natural Gas Development and Utilisation in the ASEAN Region	Bangkok
29 - 31	2nd Meeting of the 29th ASEAN Standing Committee	Indonesia
29 - 31	5th Meeting of the ASEAN Sub-Committee on Labour Affairs (ASCLA)	Singapore
*29 Jan-2 Feb	<i>Annual Meeting of the World Aquaculture Society 1996</i>	<i>Bangkok</i>
31	ASEAN Coal Network Meeting	Bangkok
Late Jan	16th Meeting of the ASEAN Sub-Committee on Biotechnology	Bangkok

FEBRUARY 1996

** 4th week	ASEAN Workshop on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures	Kuala Lumpur
1	8th ASEAN - ROK Joint Management Committee Meeting	Jakarta
1 - 3	ASEAN Coal Network Meeting	Bangkok
2 - 3	ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting for the Preparation of ASEM	Chiang Rai
5 - 6	Meeting of the Coordinating Committee for Services	Jakarta
5 - 6	Meeting of the Sectoral Negotiating Group on Services	Jakarta
7 - 11	DGs' Visit to Cambodia	Cambodia
11 - 14	DGs' Visit to Laos	Laos
14 - 16	ASEAN - 10 Ministerial Meeting	Chiang Rai
15 - 16	UN Meeting with Regional Organisation	New York
15 - 16	ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting (AEM) 7 + 3 for the Preparation of ASEM	Chiang Rai

*Feb	Senior Trade Officials Meeting on WTO	to be confirmed
Late February	Coordinating Committee on CEPT for AFTA	to be confirmed

MARCH 1996

* 1 - 2	1st Asia - Europe Meeting	Bangkok
4 - 8	4th Conference of the ASEAN Ministers Responsible for Information (AMRI)	Singapore
4 - 9	Exchange of ASEAN Archivists : Meeting of ASEAN Experts for Formulating Archives Descriptive Standards	Manila
5 - 6	Special Senior Officials Meeting on Energy (SOME)	Vietnam
11 - 13	3rd Meeting of the 27th ASEAN Senior Economic Officials (SEOM), SEOM-CER and SEOM-MITI	Bandar Seri Begawan
12 - 13	17th ASEAN-Australia Forum	Bandar Seri Begawan
23 - 24	Working Group on Economic Cooperation in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar	Bangkok
26 - 28	3rd Meeting of the 29th ASEAN Standing Committee	Indonesia
26 - 28	Seminar-Workshop on Masterplan on Natural Gas Development and Utilisation in the ASEAN Region	Malaysia
2nd week	13th Meeting of the ASEAN Sub-Committee on Youth (ASY)	Pattaya, Thailand
March	9th Meeting of the ASEAN Experts Group on Disasters Management	Manila
March	Working Group on Trade and Investment Database	to be confirmed
Late March	Experts Group Meeting on Tariff Nomenclature	to be confirmed
Late March	Workshop on Customs Valuation	to be confirmed

APRIL 1996

1st Week	11th Meeting of the ASEAN-COCI Working Group on Radio/TV and Film/Video	Singapore
8 - 10	Special SOM	Indonesia

16 - 17	PMC Meeting of the ASEAN - Australia AAECP - Phase III Energy Project	Manila
16 - 17	PSC Meeting of the ASEAN - EU COGEN Programme	Manila
16 - 17	PMC Meeting of the ASEAN - NZ NGUT Project	Manila
18 - 19	14th Meeting of the ASEAN Sub-Committee on Non-Conventional Energy Research	Manila
18 - 19	6th Meeting of the Joint Linkages Stream Appraisal Panel (JLSAP)	Jakarta
22 - 24	11th Meeting of the ASEAN-COCI Working Group on Visual and Performing Arts	Bandar Seri Begawan
23 - 24	11th ASEAN Senior Labour Officials Meeting (ASLOM)	Pattaya
24	Pre - AEM SEOM	Singapore
25	9th AFTA Council	Singapore
25 - 26	11th ASEAN Labour Ministers Meeting (ALMM)	Pattaya
26	Informal AEM	Singapore
29 Apr-1 May	11th Meeting of the ASEAN-COCI Working Group on Literary and ASEAN Studies	Indonesia
30	Seminar-Workshop on Masterplan on Natural Gas Development and Utilisation in the ASEAN Region	Brussels
Mid April	6th Meeting of the ASEAN Working Group on Environmental Economics; and Conference on Environmental and Natural Resources Accounting in ASEAN	Malaysia
April	13th ASEAN - US Dialogue	Bali
April	Working Group on Customs Procedures	to be confirmed
April	Coordinating Committee on CEPT for AFTA	to be confirmed
April	Special SOM - ASEAN Ministers of Agriculture and Forestry (AMAF) Meeting	Indonesia
MAY 1996		
Early May	16th Meeting of the Advisory Group of the ASEAN Cultural Fund	Indonesia
6 - 9	3rd ASEAN - SOM	Indonesia

10 - 11	SOM ASEAN Regional Forum	Indonesia
20 - 22	4th Meeting of the ASEAN Sub-Committee on Education (ASCOE)	Singapore
20 - 24	Seminar on the Application of Integrated Pest Management (IPM) on Fruits	Bangkok
28 - 30	4th Meeting of the 29th ASEAN Standing Committee	Indonesia
1st half of May	11th Meeting of the ASEAN-COCI Working Group on Print and Interpersonal Media	Manila
May	19th Meeting of the ASEAN Budget Committee	Indonesia

JUNE 1996

3 - 5	4th Meeting of the 27th ASEAN Senior Economic Officials (SEOM)	Kuala Lumpur
10 - 12	ASEAN - China SOM Consultations Meeting	Medan
June	17th ASEAN Food Security Reserve Board (AFSRB) Meeting	Philippines
June	31st Meeting of the ASEAN Committee on Culture and Information (COCI)	Indonesia
June	Sectoral Workshop on Harmonised Tariff Nomenclature	Indonesia
June	SEOM-SOM AMAF WG on Inclusion of Unprocessed Agricultural Products	to be confirmed
June	13th Meeting of the ASEAN Sub-Committee on Science and Technology Infrastructure and Resources and Development (SCIRD)	Bandung
June	13th Meeting of the ASEAN Sub-Committee on Food Science and Technology (SCFST)	Bandung
June	33rd Meeting of the ASEAN Committee on Science and Technology (COST)	Bandung
June	7th Meeting of the ASEAN Senior Officials on the Environment (ASOEN)	Malaysia

JULY 1996

15 - 18	4th ASEAN - SOM	Indonesia
16 - 18	5th Meeting of the 29th ASEAN Standing Committee	Indonesia

19 - 21	29th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM)	Jakarta
23	3rd ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)	Jakarta
24 - 25	29th Post Ministerial Conferences (PMC)	Jakarta
Between 16 Jul and 8 Aug	14th Meeting of the ASEAN Sub-Committee on Health and Nutrition (ASCHN)	Thailand
July	Experts Group Meeting on Tariff Nomenclature	to be confirmed
July	19th Meeting of the ASEAN Sub-Committee on Meteorology and Geophysics	Malaysia

AUGUST 1996

*9 - 13	<i>APEC SOM</i>	<i>Philippines</i>
1st Week	15th Meeting of the ASEAN Women's Programme (AWP)	Thailand
1st week	18th ASEAN Ministers on Agriculture and Forestry Meeting (AMAF)	Philippines
18 - 31	Integrated Pest Management (IPM) Training Course on Fruits	Pattaya
19 - 21	5th Meeting of the 27th ASEAN Senior Economic Officials (SEOM)	Cebu City
August	4th Meeting of the ASEAN Directors - General on Customs	to be confirmed
August	Regional Conference on Book Development	Malaysia

SEPTEMBER 1996

Sept	5th Meeting of the ASEAN Working Group on ASEAN Seas and Marine Environment (AWGASME)	Jakarta
Sept	19th Meeting of the ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters	Hanoi
Sept	20th Meeting of the ASEAN Committee on Social Development	Thailand

OCTOBER 1996

3rd Week	4th Meeting of the ASEAN Task Force on AIDS (ATFOR)	Singapore
October	Pre-AEM SEOM	Indonesia

October	10th AFTA Council	Indonesia
October	28th Meeting of the ASEAN Economic Ministers	Indonesia
October	2nd Informal AEM - CER Consultations	Indonesia
October	AEM-MITI	Indonesia

NOVEMBER 1996

* Mid Nov	<i>APEC Economic Leaders Summit</i>	<i>Philippines</i>
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DECEMBER 1996

1st Week	Informal Meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government	Bogor
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Note : * Other Related Events
 ** Tentative

Note : Schedule is subject to change

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